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A B S T RAe T 
The thesis is a study of how the NSDAP was perceived and 
interpreted by the SPD in the south Bavarian city of Augsburg 
during the period 1928-1933. It particularly seeks to investigate 
the response of the Social Democratic rank and file to the rise of 
Nazism, and to explore the relationship between the local SPD's 
literary and propaganda output, and that response. Thus, the SPD's 
failure to defend itself from National Socialist attack in 1933 is 
examined from a hitherto neglected perspective: that is, by asking 
what image of the Nazi enemy Augsburg's Social Democrats possessed, 
to what extent that image was mediated by the SPD's 'official' 
analysis of the NSDAP, and what contribution the form of that image 
made to the SPD's fate. 
In the absence of wide-ranging archival sources which would 
allow the construction of a detailed portrait of the organisational 
structure and development of the SPD in Augsburg during the Weimar 
Republic, or the recovery of the patterns of day-to-day 
working-class life and politics, the thesis concentrates on the 
local Social Democratic newspaper, the Schwabische Volkszeitung. 
It analyses thoroughly the latter's material on National Socialism, 
and relates this to the general history of the SPD in the city in 
the era of the NSDAP's growth. The question is, further, addressed 
of how effective the SPD's propaganda reaction to Nazism, as 
reflected in the Schwabische Volkszeitung was in immunising its 
rank-and-file support against National Socialism, and in instilling 
within that support the desire and willingness to defend itself 
from the NSDAP's attacks. Chapter 1 outlines the political, social 
and economic structures, and historical preconditions, which 
provided the context within which the SPD's struggle with Nazism In 
Augsburg occurred. Chapters 2 to 10 deal with var10US aspects of 
the Schwabische Volkszeitungts engagement with National Socialism, 
and discuss their wider implications. 
The main finding of the thesis is that, in the case of the SPD 
in Augsburg, the party's capitulation in 1933 cannot be considered 
the result of a failure to warn its supporters about the threat 
posed by National Socialism; rather than the SPD's long-term 
structural inadequacies, which a close reading of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's approach to Nazism also illuminates, were far more 
crucial 1n determining its behaviour. Chapter 11 applies this 
finding to events in Augsburg after Hitler's appointment as 
Chancellor, and concludes that a desire for mass action in defence 
of the SPD did exist amongst the city's core Social Democrats, and 
had indeed been partially created by the success of the party's 
anti-Nazi propaganda, but that this desire was ultimately 
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CHAPTER 1 . INTRODUCTION - AUGSBURG IN THE WEIMAR ERA 
Any overview of the city of Augsburg as it stood in the late 
1920s, as the first effects of economic receSSlon and incipient 
Nazi success began to be felt, must emphasise its apparent 
typicality as an industrial city and, concomitantly, as a workers' 
city. Indeed, with the possible exception of the overwhelmingly 
Catholic nature of its population, Augsburg would seem to accord 
with those expectations anyone with a knowledge of the period would 
bring to an analysis of an industrial centre in Weimar Germany. 
For Augsburg's economic, political and social structures certainly 
were grounded in the contours of its industrial development. From 
that industrial development flowed the existence of a clearly 
identifiable and definable working class, a working class 
specifically situated within Augsburg's economy and society. From 
that industrial development flowed the organisations and 
institutions, in their various forms, which came to represent that 
working class, and within which at least a significant proportion 
of that class came to be active. And, finally, from that 
industrial development flowed the inevitable consequences which the 
world economic crisis would have on Augsburg, those consequences 
which provided the context within which the NSDAP could garner the 
support of around one quarter of the city's electorate by 1932. In 
short, Augsburg during the period under consideration was to be 
subject to the political, economic and social conflicts consonant 
with its structure and, moreover, resonant of the wider traumas of 
the Weimar Republic. It is, thus, first of all necessary quickly 
to delineate this structure, at least as it pertains to the 
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constitution of Augsburg's working class; and, as selective 
examples of the effects created by it, to say something about 
patterns of voting behaviour 1n Augsburg, about the dominant 
institutions of its workers, and about the results of economic 
depression from the late 1920s. The aim is to establish the 
general framework within which Augsburg's workers operated 1n the 
period of the rise of National Socialism, for, whilst this 1S far 
from the whole story - a story which, as will be shown, is only to 
be understood by considering Augsburg's longer-term history - it 
should at least confirm the city's suitability for a study of the 
industrial working class in Weimar Germany. 
That Augsburg was essentially a workers' city 1S indisputable. 
With a population that reached 176,000 by 1933, it was Bavaria's 
third largest city after Munich and Nuremberg, and had experienced 
a rapid rise in population, as the following table illustrates: 
Augsburg's population 1849 32,628 
1875 57,213 
1900 89,170 
1925 165,522 [1] 
The motor for this r1se had been industrialisation: the rate of 
Augsburg's population growth between 1860 and 1920 (over 27% per 
decade) was a reflection of the extent of the latter process, just 
as much as the significant fall in this rate between 1925 and 1933, 
when it reached only 6.7%, mirrored a decline in the city's 
economic fortunes [2]. More significantly, the share of its 
working class was, in 1925, at 55.2% (that is, 46,725 workers) 
higher than in either Munich (41.1%, 147,117 workers) or Nuremberg 
(51.2%, 107,423 workers) [3]. Even clearer was the concentration 
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of this working class in the occupations of what might be termed 
the 'classical' industrial worker located in large factories: 
around 55% of all industrial employees were, in 1925, located 1n 
this sphere (4J. Thus, although smaller concerns predominated 1n a 
variety of branches of the local economy - areas, for example, such 
as clothing, foodstuffs and building often retained the 
characteristics of small-scale craft, employing only four or five 
people per factory or workshop - Augsburg's two ma1n industries 
functioned almost exclusively through large factories. These two 
spheres were, firstly, the textile industry, upon the growth of 
which Augsburg's 19th century development had been predicated, and, 
secondly, the mechanical engineering, machine tool and vehicle 
construction industry. The scale, 1n 1925, of these two industries 
in Augsburg can be gauged from the following details: 
No. of No. of No. of No. of 







Textile industry 144 16,348 9,718 6,282 
Mechanical engineering, 
machine tool and 152 13,644 2,982 9,658 
vehicle construction 
An exceptionally high proportion of the employees in the textile 
industry would, moreover, have been manual workers, in contrast to 
the engineering industry, with its larger white-collar element. 
Again, a comparison with Bavaria's two other major cities 
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elucidates the point: in Augsburg in 1923 60.7% of all those 
employed in 'Industrie und Handwerk' (both blue-collar and white-
collar workers) worked in large factories (according to 
contemporary definition those with fifty or more employees) and 
26.1% in 'gigantic' factories (those with 1,000 or more employees). 
The corresponding figures for Munich were 40.9% and 6.4%, and for 
Nuremberg 54.1% and 17.1%. In short, as Gerhard Hetzer has written: 
Als Sitz einer Reihe von Behorden und eines lebendigen 
Handelsgewerbes war Augsburg gewi~ auch eine Beamten -
und Geschaftsstadt, aber in erster Linie doch eine 
Metropole der Industrie und Industriearbeiterschaft -
und somit auch ein Zentrrnn verschiedener politischer 
und gewerkschaftlicher Richtungen der Arbeiterbewegung. [5] 
(G. Hetzer, 'Die Industriestadt Augsburg') 
The varlOUS manifestations of Augsburg's labour movement will 
be considered further on; what needs to be emphasised here is the 
very definite shape Augsburg's working class possessed - a shape 
that can be more fully defined with reference to three facts. 
Firstly, it was overwhelmingly Catholic - Hetzer estimates that ln 
1933 85% of Augsburg's workers were Catholics [6]. Given that, ln 
1925, 78.1% of Augsburg's total population was found to be Catholic 
[7], it seems reasonable to assume that the city's workers were 
more likely than other social strata to be Catholic. It should be 
noted that there existed a marked reluctance, even amongst Social 
Democratic or Communist workers, and despite widespread religious 
indifference, to break with the church [8J; indeed, bonds with the 
church were often strongest amongst the poorest sections of the 
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working class. The high rate of Catholicism within Augsburg's 
working class can also be explained with reference to the extent of 
economic activity exhibited by the city's working class-women - for 
the unusually large number of working women encompassed by it, 
constitutes the second basic characteristic of Augsburg's working 
class. This was primarily the consequence of the importance of the 
textile industry: 41 .5% of workers in this industry in Augsburg 
were female in 1885, a figure which had risen to 56.2% ln 1900, and 
to 63.9% in 1924 [9J. In any particular textile factory, almost 
without exception, more than half of the employees would have been 
women, and in many factories significantly more than half - in the 
'Weberei Nagler und Sohn' for example, the figure was 75%, in the 
'Buntweberei J. P. Bemberg' it was the highest of any Augsburg 
factory at 80%. 
Finally, Augsburg's working class was situated, even 
segregated, within well-defined and self-conscious workers' 
districts. These markedly working-class areas had sprung up ln 
the wake of industrialisation. Augsburg's development as a city 
had been predominantly influenced since the mid - 19th century by 
the choices made by industrialists of where to locate their 
factories; and the distribution of the various social classes 
throughout the city came to reflect this process - above all in 
the lack of integration of the newly existent factory working 
class. Newcomers to Augsburg, drawn to the city by the lure of 
jobs in industry, settled in close proximity to the new factories 
on its outskirts; thus a belt of working-class districts developed 
around Augsburg, isolated from the wealthier social classes in, or 
nearer to the city centre: 
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Zwar sind dies sozusagen Spatformen einer raumlichen 
Trennung, die 1n anderer Weise schon lange vorher 
bestanden hat und von der haufig die Stadtviertel 
zeugen, doch hat der enorme Arbeitskraftebedarf 
wachsender Industriestadte, hier vor allem durch 
Augsburg reprasentiert, eine klare Abtrennung von 
Arbeiterwohngegenden begtinstigt, wenn nicht bedingt. 
Zum einen geschah dies dadurch, dap die zuwandernden 
Arbeiter angesichts der knapper und teurer werdenden 
Innenstadtquartiere 1n die Vororte zogen und zum 
Arbeitsplatz pendelten,wie es ftir die inzwischen 
eingemeindeten Vororte Augsburgs, Lechhausen und 
Oberhausen, typisch ist; zum anderen geschah es 
durch den Bau von Werkswohnungen - auch hier ist 
Augsburg ein typischer Fall - auf betriebsnahem Grund 
und zum dritten durch den Bau von Sozialwohnungen ... 
Letzteres - Werkssiedlungen und sozialer Wohnungsbau, 
zum Teil auch genossenschaftlicher Wohnungsbau -
ftihrte im wesentlichen tiber Grundsttickspreise zur 
wohnraumlichen Trennung, die bestimmte Stadtviertel 
eben zu Arbeitervierteln machte. [10J 
(M. Niehuss, Arbeiterschaft in Krieg und Inflation) 
Of course, such areas were not homogeneous, they each had 
their own characteristics and degrees of social admixture; 
nevertheless, they can justifiably be described as working-class. 
The ring of districts around Augsburg's 'Altstadt', for instance -
Ostend, Nordend, Wertachvorstadt, Westend and Stidend - contained 
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sectors in which up to 70% of the population were working class, 
and which were strongly marked by the 19th century 
industrialisation which had produced them. Thus, the 'Ostend' 
contained concerns vital to Augsburg's economic life such as the 
'Augsburger Kammgarnspinnerei' (AKS) , the 'Neue Augsburger 
Kattunfabrik' and the 'Spinnerei und Weberei Augsburg' (SWA); it 
also contained major company housing settlements, such as those 
built by the AKS (originated in 1854, with 356 dwellings in 1935) 
and the SWA (originated in 1862, with 400 homes in 1921). Similar 
'works colonies' were to be found in the 'Nordend', location of 
much of Augsburg's engineering industry, belonging to the 
'Stadtbachspinnerei' and MAN (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg - Nlirnberg), 
as well as a significant amount of housing association 
accommodation. MAN, indeed, presents a good example of the close 
inter-connections that could develop between a firm and its 
workforce. Succeeding generations of families found employment 1n 
MAN, and its workers were strongly rooted in Augsburg: over 95% of 
MAN's employees were resident in the city, and around a fifth lived 
in districts near to the factory itself, such as the 'Nordend' and 
the 'Wertachvorstadt'. This latter was one of the most densely 
populated working class areas in Augsburg - and thus one of the 
most visibly proletarian: 
Die schon vor 1914 als 'Glasscherbenviertel' 
bezeichnete Vorstadt galt nach 1918 als 'Spartakistennest', 
wo der in blirgerlichen Kategorien denkende Betrachter 
1n den trostlosen Stra~enzligen den die Hande in den 
Hosentaschen verbergenden untatigen Eckensteher mit 
Schlagermlitze und im Mundwinkel hangender Zigarette zu 
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entdecken hoffte. Hier lie~ es sich in den Wirtschaften 
aber auch gemeinsam zurlickhassen. Hier konnte man 
Kommunist sein, ohne als moralisch defekt oder als 
Provokateur zu gelten [11J. 
(G. Hetzer, 'Die Industriestadt Augsburg') 
Beyond Augsburg's industrial quarters, moreover, lay a network 
of working-class suburbs - Lechhausen, Firnhaberau, Pfersee, 
Oberhausen - in which the concentration of workers was even greater 
than in those areas just discussed. Although some industry was to 
be found here - Pfersee, for instance, was the location of textile 
concerns such as the 'Buntweberei J.P. Bemberg' and the 'Spinnerei 
und Weberei Krauss' - these districts primarily contained the pool 
of labour from which Augsburg's economy sustained itself. In the 
largest, Lechhausen, two thirds of the inhabitants (its population 
in 1910 numbered 18,405) were factory workers employed in Augsburg. 
Large concentrations of workers, however, given the typically 
impoverished conditions ln which those workers lived, inevitably 
led to a complex of social problems. Thus had Oberhausen in 1910 
with 38.6% deaths per 1,000 inhabitants, ln common with Lechhausen, 
the worst yearly death rate in Bavaria. In 1914 30% of new-born 
children died within their first year ln Oberhausen, ln Lechhausen 
the figure was around 25%, 'links der Wertach' it was 23%, and ln 
the 'Westend' - home to Augsburg's bourgeoisie - only 5%. The 
segregation of Augsburg's working class was, it must be remembered, 
not simply spatial, it was also a matter of social realities, 
living conditions and quality of life [12J. 
Given this, it is hardly surprising that it was ln these areas 
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of high worker population and widespread social impoverishment that 
the strongholds of the labour movement in Augsburg were to be 
found, a labour movement which both contributed to and fed on the 
fairly dense network of educational, leisure, sporting and self-
help societies which, along with political and unlon organisations, 
constituted at least part of the social milieu which structured the 
daily life of the working population. The poorest quarters of 
Augsburg - Lechhausen, Oberhausen and Wertachvorstadt - had, in 
particular, been the germ cell of the socialist labour movement ln 
the city, and remained at its heart throughout the Weimar Republic 
- this is evidenced by the lack of electoral success of the NSDAP 
in such areas, which will be discussed further on, and indeed by 
the extent to which they were subject to the suppressive actions of 
the triumphant National Socialists, ln the weeks and months 
following the seizure of power. On 10 April 1933, for example, 
police spent nine hours combing the area 'links der Wertach', 
perceived by the Nazis as Augsburg's 'bolschewistisches 
Hauptquartier', as part of the general persecution of the city's 
Social Democratic and Communist activists. As such actions by the 
NSDAP made clear, to contemporaries Augsburg was a class structured 
city conditioned by its economy and containing concentrated working 
-class settlements - working-class settlements which, moreover, 
were increasingly stable, as the extreme population fluctuation of 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries died away, and an ever 
higher proportion of workers were Augsburg-born. 
It was this context of strong class boundaries which more than 
anything else placed limits on the extent of National Socialist 
success in Augsburg - an assertion which an examination of the 
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city's pattern of electoral behaviour confirms, for this was agaln 
produced by the city's class structure, and also provides evidence 
of the solidity of its working-class political culture. The 
outstanding characteristic of Augsburg's election results ln the 
Weimar era is the persistence of stable kernels of SPD or SPD/KPD 
combined (and thus presillnably predominantly working-class) and BVP 
(presumably containing a significant proportion of working-class) 
voters, kernels which retained a relative stability and extent even 
after the onset of depression and the emergence of National 
Socialism as a potential force: 
in Augsburg ergibt eine Untersuchung der Resultate 
der Reichs- und Landtagswahlen zwischer 1928 und 1933, 
da~ SPD und BVP ziemlich konstant bleibende Blocks 
darstellten, die fast zwei Drittel der Bevolkerung 
umfa~ten und kaum Anhanger an die NSDAP verloren [13J. 
(W. Domarus, Nationalsozialismus, Krieg und Bevolkerung) 
Although reflected also ln both Stadtrat and Landtag election 
results, this point can best be statistically exemplified with 
reference to the respective performances of the four major parties 
ln the four Reichstag elections held between 1930 and 1933: 
9/1930 7/1932 11/1932 5/1933 
BVP 30,706 (32.3%) 28,363 (30.3%) 24,893 (28.3%) 29,322 (27.1%) 
NSDAP 11,907 (12.6%) 21,574 (23.1%) 20,274 (23% ) 35,021 (32.3%) 
SPD 25,643 (27% ) 24,933 (26.6%) 21,998 (25% ) 24,974 (23.1%) 
KPD 11,012 (11.6%) 12,024 (12% ) 12,843 (14.6%) 11,058 (10.2%) 
[14 J 
Certainly, the considerable impact made by the NSDAP ln Augsburg is 
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evidenced here. As elsewhere 1n Germany, the party had filled the 
vacuum left by the decline of the conservative and liberal parties 
in the city (the DNVP's vote had fallen from 14.1% 1n the December 
1924 Reichstag election to 6.3% in November 1932, the DDP's from 4% 
to 0.5% over the same period), gaining considerable support amongst 
Mittelstand elements; but the NSDAP had also obviously become a 
more broadly-based attraction, encompassing young voters, former 
non-voters, and workers who had previously voted for the mainstream 
parties. Conversely, the decline in votes for both the BVP and SPD 
can hardly be dismissed as insignificant: basically, these two 
parties had by 1930 been thrown back onto their loyal 
constituencies, their core voters, and could no longer garner 
support from a wider societal range. The SPD, in particular, had 
long since lost that plurality in the end-phase of the Weimar 
Republic, which had seen it achieve 46.8% of the vote in Augsburg 
in January 1919, and 37.1% in the Reichstag election of April 1928. 
Both the SPD and the BVP maintained their electoral potential 1n 
areas where they had traditionally been strong - but wherever 
traditions were weaker or the social structure less propitious, 
they became vulnerable to harmful losses [15J. 
Nevertheless, the retention of these core supports, the 
relative impregnability of Augsburg's traditional socio-political 
families is an achievement that should not be underestimated; on 
the contrary, it remains impressive given the circumstances of 
desperate poverty which many working class families found 
themselves in, in the later Weimar years. That such poverty 
generated a radicalisation from which the KPD and NSDAP profited 1S 
less surprising than that the gains, especially of the NSDAP, were 
1 1 
not even more substantial. This seem1ng block on Nazism's growth 
potential was a characteristic Augsburg shared with certain other 
predominantly Catholic cities in Bavaria and the Rhineland (for 
example Wlirzburg, Regensburg, Aachen, Trier [16]); indeed, the 
contrast between Augsburg and Bavaria as a whole is an instructive 
one, for it demonstrates the way in which Augsburg as an industrial 
workers' city with a social structure unusual in a Bavarian 
context, had a political landscape which hindered National 
Socialist success on its wider Bavarian scale. Thus, the 


























The elements of Augsburg's particularity, the strength of the 
Marxist parties, the relative weakness of the NSDAP, is clarified 
by this comparison. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the 
results of the March 1933 Reichstag election 1n terms of the 
differing patterns of electoral behaviour 1n the various districts 
of Augsburg, shows that above all the socialist working class 
resisted National Socialism's dynamism - for the NSDAP's weakest 
results occur in areas with a high working-class share of the 
population, just those areas in which the SPD and KPD were 
traditionally strongest, whereas four of the five areas in which 
the NSDAP achieved on absolute majority contained only a weak 
working-class representation. The following four extreme examples 
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typify the pattern: 
Hardenberg - , Klaus - , Konigsbergerstra~e (Lechhausen. Ost) -
around 70% working class: BVP 36.9%; SPD 29.6%, KPD 14.7%; NSDAP 
15.7%. 
Firnhaberau - over 90% working class: BVP 10.9%; SPD 56.8%; 
KPD 20.5%; NSDAP 9.3%. 
Bismark - , von der Tann - , Werderstra~e (Stidend) - around 14% 
working class: BVP 24.3%; SPD 6.9%; KPD 1.5%; NSDAP 53.6%; DNVP 
13.0%. 
Spickel - around 16% working class: BVP 21.1%; SPD 14.5%; KPD 4.1%; 
NSDAP 52.3%. [18] 
Essentially then the coincidence of overwhelming Catholicism 
and a high proportion of industrial workers - that is to say those 
groups which over Germany as a whole proved relatively'immune to 
the attractions of National Socialism - worked to prevent any 
landslide of support to the NSDAP in Augsburg in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s (as did, it should also be mentioned, the relative 
quantitative weakness of Augsburg's intellectual, civil service and 
white-collar classes, often important conduits through which 
National Socialism established itself in a locality). Moreover, as 
much of the secondary literature on Augsburg during the Third Reich 
has demonstrated, the working-class and Catholic milieux continued 
to be centres of dissatisfaction and recalcitrance during the Nazi 
regime: thus Domarus, whose book concentrates on just this theme 
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with particular reference to the war years, reaches much the same 
conclusions for Augsburg as Kershaw does for Bavaria as a whole in 
his work on popular opinion, pinpointing a variety of causes and 
expressions of discontent, and refuting the idea that National 
Socialism in any way reshaped traditional modes of thinking [19J. 
Hetzer's study is of more overtly political resistance, but again 
this resistance can be seen to have fed on pre-1933 Catholic and 
socialist ideologies, organisations and personell [20J. And, 
finally, the Augsburg-related entries in the Sopade reports are 
convincing in their depiction of working-class disaffection and the 
persistence of an inevitably disabled solidarity, with connections 
to the strength and tradition of the city's labour movement before 
the advent of dictatorship [21J. 
That labour movement, the nature of the organisations and 
institutions which appear to have, to a degree, inoculated 
Augsburg's working class against Nazism, constitutes one component 
of the general framework within which National Socialism engaged 
with that class - and the interest of this study lies above all in 
the socialist labour movement, the SPD in particular, although the 
importance of the BVP as a home for the political allegiance of the 
working class must not be forgotten. Its other component was that 
of economic crisis and breakdown - and an analysis of these two 
elements should help to crystallise the main theme of this 
introduction. This can be expressed in the idea that just as 
Augsburg 
, 
political and social structures, especially s economlC, 
the contours of its working class, were determined by the course of 
its industrial development, so ln turn those contours engendered 
the political configuration as it existed during the rlse of 
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Nazism, structuring the strengths and weaknesses of parties and 
un1ons, and conditioning the extent of possible receptivity to Nazi 
ideology among Augsburg's workers. It is, moreover, the seeming 
normality of Augsburg's conditions and responses as a working-class 
(and Catholic) industrial city in Weimar Germany that should be 
emphasised - the voting patterns just examined are evidence of this 
and the same is true of the organisational basis of the labour 
movement and the decline of the economy after 1929, both of which 
will now be briefly analysed. 
It is certainly true that the identifiable trends among 
Augsburg's working-class parties and unions paralleled those 1n the 
wider arena. Thus, as was generally the case with the SPD by the 
late 1920s, both at national and at Bavarian level [22J, Augsburg's 
SPD functioned in a state of virtual stagnation, the dynamism of 
its pre-war development long since departed. Now, although more 
will be said about this later, it must be mentioned here that 
insufficient sources exist to enable the historian to construct a 
detailed picture of the life of the party in Augsburg in this era -
of, for example, the social composition of its membership, or its 
organisational structure. The sclerotic nature of the SPD 1n 
Augsburg is, nevertheless, demonstrable [23]. It was obvious, for 
example, in the party's inability to break out electorally from its 
working-class constituency - on the one hand, as previously 
suggested, the SPD's retention of a solid core of support was a 
notable achievement, but on the other hand, its failure to extend 
its support base during the Weimar Republic exposed its 
limitations, its failure to make any inroads into the middle-class 
electorate, to become a true 'Volkspartei'. This was, moreover, 
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only the electoral expression of the continued social segregation 
of Augsburg's working class and the isolation of the SPD from 
Augsburg's middle class, whose aversion to socialism simply could 
not be overcome [24J. 
Even within the working class, the SPD's potential seemed to 
have been exhausted: its membership growth, for instance - by 1929 
the party had 3,000 members organised in 16 sections - came to an 
end, as new members became ever more difficult to win. The reports 
of the SPD's general meetings for the years 1931 and 1932 
complained of this [25], and the party began to lose members - by 
1932/33 only around 2,500 members belonged to Augsburg's SPD. Of 
course, a variety of factors, above all economic distress, 
contributed to this, but it was also an expression of a crisis of 
confidence within the local party and a consequence of the 
complacency of its leaders. The party's leadership committee was 
dominated by union functionaries and had seen little change since 
the early 1920s; its two major figures were Clemens Hogg, the local 
party leader and Landtag representative, and Georg Simon, editor of 
the party's newspaper, the Schwabische Volkszeitung, and Reichstag 
representative. As characterised by Hetzer, these two, 
... beides biedere, auf die Erfahrungen eines 
jahrzehntelangen Parteieinsatzes pochende Manner, 
hielten auf strikte Einhaltung der Parteilinie [26]. 
(G. Hetzer, 'Die Industriestadt Augsburg') 
From this latter attitude stemmed the profound mistrust of internal 
ideological discussion which was characteristic of Augsburg's SPD. 
There were, however, also more locally-determined dimensions to 
this trait, and to the paralysis of thought to which it gave rlse. 
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For one thing, the SPD's leadership had a deep fear of any renewal 
of the mass mobilisation that had occurred within the party's rank 
and file during 1919, a mass mobilisation that had escaped the 
control of the local leadership [27]. With the party's main local 
political focus being reformist policy initiatives in the Rathaus, 
any spontaneous action among the membership came to be regarded as 
a distraction that had to be canalised and made harmless. 
Similarly, it was the events of 1919 in Augsburg which imbued the 
rivalry between SPD and KPD locally with a bitterness fiercer even 
than normal. The KPD was an embodiment and a reminder of the 
disunity that had overtaken the labour movement, especially as it 
became more active in Augsburg during the late 1920s. The KPD 
frequently helped block SPD initiatives in the Stadtrat; it also 
came to be blamed for the SPD's election losses, far more so, in 
fact, than the NSDAP. Indeed, to the SPD's leadership, the KPD 
appeared a more dangerous enemy than the NSDAP, and any possibility 
of co-operation with the former was consistently dismissed as 
impossible [28]. 
Whether this estimation of the relative threats posed by the 
NSDAP and KPD was shared by the party's activists and supporters, 
however, is perhaps doubtful. For there is certainly evidence of 
discontent among Augsburg's rank-and-file Social Democrats with 
their party, one aspect of which was a dissatisfaction with the 
party's reaction to Nazi success. Much more will be said 
concerning this reaction in the course of this study; but what can 
be established here is a widespread feeling that not enough was 
being done to combat National Socialism in Augsburg. The call for 
a more aggressive policy first became insistent after the Reichstag 
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election of September 1930: 
Den ungewohnlichen Erfolg der NSDAP sah man als 
Auftakt zur endgliltigen Auseinandersetzung mit 
den reaktionarsten Teilen der Blirgerturns an und 
in samtlichen Versammlungen wurde ein harterer 
Kurs im Kampf urn die Republik gefordert. [29] 
(E. Riegele, 'Parteientwicklung und Wiederaufbau') 
And although the party did to a degree respond to such pressure -
by means of meetings and demonstrations, and by using the 
enthusiasm generated by the creation of the Iron Front - yet a 
definite conflict existed between the radicalisation of the party's 
base and the constraints imposed from Reich-level by the SPD's 
toleration policy. 
Disaffection with the political practice of the party 
leadership ultimately led to, in the second half of 1932, Georg 
Simon giving up both his Reichstag mandate and his position as 
chairman of the local party, in favour of the 32 year old Josef 
Felder, since 1925 editor of the Schwabische Volkszeitung, and a 
more innovative, dynamic figure. Simon had been a target for the 
hostility above all of younger activists in the SPD, whose 
criticism of the party's leadership was often most severe. 
Augsburg's 'Sozialistische Arbeiterjugend' group, viewed with 
mistrust by the SPD's established functionaries, was particularly 
radicalised, developing a markedly elitist, anti-bourgeois 
self-consciousness, and maintaining a deliberate distance from the 
SPD as a whole [30J. 
The existence of such rank-and-file dissatisfactions, however, 
important as they are, should not be allowed to mask the fact that 
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Augsburg's SPD was capable of important initiatives at Stadtrat-
level, particularly in the fields of social and housing policy. 
The day-to-day organisational activity of the party was obviously 
also of importance to its members, although the substance of this 
is not easily recoverable. Certainly, the party demonstrated its 
vlgour in 1932, with the creation of the Iron Front, which could 
boast 7,500 members within two weeks of its founding. In addition, 
the party's continuing ability to mobilise its constituency was 
illustrated in a series of mass meetings and the frequent election 
campaigns in that year, which imparted to Augsburg's SPD an -
ultimately deceptive - feeling of self-confidence, of a kind which 
had been lacking in previous years. Finally, the importance of the 
SPD to working-class cultural life must not be overlooked In any 
analysis of the party's influence - the Social Democratic 
subculture, self-consciously alienated from the dominant bourgeois 
culture [31], the natural outgrowth of a context in which the 
working class population was concentrated in well-defined areas and 
in which party members lived in close proximity to each other, was 
still important In the lives of Augsburg's workers during the 
Weimar Republic [32]. In the city, indeed, much of the SPD's 
consolidation in the early 20th century had taken place through the 
means of its leisure, sport, education and self-help organisations, 
such as the 'Naturfreunde', the 'Arbeiterturner', the 
'Arbeiterradfahrbund Solidaritat' and the 'Volksbuhne'. Similarly, 
the numerous celebrations, anniversary commemorations and functions 
held by the SPD in the course of the year imbued its supporters 
with a sense of political community, and of belonging to a 
historically important organisation. Not that Augsburg's working-
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class subculture was restricted to Social Democrats: the KPD in 
Augsburg had virtually no success with its attempts to develop 
separate cultural and sporting clubs [33], and in organisational 
life, despite the ever-increasing tensions between the two parties, 
an otherwise lost unity within the labour movement was maintained. 
Nevertheless, the KPD was a very definite political presence 
ln Augsburg, and for the local SPD it had an importance 
disproportionate to its actual significance. One reason for this 
may have been that the KPD focused much of its attention ln 
Augsburg on the Social Democratic labour movement's maln bastion, 
the large-scale factories. The KPD had, ln fact, gained 
considerable influence within the textile industry in the early 
1920s, and throughout the decade Communist factory cells operated 
in various Augsburg factories (for example, MAN, the 
'Maschinenfabrik Riedinger', the 'Fichtelbach-Weberei'), 
occasionally accompanied by works newspapers, such as 'Die Zange' 
in MAN, the distribution of which the firm's management tried in 
vain to ban. In truth, the KPD's attempts to build factory cells 
in Southern Bavaria were seldom very successful, the number of 
activists organised in this way remained small, even ln an 
industrialised area such as Augsburg [34J; and the party's failure 
to undermine the dominance of the free unions amongst Augsburg's 
industrial workers remained constant, despite the deterioration of 
the economy and the creation and agitation of the RGO 
(Revolutionare Gewerkschaftsopposition) ln the city. The RGO 
certainly did achieve notable successes ln certain textile 
factories in the early 1930s, exploiting workers' dissatisfactions 
with wage cuts: Con~unist activists were heavily involved in a 
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spate of strikes and lock-outs 1n the industry in 1931 and 1932, 
former free union strongholds, such as the AKS, became centres of 
Communist agitation, and the Communist vote in factory council 
elections increased considerably (in the 'Stadtbachspinnerei' from 
21.5% in 1930 to 37.1% in 1931; in SWA from 22.0% in 1930 to 34.6% 
in 1931 - in both cases, these gains were made at the expense of 
the free unions) [35J. Nevertheless, the RGO in Augsburg, as 
elsewhere, essentially fulfilled a propag~nda function for the KPD 
in its conflict with the free labour movement; its possibilities 
for mobilising new forces were always limited both by its tactics, 
and by the extent to which the KPD became a party of the 
unemployed, thus losing much of its industrial base [36J. 
The SPD's perception of the Communist threat, however, was 
almost certainly exaggerated by the activism of the KPD, by its 
demonstrations and meetings, by its agitation amongst the 
unemployed, which began even before the onset of mass unemployment 
(in 1928, for instance, 8 Communists formed a 'committee of the 
unemployed' which had no union connections, and recognition of 
which was refused by the Stadtrat), and by its clashes with the 
local police, such as those which occurred during anti-war 
demonstrations in 1929 and 1931. As in Bavaria as a whole though, 
the KPD in Augsburg remained always an 'outsider' party, active on 
the margins of working-class life, never, when compared with the 
SPD on the broader scale, more than a political sect that was 
capable of achieving ephemeral success in times of crisis [37J. If 
this was to an extent determined by the close police superV1S1on 
attendant upon the party's activities in a city such as Augsburg, 
it was also partly the consequence of a deliberately chosen 
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political isolation, typified by the obstructionist policy pursued 
by Augsburg's three-strong Stadtrat group. The KPD's position in 
Augsburg was also weakened by the distractions caused by the usual 
internal squabbling which bedevilled the party [38], and by the 
fact that its membership structure - again this was typical - was 
characterised by a high rate of fluctuation and, as was just 
mentioned, by an influx of unemployed members. (In general, ln 
comparison with the SPD, KPD members in Augsburg seem to have been 
drawn from the less skilled sectors of the working class, although 
the party did contain a significant proportion of skilled workers 
from the engineering and textile industries among others [39]. It 
seems probable that, although the differences between the social 
composition of Social Democratic and Communist members ln Augsburg 
were less marked than in Bavaria as a whole, there did exist even 
in Bavaria's three largest cities a qualitative difference between 
the two groups, one which acted as another brake on the KPD's 
potential [40]. 
For all the KPD's obvious weaknesses, though, the SPD in 
Augsburg seems to have been genuinely fearful of Communism, 
particularly so after it developed a crisis-determined dynamism in 
the early 1930s, and Social Democracy in the city responded ln kind 
to the virulent, if predictable, rhetorical attacks made on it by 
the KPD [41]. Certainly, perhaps due to the very ideological 
proximity between the SPD and KPD and also to the aggresslveness 
with which the KPD propounded its cause, Communism loomed larger ln 
the world-view of Social Democracy in Augsburg than political 
Catholicism, even though significant numbers of workers were 
integrated into the latter, as supporters of the BVP or as members 
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of Catholic workers' organisations or the Catholic trade un10ns 
[42]. The Christian trade un10n movement was strongest in Augsburg 
in the textile industry, where a consistently mobilised support 
base ensured representation ln virtually every factory council. 
The Christian trade unions, however, like the RGO, could, with 
isolated exceptions, do little to alter the predominance of the 
free unions amongst Augsburg's industrial workers, a predominance 
reflected in the factory council election results [43]. This 1S 
not to say that the free un10ns were 1n an especially healthy 
position in the later Weimar years. An erosion of union membership 
in the early 1920s (from 39,600 free union members in 1920 to just 
over 20,000 by 1923/4), as inflated hopes failed to be realised, 
had been followed by a period of relative stabilisation - but 
developments from 1929 led to further losses of power from the free 
unions, as economic crisis strengthened the position of employers 
and resulted in a haemorrhaging of members, and hence in their 
financial contributions, from the unions. Thus in 1931, 1,320 of 
the 1,981 building workers who were free union members were 
unemployed, as were 715 of the 1,253 wood processing workers, and 
1,450 of the 5,200 organised in the DMV. Overall, between 1928 and 
1932, membership fell from 21,900 to around 18,000. A general air 
of fear and resignation became widespread: in MAN participation 1n 
the May Day strike fell from 42% in 1920 to 1.2% in 1931 [44]. The 
sensitivity of the Social Democratic labour movement to the attacks 
of the KPD is, against such a background, understandable - and the 
free unions' sense of vulnerability in Augsburg was no doubt 
increased by the reappearance, in MAN, of one of its traditional 
enemies of the past, the 'yellow' workers' union. 
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Clearly, then, economic crisis exercised a considerable 
influence on Augsburg's socio-economic and political landscapes -
and the rise of National Socialism in the city, the most 
significant consequence of economic depression, will be examined ln 
a moment. As for the configuration of that economic depression, it 
was the entirely predictable concomitant of Augsburg's economic 
structure [45J. Although the situation was severe in both the 
building and timber industries, the metal industry, central to 
Augsburg's economy, was the worst affected. The numbers working ln 
this sector sank from 9,300 ln early 1929, to 5,530 by February, 
1933. Long-established firms, such as 'Epple und Buxbaum', 
Augsburg's third oldest large-scale metal concern, closed down; 
those firms that survived had to shed large percentages of their 
workforce. MAN, for example, employed only 3,500 people by 1933, 
compared to around 5,000 in the mid-1920s. Among those employed ln 
the metal industry in 1925 it is probable that only one-third 
experienced constant work with no periods of unemployment in the 
period until 1933, as the workforce shrank to a core of skilled 
workers, mostly working shortened hours. 
Inevitably, unemployment ln Augsburg rose rapidly - at its 
highest point, in March 1932, it claimed 18,160 victims, the 
majority of whom were reliant on welfare assistance, their 
eligibility for other forms of financial support having run out due 
to the long-term nature of their unemployment. The burden of 
providing such assistance, moreover, together with the reduction in 
tax income, debilitated the city's financial health: it produced a 
budget for 1932/3 with a deficit of 2.8 million Reichsmarks, and 
the city's debts totalled around 60 million Reichsmarks by that 
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time. As distressing as Augsburg's economic plight was, however, 
it could certainly have been worse, had it not been for the 
resilience of the textile industry. In the main crisis years of 
1931 and 1932 the number of those employed in the latter actually 
rose by around 1,200 to 14,600; and whereas the metal industry's 
workforce in 1935 was only 57.9% of that in 1928, the corresponding 
figure for the textile industry was 94.9%. Indeed, for the first 
time in decades more male workers were employed in the textile than 
in the metal sector of the economy. Thus was Augsburg's 
unemployment rate less severe than that in either Munich or 
Nuremberg, and the possibility was offered to the wives and 
daughters of unemployed men, of earning a wage for their family. 
It would be misleading, however, to understate the 
consequences of economic crisis in Augsburg. Even those who 
remained in work were affected by the downward pressure on wages, 
and in terms of the individual poverty and misery produced, the 
situation was indeed 'catastrophic' [46]. This was to provide a 
breeding ground for right-wing radicalism in the later Weimar 
years, just as, on a lesser scale, similar economic difficulties 
generated activity by v6lkisch groups in the early years of the 
Republic. These groups sought in particular to exploit the current 
of anti-semitism perceptible in Augsburg in these years. Although 
a local NSDAP group was founded in 1921, and Hitler made his first 
'official' appearance in the city in that same year (speaking on 
'The worker ln the Germany of the future'), the most notable right-
wing figure ln Augsburg in the early 1920s was Dr Otto Dickel, 
leader of the Deutsche Werkgemeinschaft and rival to Hitler for the 
leadership of the NSDAP. The Deutsche Werkgemeinschaft was never 
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more than an insignificant sect, but it is possible that its 
influence on the way in which Augsburg's Social Democrats perceived 
right-wing radicalism was profound, in particular by confirming the 
desire of the right - already demonstrated by the success of the 
'yellow' workers' movement in Augsburg [47] - to mobilise working-
class support for its own ends. Thus, Dickel attempted to gain 
such support by contributing financially to the striking metal 
workers in 1922 (his organisation's donation was refused), and he 
did in fact gain the allegiance of former USPD and KPD activists. 
The SPD's condemnation of the Deutsche Werkgemeinschaft's actions 
was swift, and included the accusation, to be applied to the NSDAP 
innumerable times in future years, that the organisation was funded 
by big business [48]. 
The Deutsche Werkgemeinschaft was soon eclipsed by the NSDAP 
in Augsburg, however, as the latter grew to become the strongest 
volkisch group in the city in the course of 1923, with around 200 
members by the end of that year. Even at this stage, the party 
made its presence felt through its disruptive behaviour and clashes 
with the left; Augsburg's NSDAP had, nevertheless, no direct 
involvement in Hitler's failed Putsch. In 1925 a new local 
National Socialist group was founded, a group which was at first 
crippled by internal disharmony, and remained without importance 
until the inception of economic crisis, in which framework the 
NSDAP achieved both electoral success and a considerable rise in 
membership - a tripling of membership between 1930 and 1932, in 
fact, to around 1,800, a figure which made the NSDAP the second 
largest party in Augsburg in terms of members, after the SPD. The 
NSDAP remained, however, prone to internal disagreements, 
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disagreements which, interestingly enough, often had an element of 
class rivalry to them, with the SA, which was more proletarian in 
character than the party as a whole in Augsburg, often a centre of 
discontent. Thus in 1928/9, when a replacement was sought as local 
party leader for Karl Wahl (the Landtag representative and 
Gauleiter of the party in Swabia, who had given up his position as 
leader under pressure from a group of 'old fighters', and SA and 
Hitler Youth leaders) a conflict developed between Wahl's choice, 
Josef Mayr, and the more 'socio-political' inclined Gallus 
Schneider, who enjoyed the support of the SA. With the aid of 
Gregor Strasser, the latter was successful, but the rivalry between 
Schneider and Wahl endured into the years of the Third Reich. 
As the above would tend to suggest, the NSDAP in Augsburg, 
which until 1929 was fundamentally a radical Mittelstand movement, 
began after that date to receive the backing of all social groups 
in significant numbers, including workers, who made up around one 
third of the party's membership. There 1S no evidence to suggest, 
moreover, that these National Socialist workers were significantly 
different in terms of origins or experience from the core of the 
SPD's constituency: they are characterised by Hetzer, rather, as 
casualties of economic depression, whose disappointment with the 
traditional parties and unions led them to Nazism as a political 
solution [49]. Despite their definite presence within the NSDAP 1n 
Augsburg, the working class remained to a degree marginalised 
within the party - failing, for example, at any time before or 
after 1933 to provide it with a local branch leader. The majority 
of the party's members remained concentrated 1n areas of the city 
with a high percentage of white-collar workers and civil servants 
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amongst the population; relatively few were to be found in the 
working-class quarters - in Lechhausen, for instance, only around 
70 people had joined the NSDAP by 1933. Nevertheless, as will be 
demonstrated in more detail later, Augsburg's SPD perceived 
National Socialism to be a real threat to its own working-class 
constituency. The NSDAP's violent and disruptive entry on to the 
political scene in Augsburg and its success in gaining working-
class support, in whatever numbers; its propaganda which, as 
surviving local examples show [50], was often aimed in Augsburg at 
attracting workers by attacking the SPD 'Bonzentum', and depicting 
the NSDAP as an egalitarian meritocracy, fighting for working-class 
rights; and the past history of volkisch activity in the city, 
including the success of the 'Volkische Block' in the 1924 Landtag 
election, when it garnered 23.2% of the vote, only 1.4% less than 
the SPD - all of these elements combined to make the emergence of 
National Socialism as a significant force deeply disturbing to 
Social Democracy in Augsburg. 
The political, economlC and social characteristics of Augsburg 
that have been analysed thus far have all glven emphasis to the 
relative normality of the city in the Weimar era, as a large urban 
industrial complex with a class-based social structure. A wider 
historical perspective is, however, required, for specific aspects 
of Augsburg's post-1870 history had long-term resonances -
resonances which should be seen to provide the Augsburg-specific 
rather than the Weimar-general framework within which the 
conjuncture outlined above should be located and assessed; and, 
moreover, within which the question of the form of interaction 
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which occurred between National Socialism and Augsburg's working 
class takes on an enriched meaning. In the period from the 
unification of the Reich until the outbreak of the First World War, 
Augsburg had a peculiar, in some senses unique history - a history 
encompassing, paradoxically, both dynamic industrialisation, with 
the ineluctable tensions and transformations this entailed, and a 
markedly conservative, even passive set of labour relations. 
Indeed, far from the industrial sphere proving to be an arena of 
conflict, with a strong socialist labour movement to the fore, the 
latter was surprisingly weak in pre-war Augsburg, and the city, on 
the contrary, became a centre of yellow union activity, witnessing 
the emergence of 
... elne Erscheinungsform wirtschaftsfriedlicher 
betriebsgebundener Arbeitervereinigungen ... Wle 
sie in ahnlicher Bedeutung zu dieser Zeit in kaum 
einem anderen industriellen Zentrum Deutschlands 
auftrat. [51] 
(G. Hetzer, 'Die Industriestadt Augsburg') 
More generally, all of the secondary sources on this period in 
Augsburg's history stress the unexpected mildness of social 
tensions in the city, its atmosphere of stolid, conservative 
complacence. And the roots of this untypical conservative stamp 
lay again in the particularities of Augsburg's industrial 
development - in this case, however, especially in the way In which 
the course of that development in the nineteenth century worked to 
promote a far-reaching paternalist social policy, which in turn 
aided the growth of the 'employer friendly' workers movement and 
simultaneously hampered the smooth progress of the socialist labour 
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movement: a general configuration which did much to determine the 
course of Augsburg's pre-war history, and, it will be suggested 
further on, perhaps also its history after 1918. Thus, an emphasis 
on Augsburg's typicality as an industrial city ln the Weimar 
Republic, a typicality which certainly had its roots ln Augsburg's 
pre-war economic growth, must be balanced by an analysis of those 
characteristics of the city's pre-1914 history which imparted to it 
a contrasting atypicality as a centre of the conservative labour 
movement. 
The pilot function for Augsburg's economic development, its 
industrialisation from early in the nineteenth century, was a role 
played by the textile industry. The precondition for this was the 
existence of a number of local factors which favoured an early and 
rapid transition to industrial production, including good rail 
links, local investment capital, a reservoir of labour from the 
traditional textile trades, and a cheap energy source in the Lech 
and Wertach canals [52]. By the end of the 1850s Augsburg stood at 
the peak of the industrial process in Bavaria as the 'German 
Manchester', and the textile industry had been the city's largest 
employer since the 1840s. By 1868, 13 spinning and weaving mills, 
3 thread mills, 3 bleaching factories and 3 wool processing 
concerns had been established in and around Augsburg. During the 
1870s the textile industry entered a period of stagnation that 
lasted until the 1890s; since the foundation of the Reich, however, 
industrial growth had been maintained by the second pillar of 
Augsburg's economy, the metal and engineering industry. Unlike the 
textile industry, in which most firms were large-scale concerns ln 
the form of limited companies from their beginnings, many 
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engineering firms grew from relatively small-scale orlglns. The 
inter-connectedness of the two branches was illustrated by the 
'Maschinenfabrik Augsburg', the later MAN, founded in 1840, and 
which found its main sphere of production in the manufacture for 
the textile industry of engines which had previously been imported 
from France. Much of the progress made by Augsburg's engineering 
industry was in fact due to the growth of MAN, which by 1914 was, 
ln terms of share capital, the largest engineering firm in Germany. 
The specific curves of economic growth and downturn as they 
affected Augsburg's two main industries are of less concern here 
however than the entrenched economic structures and the composition 
of the workforce which their predominant position produced - for 
these were to have political and social, rather than simply 
economic importance. It must firstly be noted that Augsburg's 
course of industrialisation was both lop-sided and extraordinarily 
over-concentrated. It was lop-sided in that, as already stated, it 
was dependent for dynamic growth on its two major industries, the 
size and strength of which overshadowed the remalnlng economy - the 
detrimental long-term effects of this will be discussed later; and 
it was over-concentrated in that, even within those two branches of 
industry, a few leading firms controlled the main levels of 
economlC power. Thus in the latter half of the century the four 
leading textile firms employed 50% of all textile workers; and 
similarly, the leading six concerns in the metal and engineering 
industry employed in 1895 66% of all employees in the industry, a 
share which had risen to 70% by 1907. The following table 
compares, for the latter industry, the numbers of workers employed 
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The extent to which Augsburg's workers in this industry - although 
this would be valid also for the textile industry - were 
concentrated in large factories is clear. The contrast with Munich 
is obvious enough, for in this city a far greater proportion of 
workers were employed in small and medium-sized concerns than was 
the case with Augsburg; but the comparison with Nuremberg is also 
instructive for, despite the fact that Nuremberg's industrial 
structure was ln many ways similar to Augsburg's and that it also 
had large numbers of workers employed in large-scale operations, 
the strength of its middle-sized sector only serves to underscore 
Augsburg's weakness in this area and its over-reliance upon large 
firms. 
Secondly, and standing in close connection to the above, the 
specific composition of Augsburg's workforce must be highlighted; 
for although the relationship between the latter and the political 
and economlC structures existent during the Weimar Republic in the 
city has already been briefly dealt with earlier, this relationship 
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was significantly different, and perhaps no less important for 
later history, in the pre-war period, when political conSClousness 
and organisations were being first formed. Thus, to reiterate: as 
later, Augsburg's workforce pre-1914 contained a high and rlSlng 
proportion of factory workers, a high percentage of women factory 
workers (38%, that is 20% over the Reich average 1882-1907 [54]) 
and was predominantly Catholic. Moreover, and more specific to the 
era of industrialisation, it was a highly unstable, shifting, 
fluctuating workforce; and an extremely divided one - divided not 
only along male/female lines, but also along those of the contrast 
between textile and engineering workers and finding expression ln 
terms of differences in pay, hours and working conditions. As an 
illustration of such divisions, even in 1911/12, when the male/ 
female wage differential was certainly less than it had been in the 
19th century, women workers in the SWA earned on average around 
two-thirds as much as male workers, and women workers in the AKS 
only around half as much as their male colleagues. Because the 
employees in the engineering industry were virtually all male such 
wage differentials were less pronounced, although they could still 
be considerable. The gulf in wages between Augsburg's two main 
economic branches, and its origins in the textile industry's 
reliance on cheap female labour is, however, unmistakable, as the 
following comparison between the average wage of workers in the 













1911 1,385 RM 795/870 RM [55J 
In contrast to the obvious divisions within Augsburg's working 
class at this time, the city's economic elite was extraordinarily 
united. This most basic of the social and political ramifications 
resultant upon the underlying economic structure just examined was 
the consequence of Augsburg's highly concentrated, one-sided 
economic development - for this was accompanied by the emergence of 
a markedly homogeneous economic elite, limited to a small circle of 
often inter-related directors and rich 'Privatiers'. Most factory 
owners or managers, for example, shared common characteristics -
they were almost without exception Protestant immigrants who had 
rapidly become integrated into the local economic upper class 
through marrlage. The dominant financial structure in Augsburg's 
industry was the limited company, and this too had implications for 
the emergence of a self-conscious employers' class - textile firms, 
for example, were rarely in any true sense competitors, because the 
same small number of capitalists would own shares in several 
textile concerns. Directors' posts, moreover, often remained ln 
the hands of one family for several generations. The homogeneity 
which stemmed from such factors, allied to a sense of social 
responsibility and civic pride, met with a tradition in Augsburg of 
social engagement by the elite class, to produce ln the city a 
distinctive and extensive paternalist factory social policy which 
was certainly matched in no other Bavarian city. Given the vast 
economic power of local capitalism, the opportunity it possessed to 
influence a large mass of workers who were economically active in a 
relatively small number of factories, the situation and attitudes 
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of these workers and their political organisations could not fail 
to be fundamentally influenced by this social policy. 
The extent of the provision - which could have included 
savings banks providing higher than normal interest rates, health 
insurance, pension funds and the establishment of libraries, 
nurseries and baths - of course differed in extent according to the 
economlC situation of the firm. However, Augsburg's leading 
concerns had already, well before 1883, reached the standards set 
down in the social welfare legislation, indeed even surpassed them, 
as in particular the textile industry became a government-
recommended model for the whole of Bavaria. In the following 
period, the 'Stadtbach Spinnerei', SWA, the 'Nahfadenfabrik 
Goggingen' and MAN all overtook in expenditure their legal 
requirements, in some cases by one hundred percent [56]. The 
construction of workers' accommodation best illustrates the 
advantages and the limits of this patriarchal strain. From the 
mid-19th century until 1914 some 1,194 homes were built by 11 
firms, and as was described earlier, the largest factories had 
their own 'workers' colonies', where as many as one third of the 
workforce could live. Such accommodation was without doubt 
extremely desired amongst workers in the pre-war era, for, despite 
the additional duties it could bring with it, such as serving with 
the firm's fire brigade, it was of better quality and more spaClOUS 
than was the norm, and the rents were up to 20% cheaper than the 
usual prices ln the city. 
There were though disadvantages to living in works' 
accommodation. A degree of privacy, of life uninfluenced by work 
was lost, family life was subject to more regimentation and control 
35 
than would otherwise have been the case, as 
die Mieter mu~ten sich wie es hie~, tim Sinne 
der Fabrik treu und flei~ig bewahren'. [57] 
(Quoted in:H. Bretschneider, 'Arbeitersportler und Arbeitersanger') 
This type of housing could also be used as a method of discipline, 
since it could be withdrawn at any time - this obviously lessened 
the willingness of workers living in such accommodation to engage 
ln political activity or strike action, for to lose your job meant 
to lose also your home, not to mention any other social benefits 
which might have been accrued. Thus, the wider economic and 
political aims being pursued by employers by means of workers' 
accommodation and other types of social provision cannot be 
disguised. On the one hand, employers wish to maximise profits by 
securlng a reliable and highly skilled permanent workforce, whose 
loyalty to the factory would be secured, despite low wages and 
strenuous work discipline, because it was enmeshed in a web of 
social benefits. That this was a successful endeavour was proven 
by the complaints of small and middling factory owners, whose lack 
of capital precluded the implementation of a social policy, about 
the monopolising of the best labour by the larger concerns: 
Naturgema~ wenden sich die besseren Arbeitskrafte 
in verstarktem Ma~ denjenigen Fabriken zu, in denen 
durch Pensions- und Untersttitzungskassen usw. mehr 
geboten ist als bei uns. [58] 
(Quoted in: P. Fasl, 'Wirtschaftsgeschichte') 
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On the other hand, this welfare policy should also be seen as a 
response to the threat posed to employers by the beginnings of the 
labour movement - as, in other words, a method of social control 
that worked either directly, by placing the workers in a 
relationship of obligation to the employer, or indirectly, by 
moulding attitudes. Here, again, this was, at least temporarily, 
highly successful - the evidence that can be adduced to prove this 
being the unique success, ln two waves before and after 1900, of 
the yellow union movement ln Augsburg. 
For there could indeed be no better instance of working-class 
political culture being determined by the wider economic situation. 
Only the specific conjuncture that has been outlined here, the 
industrial location of the workforce, the economic power of the 
elite, and the intensive social policy, could have provided the 
correct environment to nurture the success of the various non-
socialist workers' organisations which flourished in Augsburg in 
these years. And only this conjuncture could have secured the high 
degree of respect for their employers that appears to have existed 
amongst many workers, and, moreover, an almost unbroken industrial 
peace until 1914: for, although strikes did occur, they were mostly 
short-lived and devoid of political significance. Christian 
workers' associations (and, later, Christian unions), liberal 
Hirsch-Duncker unions, and an 'employer friendly' anti-strike 
movement which was represented in Augsburg to an extent unknown ln 
any other south German city, all prospered ln the 1870s and 1880s, 
and indeed in the 1890s, when the three strains came together 
(1893) to form the 'Verband ordnungsliebender Arbeiter' in response 
to the renewed threat from the free unlons. Until its 
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disintegration ln 1903, due to its political and confessional 
heterogeneity, it did indeed hamper the latter, a measure of its 
success being provided by the elections to the 'Gewerbegericht' ln 
Augsburg, in which, significantly, the association's highest 
numbers of votes were to be found in those factories, such as MAN 
and the 'Stadtbach-Spinnerei' with a strong patriarchal tradition 
[59J. 
Various elements, beyond those structural preconditions 
already examined, contributed to the success of the 
'Ordnungsliebenden'. Certain concrete successes in the workplace 
(such as the abolition of the bonus system ln the textile industry 
and the introduction of the weekly payment of wages) and strong 
backing from the employers (demonstrated, for example, by 
industry's financing of Augsburg's first central employment 
exchange) must have made the association extremely attractive to 
many workers. This was especially the case as, in contrast, the 
early history of the free unions in Augsburg was one of failure, 
with strikes called in order to pressure employers into increasing 
wages or abolishing factory punishment systems virtually never 
achieving their aims. The resonance that the 'Verband 
ordnungsliebender Arbeiter' found in Augsburg was, too, a 
reflection of more general tendencies within the workforce which 
even the free unions had to take note of in their practical 
policies: that is, of paternalistic and liberal self-help ideas 
from the early period of industrialisation and of the belief, 
prevalent within Social Democratic revisionism, in the ability of 
the well-qualified worker to integrate into wider society by virtue 
of his personal performance and achievements [60J. 
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Such ideas were an important component also of the second wave 
of the yellow union movement which arose in Augsburg around the 
turn of the century, an employer-sponsored movement which, agaln, 
achieved an importance in the city which it did not attain ln any 
other German industrial centre at this time. The pacemaker and 
model for this yellow movement was the 'Arbeiterverein vom Werk 
Augsburg' (AVA) of MAN, which came into being in 1905 in the course 
of an industrial dispute: 
Auf dem Hohepunkt des Konflikts war aus der Sammlung 
Arbeitswilliger und Nichtorganisierter der "Arbeiterverein 
vom Werk Augsburg" der MAN (AVA) entstanden, der 
in der Folgezeit den Aufbau betrieblicher 
Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen mit Geldern der Direktion 
tibernahm und sich zum bestaunten Modell elner 
Vereinigung betriebsloyaler, im Interesse ihres 
eigenen Fortkommens streitbar die Belange ihres 
Betriebs vertretender Arbeiter entwickelte [61]. 
(G. Hetzer, 'Die Industriestadt Augsburg') 
The high wages wages of the MAN workforce, their attachment to 
their firm and their strong consciousness of themselves as 
Augsburg's labour aristocracy, in contrast to the poorly paid, 
mostly female workforce in the textile industry, made them 
receptive to 'yellow' ideology, with its stress on saving and the 
'performance principle'. The AVA, meanwhile, which attained a 
position of some importance within the yellow movement at national 
level, was a declared enemy of the free unions, and did not shy 
away from strike-breaking activity (during a brewing strike and 
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beer boycott in 1908, for example). It was also the progenitor of 
a number of similar organisations 1n the metal, textile, paper and 
shoe industries, although none of these was as successful as the 
AVA. Nevertheless, for some years the popularity of the yellow 
unions posed a serious threat to Augsburg's free unions: between 
1905 and 1907 the textile union lost 43%, the metal workers' union 
14% and the shoemakers' union over 75% of their membership to the 
yellow unions. And in 1912 the non-socialist unions possessed more 
members (11,463: 3,029 belonging to the Christian union, 1,551 to 
the Hirsch-Duncker unions, and 6,883 to the yellow unions) than the 
free unions (10,805 members) [62J. 
There was certainly a close connection between the success of 
the yellow movement in Augsburg and the dynamic factory social 
policy outlined above: the latter created a conflict amongst 
workers between the demands of class solidarity and loyalty to an 
employer who was providing material benefits, a conflict which 
could be resolved by joining a yellow union. The composition of 
Augsburg's workforce, however, was also important here, for in the 
interaction between a uniquely strong yellow movement and an 
unexpectedly weak socialist labour movement, those aspects of the 
city's socio-economic structure which aided the former tended to 
actively hinder the latter. If one precondition for successful 
political and un10n agitation from the left is a degree of common 
conSC1ousness within a stable and relatively unified working class, 
then this precondition simply did not exist in Augsburg in these 
years: the extreme mobility of workforce and population, the 
importance to the economy of immigrants from rural Swabia and 
Bavaria (and thus, it may be speculated, the continued influence of 
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rural patterns of thought and behaviour unconducive to the 
acceptance of socialist ideology), the high proportion of Catholics 
amongst workers (the strength of Catholic workers' organisations in 
Augsburg was one prerequisite for the progress made by the yellow 
movement), the large number of women workers (traditionally those 
most influenced by the clergy), the strong lines of economically-
determined division running through the workforce - all of this 
could not but hamper the solidifying of class consciousness or the 
creation of a stable labour movement. 
This is not to deny the very real achievements of the SPD and 
free unions in Augsburg in this period, the very real growth 
demonstrated by both branches of the socialist labour movement. 
The steady rise of the SPD to the position of third political force 
ln Augsburg after the Centre and Liberal parties (the party's share 
of the vote ln Reichstag elections rose from 2.4% in 1871, to 21.7% 
in 1890, to 29.8% ln 1912, and in 1905 it gained one of Augsburg's 
three seats in the Landtag) had decisively altered the political 
landscape in the city. And, as will be discussed later, the years 
immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War were to 
witness a change of mood amongst Augsburg's workforce, a change 
which worked in favour of the free unions and against the continued 
advance of the yellow movement. Nevertheless, that the position of 
the socialist labour movement was adversely affected by the 
bifurcation of Augsburg's working class into two hostile camps lS 
clear, and it made the process of rebuilding after 1890 much more 
difficult. The existence of the anti-socialist union movement not 
only deprived the socialist unions and the SPD of potential 
members, it also lessened the likelihood that industrial action 
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would prove successful by providing a reservoir of workers who 
either would not participate in strike action or would even be 
prepared to engage in strike-breaking activity. Augsburg's 
specific socio-economic conjuncture had opened up space in the 
city's labour relations polity for a variety of competing 
ideologies to press their claim to represent Augsburg's working 
class best, and in many of its aspects that conjuncture acted as a 
barrier to the progress of the socialist labour movement. Thus the 
textile industry, with its unstable, low paid, often female and/or 
young and unskilled labour force was unpropitious ground for 
socialist agitation before 1914 - and, reflecting this, an existing 
SPD membership breakdown for 1900 shows that, despite the fact that 
textile workers were the clear majority among Augsburg's workforce, 
they constituted only one fifth of SPD members (37% were skilled 
metal workers, 14% cobblers and tailors, 12.6% carpenters, the 
remainder print workers and cigar makers) [63J. 
More than this though: just as Augsburg's industrial 
configuration, and those elements of it which generated a powerful 
yellow movement, necessarily produced a weak socialist labour 
movement, so did an awareness of this weakness have a determining 
effect on the political attitudes of that labour movement. Thus on 
the one hand, admittedly, a reformist tendency emerged within the 
free unions, a tendency which was anyway consonant with their far 
from radical practice. On the other hand, and more interestingly, 
for it merely entrenched its comparatively weak position, 
Augsburg's SPD reacted against the prevailing south Bavarian 
reformist tradition as it was directed by George von Vollmar, 
indeed was constantly critical of it [64J. There was certainly no 
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acknowledgement of the possibility that a less radical stance might 
have, as it was designed to do in Bavaria as a whole, helped to 
broaden the base of support for the SPD in the city [65]. Hence 
Augsburg's SPD had more in common politically with the party 1n 
north Bavarian Nuremberg, which also opposed reformism, than with 
the SPD of its near neighbour, Munich. Indeed, to compare and 
contrast Augsburg with Nuremberg is a salutary way to sum up here -
for despite the similarities in terms of industrialisation and the 
organisations of socialism, it is finally the differences that 
resonate most, Augsburg's peculiarity in the pre-1914 period, its 
deviation from expected patterns, the outstanding characteristic of 
which was the influence of non-socialist organisations and theories 
on the working class to a degree discernible in few, if any, other 
areas of Germany at this time. 
All of the above was very much of its time, however, located 
1n an era of complex change, conditioned by phenomena the 
transience of which 1S obvious in retrospect. It had, however, a 
long-term relevance - a relevance to be found, it will be argued 
here, in the painful transition from the established atmosphere and 
texture of pre-1914 Augsburg to the tensions of war, revolution and 
the Weimar Republic. Though this transition was certainly part of 
the universal instability and unpredictability out of which the 
Weimar Republic was born, it was, however, in Augsburg's case 
especially intense and traumatic given the city's conservative 
pre-war climate. It is also this traumatic transition, just as 
much as the specifics of the period from 1928 to 1933, that must be 
analysed if the interaction of Augsburg's working class with 
43 
National Socialism is to be fully understood - an interaction at 
least partially conditioned by the effects occasioned by this 
transition on that working class. The war and its aftermath 
brought to Augsburg a transformation, a transformation in which the 
previously solidified attitudes and organisational responses melted 
away and yet failed to resolidify into a new general pattern -
unless that new pattern can be described in terms of the 
replacement of economic complacency and social conservatism by 
economic stagnation, a febrile political arena and the infusion of 
a new dynamic, of radicalised potentialities, into the working 
class. Those concepts which had previously muted social conflict 
in Augsburg became outmoded, consigned to an irretrievable past, 
rendered irrelevant in the face of a working class more radical, 
more unpredictable and less malleable than before - even by its own 
organisations. 
It constituted ln short a radical break - and yet it was a 
radical break containing within itself at least an element of the 
release of social tensions previously smothered. The astonishing 
ease with which previously apparently dominant social and political 
structures disintegrated under the pressure of war and revolution, 
allowing an unfolding of political energy which penetrated deep 
into Augsburg's working-class population, suggests that those 
structures were, to say the least, not without flaws. In the 
period immediately preceding war, developments were such as to 
indicate that a sea-change may well have been inevitable, even 
without the stimulus of events after 1914. Certainly it needs to 
be said that paternalistic social policy could conceal, suppress 
and suffocate social problems but could not fully eradicate them; 
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Augsburg possessed all of the unfavourable attributes of a rapidly 
developed industrial centre, and the ameliorative effects of 
paternalism were limited [66]. Social tension and conflict 
involving the working class did not disappear, and, in the long-
term, the attempt to diffuse and divert such tension and conflict 
by means of an 'enlightened' social policy and the yellow movement 
must be considered a failure. This failure was becoming apparent 
even before 1914, most significantly in the decline of the yellow 
union movement: reduced to a position of irrevocable irrelevance by 
internal events during the war (when, for example, MAN's management 
abandoned the AVA, in favour of a conciliation with the free 
unions), the movement had already passed the peak of its popularity 
before that point. The seeming victory of non-socialist over 
socialist unions had proved transitory, and there had occurred a 
change in mood amongst the workforce in favour of the free unions 
and against the yellow un10n movement - influenced, it may be 
speculated, by the failure of the latter really to improve the 
position of Augsburg's workers, either materially or in terms of 
giving them a greater voice within the workplace [67]. The best 
illustration of this new mood came in 1912, during a campaign in 
Augsburg's textile industry aimed at achieving the introduction of 
industry-wide agreements. The 20,000 strong demonstration which 
took place in the course of this was the greatest ever show of 
strength by Augsburg's labour movement - and demonstrated, 
moreover, that workers 1n Augsburg's textile industry could be 
successfully mobilised 1n support of a union-led campa1gn. 
Thus the political turbulence which, as will be seen in a 
moment, marked the birth of the Weimar Republic in Augsburg should 
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not be interpreted as having only had specific origins ln the 
conflicts generated by war, but rather should be considered also as 
an intensification of a process which had begun before 1914. And 
the same is true in the economic sphere. The post-war economlC 
conjuncture in Germany did indeed produce inevitable periods of 
economic downturn in Augsburg, but the city was also afflicted by 
the unmistakable signs of long-term, inherent economic decay and a 
general loss of complacent self-confidence in its future 
development, the causes of which lay in Augsburg's old-fashioned, 
increasingly sclerotic industrial economy. The illusory boom of 
the mid-1920s could not mask the true situation, in which the 
periods of economic depression in the early and late 1920s merely 
accentuated and accelerated a more general problematic predicated 
upon just those factors of over-concentration and one-sided 
development examined above. Augsburg's economy was over-dependent 
on textiles and engineering and metals, industries facing, to say 
the least, uncertain future prospects. The textile industry in 
particular entered into a period of prolonged crisis, one measure 
of which was the intrusion of outside interests and concerns into 
its operations (although ironically, as discussed earlier, the 
industry's position did stabilise ln time to offer Augsburg some 
relief during the economlC crlS1S after 1928). Just as seriously, 
as had become evident in the early years of the century, Augsburg 
had failed to attract modern, dynamic new branches of industry such 
as electronics and chemicals, precision engineering and machine 
tool engineering. After 1918 no significant industrial concern of 
the type that could have altered Augsburg's economic structure and 
labour market was established in the city. Together with the lack 
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of adaptable middle-sized concerns, aga1n the consequence of 
limitation to econom1C expansion 1n only a few industrial areas, 
what these facts added up to was virtually inevitable economic 
deceleration and a perceptible undermining of previous certitudes. 
This unfavourable perspective was as evident in the unchangingly 
high share of those employed in the trade and industry sector 
(58.6% of the working population in 1933) as opposed to the 
hesitant expansion of the stagnating service sector, as it was 1n 
the dramatic slow-down of population increase (as already 
mentioned, between 1860 and 1920 Augsburg's growth rate had been 
over 27% per decade, a figure which, by the period 1925-1933, had 
fallen to 6.7%) as Augsburg was left trailing in the wake of its 
two Bavarian counterparts, Munich and Nuremberg [68J. 
This had a socio-political dimension, too, in the rendering 
impotent of those social concepts which had thrived in an era of 
econom1C expansion and aggression, of those social policies which 
had been used to control and to assuage, but, for all that they 
might still have existed, were now to be overtaken by fundamental 
changes in attitude and policy in society, now to lose their 
relevance along with the industries and the enclosed industrial 
elite which had given them their purpose. One perhaps symbolic 
example of this was the decreasing popularity of workers' colonies 
in the Weimar years - for most workers of the post-war generation a 
private life completely beyond the influence of their workplace now 
outweighed the ostensible advantages of such accommodation [69J. 
This latter point, too, signals a wider change of social 
atmosphere, particularly amongst Augsburg's working class, which 
was the corollary not only, or even mainly, of economic dislocation 
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but rather of political dislocation. The birth of the Weimar 
Republic, the traumas of war, revolution and of the Soviet 
Republic, produced amongst Augsburg's population a hitherto unknown 
unstable, radical temper, a radical temper which found a parallel 
in the stormy history of the city's working-class organisations at 
this time. To an extent this radicalisation was not simply the 
ephemeral product of exceptional circumstances, it also amounted to 
a permanent change in Augsburg's political culture, and especially 
in the political culture of the working class. A radical potential 
had been created which was constantly liable to emerge ln the 
crisis-ridden Weimar years. It is important here to define this 
idea of a radical potential more specifically. It refers not 
simply to a left-wing radicalisation, but to the change to a more 
febrile politics than previously, a politics which could encompass 
both left- and right-wing radicalism, and a politics in which such 
radicalism was greatly feared by the leadership of the SPD. This 
was particularly the case as a further aspect of Augsburg's new 
political culture was a rank-and-file disillusionment with moderate 
SPD and union leaders, as the massive expectations of the immediate 
post-war period remained unfulfilled. 
The contrast in social and political behaviour accompanying 
the transition from Empire to Republic was one perceptible to 
contemporaries in Augsburg. For the local Social Democratic 
newspaper, this transition represented an opportunity to atone for 
Augsburg's shameful past as a centre of capitalist exploitation and 
the yellow union movement: 
Was der klihnste Optimist noch vor wenigen Wochen 
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nicht ftir moglich gehalten hat, das ist in der 
Nacht vom Freitag auf Samstag Tatsache geworden: 
tiber der Stadt Augsburg weht die rote Fahne! Die 
alte Patrizierstadt, die Stadt der Fugger und 
Welser, die kapitalistischen Unternehmergeist dann 
spater zum bayerischen Manchester umgewandelt, sie 
hat ihre Farbe gewechselt: die rot-grtin-wei~e Fahne 
ist niedergeholt und am Mast steigt die Fahne der 
Freiheit empor in leuchtendem Rot. 
Wie ein Lauffeur hat sich die Kunde von der Revolution 
in Mtinchen, in ganz Deutschland verbreitet. Erst 
Kiel, dann Mtinchen und andere Stadte, warum sollte 
die Stadt Augsburg zurtickbleiben? Die Stadt Augsburg, 
deren Bevolkerung ja noch einen besonderen Schuldposten 
zu begleichen hat! Die Augsburger Bevolkerung, die 
seit Jahrzehnten als willenloses Ausbeutungsobjekt 
profitstichtiger Kapitalisten betracht worden ist. 
Und siehe da - kaum war ein Tag nach den Mtinchner 
Ereignissen verflossen als auch in Augsburg der Umsturz 
erfolgte Sie bedeutet den Anbruch einer neuen Zeit 
und wird ein Markstein in der Geschichte der 
sozialdemokratischen Partei bleiben [70J. 
(9 November 1919) 
For the authorities in Augsburg, however, the change In atmosphere 
in the city was rather more threatening: 
Die Polizeiorgane sind den Ausschreitungen der Soldaten 
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und der Zivilbevolkerung gegenuber machtlos. Selbst 
die Angehorigen des Soldatenrates werden, wenn Sle 
polizeilicherseits urn Hilfe angegangen werden, 
seitens der jungeren Soldaten und eines gewissen 
Gesindels mit den grobsten und gemeinsten Beschimpfungen 
uberhauft, so da~ auch deren Einschreiten fast immer 
nutzlos ist ... Auch die Arbeiterbevolkerung ist der 
Meinung, da~ die Polizei nichts mehr zu sagen habe, 
und da~ nun alles nach ihrem Willen gehen musse. Es ist 
deshalb sehr schwer die notwendige Ordnung aufrecht 
zu erhalten, und mu~ nun uber sehr viel gesehen werden, 
was eigentlich strafbar ware [71]. 
('Wochenbericht Magistrat der Stadt Augsburg, 13 December 1919') 
And indeed a certain breakdown in order was characteristic of 
Augsburg in this period, one which took the form not only of a 
sudden change in social mores, or, as was also the case, of a rapid 
rise in criminality (Augsburg had one of the highest rates of 
criminality in Germany in the early years of the Weimar Republic) 
but which rather witnessed the entry of violence onto the political 
scene in the city for the first time with major outbreaks of 
violent unrest which had definite political motivations. The 
murder of Kurt Eisner, for example, clearly perceived by Augsburg's 
working class as a reactionary assault on their newly-won rights, 
provoked in the city a riot in which the targets were symbols of 
wealth and authority: thus the Bishop's palace and the justice 
buildings were attacked, as were the offices of Augsburg's non-
socialist newspapers; files and documents were destroyed, prisoners 
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freed from jail, Augsburg's premler hotel ravaged and many shops 
plundered. Before order could be restored, two people had died and 
several had been injured in exchanges of gunfire [72]. As will be 
shown in a moment, the events of the Soviet Republic in Augsburg 
constituted the worst example of mass political violence, but even 
after this violent incidents occurred - on 1 September 1920, for 
example, a spontaneous demonstration outside the Rathaus in protest 
at the workers' economic situation ended with four people having 
been killed in clashes with the police [73]. The contrast such 
events made with Augsburg's previous history is obvious enough but 
even acts of violence on a lesser scale, such as the assaults on 
the meetings and newspapers of political opponents which now began 
to accompany election campaigns, contributed to a climate of 
apprehension in the city, in which rumours about potential unrest 
and Putsch attempts became commonplace [74]. 
Violence was, however, only one element of a more general 
dynamic of radicalisation which developed spontaneously out of the 
extremely labile post-war situation. This situation combined 
severe economic and supply problems with an unstable and 
discontented population. Above all it was those deracinated 
through the effects of war or through demobilisation, along with 
the unemployed who constituted the core of those involved in 
political violence. At the same time the USPD, during the war 
years insignificant in Augsburg, gained more and more influence as 
the motor of revolutionary change. Although more often responding 
to events than guiding them, the USPD did successfully exploit 
economic disaffection, and, in particular, dissatisfaction with the 
difficulties faced by the unions in realising the social gains of 
the revolution at the local level [75]. 
It was this conjuncture of mounting economic and political 
problems which began to undermine the local SPD's control of 
circumstances in early 1919. The party's response to the 
revolution had been shaped by the desire to maintain such control, 
to avoid anything resembling civil war, and to create 'order from 
chaos and new life from ruins', as the Schwabische Volkszeitung put 
it [76]. The initially smooth and peaceful transition from Empire 
to Republic [77], and the SPD's seeming mastery of it by means of 
its dominance of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council, was deceptive; 
the establishment of the Soviet Republic in Augsburg on 7 April 
1919, the day after its proclamation in Munich, was merely the 
final sign that the SPD had failed in its attempt to canalise the 
political energies of the working class into orderly channels, and 
the events that ensued had long-term significance for Augsburg's 
labour movement. The creation of the Soviet Republic in the city 
and its initial measures [78] are of less interest here than the 
behaviour of the SPD, which retained its majority on the newly-
formed council. The party, motivated by political reasoning and 
Augsburg's desperate economic situation, endeavoured to achieve a 
conciliation with the Hoffmann government in Bamberg, even at the 
cost of reversing previously taken decisions. And indeed such an 
agreement was reached and accepted by a mass meeting on 12 April. 
This acceptance, however, was based on the understanding that 
Augsburg would not find itself involved in the imminent military 
conflict, an understanding that was to prove false. On the morning 
of 20 April army contingents from both Bavaria and Wlirttemberg 
entered the city in order to secure the lines of communication 
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during the operation against Munich: 
Die Lage in der Stadt war verworren, die Atmosphare 
von Gertichten, Angst und eisiger Frontstellung zwischen 
Parteien und Sozialgruppen aufgeladen. Die stellenweise 
heftigen Kampfe mit Verbanden des Arbeiter- und 
Soldatenrats wie mit hastig bewaffneten Arbeitern 
forderten, von Akten individueller Grausamkeit ebenso 
begleitet wie von lokalen Skurilitaten, 44 Todesopfer. 
Die Arbeiterviertel links der Wertach und Oberhausen 
waren bis zum 22.April Zentrurn der Gegenwehr [79]. 
(G. Hetzer, 'Von der Reichsgrtindung ... ') 
The bloody suppression of the Soviet Republic 1n Augsburg left 
a variety of legacies. The city's labour movement was irrevocably 
split - the fierce hatred that existed between the KPD and the SPD 
in later years was in part the continuation of the bitterness 
produced within the USPD at what it perceived as a betrayal of the 
courage of the radical left by the majority SPD. This myth of 
betrayal remained potent throughout the Weimar years and indeed 
beyond. It was not however only USPD activists who felt themselves 
betrayed by the SPD's actions: as the SPD itself recognised in a 
pamphlet it published justifying its actions, this feeling was 
widespread amongst Augsburg's workers: 
Eine tiefgehende Erbitterung hat sich der Augsburger 
Arbeiterschaft bemachtigt. Sie glaubt sich Uberfallen 
und betrogen. In unverantwortlicher, leichtfertiger 
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Weise wird ihr eingeredet, da~ S1e von ihren FUhrern 
verraten worden sei: Dieser Vorwurf mu~ mit aller 
Entschiedenheit zUruckgewiesen werden. Wenn erst die 
Erregung geschwunden ist und das ruhige Denken wieder 
Platz gegriffen hat, wird die Augsburger Arbeiterschaft 
ihr Urteil selbst dahin fallen, da~ das Tun ihrer 
FUhrer einzig und allein von dem sehnlichen Wunsch 
geleitet war, das Beste fUr die Arbeiterschaft zu 
wirken und so zu handeln, wie es das Interesse der 
gesamten Arbeiterschaft forderte. Eine freche LUge 
ist es, zu behaupten, da~ die FUhrer die Truppen der 
Regierung selbst gerufen hatten [80J. 
('Flugblatt der Augsburger SPD zur militarischen Besetzung der 
Stadt durch Regierungstruppen') 
That such protestations were largely in vain was proven by the new 
momentum gained by the USPD, which allowed it to develop into a 
true mass party 1n competition with the SPD for the first time. 
The SPD had suffered a maSS1ve loss of respect, and the process of 
radicalisation already existent before April 1919 was catalysed: in 
the Reichstag election of 1920 the USPD polled 20.2% of the vote, 
the SPD 24.8% (the corresponding figures in January 1919 had been 
3.1% and 46.8%), with the USPD gaining more votes than the SPD in 
many of the latter's traditional strongholds, such as Oberhausen 
and 'links der Wertach'. Another measure of the extent of this 
radicalisation was g1ven by the results of the first workers' 
council elections in April 1920 in MAN, the factory it should be 
recalled at the centre of the yellow union movement - for the USPD 
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achieved a vote of 64.6%, compared to 22.6% for the SPD (Christian 
10%, Hirsch-Duncker 2.8%). 
With the loss of respect for the SPD came also a wider sense 
of humiliation, a sense that the great hopes of 1918 had come to 
nothing; and to this perception was added a growing disillusionment 
with the free unions, which was generated by failures in the sphere 
of industrial conflict. Union campaigns and strike action were 
unable to prevent the attrition of the social achievements brought 
about by the revolution, which occurred in both the textile and 
metal industries in the early 1920s [81J. In part this 
disillusionment found an outlet in radicalism as the KPD gained 
some influence at this time, especially in the textile industry. 
It also found an expression, however, in the increasing reluctance 
of the working class to be mobilised for political mass strikes 
[82J and, as previously mentioned, in the flow of workers away from 
the unions. In short, the SPD had lost some of its influence on 
Augsburg's working class. The party was now faced with a working-
class constituency which was more divided and to a degree more 
radical, but also more sceptical and more changeable than that 
which it had hoped to control in 1918. The events of April 1919 
had also created a deep fear within Augsburg's Social Democratic 
leadership of working-class spontaneity, of radical mass movements 
which could easily become unmanageable [83J. 
The changes that had occurred in Augsburg's political culture 
cannot then in truth be conceptualised as amounting to a 
radicalisation of the working class - for although this was one 
element of the immediate post-war configuration in the city, and 
although a radical potential had been created which would later 
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find its expression ln the growth of the KPD's support, this was 
succeeded by a disenchantment with the established labour movement 
amongst some sections of the working class, generated in particular 
by disappointment with the practical outcome of the political 
turbulence. At this point, too, should be located the beginning of 
that rank-and-file discontent with the stagnation of the SPD in 
Augsburg which was mentioned earlier. The continuing anxiety 
within the SPD's leadership in Augsburg over the dangers of mass 
spontaneous mobilisation must, however, have been accompanied by 
the fear that the party's grip on its traditional constituency was 
now under threat, that this constituency could be lost not only to 
left-wing radicalism, as the success of the USPD had shown, but 
also to right-wing radicalism: thus, as previously mentioned, the 
Landtag election of April 1924, when the 'Volkischer Block' 
achieved 23.2% of the vote in Augsburg (the SPD figure was 24.6%), 
demonstrated that a significant proportion of the city's workers 
could be mobilised by the right in a time of crisis, for although 
this grouping gained its highest share of the vote in bourgeois 
areas (areas which would later become the electoral strongholds of 
the NSDAP), its results were also impressive in certain working-
class districts (19.8% ln 'rechts der Wertach', 18% in 
Kriegshaber). As will be made clear throughout this study, the 
fear, however justified or unjustified it may have been, of losing 
its constituency to the right was fundamental to the SPD's 
engagement with National Socialism in Augsburg. 
That engagement will be the central concern of this thesis. 
Augsburg became during the Weimar Republic, far more intensely than 
in its pre-1914 history, a crucible for bitter political 
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confrontation, in which rival ideologies were in fierce competition 
for working-class allegiance within a volatile and unpredictable 
political framework. The confrontation between Social Democracy 
and Nazism was especially vehement, encompassing both physical and 
linguistic violence, as the clashes between Nazis and Social 
Democrats which took place in the streets of Augsburg found their 
mirror image in the propaganda output of the two movements. The 
starting point, in the broadest terms, of this work is the question 
of how National Socialism was perceived and analysed by the SPD in 
Augsburg and, more specifically, of how the rank and file, the core 
Social Democratic following as distinct from the leadership or 
functionaries, responded to the rise of Nazism. Above all the 
intention will be to explore the relationship between the 
interpretation of National Socialism propounded in the local SPD's 
literary and propaganda material, analysis of which will make up 
the bulk of the study, and the reception of this interpretation by 
the rank and file. This should provide a context for the discussion 
of such questions as how far the rank and file were ideologically 
armed against National Socialism, immunised against 'infection' by 
it, and whether any potential existed amongst that rank and file to 
resist Nazism physically, if such a demand had been made upon it by 
the SPD's leadership. As has already been mentioned, there existed 
considerable dissatisfaction amongst some Social Democratic 
activists, with the party leadership's cautious attitude regarding 
measures to counteract Nazism, and a real desire for a more 
aggresSlve policy - perhaps even, it will be suggested later, the 
desire for an effort of physical resistance in early 1933. The 
main aim of this thesis is therefore to deepen existing knowledge 
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about the SPD's response to National Socialism's attack on it In 
1933 by examining the question, in a specified local setting, from 
a hitherto under-used perspective [84]: that is, by asking what 
image of the Nazi enemy Augsburg's Social Democrats possessed, how 
far and in what way that image was mediated by the SPD's 'official' 
analysis of the NSDAP, and what contribution the form of this image 
made to the SPD's fate. 
The complete realisation of the intended analysis just 
outlined would, ideally, include a comprehensive examination of the 
contours of working-class political culture in Augsburg, the 
culture within which the SPD functioned as a political movement. 
Such an examination would necessarily encompass a delineation, in 
greater detail than has hitherto been given, of the organisational 
make-up and membership composition of the city's major working-
class political, social and union organisations, and of the 
existing network of educational, leisure and sporting activity 
which constituted much of the social milieu that structured the 
daily lives of the working population and which was closely 
connected to political life. Even more than this, if the 
interaction of National Socialism with Augsburg's working class lS 
to be understood, then some attempt would have to be made to 
recover the attitudes of that class at the mass level; and this 
attempt would necessarily have to take into account the complexity 
and diversity of the working class, the fractured nature of 
working-class political allegiance, the importance of religion as a 
factor, and the substantial proportion of workers who never 
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belonged to the labour movement or voted for the political parties 
of the left. A detailed framework of this kind, within which a 
study of the image and interpretation of National Socialism 
prevalent amongst Augsburg's Social Democrats could unfold, would 
also facilitate a discussion of a more general historical 
problematic - that is, the question of just how relevant 
ideological prescriptions from above, in this case regarding the 
NSDAP, were to political realities on the ground within the SPD, 
and whether such prescriptions in any true sense conditioned or set 
parameters for actual responses and actual behaviour amongst rank-
and-file members; and whether errors in the analysis of National 
Socialism at the higher levels of the SPD seeped down through the 
party's hierarchy, or whether there did in fact exist a 
contradiction within that hierarchy between flawed perspectives at 
the top and a greater clarity about the aims and nature of Nazism 
amongst local party members and functionaries. 
It must be emphasised at this point that although the analysis 
being developed here remains structured around an exploration of 
such questions, the approach to them employed in this thesis is 
circumscribed by an absence of archival material specifically 
relating to the structure and development of Augsburg's working-
class organisations during the Weimar era, or which would have 
allowed a reconstruction of the patterns of day-to-day working-
class political life. And the inability fully to explicate the 
position of the working class in its political context in a way 
which would do justice to its variegated nature obviously lessens 
the possibility of recapturing the beliefs and attitudes of workers 
as they responded to the rise of National Socialism. This 
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difficulty in moving from the type of general portrait of working-
class politics presented briefly in this introductory chapter, to a 
more specific examination of the history of workers as a social 
class within that politics which would include a consideration of 
the 'voice' of these workers, 1S exacerbated by the problems facing 
the historian of the Bavarian SPD during the Weimar era, 
particularly in the context of a local study. The lack of 
extensive source material of the type that would allow the 
construction of a socio-historical profile of the SPD in Bavaria 
for this period, has been pointed out by Hartmut Mehringer [85J, 
and Augsburg is no exception to this. This lacuna has its or1g1ns 
firstly in the fact that the SPD's activities were far less 
stringently monitored by the authorities than the KPD's, hence the 
abundance of information on the KPD that is to be found in, for 
example, police and court files, does not exist for the SPD; and 
secondly in the widespread destruction of documents which was a 
byproduct of the establishment of the Nazi dictatorship, and, 
especially in Augsburg's case, a consequence of the effects of 
heavy Allied bombing during the Second World War. 
These facts necessitate a concentration in this study on the 
one source which does provide an insight into the life of 
Augsburg's SPD in the Weimar Republic, and which can illuminate 
many aspects of the party's engagement with National Socialism 
after 1928 - that is the local Social Democratic newspaper, the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, which was the second largest newspaper 1n 
Augsburg by 1930, with a circulation of around 11,500 copies daily 
[86J. The importance of the Schwabische Volkszeitung, the 
influence it must have had in shaping rank-and-file attitudes, 1S 
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obvious enough - it was the ma1n V01ce of Social Democracy in 
Augsburg, the main means the party possessed of propagating in any 
complexity the messages and signals it wanted to transmit, and 
above all the ma1n weapon in its propaganda war with the NSDAP. 
Certainly, it must be recognised that the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
was also a commercial concern, it was not, at least ostensibly, a 
newspaper aimed narrowly at members of the SPD, but was rather one 
of several newspapers competing in Augsburg for a share of the more 
general market; and an awareness of the fact that the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's material was intended to exercise an influence on 
this potential wider audience should be brought to any analysis of 
it. Nevertheless, such an analysis can also leave little doubt 
about how intimately the Schwabische Volkszeitung was identified 
with the SPD and the socialist labour movement in general - closely 
interlinked with the history of the party's development in 
Augsburg, and edited by its leading local functionaries, it was the 
primary conduit for the SPD's V1ews in the city. Of course, it must 
be recognised that the use of such a source must 1n essence be more 
impressionistic than the utilisation of material originating 
directly from working-class organisations and elucidating their 
internal structures and workings; nevertheless, an extensive mining 
of the Schwabische Volkszeitung for references to and articles on 
National Socialism - and these were copious indeed from 1930 
onwards - furnishes the opportunity to follow, in Augsburg's major 
sphere of working-class activity, that 1S the Social Democratic, 
the reaction to National Socialism through the last years of the 
Weimar Republic, as that reaction initially took shape and as it 
then developed in a rapidly changing context. 
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The bulk of this thesis will consist of a detailed analysis of 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung's reception of National Socialism, of 
the reports it contained on the activities of the NSDAP and the 
interpretations propounded in its pages of Nazism as a political 
phenomenon; as a general point, though, it can be said here that 
the challenge presented by the success of National Socialism and 
the urgent need to combat it, altered the nature of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung as it altered the nature of the Social Democratic 
press as a whole [87]. The party's press was always of great 
importance to the SPD, closely connected with the desire 
ideologically to school its membership; as one activist expressed 
it at the 1919 party conference in Weimar: 
Es ist selbstverstandlich, da~ unsere Parteipresse 
ln erster Linie politisches Kampf - und 
Aufklarungsmittel bleiben mu~. Sie ist nicht dazu 
da, ein ordinares Sensationsbedtirfnis zu fordern 
und zu befriedigen. Ihre vornehmste Aufgabe mu~ 
seln, die Schulung und Beeinflussung der Massen 1m 
Sinne der sozialistischen Weltanschauung [88]. 
(Quoted in: G. Eisfeld and K. Koszyk, Die Presse der deutschen 
Sozialdemokratie) 
Though this conception of the role of its newspapers was certainly 
never abandoned by the SPD, the 1920s did witness an attempt by the 
Social Democratic press to become more competitive in the newspaper 
market; there thus occurred a process of modernisation, a stylistic 
relaxation, and a greater emphasis on providing entertainment to 
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accompany the traditional emphasis on politics. The fight against 
the NSDAP, however, put into reverse many of these changes, as the 
SPD's newspapers increasingly focused on the narrow goals of 
electoral agitation and anti-Nazi propaganda. The heavy burden of 
propaganda carried by the Social Democratic press in the later 
Weimar years was not lost on the SPD's opponents, and the party's 
newspapers became the target for both violence and legal means of 
suppreSSlon, in those areas of Germany where the NSDAP had 
governmental influence. The contents of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung in this period leave no doubt about the awareness of 
those who produced the newspaper of its purpose as a propaganda 
weapon ln opposition to National Socialism; similarly, as the 
newspaper became ever more involved in the political climate of 
vicious confrontation in Augsburg, so its journalists were 
frequently subjected to Nazi attempts to intimidate them using the 
threat of violence [89]. 
The Schwabische Volkszeitung 1n this period can therefore be 
considered a barometer of the SPD's struggle both to interpret 
National Socialism intellectually and to counteract it, within the 
context of the newspaper's active involvement in Augsburg's local 
political scene. This dual perspective is possible due to the 
nature of the composition of Social Democratic newspapers: thus it 
must be understood that the Schwabische Volkszeitung was 
constructed using material from a variety of sources, encompassing 
not only locally produced journalism but also input from the SPD's 
press agency, articles from other Social Democratic newspapers, 
reports of speeches made by leading Social Democrats and 
proclamations from the party executive. Material relating to the 
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NSDAP was also of a variety of types, ranglng from crude anti-Nazi 
polemic to serious intellectual analyses of National Socialism. 
However, although the Schwabische Volkszeitung contained a number 
of voices, not necessarily always in agreement, and although any 
discussion of the newspaper's treatment of National Socialism 
demands an awareness of the complexity of its material, the 
different nuances of interpretation revealed, and the variety of 
approaches deployed, certain constants remain throughout. The 
implicit political aim of the newspaper is one such constant, the 
very clear belief that it could shape and alter opinions about 
Nazism, not only the opinions of Social Democrats, but also of 
those outwith the labour movement. Similarly, as the following 
chapters of this work will demonstrate, a basic consistency of 
analysis underlies the multiplicity of articles on the NSDAP, a 
consistency which validates the idea that the SPD's general 
interpretation of National Socialism is revealed in the day-to-day 
coverage of a newspaper such as the Schwabische Volkszeitung. This 
is especially so in the case of Augsburg, as it must be recognised 
that the moderate nature of the SPD and its leading functionaries 
in the city during the Weimar era meant that the newspaper was 
never a forum for overt criticism of the party line, and, in fact, 
closely reflected the attitudes and policies of the SPD at national 
level. 
Taken as a whole, the plurality of perspectives found in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung constituted the web of response, analysis 
and propaganda which would have shaped the reaction of the 
newspaper's readership, Augsburg's core Social Democrats, to 
National Socialism - and to consider the effect that the portrayal 
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of Nazism would have had on those rank-and-file Social Democrats, 
the extent to which it might have insulated them against Nazi 
ideology or determined their response to the NSDAP's violent 
assault on Social Democracy, is one of the aims of this thesis. 
Beyond this, though, a more sophisticated deconstruction of the 
material must be attempted, one which examines what it reveals of 
the deeper flaws which disabled the SPD in its fight against 
Nazism. An analysis of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's engagement 
with National Socialism must be as much a literary exegesis as a 
historical investigation - it is necessary to be as interested ln 
how things are said, in language, in imagery, ln rhetoric, as 1n 
what 1S said. The Schwabische Volkszeitung's treatment of Nazism 
will thus be used here as a model from which can be extrapolated 
the more general condition of the SPD in the Weimar Republic. The 
depiction of the SPD in this era as a stagnant, 'middle-aged' 
party, one which had lost much of its previously strong sense of 
purpose and self- definition, and was hence ill-equipped to face 
the threat posed by the NSDAP, is by now well-established [90]; 
less attention has however been paid to the SPD's image of the Nazi 
enemy, to the question, that is, of how far the party's political 
reaction to National Socialism, particularly in 1933, was 
conditioned by the way in which Social Democracy perceived and 
analysed Nazisnl. Of course, the SPD's interpretation of Nazism and 
its articulation as propaganda cannot be separated from the party's 
longer-term structural problems. Whether these long-term problems 
made it impossible for the SPD adequately to confront the NSDAP, 
however clearly the latter may have been perceived, or whether 1n 
fact basic failures in the analysis of National Socialism were more 
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crucial in determining the SPD's behaviour in the last years of the 
Weimar Republic, is however one of the issues which a study of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's engagement with Nazism must address. 
This general perspective, though, would be incomplete without 
an accompanying consideration of the influence exerted on rank-
and-file attitudes in Augsburg by the Schwabische Volkszeitung. It 
must of course be accepted that, as a literary production of the 
SPD's articulate and well-informed functionaries, that is the 
formulators or at least the transmitters of ideology and propaganda 
rather than its consumers, it is highly unlikely that the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung would have reflected popular op~n~on 
amongst the party's supporters 1n Augsburg. Gauging rank-and-file 
op~n~on l.n the absence of sources which directly express it 
becomes, to a degree, speculative, dependent on inference or on the 
retrospective evidence of contemporary participants whose testimony 
may be far from disinterested. As will be suggested later in this 
work, some evidence can be adduced to support the idea, mentioned 
earlier, that a significant number of Social Democrats in Augsburg 
were dissatisfied with their local party's response to Nazism, and 
desired the adoption of a more radical stance. It 1S above all 
this possibility which makes necessary the attempt to gauge the 
attitudes of Augsburg's core Social Democrats to the NSDAP, for it 
will be the argument of this thesis that rank-and-file discontent 
over the perceived weakness of the SPD's measures to combat Nazism 
locally was to a great extent exacerbated by the crude 
effectiveness of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's anti-Nazi material, 
which ensured that its readership did indeed know its enemy, and, 
moreover, through the aggressiveness of its rhetoric imbued at 
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least part of that readership with a willingness to move onto the 
offensive if this was required to defeat National Socialism. This 
latter possibility must of course be treated with extren~ caution; 
the situation in 1933 was obviously highly complex, and a wide 
range of factors must be considered when discussing the extent to 
which the potential for any type of physical response to Nazism in 
power existed. Thus, any interpretation which suggests that the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung may have partially created, or at least 
reinforced such a potential in Augsburg must be embedded in a 
broader analysis which takes into account the many aspects of the 
situation in 1933 which militated against the possible success of 
mass resistance by the SPD, and hence renders the party's rejection 
of such a course of action more understandable; and this 1S an 
lssue which will be considered further in the conclusion to this 
work. What will be suggested throughout this thesis, however, is 
that explanations for the SPD's behaviour after the Nazi seizure of 
power can be found 1n the Social Democratic interpretation of 
National Socialism which the Schwabische Volkszeitung contained -
for in the misperceptions and flawed insights of this 
interpretation were laid bare the inherent deficiencies which 
increasingly condemned the SPD to a state of ineffectuality in its 
struggle with the NSDAP. 
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CHAPTER 2 The Schwabische Volkszeitung's engagement 
with National Socialism : Introduction 
i) Initial perspectives 
The Social Democratic analysis of National Socialism, as 
conveyed by the Schwabische Volkszeitung~ was in essence in place 
by late 1929, formed in response to the increasing activism of the 
NSDAP in that year - and it was this analysis that underlay the 
ossified polemic that came to dominate the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's engagement with National Socialism in the following 
years, as any of the flexibility of thought that would perhaps be 
considered vital for any successful engagement with a movement as 
dynamic as National Socialism appeared to be undercut by the 
exigencies of day-to-day political conflict and the deeper 
determinants of the SPD's particular political nature. This should 
not be taken to imply that Social Democratic reactions to Nazism 
were ln any precise way uniform - as already stressed, the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's material was representative of a variety 
of voices from within the movement, by no means all in agreement 
with each other. But, nevertheless, the obdurate persistence of a 
few fundamental, shaping conceptions of the type of movement 
National Socialism was, is the most obvious feature of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's analysis of and polemics against Nazism. 
It will be argued here, in fact, that this inflexibility was 
the consequence of Social Democracy's rigid mind-set, of its 
peculiar Weltanschauung; that this Weltanschauung was capable only 
of assimilating National Socialism to a limited extent - the limits 
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being defined by the traditional tram-lines of that world-view, a 
world-view to a large degree unchanged since the period of its 
first fashioning in the decades prior to the First World War. More 
than this, however, it seems clear that National Socialism was 
especially and deeply disturbing to the SPD precisely because it 
appeared to operate outwith the favourite categories of Social 
Democratic thought; the NSDAP's political practice, indeed its very 
existence and success stood in contradiction to the dictates of the 
SPD's Marxist theory, its class-based political philosophy. What 
will become clear in this study of the Schwabiache Volkszeitung is 
the extent to which an essentially Marxist conceptual framework, 
however unsophisticated, provided the mode of analysis and 
discourse within which the SPD, at the level of literary 
propaganda, worked. However far from its Marxist theory the SPD 
deviated in its political practice [91], however little understood 
Marxism may have been by the rank and file, or even by the 
leadership [92], a continuing adherence to the basic tenets of 
Marxist ideology, even if only in the form of vague assumptions and 
verbal radicalism, clearly exercised a shaping influence upon the 
SPD's interpretation of, and response to, Nazism. Indeed, the 
difficulties National Socialism presented for the SPD in terms of 
social and political analysis are, however paradoxically, revealed 
most obviously in the party;s unwavering adherence to the 
certitudes of an interpretation of Nazism derived from that 
Marxism. The SPDfs ideology of class in fact led it often to 
'explain' the rise of National Socialism by reference to models and 
ideals that elucidated more about the SPD itself than about the 
NSDAP. This was the source of many of the flaws that characterised 
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Social Democracy's analysis of Nazism; and these flaws were of 
particular significance, firstly because they certainly hampered 
the development of an appropriate strategy to combat the NSDAP, but 
more importantly because, to the historian, they are revelatory of 
the deeper fault-lines and fissures within the SPD which provide a 
framework within which the decisions the party made in 1933 can be 
interpreted. The treatment of National Socialism in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung will thus be used here as a paradigm, a 
delineation of which will expose the wider pathology of the SPD in 
the Weimar Republic. An exploration of the language, the rhetoric, 
the intellectual and ideological concepts used in the struggle to 
comprehend and counteract the NSDAP is an exploration of the very 
psyche of the SPD at its moment of greatest crisis. 
It will perhaps be useful to begin by looking at one of the 
first rigorous analyses of National Socialism to appear in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung - although it was by no means an isolated 
appearance of Nazism in the newspaper, for the NSDAP attracted 
frequent attention to its activity from early 1929 onwards. This 
particular example, though, appears to be almost a crystallisation 
of themes and of an approach that would persist throughout the last 
years of Weimar - a mixture of perceptions and confusions and a 
demonstration of the extent to which the Social Democratic mind-set 
determined those perceptions and precipitated those confusions. It 
thus provides a starting point from which to widen the analysis, to 
make connections and to adumbrate some of the main theses to be 
dealt with in more detail later. 
Entitled 'Aufgepeitschter Mittelstand. Warum werfen sich die 
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Nationalsozialisten auf den proletarischen Mittelstand!' the 
article appeared in November 1929 [93]. The essence of the 
conception of National Socialism it contained is made clear from 
the outset: 
Neben der politisch-agitatorischen Seite der 
Nationalsozialisten ist es notwendig, auch deren 
wirtschaftliche Seite zu betrachten, wo wir, sie 
als verschleierte Schutztruppe des scharfmacherischen 
Unternehmertums finden. 
And the underlying ideological preoccupations are similarly 
revealed, as the necessity of a class-based, Marxist engagement 
with the rival party is emphasised and the inter-relationship 
between National Socialism and capitalism is stressed: 
Der Nationalsozialismus ist e1n typisches Produkt der 
gegenwartige Lage des Kapitalismus. 
From this starting point the author firstly 1S concerned to 
explicate the difference between Nazism and earlier anti-semitic 
movements, perceptively recognising that anti-semitism was 
subordinated to economic and political questions as a motivating 
force in the Nazi movement and highlighting the 'socialist' and 
'proletarian' aspects of the party programme as another 
differentiating element (it will be shown later however that 
similarities between the NSDAP and earlier anti-semitic upsurges 
were also often drawn, and the conclusion reached that the success 
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of the former would be as ephemeral as that of the latter). 
The core of the interpretation, however, was constructed 
around an examination of the 'present capitalist conjuncture', that 
is 'capitalist concentration' and its consequences, the most 
important amongst which is seen as the 'proletarianisation' of the 
middle class and its concomitant, a potential increase in the 
intensity of the class struggle. This latter, though, can only 
occur 
wenn die neuen proletarischen Schichten zur Erkenntnis 
ihrer Klassenlage gelangten 
- and it is in the prevention of this that National Socialism's 
'objective function' lies: 
Das unbewu~t, meist noch unfertig erwachende 
Klassenbewu~stein der betreffenden Schichten wird 
abgelenkt, in falsche Bahnen geleitet, umgewandelt. 
The NSDAP's 'primitive socialism' is in reality simply a sham, 
rank-and-file radicalism is contained by the targeting of so-called 
'Jewish' capitalism, a diversionary tactic rendering the 
disconnected middle class harmless to capitalism as a whole. In 
short, the NSDAP occupies an 
... objektive Rolle als bedeutsamer Hilfsfaktor der 
modernen kapitalistischen Entwicklung. 
And, as the proposal 1n its economic programme to forbid strikes 
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under pa1n of death shows, the party's attempt to gl.ve the 
appearance of a truly socialist movement is mere pretence, l.n 
reality it l.S 'eine ausgesprochen reaktionare Bewegung' l.n receipt 
of both open and secret support from 'das industrielle 
Unternehmertum'. The necessary consequence of this is therefore 
da~ der Nationalsozialismus das Schwergewicht seiner 
Tatigkeit der- Bekampfung der organisierten Arbeiterschaft 
gewidment hat. Judenfeindschaft ist heute nicht mehr 
tlberzeugungssache und Selbstzweck, sondern dient zur 
Verschleierung wirtschaftsimperialistischer Ziele. 
In conclusion then: 
Damit ist der Kampf gegen den Nationsozialismus fur 
die klassenbewu~te Arbeiterschaft und ihre Organisationen 
zu einer politischen Aufgabe ersten Ranges geworden, 
wobei es unsere Aufgabe ist, nicht nur die Arbeiterschaft 
uber die Gefahren der Nationalsozialisten fur ihren 
weiteren Aufstieg aufzuklaren, sondern auch dem Mittelstand 
klar zu machen, da~ es mit einer Unterstutzung des 
Nationalsozialisten sich den Weg fur seine weitere 
Zukunft verbaut, mogen auch schwerindustrielle und 
junkerliche Drahtzieher der Nationalsozialisten ... die 
Spuren noch so sehr verwischen. (16 November 1929) 
This, the most sophisticated analysis that had thus far 
appeared in the Schwabische Volkszeitung - and obviously presented 
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In greater detail and with more polemical force than a short 
summary suggests - illustrates the potency of the theoretical 
substructure upon which the Social Democratic interpretation of 
National Socialism was built; for the article is perhaps best 
summed up as a number of perceptive assessments subsumed within a 
rigid theoretical framework. The attraction of the NSDAP for the 
declassed Mittelstand; the function of anti-semitism within the 
movement as an adjunct to a much wider political and social attack 
rather than the central factor in the garnering of support; the 
dissimilarities between National Socialism and previous successful 
anti-semitic movements; the NSDAP's antipathy to the organisations 
of the working class - none of this is impercipient, especially 
given that the NSDAP of this time, although increasingly active, 
had yet to become the serious threat that it would later, its main 
characteristics hence being perhaps not quite fully evident to the 
outside observer. And yet such insights are allied to a 
mechanistic class-based, fundamentally Marxist analysis, which 
portrays National Socialism as a tool of big business, as the 
'Schutztruppe' of capitalism, and thus lacks any appreciation of 
the autonomous, uncontrolled dynamism of the party; and which 
moreover is too deterministic in its view of the impoverished 
middle class as being manipulated and diverted away from its 'true' 
class instincts. Indeed, the whole interpretation is predicated 
upon a preCIse, theory-driven vIew of the putative proletarianised 
middle class, a too hopeful belief that the labour movement must be 
this latter's natural, inevitable political home, and yet at the 
same time upon a facile, comforting acceptance that specifically 
this class (as opposed to the working class), due to its 
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underdeveloped class conSC1ousness, was susceptible to the Nazi 
message. The schematic nature of the article, moreover, 1S only 
increased 'by the language of dogmatic certainty in which it 1S 
couched, the use of the cliches of Marxist orthodoxy and of blanket 
terms, often with clear pejorative overtones (such as 'das 
Unternehmertum'), in order to mask complex realities. 
The point here is that these themes will have to be discussed 
ln far greater detail in this examination of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's coverage of the NSDAP; for although, as will be 
shown, this coverage had many strands and aspects, again and again 
the conclusion will be reached that the SPD's responses to National 
Socialism were ideologically predetermined, that polemic took 
priority over objective observation, that the party often failed 
really to see or comprehend Nazism, so busy was it looking behind 
the NSDAP to find the 'real' enemy, the true 'wire pullers'. And 
whilst this was not the only source of the SPD's misperceptions -
the crucial influence exerted by Social Democracy's self-image 
will, for example, be made evident, along with other factors, less 
profound, but more prosa1C and understandable - its effect was the 
most disabling. 
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ii) 'Darkness against light' the threat of National Socialism 
What will not, however, be argued here is that the SPD 
underestimated the potential threat posed by the rise of National 
Socialism, that the party did not fully grasp the disastrous, 
deadly consequences Nazism in power would entail, or that the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung failed adequately to emphasise just how 
much was at stake in the struggle against the NSDAP. On the 
contrary, it is crucial to the overall argument being advanced 1n 
this thesis that the extent to which a rank-and-file reader of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung would have been aware, had indeed been 
purposefully made aware of all of this, is recognised. It 1S, 
therefore, necessary to delineate at the outset the consistency and 
intensity with which the Schwabische Volkszeitung sought to convey 
that National Socialism aimed to destroy freedom and democracy, to 
stress that working-class achievements and even working-class lives 
were at risk, and the means by which this was done. In one sense, 
of course, the whole of the material that is under consideration 
here, its extent and variety, testifies to this perception of 
National Socialism as a real threat. It was in response to this 
perception that Social Democracy developed its analysis of and 
propaganda against the NSDAP. That the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
was extremely anxious to maintain this image of the NSDAP, and to 
use it to galvanise its readership, will also be confirmed by other 
aspects of that analysis and propaganda that will be considered 
later, in particular by the newspaper's presentation of the NSDAP 
as the instigator of political violence. At this point, though, 
there are two broad areas that can usefully be examined to 
76 
demonstrate that the SPD cannot, in general, be held to have 
underestimated the potential danger of National Socialism: firstly 
the predictions to be found in the Schwabische Volkszeitung of the 
horrors and deprivations a Nazi dictatorship would bring; and 
secondly, the use made of Fascist Italy as a warning example to 
reinforce the latter message. 
In both these cases, of course, future possibilities 
functioned in the Schwabische Volkszeitung as a means by which 
present opinion could be shaped or reinforced; especially at 
critical junctures, the concept of the 'Third Reich', with all that 
it implied in the Social Democratic lexicon, was an extremely 
potent propaganda weapon, an admonition to the readership against 
wavering from the SPD's line. At such critical times, moreover, 
the struggle against National Socialism was often presented in 
apocalyptic terms, in terms that is, that could have left the 
reader ln no doubt about the urgent necessity of defeating the 
NSDAP, or the consequences of failing to do so. Thus, in early 
1931, as the ramifications of the Nazi success in the Reichstag 
elections of the previous autumn were still being considered, the 
following statement could be found in the Schwabische Volkszeitung: 
Nach dem Ausfall der Wahl am 14. September handelte es 
sich nicht mehr urn die Notverordnung, nicht mehr urn 
Krankenschein oder Panzerkreuzer, es handelte sich urn eln 
Ringen auf Leben und Tod, zwischen Demokratie und 
Republik, gegen Faschismus, Diktatur und Verfassungsbruch. 
(2 March 1931) [94J 
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A similar tone was set in the first paragraph of a fierce 
front-page anti-Nazi polemic in July 1932: 
Die deutsche Arbeiterklasse und mit ihr die deutsche 
Demokratie stehen in einem Kampf urn Leben und Tod. 
Barbarei und Untergang, oder Freiheit und Fortschritt, 
es gibt keine andere Wahl fur das deutsche Yolk und fur 
die deutsche Nation. Das ist der Sinn des groaen Ringens, 
das angehoben hat und in dessen Anfangsstadium wir stehen. 
(2 July 1932) [95J 
And aga1n a few weeks later, 1n reference to the forthcoming 
election: 
Gezahlt und gewogen wird zum letztenmal am 31. Juli. An 
diesem Tage entscheidet sich wahrlich das Geschick der 
Arbeiterklasse. An diesem Tage entscheidet sich, ob 
unsere Bruder umsonst gefallen oder ob sie weiterleben, 
1n uns selbst und in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. An 
diesem Tage entscheidet sich, ob wir Spreu sind oder 
Weizen, ob wir Hammer sein wollen oder Ambos, freie 
deutsche Menschen oder rechtlose, hungernde Sklaven. [96J 
(26 July 1932) 
This rhetoric of a life and death struggle, of a struggle 
between two opposing world-views that would decide the fate of the 
working class, indeed of German democracy in general for the 
foreseeable future, had in fact become by 1932 commonplace 1n the 
Social Democratic engagement with National Socialism - the 
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oppositions were starkly drawn, the darkness that would accompany a 
National Socialist victory continually underlined: 
Klar stehen die Fronten! Die alte Zeit gegen die neue! 
Die Vergangenheit gegen die Zukunft! Die Nacht gegen den 
Tag! Die Barbarei gegen den Fortschritt! Die Finsternis 
gegen das Licht! 
Seit den Julitagen 1914 gab es In Deutschland keine solche 
Spannung als in diesem Juli 1932. 
Der 31. Juli 1914 war der Schicksalstag des deutschen 
Volkes und Europas. Was die Wissenden klar erkennen und 
was die Unwissenden dumpf ahnen, das ist es, daJ3 an diesem 
31. Juli 1932 ebenfalls fUr uns und fUr Generationen die 
WUrie! fallen und das Los gezogen wird. Nicht urn 
Abgeordnete geht es, sondern urn die Freiheit, urn Sein oder 
Nichtsein der deutschen Arbeiterklasse und damit des 
deutschen Volkes. (30 July 1932) [97] 
The implications of the situation In Germany could even be 
seen as having a far wider resonance: 
Es geht nicht nur urn uns, es geht auch urn die nachste 
Generation und urn das Schicksal aller europaischen 
Klassengenossen. (6 July 1932) [98] 
Now it is no surprlse that these last four examples all stem from 
July 1932, that they formed part of the propaganda campaign in the 
run up to the Reichstag election at the end of that month - for 
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such moments of decision provided the obvious context for appeals 
like this, especially as the political conjuncture appeared to 
justify rhetorical extremes. It would be incorrect to assume that 
this strain of writing in the Schwabische Volkszeitung was only 
propaganda, that it was not a S1ncere expression of very real fears 
about Nazism's destructive potential; but nevertheless, its pr1mary 
function was clearly propagandistic - the readers of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung were to be left in no doubt that the fight 
against Nazism was no normal political fight, but rather one with 
profound implications for Germany's, or even Europe's, future. 
What these implications were was not, however, simply left to 
the reader's imagination; for, even if detailed specifics were 
rarely given, the Social Democratic idea of the Third Reich was not 
expressed only in general terms which predicted a reign of 
barbarism and an end of progress - there was also a more preC1se 
conceptualisation of what a Nazi dictatorship would mean for 
Germany, and a not inaccurate one. That Nazi rule would mean Nazi 
dictatorship was something about which the SPD was in no doubt: 
1m Dritten Reich solI das System der parlamentarischen 
Demokratie durch die Parteidiktatur abgelost werden. 1m 
Dritten Reich werden die breiten Volksschichten nach e1nem 
Ausspruch Hitlers durch eine Flihrerschicht angeblich 
besserer Rasse rlicksichtslos beherrscht. [99] 
(12 April 1932) 
The destruction of the Weimar democratic ideal was consistently 
stressed as the most fundamental consequence of any Nazi victory: 
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Es kann keinem Zweifel unterliegen, da~ die 
nationalsozialistische Politik voraussichtlich die Sache 
Deutschlands nicht bessern, sondern verschlechtern wird. 
Nun ist aber das Bedenkliche an der Sache, da~ ein 
nationalsozialistischer Sieg zur nationalsozialistischen 
Diktatur fUhren wird. Dann entscheidet nicht mehr die 
Volksmehrheit, sondern allein die nationalsozialistische 
Regierung, welche auf e1nem auf sie zugeschnittenen 
Wahlapparat aufgebaut ist. Das Yolk ist dann nicht mehr 
imstande, durch einen Mehrheitsbeschlu~ eine schlechte 
nationalsozialistische Regierung zu beseitigen. Mit 
brutaler Gewalt werden aIle Widerstande niedergedrUckt 
und die StaatsbUrger ihrer freien Meinungsau~erung 
beraubt. Denn das Ziel all der nationalsozialistischen 
FUhrer ist ja kein anderes, als der Besitz der Macht, der 
Macht und nichts als der Macht. 
This article (headlined 'Hitler-Sieg ware Hitler-Diktatur') ends 
with an admonition to the German electorate to take care not to 
vote the NSDAP into power, because it would not be so easy to 
remove the party thereafter: 
Nur durch schwerste ErschUtterungen und blutigen 
BUrgerkrieg konnte eine nationalsozialistische 
Diktaturregierung wieder beseitigt werden. Welcher 
denkende Deutsche kann dies aber wollen? [100] 
(20 April 1932) 
A one-party state, moreover, could only be a state riddled with 
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corruption: 
Ganz Deutschland elne Domane der Nazi, unter 
Ausschaltung jeder parlamentarischen Kontrolle und Partei; 
denn auaer der Nazidiktatur solI jede andere Partei 
aufhoren zu existieren. Adolf als Diktator, die kleinen 
AdolfB als Verwalter des deutschen Volksvermogens. Mua 
da nicht jeder Korruption und jedem Betrug Tlir und Tor 
geoffnet werden? Wo bisher Parteien und Parlamente 
Kontrollinstanzen und stete Kritik waren, da solI jedes 
freie Wort unterbunden und damit jede Gemeinheit und jeder 
Nazibeamte gedeckt sein. Das Reichsfinanzministerium als 
Kassenverwaltung der Naziparteikasse. Die SA als 
staatliche bezahlte Truppe. Die Naziflihrer und 
Naziabgeordnete als die mit diktatorischen Vollmachten 
ausgestatteten Beamten, Landrate, Polizeiprasidenten, 
Blirgermeister und stadtischen Kassierer. Arme Steuerzahler. 
(29 July 1932) [101] 
The Third Reich would then mean the end of democracy and its 
substitution by a dictatorship; it would also lead to the vitiation 
of rights and freedoms in a wider sense, Germany would become a 
police state: 
Deutschland eln Zuchthausstaat ... Kein Parlament mehr, 
keine sozialdemokratische Zeitung, Ende der 
Arbeiterbewegung, Ende des Rechts, Ende der Freiheit. 
Das deutsche Yolk ein Heer von billigen, rechtlosen und 
hungernden Sklaven, solI dazu dienen, das sterbende 
Wirtschaftssystem wieder aufzurichten. [102] 
(30 July 1932) 
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That the realisation of National Socialist desires could only mean 
a drastic curtailment of many only recently established freedoms 
was, for example, the message of an article published in March 
1930, which outlined NSDAP proposals for amendments to the 
'Republikschutzgesetz' of that year - proposals which the article 
claimed, could be read 'gewisserma~en als Verfassungsgrundlage im 
faschistischen Zuchthausstaat', and which, if they had become law, 
would have introduced a series of draconian punishments for 
offences against the German nation, culture or race such as any 
expression of the idea that Germany could be held to blame for the 
war, or marriage to a Jew. These are proposals, the article begins 
before reprinting them in full, 
... die besser als aIle Aufklarungsvortrage gegen den 
Faschismus die Arbeitermassen lehren, was sie zu erwarten 
haben, wenn die Faschisten in Deutschland zur Macht 
gelangen. 
And the propaganda purpose lS also made explicit 1n the final 
paragraph: 
Dieser Antrag, nach dem neun Zehntel des deutschen Volkes 
ins Zuchthaus gesperrt oder erschossen werden sollen, 
dieser Antrag, der die Prtigelsstrafe in Deutschland 
einflihren will, ist bezeichnenderweise unterzeichnet von 
dem thliringischen Innenminister Dr Frick. Die hier einmal 
offen ausgesprochenen Absichten der Hakenkreuzler mlissen 
das deutsche Proletariat endlich aus seiner 
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GleichgUltigkeit aufrUtteln, mU~ten das deutsche Yolk 
mobilisieren urn dem faschistischen Spuk in Deutschland bald 
ein Ende zu machen und dafUr zu sorgen, da~ die Baurne der 
Hakenkreuzler nicht in den Himmel wachsen. [103J 
(18 March 1930) 
One of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's favourite methods of 
approaching this theme, moreover, was through the sensational 
coverage given to discoveries of secret National Socialist letters 
and documents which apparently revealed the NSDAP's plans for the 
Third Reich. The infamous 'Boxheimer document' and the publicity 
it received in the Social Democratic press was an obvious instance 
of this, but just as pertinent in this context was the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's coverage - occupying the whole of the front page on 
23 July 1932 for example - of the discovery of a letter stemming 
from the NSDAP in Berlin, describing a variety of measures to be 
taken in the event of a Nazi selzure of power - measures which 
appeared to reconfirm all of the SPD's previous warnlngs about Nazi 
intentions: 
Kein KosakenfUhrer im ehemaligen zaristischen Ru~land 
hat je die Peitsche derart Uber arme, hilflose Gefangene 
geknallt, wie es dieser Hitler und seine Horden fUr das 
Dritte Reiche fUr die deutsche Arbeiterklasse und fUr das 
deutsche Yolk planen und ankUndigen. Keine 
Zuchthausverordnung von Horthy, von Mussolini und allen 
Hollen der heutigen Inseln der Verbannten kann so gesattigt 
sein von Barbarei, Schrecken und Hunger, so bar jeder 
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MenschenwUrde und jeder Menschlichkeit, Wle Jener 
Zuchthausstaat des Dritten Reiches, dessen Paragraphen und 
Verordnungen wir an Hand eines streng geheimen Dokumentes 
der Berliner Nazi Partei inzwischen veroffentlicht haben. 
Sie Ubertreffen in ihrer Brutalitat selbst das Boxheimer 
Blut-Dokument . 
... Verbot der Gewerkschaften und Ende des Arbeitsrechtes. 
Ende jeder personlichen Freiheit, Ende der 
Arbeiterbewegung, Sammellager fUr 'Arbeitsunwillige' und 
politische Gegner, mit Kriegsgefangenenkost, 
Kriegsgefangenenbehandlung und Strafkompagnien: ganz 
Deutschland ein Zuchthaus, die deutschen Arbeiter und 
Angestellten ein Sklavenheer ... Das ist das Dritte Reich 
und so ist der Plan fix und fertig. [104J (26 July 1932) 
The concept of the Third Reich in the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
thus symbolised dictatorship and a threat to basic freedoms. 
Beyond this, the effects of any Nazi government on certain groups 
within German society (such as the Jews [105]) or on Germany's 
economy [106J; or as in the following passage, which encapsulates 
well the whole approach, the potential for disruption and perhaps 
even violence in both Germany and Europe, could be emphasised: 
Hitler statt Hindenburg - das bedeutet: Chaos und Panik In 
Deutschland und ganz Europa, au~erste Verscharfung der 
Wirtschaftskrise und der Arbeitsnot, hochste Gefahr 
blutiger Auseinandersetzungen im eigenen Volke und mit dem 
Auslande. Hitler statt Hindenburg - das bedeutet: Sieg des 
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reaktionarsten Teiles der Bourgeoisie tiber die 
fortgeschrittenen Teile des Btirgertums und tiber die 
Arbeiterklasse, Vernichtung aller Staatsbtirgerlichen 
Freiheiten der Presse, der politischen, kulturellen und 
gewerkschaftlichen Organisationen, verscharfte Ausbeutung 
und Lohnsklaverei. [107] (29 February 1932) 
Nevertheless, and as this passage might also suggest, the 
overriding desire of the Schwabische Volkszeitung when discussing 
the potential specific effects of Nazism in power, was to accent 
the deterioration of the circumstances of the working class that 
would occur. As the paper stated in late 1931: 
Es geht gegenwartig nicht darum, ob die Sozialdemokratie 
ktinftig Wahlerstimmen verlieren wird oder nicht, sondern 
darum, ob die Republik, mit ihren sozialen Errungschaften 
morgen oder tibermorgen dem Faschismus ausgeliefert werden 
und an die Stelle des sozialen Volksstaates die 
faschistische Diktatur treten soll.[108] (30 December 1931) 
The whole idea of the 'social state' encompasslng concrete social 
achievements, of the much improved position of the working class In 
the Weimar Republic in comparlson with the preVlOUS era, was a 
central component of the SPD's conception of itself at this time -
for it considered itself responsible for that improvement and, 
moreover, the 'social state' provided an oft-needed reason for 
defending Weimar democracy. That the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
should portray any future Third Reich as the negation of all that 
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the 'social state' was held to signify, both in reality and as a 
symbol, is therefore .unsurprising. Thus, although many of the 
post-war advances made by the unions had already been lost by the 
early 1930s - as a consequence of both the depression and the 
partially successful attempts of right-wing circles, and especially 
the business community, to undermine the 'social state' [109J -
that their fate under Nazi rule would be drastic was clear enough 
to the SPD: 
Es sollen keine neuen Gewerkschaften gegrtindet, wahl aber 
die bestehenden Gewerkschaften von den Nationalsozialisten 
erobert und 'umgeformt' werden. Mit anderen Worten: die 
Gewerkschaften sollen durch den Faschismus ersetzt werden. 
(25 January 1932) [110J 
The condition of the working class would worsen ln other ways too. 
It was, for example, constantly asserted that the Third Reich would 
witness the introduction of a coercive 'Arbeitsdienstpflicht' -
this was the subject of a Schwabische Volkszeitung article in June 
1932, involving yet another secret Nazi document, which outlined 
the NSDAP's plans for the establishment of such a scheme to be 
administered under the command of the SA. This article also 
reported a statement by a Nazi Landtag representative, made in 
reference to the possible introduction of an 
'Arbeitsdienstpflicht', which appeared unambiguously to confirm 
that the NSDAP itself imagined the realisation of its intentions as 
a deliberate reversing of post-1918 developments: 
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Die Arbeitsdienstpflicht sei liberhaupt der wichtigste 
Abschnitt im ganzen nationalsozialistischen Programm, mit 
ihr wlirden die wichtigsten Blatter der Geschichte von 1918 
ab endgliltig vernichtet, ein neues Zeitalter breche damit 
an. (16 June 1932) 
The Social Democratic V1ew of this possible 'new age' was, though 
predictably somewhat different: 'Das neue Zeitalter hei~t 
Zuchthaus!' [111]. 
It would also mean econom1C deprivation and the loss of the 
means of political articulation for the working class - or so the 
SPD constantly prophesied. One of the means by which validity was 
g1ven to such prophecies was the frequent attention paid to those 
areas of Germany, such as Thuringia, Coburg and Brunswick, 1n which 
the NSDAP possessed some measure of governmental influence 1n the 
early 1930s, an influence claimed to have been anything but 
beneficial for the working class in those places. The 
opportunities for anti-Nazi propaganda were obvious enough, and 
nowhere more so than in the case of Wilhelm Frick's appointment to 
the position of Minister of the Interior in Thuringia. An example 
of the way in which Frick's activities were portrayed in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung was an article in early 1931, in which his 
attempts to reduce the wages of the state's employees were 
lambasted and lessons explicitly drawn from this about the position 
of the working class in the Third Reich. Under the headlines 
'Naziminister kommandiert Lohnabbau! So arbeitet das Dritte 
Reich!' the article begins: 
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Wie wird es den Arbeitern und Angestellten im Dritten 
Reich gehen. Antwort: Dreckig! Wer das nicht glaubt, 
mua durch den Lohndruck des thtiringischen Nazi-
Innenminister und Vorsitzenden der Nazifraktion 1m 
Reichstag Dr Frick eines Bessern belehrt werden. 
And, after describing 1n detail Frick's actions, it concludes: 
Die arbeiterfeindliche Haltung des von e1nem 
Nationalsozialisten geftihrten thtiringischen 
Innenministeriums ist vollig offenkundig. AIle Arbeiter 
und Angestellten, die den Nazis in Thtiringen oder sonst 
zur Macht verholfen haben sehen hier, wohin die 
Hitler-Reise geht. [112J (12 January 1931) 
Similar judgements were equally as often made about the Nazis 1n 
Brunswick - for example from February 1932: 
Was Herrschaft des Faschismus bedeutet, dartiber haben 
wir auch nicht mehr den geringsten Zweifel. Wo der 
Faschismus seine Herrschaft errichtet hat, dort ist das 
Proletariat rechtlos. Wir konnen in Braunschweig heute 
nicht ein Flugblatt verteilen, geschweige denn Kundgebungen 
veranstalten. Sogar Umzlige unserer Kinderfreunde werden 
verboten, weil Sle angeblich die 'offentliche Sicherheit 
gefahrden' [113J (22 February 1932) 
But of course this technique of focusing upon the NSDAP 1n 
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positions of power was only one aspect of the general hammering 
home of the message about working-class prospects in a Nazi-ruled 
Germany. Another interesting instance of this, was the use made by 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung of a secret meeting held in Augsburg 
in the Autumn of 1931 between the NSDAP and Augsburg's leading 
businessmen and industrialists, at which the party's economic and 
industrial policies were expounded to the invited audience. This 
meeting, one of several which took place in Augsburg in the period, 
was portrayed as a confirmation of Nazi intentions towards the 
working class [114]. The 'true face' of National Socialism was 
held to have been uncovered, one which consisted in the desire to 
remove the rights of the working class and to destroy the whole of 
the German labour movement in the event of a 'Machtergreifung'. 
According to the newspaper's account, those present were promised a 
full scale assault on the 'burden' of the social state, on wages, 
and on working-class bargaining power in the workplace. 
What this would constitute, as far as the SPD was concerned, 
was slavery, and it was this idea that National Socialism sought to 
enslave the working class, to subordinate it in order to make it 
malleable, that became one of the main motifs of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's anti-Nazi polemics in the final months of the Weimar 
Republic. Thus, the expose of the NSDAP's post-Machtergreifung 
plans published in July 1932 and referred to above, was informed by 
just such a rhetoric of enslavement - an enslavement again 
conceived as a turning back of history, a forced return to pre-war 
circumstances: 
Die Arbeiterschaft solI versklavt werden! Die Lohne 
90 
sollen auf den Stand vom Jahr 1900 zurlickgeflihrt werden. 
Hart es, ihr Werktatigen! Das Hakenkreuz will euch urn 30 
Jahre zurlickwerfen! Ihr sol It verlieren, was ihr euch 
mlihselig erhungert und erkampft habt! Zurlick zurn Jahre 
1900! Kein auswartiger Feind hat es gewagt, euch mit der 
Hungerknute in solcher Form zu drohen! Das drohen euch 
Hitler und Goebbels an! Hakenkreuz ist Hungerkreuz. [115J 
(23 July 1932) 
The social state and its provisions, wage levels, the trade unions 
- in other words the perceived core of the Social Democratic 
achievement would be obliterated and, as had been declared on the 
front page of the Schwabische Volkszeitung a few weeks earlier, 
'two nations' would be created: 
Die letzen Wochen zeigten euch, was das 'Dritte Reich' 
bringen wird. Wer nichts besitzt, ist vogelfrei. Wer 
wenig hat, dem solI auch das Wenige genommen werden ... 
... So klindigt sich das 'Dritte Reich' an, in dem die 
Todfeinde des werktatigen Volkes nach ihrer Willklir 
herrschen wollen, das Deutschland, in dem es zweierlei 
Recht und zwe1 Nationen gibt: die Nation der Bevorrechteten 
und die Nation der Hungerlahner und Almosenempfanger. [116J 
(23 June 1932) 
Now, the potency of such rhetoric - of, indeed the material 
that has been referred to thus far as a whole - should be clear 
enough: the Schwabische Volkszeitung's readership could hardly have 
been in doubt about the fate of Germany and the German working 
class under National Socialist rule, although the precise nature of 
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the cumulative effect that the barrage of anti-Nazi propaganda had 
should not be taken for granted and must be considered more 
carefully later. As already mentioned, however, the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung,s grasp of the Nazi threat and its determination to 
highlight that threat, was demonstrated not only by the constant 
predictions it made about the shape any future Third Reich would 
take and the symbolic weight the idea of the 'Third Reich' came to 
carry, but also by the space the newspaper devoted to informing its 
readers about events in Mussolini's Italy, the use, as a warnlng, 
to which this trenchant example of fascism ln power, was put. And 
the primary propaganda function which Fascist Italy served was, 
overwhelmingly, as a reinforcement of the message that for the 
working class fascism could only be debilitating - the intentions 
and behaviour of the NSDAP in Germany were paralleled with the 
realities - or at any rate, what were claimed as the realities - of 
life for the working class in Italy, and the obvious conclusions 
drawn: 
Die larmenden Horden der Hakenkreuzler, die mit 
demagogischer Agitation und blutigem Terror durch die 
deutschen Lande ziehen, an die niedrigsten Instinkte 
appellieren, schie~en und morden, sind getreues Abbild 
der Italienischen Faschisten. Hier Wle dort gilt nicht 
das Recht und die Vernunft, sondern die Gewalt, die 
Gewalttat. Hier wie dort gilt mangels geistiger Waffen 
und Uberzeugungskraft der Idee die hirnlose Anbetung der 
terroristischen Faust. Versklavung der Freiheit und 
freien Meinungsau~erung, Zerschlagen der Rechte des 
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werktatigen Volkes, Begeisterung fUr den Militarismus, 
Sieg durch Demagogie und LUge, durch Terror und Mord, 
das sind die hervorstechendsten Merkmale des italienischen 
wle des deutschen Faschismus. [117] (15 July 1930) 
Or more bluntly, from an article headlined 'Hitler, der kleine 
Mussolini' in which it is asserted that National Socialism's use of 
violence is a conscious apeing of Mussolini's methods: 
Mussolini will bewupt die sozialistischen Arbeiter durch 
Gewaltstreiche einschUchtern und ihre Widerstandskraft 
brechen. Das gleiche Ziel verfolgt die 'Sturmtruppe' 
Adolf Hitlers. [118] (25 July 1930) 
Of course, Social Democratic interest in Italian developments 
predated National Socialism's resurgence [119]; and indeed, even 
before explicit connections were being drawn to events in Germany, 
the main emphasis in reports about Fascist Italy was on the 
limitations on working-class freedoms and the undermining of the 
economic position of the working class that had occurred there 
[120]. However the initial paralleling of National Socialism with 
Fascism in the late 1920s, was overlaid with a tone of mockery -
the implication being that for a party as seemingly insignificant 
as the NSDAP to have pretensions to rule Germany as Fascism now 
ruled Italy, was simply laughable [121]. Most often this ridicule 
was expressed through the use of descriptions of Hitler as 'der 
Duce von MUnchen', 'Mussolini der kleine' [122] or 'der deutsche 
Mussolini' [123] - with memories of the debacle of 1923 still very 
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much alive (indeed the Beer Hall Putsch was continually referred to 
in the Social Democratic press) this mock-heroicisation of Hitler 
must have been an effective tactic. Nevertheless, that there 
existed a core of similarity hetween German National Socialism and 
'its Roman brother, Fascism' [124] had been established - a 
consequence, in part, of Nazism's own consciousness of such 
similarities, its own emulatory desires: 
Mit leuchtenden Augen weist jeder Naziot auf die 
Verbundenheit der Hitlerbewegung mit dem faschistischen 
Regime in Italien hin. Dabei schwingt das stolze 
Bewu~tsein mit, Mussolinis Experiment eines Tages auf 
Deutschland zu Ubertragen. Abwechselnd laden sich auf 
diesem Grunde Nazi - und Stahlhelm - Delegationen 
demutsvoll nach Rom ein und Hitler kopiert mit Flei~, 
wenn auch mit wenig Erfolg, sein romisches Vorbild. [125] 
(2 September 1931) 
And as the strength of the NSDAP began to increase alarmingly, so 
too did the seriousness of the comparison: 
Die Nazisozi reprasentieren nicht nur den 'Sozialismus 
der dummen Kerle', sie sind auch Todfeinde des heutigen 
Staates seiner demokratischen Grundlage wegen. Sie 
schwarmen fUr den Faschismus a la Mussolini, den Sle In 
deutscher Nachahmung verschlimmern wollen. [126] 
(7 May 1931) 
Thus, the recognition of a commonality of nature and purpose 
between Nazism and Fascism merged with a pre-existent interest In 
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Italian affairs, to produce a regular emphasis on the usefulness of 
Fascist Italy as a prophetic model, a reinforcement of the SPD's 
warnings about Nazi intentions. Before this is examined in a 
little more detail, though, it must first be said that the concept 
of 'fascism' as it appeared ln the Schwabische Volkszeitung - and 
the generlc term was used, and was applied to other right-wing 
movements in Europe besides those in Germany and Italy - was hardly 
a sophisticated one, it was not deployed as a precise theoretical 
concept. Rather 'fascism' simply meant a desired subjugation of 
the working class, it was a catch-all term of condemnation for any 
political group perceived as representing an anti-working-class 
ideology - the German reactionary right as a whole, as gathered 
together in the 'Harzburg Front' was, for example, frequently 
described as fascist [127J. 
That the use of the term fascism was fairly indiscriminate, 
however, in the context of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's aims, 
matters as little as the accuracy of the detailed critiques to be 
found in the paper of, say, the state of the Italian economy under 
Fascism: the point is that, again, the threat of National Socialism 
can be seen not to have been underestimated, that a wider, if 
basic, conception of fascism and an awareness of the situation ln 
Italy provided a further context within which the NSDAP could be 
evaluated, within which the potential extent of Nazism's 
destructive energy could be strikingly impressed upon the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's readership. And although the affinity 
between Nazism and Fascism provided a variety of angles from which 
the former could be attacked - it was, for instance, often asserted 
that aspects of Hitler's foreign policy proposals were, to the 
95 
possible detriment of German interests, conditioned by a partiality 
towards the Fascist regime [128J - it was, as has already been 
said, as a further layer of almost minatory propaganda that the 
material on Italy was utilised; the implications of Nazi policies 
and behaviour could in this way be removed from the realm of theory 
and speculation and g1ven a concrete grounding (even if Italian 
realities could never have been quite as grim as the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's dark prophecies had made it clear the Third Reich 
would be). 
Thus, and unsurprisingly, Italy as it appeared 1n the 
newspaper was, firstly, a land without freedom: 
Die Geschichte des Sieges des Faschismus in Italien ist 
die Geschichte des Untergangs der Freiheit des 
italienischen Proletariats und der freiheitlich gesinnten 
.Bourgeoisie, sie ist die Geschichte der Vergewaltigung 
der MenschenwUrde durch ein barbarisches System, das auf 
politischer Sklaverei beruht. Wir kampfen jetzt gegen 
den Faschismus in Deutschland! Wir wollen nicht Terror, 
nicht politische Rechtlosigkeit, nicht UnterdrUckung des 
klassenbewu~ten Proletariats . 
... In Italien, unter der Knute Mussolinis, gibt es 
keine freie Arbeiterpartei mehr, kein Koalitionsrecht, 
kein politisches Recht, kein Recht der freien Vereinigung 
und Versammlung. Wer es wagen wtirde, eine sozialistische 
Partei organisieren zu wollen, wtirde in den Kerker fliegen. 
Das will Hitler fUr Deutschland! [129J (12 March 1932) 
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The NSDAP's programme was nothing more than a 'Salat a la 
Mussolini'. And: 
Dieser Salat a Mussolini ist es, dem zuliebe unsere 
BrUder in Italien auf die liparischen Inseln, in die 
Gefangisse und Zuchthauser gebracht werden, fUr den die 
Freiheit niedergeschlagen und Italian in einen 
TrUmmerhaufen politischer Freiheit verwandelt wurde. [130] 
(22 February 1932) 
Italy had become, moreover, a land in economic decline, a land of 
homelessness and poverty [131]; a land ln which working-class wages 
were the worst in Europe [132]; a land ln which Fascism had 
achieved its victory only by posing as anti-capitalist and 
sympathetic to the workers, only to betray a rather different 
reality by its actions once in power [133] - and the similarity of 
this idea of Fascism with the SPD's conception of National 
Socialism's political tactics shall be discussed shortly; and, as a 
the most effective warnlng signals to Germany's working class of 
what Nazism victorious would mean for its rights and freedoms: 
Der deutsche Faschismus hat selne Floskeln und 
Agitationsmethoden Herrn Mussolini abgeschaut, der bis 
1924 von den Alpen bis nach Sizilien gezogen ist und 
gepredigt hat. Die Gewerkschaftsbonzen, die Sozialisten, 
verraten euch an das internationale Kapital. Gebt mir die 
Macht, und ich bringe euch den Sozialismus. Ein Teil des 
italienschen Proletariats hat das geglaubt. Das Ergebnis: 
Heute ist der italienische Prolet am niedrigsten entlohnt, 
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steuerlich am meisten belastet und sozialpolitisch am 
starksten beraubt unter den Proleten Europas. 
Das Schicksal der italienischen Klassengenossen ist das 
starkste Warnungszeichen. [134] (6 July 1932) 
This idea of Fascism as a warn1ng slgn could even extend to a more 
elaborate paralleling of Mussolini's actions with Hitler's designs: 
thus in a front page article published in August 1932 (entitled 
'Adolfo Schmussolini') a detailed comparison is drawn between 
Hitler's political position at that time and Mussolini's after the 
march on Rome. Hitler, it was claimed, was following Mussolini's 
model by attempting to use his present strength in order to attain 
an initial power base from which he could then implement a similar 
suffocation of opposition to that which had occurred in Italy. In 
August 1932, of course, it appeared that Hindenburg was not 
prepared to play the role that King Victor Emmanual III had played 
in Italy, that he was determined, from whatever motives, to 
withstand the Nazi movement's pressure. The very example of Victor 
Emmanual however, was highlighted by the article as well 
illustrating the potential for disaster that would be generated if 
Hindenburg were to give 1n to this pressure - for had not 
Mussolini's appointment been seen by the Italian King as no more 
than a temporary expedient, only to find himself powerless to 
prevent Mussolini dictating the course of developments? To give 
Hitler any degree of authority, however seemingly limited, would be 
to court similar catastrophe for Germany: this, for the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, was the most useful lesson that could be learned from 
Italian events, as German democracy threatened to implode. [135J 
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And yet, as is well known, precisely this lesson was not 
learned by the SPD: although it was certainly not alone in doing 
so, the party itself, as will be discussed in greater detail later, 
underestimated Hitler 1n 1933, it did not act on the assumption 
that Hitler would use his position as Chancellor to consolidate and 
extend his power, but rather assumed the opposite, that is that 
National Socialism had been tamed, hemmed in by traditional 
conservatism. The Italian parallel may have been a potent 
propaganda device, but it seems to have exercised little effect on 
actual political strategy. And indeed, this is the fundamental 
paradox within which the Schwabische Volkszeitung's engagement with 
Nazism finds, in retrospect, its historical context: the extent to 
which the SPD was acutely aware of the threat of National 
Socialism, and was anxious to convey the reality of that threat to 
its rank-and-file support is, from the historian's perspective, 
always undercut by the knowledge of the party's inaction after 
Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, by the - at least on the 
surface - blatant contradiction between the virulent polemics which 
had been a mainstay of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's output during 
the preV10US years, and the paralysis of Social Democracy after 
January 1933. The propaganda themes that have just been outlined 
have not been subjected here to detailed scrutiny, the accuracy of 
the prophecies about the Third Reich or of the claims about Fascist 
Italy has not been considered - and with reason, for what has to be 
established is, more simply, the way in which these themes were 
used, as they were continually, to underline the enormity of the 
danger National Socialism represented. Thus the most striking 
aspect of the confrontation of the SPD with the NSDAP, as it was 
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reflected ln the Schwabische Volkszeitung, is not a failure to 
recognlse the danger, but rather how little influence the continual 
emphasis on that danger was to have when decisions were made by the 
SPD's leadership after the Nazi seizure of power; the elaborate and 
precise portrayal of the threat posed by National Socialism 
developed in response to the latter's growth, and the possible 
effect that portrayal may have had on the SPD's rank and file, 
seems to have little impact in determining the party's response to 
National Socialist attack in 1933. 
As a wider spectrum of material from the newspaper is 
assessed, moreover, this sense of inherent contradiction will be 
deepened: for, not only will the Schwabische Volkszeitung's attempt 
to arm its readership ideologically and politically against Nazism 
be confirmed, but it will also be argued that this attempt would 
have been effective in ensuring that a consciousness of what a Nazi 
Germany would mean for them would have been created amongst 
Augsburg's dedicated Social Democrats. More than this, indeed, it 
will even be suggested that a significant number of these latter 
would have been willing physically to defend the achievements of 
the working class, had indeed been psychologically prepared for 
this eventuality which was ln many ways the logical conclusion of 
the whole tenor of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's treatment of 
Nazism. Thus it must be made clear that the historian's desire to 
examine the flaws in the SPD's analysis of National Socialism, or 
indeed the existence of such flaws, does not preclude the 
possibility that the essentially propagandistic articulation this 
analysis found in the Schwabische Volkszeitung was efficacious in a 
contemporary context where sophisticated intellectual discussion 
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necessarily often took second place to the needs of the moment. It 
is, in fact, the very probability that anti-Nazi propaganda was 
successful, that it did influence rank-and-file Social Democrats, 
and the contrast this makes with the immobility of the SPD after 
the Nazis' seizure of power that constitutes the kernel of the 
historical puzzle which is being addressed in this thesis. It also 
opens up a further, potentially fertile area for analysis: for if 
there did exist a greater clarity and simplicity of view amongst 
the SPD's core support ln the confrontation with the NSDAP, a 
clarity and simplicity encouraged by the leadership and the shapers 
of opinion within the movement, but which ultimately found no 
outlet, the result, it might be expected, would have been 
disaffection, disaffection that would have had a particular 
opportunity to flourish in the final months of Weimar and in the 
first months of Nazi dictatorship: this however can only be 
considered after the full variety of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
engagement with National Socialism has been discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3 : The working-class constituency as contested ground: the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's attack on Nazi "socialism". 
The NSDAP, however, was not merely perceived by the SPD as a 
threat in purely political and oppositional terms - that 1S, as a 
movement which adhered to a philosophy hostile to all that German 
Social Democracy represented and which counted as one of its main 
aims the destruction of the 'Marxist' SPD; for 1n the area of 
ideology, in the NSDAP's use of the concept of socialism and its 
exploitation of socialist rhetoric, there is to be found in the 
Schwiibische Volkszeitung the, at least implicit, acceptance that 
National Socialism also constituted another type of threat, as a 
very real competitor for the constituency that the SPD considered 
as its own. The confrontation between the SPD and the NSDAP was 
never one of simple oppositions. Thus, however much the NSDAP was 
characterised and caricatured as middle class, as 'spie~ilrgerlich' 
in the Schwabische Volkszeitung, that newspaper's own responses to 
Nazism betray the level of anxiety the SPD felt about National 
Socialism's ability to penetrate into both the traditional core of 
Social Democratic support and the newly 'proletarianised' middle 
class. Hence, it is the effect this anxiety exercised on the SPD's 
analysis of Nazism that will be considered in this chapter - for it 
led above all to that determination to disprove the NSDAP's claims 
to be socialist, that obsessive need to demonstrate that National 
'Socialism' was nothing more than an insincerely used political 
tool and to refute the idea that the NSDAP was 1n any true sense a 
'workers' party', which was a constant feature of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's coverage of Nazism. The desire to discredit the 
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idea of Nazi socialism could indeed be said to have been the englne 
driving the Social Democratic analysis, the defining feature 
shaping its main contours. 
The implications of this are certainly far-reaching. For one 
thing, the SPD's worries about the possible inroads National 
Socialism was making into the working class would appear to be at 
least a partial confirmation of that recent trend in historical 
interpretation [136] that has sought to stress the significant 
working-class presence in the NSDAP, and the extent to which Nazi 
propaganda aimed at mobilising support from that class, certainly 
through vicious attacks on the established labour movement, but 
also by propounding a quasi-socialist message in tune with working-
class desires and discontents [137]. This theme, furthermore, also 
reveals much about the SPD as a political organisation - not only 
in the ways in which it found an expression in a newspaper like the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, but also through the theoretical 
expectations that were obviously at work in its formulation. Above 
all the theory-driven expectation that the totality of the working 
class should support the SPD is present here, as well as, as 
mentioned already above, the belief that if sectors of the middle 
class had become 'proletarianised' then they too would find a 
natural home in the party [138]. These expectations may have been 
all too obviously belied by reality throughout the Weimar era, but 
the point is that the SPD, at least publicly, never discarded this 
idea of a natural constituency - and thus, as will be seen when the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's depiction of the social bases of Nazi 
support is discussed, the existence of the working-class Nazi posed 
particular problems for the SPD, reluctant as it was to admit that 
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a party such as the NSDAP could garner support amongst the working 
class. That there was, however, at least a suppressed recognition 
of the latter fact, and that this was felt to be a challenge to the 
very heart of the Social Democratic identity, 1S precisely what the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's persistent attack on the NSDAP's 
socialist fa~ade discloses. For all its dismissals of the 
movement's socialism as sham, for all its disbelief that any 
worker, particularly any worker schooled in the traditions of the 
labour movement, could be 'seduced' by Nazism, in reality the 
discomfort the NSDAP caused the SPD was in large part a consequence 
of the fact that both parties were engaged in a struggle for the 
support of the working class - a struggle in which the SPD was 
forced onto the defensive in its attempt to retain the allegiance 
of that proportion of the working class which constituted its core 
support, and to maintain, at least to its own satisfaction, the 
validity of the concept of a wider, 'natural' constituency [139J. 
At the centre of that attempt did indeed lie a constantly 
repeated assault on the NSDAP's credibility as any kind of true 
workers' party or valid socialist alternative to the SPD. In the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung this was couched in a rhetoric of exposure 
- exposure of the cynical deception that was Nazi socialism to 
reveal the rather different reality this deception was intended to 
disguise. The favourite metaphor for the NSDAP's instrumental use 
of socialist or radical propaganda was its description as a 'mask', 
an 'antikapitalistische Maske' [140J and the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's aim was to rip away this mask in order to lay bare 
the 'true face' of the Nazi 'deceivers'. A front page article from 
late 1931, for example (entitled 'Betrtiger. ReiBt ihnen die Maske 
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herunter! ') quotes a paragraph with a seemingly anti-capitalist hue 
from Feder's National Socialist 'programme', and continues: 
Diese Satze sind ein Musterbeispiel fUr die verlogene 
Nazi-Propaganda. Sie sind die 'sozialistische' Larve, 
die die Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 'Arbeiter' -
Partei, diese Partei mit dem falschen Namen, mit den 
vielen auswechselbaren Masken aufsetzt, wenn S1e zu dem 
'Arbeitertum' spricht, wenn sie den radikalen 
Kapitalistenfresser mimt, wenn sie antikapitalistische 
Hetzreden vor Arbeitern und Angestellten halt urn - ihre 
schimpfliche Stellung als Soldknechte des internationalen 
Kapitalismus zu vernebeln. [141] (20 October 1931) 
In short, 1n another context: 
So sieht der Sozialismus der Hakenkreuzler in Wirklichkeit 
aus! Ihre sozialistische Redeweise entspringt nicht der 
Gesinnung, sie ist lediglich ein Mittel des Betruges, urn 
Arbeiter fUr Unternehmerzwecke einzufangen. [142] 
(12 June 1930) 
Even before the NSDAP was taken seriously as a threat by the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, the desire to undermine its false 
pretensions to being either a socialist or a workers' party was 
present in the newspaper: thus the practice of using inverted 
commas when referring to the NSDAP - National 'Sozialismus', 
National 'Sozialisten', 'Arbeiter' Partei - was commonplace even 1n 
early 1928. And as the shape of the party's political strategy 
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became more obvious to the Schwabische Volkszeitung, so this 
simplistic technique was supplemented with a developing analysis 
which sought to highlight for the paper's readership the true 
purpose of the Nazi appropriation of aspects of socialism - thus, 
for example, an article in July 1929 which ridiculed the NSDAP's 
assumed pose of 'wild anti-capitalism' [143], or the following from 
October of the same year in which Nazi socialism 1S, typically 
enough, viewed as an enticement, a lure for the unsuspecting: 
Der 'Sozialismus' Hitler aber ist Phrase, ist Kader fur 
die Massen der noch nicht marxistischen Arbeitnehmer und 
Intellektuellen, welche die uberlebten burgerlichen 
Parteien aller Schattierungen nicht mehr zu halten vermocht 
haben. [144] (14 October 1929) 
Also typical was the idea expressed here that above all workers and 
intellectuals who were 'not yet' Marxist and who had become 
disenchanted with the 'bourgeois' parties, were especially 
susceptible to this strain of the Nazi message; for the reluctance 
to admit openly the existence of the very real fear that even 
workers from within the Social Democratic tradition could be 
attracted by the NSDAP's pseudo-socialism, permeated the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's handling of this theme, even as the 
increasing urgency with which it strove to emphasise its false 
nature seemed to be a consequence of just such a fear. It was, of 
course, more convenient and more desirable in propaganda terms to 
present the SPD's support as an unbreakable fortress, and to locate 
the groups misled by the NSDAP's use of socialist rhetoric in the 
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marglns of potential SPD support. This tendency is again evident 
in the reaction of the Schwabische Volkszeitung to the unexpected 
success of the NSDAP in the Saxony Landtag election of June 1930, 
one of the defining moments at which the potential threat posed by 
Nazism became clear: 
Die Nationalsozialisten haben den Wahlkampf In Sachsen 
vorwiegend mit sozialistischer Phraseologie bestritten. 
Sie haben aus propagandistischen GrUnden an der Maifeier 
teilgenommen! Sie haben dennoch nicht vermocht 
Sozialdemokratie und Kommunisten nennenswert zu schwachen. 
Aber sie haben jene Massen aus den bUrgerlichen Parteien 
an sich gezogen, die klassenma~ig nicht zum BUrgertum 
gehoren. Sie haben mit ihrem primitiven Sozialismus der 
Phrase auf die Schichten gewirkt, die im Laufe der Krise 
proletarisiert worden sind . 
... diese Wahlerschaft wird zu ganz anderen Zwecken als 
zu sozialistischen von den FUhrern der Nationalsozialisten 
gebraucht. Siehe ThUringen! [145] (23 June 1930) 
The inevitable denial of any weakening of the two parties of the 
left in the face of a successful Nazi offensive is, though, here 
accompanied by a pained awareness that the NSDAP was beginning to 
intrude on territory that the SPD liked to think of as theirs 
alone. And although later, as shall be seen, the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung could not but admit the existence of the working-class 
Nazi, at this point there is a sense in which the example of the 
proletarianised middle class was being used in an attempt to 
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counteract the possibility that National Socialism could achieve a 
breakthrough into the organised working class, a possibility that, 
given the SPD's self-image, could not be easily articulated. An 
awareness of the SPD's failure to attract the support of 
disaffected middle-class elements was certainly apparent 1n the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung: 
Die sozialistischen Parteien ... konnen nicht langer 
zusehen da~ die Hunderttausende proletarisierter Blirgerlich 
- Nationaler statt in ihr eigenes Lager in die Reihen der 
Pseudosozialisten wandern. [146J (27 June 1930) 
It seems highly likely, however, that Social Democratic anxiety 
about the effectiveness of the NSDAP's socialist sloganeering 
extended well beyond this particular stratum - an anxiety that 
could only increase as the NSDAP made ever greater advances. 
The techniques through which the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
demonstrated the insincerity of this particular strand of Nazi 
rhetoric were, as will be shown 1n a moment, various, but the 
underlying reality of National Socialism the newspaper claimed to 
be exposing was always the same, that is the reality of a movement 
that was implacably hostile to the organised working class, that 
had plans for Germany that would be disastrous for working-class 
interests. Far from being socialist, Augsburg's Social Democratic 
Blirgermeister was reported as saY1ng in late 1929, the Nazi 
movement represented no more than 
... den Versuch des Kapitalismus, die gelbe Bewegung der 
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Vergangenheit durch diese neugelbe Bewegung der Gegenwart 
zu ersetzen, es ist nichts anderes als der Versuch, die 
Arbeiterklasse zu zersplittern ... [147] (29 November 1929) 
(This reference to the yellow un10n movement would, of course, 
glven Augsburg's recent history, have had a particular resonance). 
This type of depiction of the NSDAP is in little need of expansion 
here; what is more interesting is the way in which the idea of the 
Nazi use of a socialist fagade was located within the more general, 
overarching theoretical structure outlined at the start of this 
work. That 1S to say, the undermining of the NSDAP's credibility 
1n this sphere was not only a practical political necessity, it was 
also a theoretical inevitability as an aspect of the capitalist 
conspiracy within which Nazism was embroiled: 
Schwachung der Sozialdemokratie war das Kampfziel des 
Blirgertums bei der Wahl am 14. September. Urn es zu 
erreichen, forderten Gro~agrarier und Gro~kapitalisten 
den Nationalismus und Kommunismus , die sich aufgeregt als 
die radikalsten Gegner des Kapitalismus aufspielen, die 
in Wirklichkeit aber seine besten Werkzeuge sind. [148] 
(19 September 1930) 
Thus even if this aspect of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's coverage 
certainly began as a genuine reaction to a perceived threat to the 
SPD's own constituency, its development took place within the wider 
theoretical construct, it was rapidly assimilated into the fixed 
analysis through which the NSDAP was evaluated - and thus became 
inter-connected with Social Democratic beliefs about the funding of 
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National Socialism, the agency theory of capitalist control, the 
nature of working-class Nazis and National Socialist supporters in 
general. 
This indeed is an instance of the way in which the SPD's 
theories about Nazism became self-justifying: for one of the main 
proofs adduced by the Schwabische Volkszeitung of the falsity of 
National "Socialism" was the 'fact' that the movement was heavily 
financed - and hence controlled - by big business. This 
misconception about the financial basis of the NSDAP was ln many 
ways the lynchpin of the whole Social Democratic analysis and as 
such will be examined in detail in the next chapter; here though 
what is to be noted is the use of this absolute conviction that 
National Socialism was funded by big business to underscore the 
insincerity of the movement's anti-capitalist rhetoric: the 
contradiction between these two elements of Nazism was in the eyes 
of the Schwabische Volkszeitung, too blatant to pass unnoticed. 
Thus, for example, in October 1929, putative new evidence about the 
capitalist financial backers of National Socialism is said to 
demonstrate 
da~ die Hitler - Leute es sehr gut miteinander vereinbaren 
konnen, in den Versammlungen und in ihrer Presse gegen die 
'Kapitalisten' loszuwettern und Sle gleichzeitig recht 
kraftig zur UnterstUtzung ihrer Bewegung in Anspruch zu 
nehmen. [ 1 49] (28 October 1928) 
The sub-text, as always, is that such financial support would only 
be forthcoming for a purpose, a purpose far removed from the 
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NSDAP's socialist rhetoric, which was no more than a method for 
ensnaring the working class for reactionary purposes: 
Vor den wissenden Geldgebern erklaren die Herrn Nazis 
lachelnd: 'Unser Sozialismus ist nur Mittel zurn Zweck, urn 
an die Massen heranzukommen'. [150] (20 October 1931) 
And more fully, from an article which referred agaln to the Nazis' 
seemingly radical demands: 
Die Nazis nennen sich Sozialisten, obwohl Sle von wahrem 
Sozialismus nicht einen Hauch versptirt haben. Mit allen 
diesen schonklingenden Forderungen ist es den 
Nationalsozialisten nicht ernst, darf es ihnen nicht ernst 
sein, denn sie mtissen nach der Pfeife tanzen, die die 
arbeiterfeindlichen Industriellen blasen. [151] 
(26 November 1929) 
Emphasising this supposed contradiction was not, though, the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's only method of exposing the sham nature 
of the NSDAP's socialism, and the frequency, and variety of 
contexts, in which this was done reveals just how anxious the 
newspaper was to drive this particular message home to its 
readership. The types of prophecy about the Third Reich that were 
examined above, for example, were certainly used in this way, as 
was one of the themes that will be examined further later in this 
work, that lS, National Socialist violence: witness the following 
quote taken from the midst of a more general diatribe against the 
Nazi tendency to favour the fist over the intellect: 
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Die Bestialitat kann sich kaum noch beherrschen, S1e kann 
kaum den Tag erwarten, bis sie die sozialdemokratischen 
Arbeiterftihrer an den Laternenpfahlen aufhangen kann. 
Und diese Leute bringen es fertig, gleichzeitig den 
Arbeitern vorzumachen, da~ sie den Sozialismus erstreben. 
Nie ist mit dem Wort 'Sozialismus' ein gro~erer Unfug 
getrieben worden, als in diesen Tagen von den 
Nationalsozialisten. [152] (24 July 1930) 
It was indeed the general tactic of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung in this area of the propaganda battle, to strive to 
demonstrate the gulf that separated 'socialist' words from the 
actual deeds of the NSDAP; the Nazi movement was continually 
accused of hypocrisy, of betraying its radical promises, of 
revealing its true self through its actions. The aim, in short, 
was to prove of the National Socialists 
... da~ ihre Taten im schneidenden Widerspruch zu ihren 
Worten stehen. Soziale Gesinnung ist nur eine Maske, 
hinter der sich reaktionare und kapitalistenfreundliche 
Gesinnung verbergen. [153] (8 January 1931) 
This could take the form of highlighting fairly m1nor 
instances of hypocrisy: thus an article in May 1930 which claimed 
that the NSDAP was acting in contradiction of the 'socialist' 
aspects of its party programme - specifically the professed 
intention of 'breaking' the 'Zinsknechtschaft' - by accepting an 
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advert from a bank for the Volkischer Beobachter [154J. The 
failure of the movement to realise the anti-capitalist aspects of 
its election promises was, similarly, frequently castigated - the 
NSDAP was accused of uSlng socialist rhetoric as a convenient 
campalgnlng tool and dropping it thereafter [155J. And connected 
with this was the attention paid to the activities of the Nazi 
Reichstag group, where, again, every opportunity was taken to 
contrast propaganda with the voting behaviour and the general 
demeanour of the NSDAP's representatives [156J. Generalisations 
were drawn, moreover, from the experiences of individuals within 
the Nazi movement, particularly from the experiences of duped and 
disillusioned working-class Nazis - thus after relating the rather 
involved history of just such a working-class Nazi living ln a 
Thuringian city, the Schwabische Volkszeitung concluded: 
Und dieses verbrecherische Spiel an elnem Arbeiter leistete 
sich elne Organisation, die sich 'Arbeiterpartei' nennt. 
Pfui Teufel! Mit ihrem neuesten Skandal, der aile 
bisherigen Korruptionsaffaren dieser Partei Ubertrifft, 
haben die Hitlerianer ihren wahren Charakter in einer Weise 
offenbart, die nicht mehr das geringste zu wlinschen Ubrig 
la~t: Sie haben sich der Offentlichkeit als das 
vorgestellt, was sie sind, als verbrecherische Ausbeuter 
unserer Proleten! [157J (27 August 1930) 
The preClse details of 'case histories' like this, and even their 
veracity, are of less interest than the confirmation they provide 
of the SPD's agenda in this area, of the illustration they give of 
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the variety of means by which the lesson that Nazism's socialist 
appearance was deceptive was constantly being reinforced. The 
Schwabische Volkszeitung was, indeed, even quite willing to use 
material lifted from the newspapers or pamphlets of dissident Nazi 
groups, accusing the NSDAP of betraying the movement's original 
socialism by allying with reaction and big business, in order to 
make its point [158]. It was, though, always those instances ln 
which National Socialists themselves were discovered revealing the 
insincerity of their radical rhetoric, that were reported with the 
greatest relish - as when, in January 1932, the newspaper published 
a letter from a leading Nazi in Dresden to a factory owner in 
Weimar, in which the former admitted that the NSDAP was cynically 
using socialist slogans in order to garner working-class support. 
In reply to the factory owner's worries about the seeming 
radicalism of the Nazi movement, the letter states: 
Lassen Sie sich doch nicht immer von dem Text unserer 
offentlichen Plakate beirren! Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel 
Also ~ verstehen Sie nur recht: Wir mUssen die Sprache 
der verbitterten sozialistischen Arbeiter sprechen, urn 
selbige an uns zu ziehen, sonst wUrden sie sich nicht bei 
uns zu Hause fUhlen. Mit einem direkten Programm 
marschieren wir nicht auf - aus diplomatischen GrUnden -
das behalten wir uns vor. [159] (21 January 1931) 
To the Schwabische Volkszeitung, naturally enough, such 'diplomacy' 
was no more than 'mendacity' that 'stank to the heavens'. 
It was, though, not only the actions of the NSDAP and of 
114 
individual Nazis that were used by the Schwabische Volkszeitung to 
discredit the movement's socialist rhetoric, for there were also 
other available avenues of attack that played more heavily on 
straightforward class resentments, especially effective, no doubt, 
at a time when such resentments were exacerbated by economic 
depression. Thus, the supposedly brazen contradiction between Nazi 
propaganda and Hitler's luxurious lifestyle - a concept which, 
whether reality or falsehood, functioned as a potent myth in the 
Social Democratic press - was often highlighted. There was, 
indeed, a belief from quite an early stage that the NSDAP was 
deliberately fostering Hitler's image in such a way as to ga1n or 
retain credibility as a 'good proletarian figure' [160J; the task 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung set itself, therefore, was the 
destruction of that image, as 1n the following example, in which 
the appeal to class instincts lS crudely apparent: 
Die Massen hungern. Nur Hitlers Geschaft geht glanzend. 
Er wird von Tag zu Tag nobler! Jetzt hat er sich zu seiner 
feudalen Achtzimmerwohnung, seiner Villa im bayerischen 
Hochgebirge und was sein Herz in der Zwischenzeit sonst 
noch an Luxus begehrt, ein neues Automobil zugelegt. Es 
ist ein 150-PS- Mercedes-Benz. 
Kostenpunkt: die Kleinigkeit von 44,000 RM. Nun kann er 
wenigstens standesgema~ bei Kirdorf und seinen andern 
schwerindustriellen Gonnern vorfahren. Seine anderen drei 
Personenautos waren wohl nicht feudal genug. [161J 
(20 February 1931) 
115 
Elsewhere the obvious implicit contrast that was being made here 
between rhetoric and reality was made explicit and the basic alm of 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung of structuring its readership's 
perception of the NSDAP in a particular way reconfirmed - for 
instance in a short article headlined "'Prolet' Adolf Hitler" 
which, after again detailing Hitler's luxury homes and cars and 
querylng the source of his wealth, claimed that this aspect of 
Hitler's life was well worth investigating given the type of party 
the NSDAP claimed to be: 
Wenn dieser Mann noch dazu Fuhrer seiner Partei ist, 
die sich Nationalsozialistische Arbeiter partei nennt, so 
mu~ die Forderung nach Klarheit mit besonderem Nachdruck 
gestellt werden. [162J (10 October 1931) 
Of course this tactic was not applied to Hitler alone; other Nazis, 
both well known and obscure, received similar treatment [163J; and 
as an abstract symbol of Hitler's love of luxury and of the NSDAP's 
distance from the lives of the ordinary worker, the Nazi 'Brown 
House' was often invoked [164J. Most often though, and probably as 
an attempt to counteract the emerging 'Hitler myth', the Nazi 
leader was the target, not only with regard to his 'sybaritic' 
tastes, but also in terms of the type of people he had begun to 
associate with: a description in early 1932 of Hitler enjoying 
champagne and lobster as the guest of some leading businessmen, 
whilst enraged workers protested outside the hotel [165J, was 
entirely typical of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's depictions of 
Hitler's relationships with bankers, industrialists and the 
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bourgeoisie in general [166]. 
The connections of these traditional 'class enemies' of the 
SPD to the NSDAP were also used in a wider sense as proof of the 
party's hypocrisy: for how could it claim to be in any way 
socialist when such social groups could exercise an influence 
within the movement? Such reasoning was applied both to the 
alleged financial backers of National Socialism from business 
circles, and to the presence of aristocrats and landowners ln the 
party. This latter point demonstrates the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's deliberate exploitation of class feeling, for 
although it must have been obvious that old-style reaction actually 
had little influence on the NSDAP, nevertheless the presence of 
such elements was extremely useful, constituting as they did, the 
SPD's oldest foes and hence being completely incompatible with any 
form of true socialism: 
Von Sozialismus findet sich heute ln der Hitlerpartei 
keine Spur mehr, die vor der Wahl gemachten Versprechungen 
sind langst vergessen, verweht im Winde. Heute hat der 
Arbeiter in der Nazi-Partei nichts mehr zu sagen: er ist 
gut genug, den Kopf hinzuhalten, damit ist SchluB. Den Ton 
geben heute degenierte Prinzen, abgetakelte Generale, 
feudale Gutsbesitzer und Bankdirektoren an. [167] 
(10 August 1931) 
Hitler's true alm, it was claimed, was the oppression of the 
working class and the restoration to their former positions of the 
'old powers': 
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Nur deshalb wirken Exprinzen, Barone und nationalistische 
Offiziere in die Reihen dieser famosen 'Arbeiter' partei 
als Agitatoren! [168] (16 March 1932) 
Again and aga1n, 1n numerous contexts, this Social Democratic 
desire to taint National Socialism, to depict it as inevitably 
polluted by the type of support it attracted, indeed welcomed, 
found an outlet 1n the Schwabische Volkszeitung. It could be a 
report of a former pr1nce declaring his support for the NSDAP 
('Naturlich! Willy jun. ist jetzt auch fur die 'Arbeiter' Partei' 
[169]): or it could be a description of a National Socialist rally 
and the number of luxury cars present, which concluded: 
Nur war es keine Arbeiter, die in Braunschweig in 
Luxuslimousinen erschienen, sondern Generaldirektoren, 
Hohenzollernprinzen au~er Dienst, Generale und andere 
Gro~pensionare der Republik. [170] (24 October 1931) 
It could be an examination of the social composition of the NSDAP's 
Reichstag group, revealing just how few workers this 'workers' 
party' was represented by [171]; or it could be the propagandistic 
capital that was made out of the creation of the Harzburg Front: 
Das ganze Theater, das in Harzburg vorgefuhrt wurde, 
paradiert jetzt fur Hitler. Die Herren Prinzen, Grafen 
und Barone, die Gro~agrarier und die Herren von Borse und 
Finanz, die ganze Hinterlassenschaft der Reaktion von 
gestern und vorgestern fullen die Hitlerfront. [172] 
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(6 April 1932) 
The a1m though was constant: and if the SPD's inability ever fully 
to remove its gaze from its traditional, but increasingly 
irrelevant, enemies is worthy of further examination, their 
usefulness to Social Democracy in its attempt to construct a 
powerful negative image of National Socialism 1n contradiction of 
the latter's socialist rhetoric, 1S undoubted. 
Another illustration of the construction of this negative 
image was the Schwabische Volkszeitung's response to the NSBO's 
efforts to build up support for Nazism in the factories [173J - a 
response which was predictable enough in itself, but, because it 
focused on the perceived heart of the SPD's constituency, provides 
a helpful point from which to sum up what has been said and implied 
in this chapter so far. Thus the details of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's attacks on the NSBO, the unmasking of the reality 
behind the worker-friendly fa~ade [174], is less important than the 
confirmation it provides that the SPD, whatever its denials and its 
ritual invocations of the 'unshakability' of the movement, did feel 
vulnerable when the NSDAP engaged it in a competition for the 
working-class constituency, and did fear the potential for success 
of Nazism in this area. The giving over of the whole of the front 
page on 19 May 1932 to an expose of the true purpose of the NSBO, 
through the reprinting of a 'document of shame' which supposedly 
revealed just what socialism meant to 'this famous workers' party' 
[175], is just such a show of fear, of sensitivity, of that 
consciousness of the Nazi threat, and of the need to reject and 
ridicule the NSDAP's pretensions and aspirations with regard to the 
working class, that the Schwabische Volkszeitung consistently 
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displayed. Consequently this, and indeed the totality of the 
material adduced by the Schwabische Volkszeitung to support its 
polemics, corroborates claims made about the extent to which the 
NSDAP targeted the working-class constituency. The anxiety which 
this trawling for working-class support produced in the SPD 1S an 
example of a theme briefly touched on earlier, one which will 
recur: that is, the SPD's inability to cope with National 
Socialism's ambiguities, its blurring of ideological and social 
boundaries. For the complexity of the NSDAP's relationship to the 
working class, the fact that to some extent it was a workers' 
party, that there were at least elements within the party who were 
sincere in their radicalism, could not have escaped notice [176]. 
What was problematic for the SPD was the co-existence of these 
latter aspects of National Socialism with other, seemingly 
contradictory, aspects, both ideological and social. Thus the 
representation of Nazi socialism as nothing more than a propaganda 
tool was not simply an attempt by the Schwabische Volkszeitung to 
immunise its readers against this strain of Nazism; it was also a 
reflection of the SPD's own deep-seated need to resolve National 
Socialism's apparent ambiguities and confusions. 
The implications this has for the quality of the SPD's 
analysis will be considered in a moment; however, the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's attacks on the NSDAP's pseudo-socialism well 
illustrate a tendency in that analysis that has previously been 
briefly mentioned, but can be usefully amplified here - that is, a 
tendency to ossification and repetition. By this is meant not the 
ideologically predetermined nature of the SPD's engagement with 
National Socialism and the inflexibility that flowed from this, 
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although that is certainly relevant, but rather a more general 
sense of stagnation that becomes particularly apparent in late 1932 
and early 1933. By that stage reactions had seemingly become 
knee-jerk, the analysis of National Socialism was running along 
well-worn grooves, a process that precluded original thought. 
Undoubtedly, this had its origins in the ideological certitudes of 
the SPD, but it was also a natural outgrowth of the literary and 
propagandistic articulation of these certitudes when applied on a 
daily basis to the NSDAP, for this articulation was founded upon 
the constant reiteration, uSlng a variety of methods, of a handful 
of basic theories which, taken in total, constituted the SPD's 
counter-image to the Nazi movement's carefully cultivated 
propaganda image. The approach of~the Schwabische Volkszeitung ln 
the last months of Weimar as a whole reflects this sense of 
stagnation, and this end period will be considered later; the 
Social Democratic desire to discredit the NSDAP's socialism, 
however, is an especially good example of how the analysis had 
become petrified and responses predictable. 
Thus, every development in the rapidly changing situation in 
Germany from mid-1932 onwards was read by the SPD as a confirmation 
of its established interpretations and used as an opportunity to 
further underline its main propaganda themes. In the context of 
the SPD and the NSDAP's socialism, two examples are particularly 
salutary, the formation of the 'Cabinet of Barons' and the weeks 
after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933 - for in 
both cases the Schwabische Volkszeitung's reaction demonstrated how 
rigid and entrenched the analysis of National Socialism had become, 
to what extent, in fact, events were simply being assimilated into 
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that pre-existent analysis rather than shaping it anew. Thus 
Papen's cabinet functioned in the Schwabische Volkszeitung mainly 
as a further proof of the cynicism of the NSDAP's socialist 
rhetoric: 
Die Nazis sind in Versammlungen 'sozialistisch'. Das ist 
Goebbels - Leim. Ihre Fuhrer wollen keine Umbildung der 
privatkapitalistischen Wirtschaft. Sie sind mit dem 
Kabinett des Barons ein Herz und eine Seele. Das 
privatkapitalistische System will sich mit Hilfe der SA 
wieder in den Sattel setzen. [177] (29 July 1932) 
The NSDAP was, of course, held to be responsible for the 
appointment of the new cabinet - and to have achieved new freedoms 
as a result, freedoms that were far from being used to the benefit 
of the working class: 
Durch Hitlers Gnaden sind Herr v. Pap en und die Seinen an 
die Macht gekommen. Die SA, von Bruning verboten, unter 
Papen marschiert sie wieder, marschiert in den feinsten, 
besten und buntesten Uniformen zum Krieg gegen - das 
Kapital und gegen die Kapitalisten? 0 Nein! Gegen das 
Volk, gegen die Arbeiter! Unter Bruning sprach kein 
Strasser im Rundfunk fur das Dritte Reich. Unter Papen 
reden sie! Gegen Thyssen, gegen die Schwerindustrie? 
Gegen die GroBagrarier, gegen die Banken, gegen die 
Zinsknechtschaft, gegen die Notverordnung? Bewahre! 
Sie reden fur Arbeitsdienstpflicht der deutschen Jugend und 
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30 pfennig Tagesgold. [178J (2 July 1932) 
That such capital was further made out of every action of the Papen 
cabinet that had negative implications for the working class need 
hardly be stated; the new political configuration merely gave added 
impetus to the old message. And this was also the case in the 
period after January 30, 1933. Certainly the SPD's reaction to 
Hitler's appointment was a complex one, flawed in a variety of 
ways; and yet, even as the situation was changing dramatically, had 
indeed already moved far beyond the initial shaping confrontations 
between National Socialism and Social Democracy, the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung persisted in using Hitler's new position as ammunition 
to discredit him and his party's socialist propaganda. Even at 
this stage it was felt necessary to make the same point that had 
been made hundreds of times over the previous three years: 
Der neue Reichskanzler ist FUhrer elner Partei, die sich 
heute noch Arbeiterpartei und sozialistisch nennt. Seine 
Regierung ist aber eine Kapitalistenregierung, wie Sle 
Deutschland noch nicht gesehen hat. [179J (4 February 1933) 
Once agaln the 'mask' was held to have been 'thrown off': 
Dies Kabinett ist der vollstandige Sieg der feinen Leute. 
Sie haben Hitler in die Mitte genommen, der sogennante 
Sozialismus der Nationalsozialisten ist gerade genug, urn 
den gro~kapitalistischen Kurs Hugenbergs, den Angriff auf 
die Arbeiterschaft, die Begehrlichkeit der feudalen 
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Ostelbier zu decken. Dahingeschwunden sind aIle 
Deklamation der Nationalsozialisten gegen die Reaktionare 
und die feinen Leute. Die sozialistische Maske ist 
abgeworfen, im Bunde mit der schwarzesten volksfeindlichen 
Reaktion tritt Hitler seine Reichskanzlerschaft an. Die 
industriellen Scharfmacher und die Junker, die ihn 
gro~gezogen und finanziert, ihn gesttitzt haben, kassieren 
jetzt den Nutzen ein! [180] (31 January 1933) 
This latter quote, of course, demonstrates both the SPD's wider 
ideologically-based conception - predicated on the belief that 
reaction financed and controlled the NSDAP - and the major fault 1n 
the party's response to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, that 1S 
the unwillingness to accept that Hitler now possessed real, 
autonomous power. Here, though, it is the remarkable adherence to 
the effort to undermine the credibility of Hitler and his party as 
being in any way socialist that is to be noted; and in the days and 
weeks following the thirtieth of January, Hitler was again and 
again charged in the Schwabische Volkszeitung with failing to 
fulfil his radical prom1ses and, g1ven the make-up of his cabinet, 
of having allied himself with reaction - 1n short, with betraying a 
socialism that the newspaper had spent much time and effort on 
prov1ng a fake over the preceding four years [181]. Undeniably, 
this was one element of a broader, deep-rooted failure of analysis; 
it is being suggested here, however, that it was also symptomatic 
of the extent to which analysis by this time had become simply a 
reiteration of stock orthodoxies. In fact the attacks on Nazism's 
appropriation of elements of socialism is an example of the way in 
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which the reality of National Socialism was replaced in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung by a construct of National Socialism 
designed to suit the ideological preconceptions of the SPD. By 
1933 National Socialism had come to denote a variety of themes and 
characteristics which had been underlined so emphatically and so 
often in the newspaper that even their effectuality as propaganda 
must have been slightly blunted. Given the seemingly almost 
automatic resort to them at every opportunity, they were certainly 
ill-suited to providing flexible responses within the context of a 
rapidly changing situation. 
This 'construct', moreover, amounted to a means of avoiding or 
containing the difficult ambiguities of National Socialism. Thus, 
judged as an analysis rather than propaganda, the mechanistic 
reduction of Nazi 'socialism' to a tactic used by the party in 
order to artificially retain support amongst the working class and 
the proletarianised middle class, can only be judged simplistic and 
superficial. And this is worthy of note, not because the use of 
simplistic propaganda themes in such a context should be considered 
unusual, but because their use was often as much an ideologically-
driven necessity as a deliberate propaganda technique - that lS, a 
way of conceptualising the NSDAP ln a way most convenient to the 
SPD's theoretical imperatives. For it is obvious enough that the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's treatment of the NSDAP's socialist 
rhetoric bypassed the very real strains of, if not socialism, then 
at least of a radicalism within the Nazi movement which could 
encompass anti-capitalism, and the existence of National Socialists 
who were genuinely concerned with the welfare of workers [182J; and 
that the SPD was unwilling to recognise that Nazi anti-capitalism 
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was, although without doubt partly instrumental, not only 
demagogic, but also one aspect of the movement's dynamism. And 
this was necessary to the SPD because any such recognition would 
have contradicted the conception of National Socialism as belonging 
wholly to the forces of reaction. Portraying the NSDAP's 
radicalism as nothing more than a cynically- used lure, enabled the 
SPD to square the circle, providing an explanation of why a party 
supposedly under the control of big business was yet often 
anti-capitalist in its pronouncements. Thus, the complexities of 
National Socialism were suppressed, the movement was comfortably 
located within the traditional class and ideological parameters, 
within the rigid battle lines of a previous era, the era in which 
the Social Democratic Weltanschauung remained grounded. 
Not that this suppression was complete. There were moments 
when a slightly more sophisticated reading of the NSDAP's 
radicalism was articulated, one which at least acknowledged that 
that radicalism was not without its sincere representatives even 
among the party's leadership. Thus, from an essay by Rudolf 
Breitscheid, published on the front page of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung: 
Die Stohr, Stra~er, Reventlow usw., die sich jetzt in 
Wort und Schrift antikapitalistisch au~ern und einen 
Trennungsstrich zwischen sich und den Scharfmachereien 
der Industrieverbande und ihrer deutsch-nationalen 
Vertreter zu ziehen suchen, sind eben nicht die 
Nationalsozialistische Partei, sondern bilden einen sehr 
wenig einflu~reichen Flligel der Hitlerschen Phalanx 
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... Was aber das Wesentliche bleibt: Die sozial-
fortschrittlichen Krafte im nationalsozialistischen Lager 
mogen ziffernma~ig so stark sein, wie sie wollen, sie 
haben doch nicht die Macht und nicht die Ftihrung. Sie 
haben sie vor allem deswegen nicht, weil Sle sich durch 
ihren gehassigen und erbitterten Kampf gegen den Marxismus, 
das hei~t, gegen die Klassenbewu~te Arbeiterbewegung, 
selbst in eine Position hineinmanovriert haben, die ihnen 
die Abwehr gegen die Sozialreaktionare ln ihren elgenen 
Reihen aufs au~erste erschwert. [183J (5 October 1931) 
Even given the inevitable dismissal of the 'social-political wing' 
as a sector of the movement without influence, the very depiction 
of such a wing of sincere anti-capitalists among National 
Socialism's leading figures [184J within an analysis is unusual 
enough to appear subtle in comparison with the normal approach in 
this area. An insight such as this, however, emphasising as it did 
the multiplicity of Nazi 'ideology', was too disruptive to the 
Social Democratic mind-set ever to have become generally 
articulated, although it continued to find occasional expression 
[185J: the hackneyed certainties of the SPD's interpretation of 
National Socialism did not encourage sophisticated thinking. 
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CHAPTER 4 The NSDAP as a 'political instrument': the Social 
Democratic denial of National Socialism's political 
autonomy. 
i) The 'agent theory' of capitalist control. 
This, indeed, is a recurring feature of the Social Democratic 
analysis of National Socialism as revealed by the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung: the novel nature of the movement, its refusal to 
conform to the traditional ideological and class contours of German 
political life, was so confusing a phenomenon for the SPD, that its 
ma1n response was to deny the NSDAP's complexity, to simplify it. 
This was not, however, merely a reaction to the character of the 
NSDAP, it was also a consequence of the SPD's inherent 
predisposition to ideologically-driven mechanistic thinking, a type 
of thinking that certainly provided a framework within which 
National Socialism could be located with little trouble, but also 
mostly with little originality or clarity of insight. In truth, it 
provided a framework within which an interpretation of Nazism most 
suited to the dictates of its essentially Marxist world-view could 
be developed. And the core of this was the 'agent theory' of 
National Socialism, which refused the NSDAP its autonomy, viewing 
it, rather, as the agent, the puppet of big business, of heavy 
industry, of reaction as a whole - that is, significantly enough, 
of those traditional conservative forces, in the struggle against 
which the SPD's self-image and ideology had been formed and fixed. 
This conviction was the prism through which the NSDAP's 
characteristics were examined by the Schwabische Volkszeitung. 
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Thus, in the preceding discussion of the SPD's dismissal of Nazi 
anti-capitalism as nothing but a rhetorical lure, a disguise 
obscuring the reality of the movement's position as a tool of 
reaction, it is important to realise that this was not the result 
of empirical observation but rather was the inevitable outgrowth of 
the SPD's established expectations, of the conspiracy theory, 
incorporating a very precise portrayal of the relationship between 
big business and National Socialism, through which the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung so often explained events in Germany. It is this 
'agent theory' that must now be analysed - firstly in general 
terms, and then with regard to one of its main components and 
perhaps the main misconception held by the SPD about the NSDAP, 
that is the belief that the party was financed (and hence 
controlled) by big business. Above all in this area the lasting, 
and stultifying, grip which ideas and modes of thought shaped 1n 
the period before the First World War had on the SPD 1S 
demonstrated. [186] 
The belief that the NSDAP was acting as an agent for the 
reactionary elements in German society provided the SPD with the 
basic mode of understanding - or misunderstanding - National 
Socialism, and, again, this belief and that mode of understanding 
found an expression in the language by which the Nazi movement was 
conceptualised in the Schwabische Volkszeitung: the NSDAP was, for 
example, 'an instrument in the hands of the employers' [187], 'a 
tool of political and social reaction' [188]; a puppet being 
manipulated by the 'string pullers' [189], the 'Hintermanner' [190J 
of heavy industry; or a 'yellow army' of mercenary henchmen, 
hirelings of capital, 'Unternehmerknechte' [191], 
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... die Soldknechte elnes machtllisternen, brutalen 
Unternehmertums." [192] (18 February 1932) 
These instances could be multiplied, but the idea of the NSDAP as 
an organisation under the control of other forces made explicit ln 
such language was merely a convenient propaganda contraction of a 
fully developed theory of this process of control, a theory that 
had emerged fairly early on in the Schwabische Volkszeitung [193] 
and which shaped the SPD's interpretation of Nazism until 1933. 
The essence of this theory was that 'reaction', variously 
characterised as 'Unternehmertum', 'Schwerindustrie', 'Kapital', or 
even 'Junkertum', was engaged in a consplracy, the aim of which was 
the suppreSSlon of democracy and working-class rights, and in the 
realisation of which the NSDAP had been allotted a vital role. An 
article in July 1930 concisely summarised in one paragraph the 
Social Democratic portrayal of this conspiracy, beginning with a 
typical characterisation of the Nazi movement: 
Der Nationalsozialismus ist heute noch, was er von Anfang 
an war: Dummenfang im Interesse des Kapitals. 
And 'capital', it was alleged, had deliberately undermined both the 
economic circumstances of the working class - through, for example, 
the 'artificial increasing' of unemployment - and the democratic 
institutions of the Weimar Republic, in order to create conditions 
propitious for the success of the NSDAP: 
Und die Arbeiter sollten verargert und entmutigt werden. 
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Verzweiflungsstimmung unter den breiten Massen, das war 
das Ziel, das das Unternehmertum auch mit dem Abbau des 
Kranken- und Arbeitslosenschutzes verfolgte. Entmutigte 
Arbeiter hoffte es, leichter zu dem Glauben an brutale 
Gewalt, d.h. an den Nationalsozialismus bekehren zu 
konnen. [194] (24 July 1930) 
The a1ms that reaction was pursu1ng by means of the NSDAP were also 
clear enough to the SPD: 
Hinter dem sogenannten Nationalsozialismus steht als 
Treiber und Geldgeber der reaktionarste und brutalste 
Teil der deutschen Kapitalistenklasse. Er will die 
Zerstorung der Gewerkschaften aller Richtungen, die 
Beseitigung der Kollektivvertrage, die Vernichtung der 
Sozialversicherung. Ausgerottet werden soll das 
Bewu~tsein eines freien, gleichberechtigten Menschentums, 
das die Sozialdemokratie in den arbeitenden Massen geweckt 
hat. Man will wieder ergebene Industrie-Untertanen, die 
sich aus Furcht vor dem Hunger jedem Diktat fligen. [195] 
(28 November 1931) 
And in accordance with these a1ms the Nazis had 'received their 
orders' : 
Sie sind die Soldlinge des Junkertums und des 
schwerkapitals, die den Auf trag erhalten haben, der 
deutschen Arbeiterklasse die politische Gleichberechtigung 
und die sozialen Institutionen zu rauben.[196] 
(19 October 1931) 
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Only through the NSDAP could reaction achieve its greatest desire, 
that 1S the capturing of the working class [197J. 
It was, moreover, also posited in the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
that the capitalist conspiracy served other purposes beyond its 
obvious anti-labour movement aims - for instance, as a means of 
disguising the culpability of German big business for the country's 
economic distress: 
In Deutschland liegen Millionen von Arbeitern erwerbslos 
auf der Stra~e. Die deutsche Wirtschaft liegt in schwerer 
Stagnation, die deutsche Kreditwirtschaft zittert 1n allen 
Fugen - und jeder in Deutschland wei~ heute, wer die 
Schuldigen sind. Das sind die bankrotten 
Wirtschaftsflihrer, die gro~te deutsche Konzerne durch 
Unfahigkeit und Verbrechen in den Zusammenbruch getrieben 
haben. Das sind ... Nationalsozialisten, die von den 
bankrotten Wirtschaftsflihrern als Schutzgarde zur 
Verdeckung der eigenen Schuld engagiert worden sind. [198J 
(13 July 1931) 
More generally, the 'unleashing' of National Socialism on Germany 
was viewed as a last attempt to save itself by capitalism in crisis 
[199J. Whatever the nuances of analysis involved, however, what 
remained constant was the presentation of events and processes as 
being controllable by the capitalist class - and the NSDAP in 
particular was conceived of as manipulable, as acting at the behest 
of others' orders, as simply a means that would help to achieve 
capitalism's ends. Even the economic depression was depicted as 
having been intentionally precipitated by the 'Unternehmertum', 
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desperate as it was claimed to be to inflict wounds on the working 
class and its organisations. And, of course, as the political 
situation changed, so new developments and occurrences were 
smoothly assimilated into the broader theory, which provided a 
framework of comprehension, as well as a framework within which the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung could make apparent to its readership the 
inter-connectedness of political, social and economic events and 
forces - and in particular the linkage of National Socialism to the 
traditional foes of Social Democracy. 
Thus, for example, the newspaper's coverage of Hitler's 
meetings with industrialists, already mentioned as one of the means 
by which the NSDAP's socialist rhetoric was discredited, was 
further used to reinforce the image of National Socialism ln 
subordination to big business. Hence at one such meeting which 
received much attention in the Schwabische Volkszeitung [200J, held 
in Dusseldorf in early 1932, Hitler was portrayed as having, once 
again, been given his 'orders' to destroy the labour movement, and 
the nature of this conspiracy and the part of the NSDAP in it, was 
left in no doubt: 
Das gro~te der gro~en Dinge aber, die die Schwerindustrie 
mit Hitler meistern will, ist nach wie vor ihr nicht ohne 
Kuhnheit unternommener Versuch, elne Nazi-Arbeiter-Partei 
zu schaffen. Bis jetzt ist sie noch nicht da, diese 
Arbeiter-Partei zur Niederknuppelung der Arbeiter. Sie 
ist die gro~e Sehnsucht, das gro~e Ziel der 
schwerindustriellen Verschworer und ihrer Henkersknechte: 
der deutsche Arbeiter solI sich selbst umbringen. Das ist 
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der Sinn, der Zweck und das Program der Hitler-Partei.[201] 
(8 February 1932) 
It was indeed a necessity for the Schwabische Volkszeitung to 
'read' the political configuration in such terms, in terms, that 
is, of conspiracy, of the NSDAP deployed by the forces of 
capitalism in order to achieve consciously pursued aims. The 
actuality of events, the essentially uncontrolled nature of much 
that occurred in Germany at this time, and particularly the reality 
of the NSDAP's independence, was inevitably suppressed by the 
certitudes of this conviction. Another example of this was the way 
in which Hitler's presidential candidacy was seamlessly woven into 
the broader fabric of the Social Democratic world Vlew, the 
motivations behind the candidacy presented not in terms of Hitler's 
ambitions or the exigencies of the NSDAP's political position, but 
rather, again, as an aspect of capitalism's desperate attempt to 
save itself from collapse. In the presidential election, Hitler 
would be nothing more than a representative of the interests of 
heavy industry and large-scale landownership, as was made clear to 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung's readership in an analysis of his 
candidacy which appeared in mid-February 1932: 
Ein Kandidatur Hitlers fur die Reichsprasidentschaft ist 
deshalb die Kandidatur der politischen und sozialen 
Reaktion. Sie stellt den letzen Versuch der sozialen 
Reaktion, des in sich zerrutteten Kapitalismus dar, mit 
Hilfe der faschistischen Diktatur sich zu behaupten 
gegenUber der in der Krise immer starker hervortretenden 
antikapitalistischen Grundstimmung des Volkes. Fur wen 
134 
will Hitler Reichsprasident werden? Fur Deutschlands 
Millionare. [202J (15 February 1932) 
Of course Hindenburg, the candidate that the SPD found itself 
supporting ln opposition to Hitler, could also hardly have been 
considered ps anything other than a representative of reaction; ln 
the peculiar circumstances of the 1932 presidential election, 
however, this fact, perhaps not surprisingly, received little 
emphasis in the Schwabische Volkszeitung. 
If this once more illustrates the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
ever-present tendency to look behind Hitler and the NSDAP ln an 
attempt to discern the hands of the real enemies at work, it must 
be realised that this tendency was the natural concomitant of the 
SPD's belief that these real enemies were engaged in the unfolding 
of a machiavellian plot aimed at undermining the Weimar Republic 
[203J. From such a perspective, events were never random but part 
of a concerted effort to achieve this aim - a mode of thought well 
revealed by a speech given by Joseph Felder, Augsburg's Social 
Democratic Reichstag candidate, and printed in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, in late September 1932, and particularly in the idea 
that the frequency of elections in Germany at this time was in no 
way mere chance: 
Es ist interessant, die Richtlinien und die Taktik der 
Reaktion zu verfolgen: Erst die wirtschaftliche Zermlirbung 
der breiten Massen, Sabotierung der Arbeitsbeschaffung, 
Vergr6~erung der Arbeitsnot, Zerschlagung der 
Sozialgesetzgebung, einseitige Steuerpolitik, die die 
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Lebenshaltung der Massen noch mehr herabdruckt, brutaler 
Lohnabbau, Zerstorung des Tarif- und Schlichtungswesens. 
Dann weitere Starkung des Militarismus Dann noch die 
politische Zermurbung der Wahler. Aus den Parlamenten solI 
eine Groteske werden. Durch Wahlen bis zum Ermuden im 
Reich, im Land und in den Gemeinden sollen die Wahler 
stumpfsinnig, interesse los gemacht werden - dann ist die 
Zeit fur die Reaktionare gekommen.[204] (26 September 1932) 
It was moreover this type of thinking that would lead to the 
fundamental misjudgement of Hitler's position after his appointment 
as Chancellor, for the belief that National Socialism was in the 
control of reaction meant that the SPD could always interpret 
political changes as a consequence of deliberate decisions on the 
part of reaction to alter the nature of its relationship with the 
Nazi movement. It was thus quite possible for the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung to claim at various times, that the NSDAP had been 
dropped by reaction, that the latter would henceforth pursue its 
aims by means other than through the Nazi movement, which had 
outlived its usefulness - through, for instance, the 'Cabinet of 
Barons', which, in the months it held power, seemed to replace 
National Socialism in the pages of the newspaper as the main 'tool' 
of capitalist interests. Indeed, it was even claimed in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung that Bruning's fall presented the NSDAP's 
'masters' with the opportunity to detach Nazism's support from the 
party, and use it to fill the power vacuum: 
So ist fur Generale, Gro~agrarier und Industriekapitane 
136 
der gro~e psychologische Moment, auf den Sle schon lange 
gelauert haben, herangekommen, urn Hitler se1ne treue 
Millionenschar abzunehmen und fur sich gefugig zu machen. 
[205] (14 June 1932) 
And yet it was just as inevitable that when Hitler attained power, 
it would be depicted as a bestowal upon him by these same social 
forces [206] - and that that power would be analysed as 
constricted, limited, as representing National Socialism tamed, for 
this was the only interpretation that the agent theory could allow, 
the only way in which the reality of Hitler's new position could be 
acknowledged without contradicting the insistence that the NSDAP 
was nothing but the servant of reactionary interests. Thus the 
fatal misjudgements of 1933 were generated not simply by the 
reaction of the SPD to the specific political conjuncture after 
Hitler's appointment, but also by the mode of analysis that had 
been developed over the previous years and which determined that 
reaction - that. is, by constantly locating the SPD's real enemies 
behind National Socialism and thus supposedly exposing the 
movement as a tool of capitalism, the party's intellectual 
flexibility was reduced and its ability to respond adequately to 
the Machtergreifung damaged. 
Given this, it 1S unsurpr1S1ng that any evaluation of this key 
aspect of the Social Democratic analysis of National Socialism must 
conclude that its effect on that analysis as a whole was almost 
entirely negative. At times the explications to be found in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung of the reactionary conspiracy supposedly 
engulfing Germany hardly seem concerned with social realities at 
all; rather, they appear to be baroque fictions, fantasies in which 
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complicated events and processes are reconstructed as simplistic 
Marxist cautionary tales and to 'reaction' is ascribed the ability 
to exercise complete control over complex political, social and 
economic phenomena. The improbability of this, moreover, is only 
increased by the use of undifferentiated terms, such as 'heavy 
industry' , 'large-scale capital', 'Unternehmertum' or 'Junkertum' , 
as if such socio-economic group1ngs were easily definable and could 
be assumed to act, either as united blocs or together under the 
catch-all of 'reaction', with one will 1n pursuit of a common goal. 
It was, however, precisely this belief that 'reaction', and 
especially the capitalist class, was capable of concerted action 
designed to eradicate the rights and achievements of the working 
class, that was consistently articulated in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, a belief, as has been demonstrated, that was in no 
way vague, but was, rather, almost schematic in its conception -
particularly in the conviction that the NSDAP was the agent of 
reaction, the means by which the labour movement was to be 
destroyed and the working class captured. Thus were the 
complexities of the Nazi movement collapsed into one overriding 
theme; and the refusal to view National Socialism as autonomous 1S 
yet another instance of Social Democracy's inability to recognise 
the NSDAP's true nature, another means by which the difficulties of 
analysis which the Nazi movement presented for the SPD could be 
bypassed. Of course, that National Socialism was perceived as a 
threat by the SPD has already been established; the whole of the 
material that is being discussed here testifies to this gut 
reaction on the part of the Social Democratic movement. But what 
is being considered in this section is an intellectual rather than 
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a visceral response to Nazism, and although this did not minimise 
the danger posed by the movement, it yet sought to locate the 
danger behind National Socialism, as opposed to identifying it as 
an inherent part of the NSDAP. The SPD simply could not accept 
that the real enemies, the old foes were not pulling the strings 
that made the NSDAP dance. 
National Socialism, ln fact, often seems to function in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung as symbolic of these long-established 
enemies of the SPD; this, indeed, explains why, when a potentially 
more potent symbol of reaction appeared, the newspaper's focus 
could, with great ease, leave the NSDAP, as it did when Papen 
became Chancellor. The fact that the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
could claim, because it was propagandistically expeditious to do 
so, that big business, landowners and reaction ln general had 
abandoned Hitler and turned to Papen as their new 'agent' [207J, 
simply underlines the extent to which the SPD's main target was 
that reaction, those landowners, the capitalist class - and Papen 
and his 'Cabinet of Barons' could be inserted just as easily as 
Hitler and the NSDAP into the SPD's conspiracy theory. 
Admittedly, none of this constitutes a negative judgement on 
this approach as propaganda; it may well have been, indeed, another 
factor in the general immunisation of Augsburg's core Social 
Democratic rank and file against National Socialism that is being 
posited here - after all, the association of the NSDAP with the 
SPD's traditional enemies could not but have been powerful 
propaganda. However, considered as the basis of a strategy, this 
analysis must have had a deleterious effect on the SPD's ability to 
combat National Socialism, because it structured the whole 
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perception of the movement upon a mistaken assumption. The effects 
of this should be evident throughout this work, but it is obvious 
enough, for example, that the Schwabische Volkszeitung's approach 
in this area shows little appreciation of the reality of the 
relationship between the forces identified as reactionary and 
National Socialism - which was at best ambiguous and at worst 
hostile. The failure to grasp the potential Nazism possessed for 
disturbing the political desires of the traditional right, just as 
much as the left, was a misjudgement hardly compensated for by an 
easy resort to a predictable Marxist interpretation of the NSDAP. 
Conversely, though, the SPD was also prevented from achieving a 
recognition of the true role of, in particular, the business 
community in the Weimar policy - for a real case could undoubtedly 
have been made for the idea that that role was a corrosive one, but 
it was a case ill-served by the crudely formulaic conception of the 
links between National Socialism and big business that have just 
been outlined. [208] 
What must be stressed here, moreover, 1S that the source of 
this conception was the SPD's pre-existent hostility towards 
capitalism and the forces of social reaction; once again, that 1S, 
the Social Democratic analysis of National Socialism can be seen to 
have been ideologically pre-determined, for that analysis was 
really just a further expression of a world-view that had been 
shaped by a history of past struggle and which was not capable of 
adaptation. The rise of National Socialism did not lead the SPD to 
redefine the idea of who its main enemies were; rather that rise 
was interpreted within an ideological framework which dictated that 
capitalism and traditional conservatism were those enemies, and 
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that even an apparently new threat such as Nazism could only be a 
subsidiary of them. This indeed is why the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
seemed particularly to relish its propaganda onslaught on Papen -
for the SPD was simply more comfortable attacking the old-style 
reaction and blatant capitalism that the 'Cabinet of Barons' was 
perceived to represent, than the NSDAP. There was almost a sense 
of anticipatory relief in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
proclamation in this period that: 
Sie kommen zurtick, aIle, aIle, die sich 1m November 1918 
verkrochen hatten. [209] (9 June 1932) 
After all, what could have been more congenial to a party whose 
self-image and entrenched convictions had been formed in the 
pre-1918 struggle against reaction, than to have had that struggle 
openly recommenced; although, of course, the point is that the SPD 
had not, in fact could not have ceased to feel itself still engaged 
in the historic struggle between socialism and capitalism through 
which much of the party's self-belief and most of its certitudes 
had been forged. To have removed National Socialism from this 
wider context, to have analysed it in any other terms but as an 
adjunct of capitalism, would have been profoundly disturbing to 
those certitudes. The SPD's traditionalism of thought was 
ill-equipped to cope with a movement that was, ln comparlson, 
modern - and ill-equipped to deal with the crisis of modernity out 
of which that movement grew. 
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ii) The myth of big business funding. 
In retrospect it 1S clear enough that the SPD's expectations 
predisposed the party to the assumption that the NSDAP was the 
puppet of reaction; but an analysis of the Schw~bische Volkszeitung 
further demonstrates that this latter belief, far from being 
considered an assumption, was presented as an evidentially-based 
fact - the evidence being the NSDAP's sources of financial support. 
The supposed financial dependence of the NSDAP upon that sector of 
reaction to which the SPD was most antipathetic - that 1S 'big 
business', and, within this, especially heavy industry - functioned 
in the Schwabische Volkszeitung as the 'proof' of its dependency on 
reaction per se, the glue that held the agent theory together. In 
reality this putative proof was no such thing, for the absolute 
conviction that the NSDAP was being bankrolled to a huge extent by 
the business community was not the cause of the development of the 
agent theory, but another of its consequences. Capitalism had to 
be seen to be responsible for National Socialism and, as has just 
been suggested, the truth of the relationship between business and 
National Socialism was therefore displaced by what was 1n essence a 
propaganda narrative based on myth and supposition rather than on 
substantiated evidence; nothing reveals this as starkly as an 
examination of the SPD's misconception of how the NSDAP was 
financed, a misconception which was simply the greatest myth of 
all. 
Intense curiosity about the sources of National Socialism's 
funding had been frequently expressed in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung since the early 1920s [210], and the refounding of the 
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NSDAP in 1925 merely gave this curiosity a renewed intensity. The 
party's financial basis was presented as a mystery that had to be 
solved in order to fully understand it: 
Eines war selbstverstandlich, da~ aus den elgenen Reihen 
die ungeheuren finanziellen Mittel Hitlers nicht stammen 
konnten; aIle dahingehenden Erklarungen Hitlers wurden 
selbst in der eigenen Partei nicht ernst genommen, konnten 
Uberdies durch ein einfaches Rechenexempel widerlegt werden 
... Auf die Frage nach dem Ursprung der ebenso gro~en Wle 
mysteriosen Geldmittel wollten wir Auskunft haben, urn aus 
der Antwort unsere SchlUsse ziehen zu konnen Uber Hitlers 
RUckverbindungen und - etwaige Abhangigkeiten." [211J 
(14 October 1929) 
And even in 1932 the same questions, with the same implications, 
were still being posed: 
Immer wieder herrscht in der Offentlichkeit mit Recht 
darUber Kopfzerbrechen, woher Hitler fUr die Unterhaltung 
seiner Privatarmee und fUr gro~zUgige Propaganda die 
Geldmittel nimmt. 
After calculating that comparlng the NSDAP's estimated expenditure 
with its supposed income left around 3.9 million marks a month of 
expenditure unaccounted for, the article continues: 
Es verbliebe also aufzuklaren, von welcher Seite die NSDAP 
mit monatlich 3.9 Millionen subventioniert wird. Diese 
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Aufklarung tiber die Subvention ist heute mehr denn Je e1n 
dringendes Erfordernis. 
1m Gegensatz zu fast allen Organisationen und Parteien ist 
seitens der NSDAP ein Kassenbericht noch nicht 
veroffentlicht worden. Die Offentlichkeit aber hat an 
einer Klarlegung der finanziellen Hintergrtinde Hitlers e1n 
gro~es Interesse. Das Yolk mu~ doch schlie~lich und 
endlich wissen, ftir wen Hitler eigentlich gegen das 
herrschende System kampft. [212] (12 March 1932) 
Of course, the SPD had long before 1932 determined to its own 
satisfaction the 'realities' that lay behind the mystery of the 
NSDAP's financial affairs, steadfastly refuting the (probably 
correct) suggestion that the party was self-financing in favour of 
the belief that National Socialism could only surV1ve and prosper 
by means of big business donations - a belief that was, as has been 
mentioned, most basically given expression in the language used to 
describe the NSDAP, as references to the party as, for example, the 
'hireling' of the 'Unternehmertum' became part of the routinised 
rhetoric of the Schwabische Volkszeitung. 
There was, of course, much more depth to the SPD's theories 
about National Socialist finance than this, even if that depth was 
in essence spurious; an examination of an extended 'analysis' of 
the NSDAP's financial affairs which appeared in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung in May 1930 presents a useful starting point for a 
discussion of those theories. Headlined 'Geldgeber der Nazisozi. 
Wer finanziert die staatsfeindliche Hitlerbande" [213], the article 
begins by offering a reason for the restriction of the NSDAP's 
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attacks on capital to 'Jewish' capital rather than also 
encompassing so-called 'Christian' capital: 
Das hat selne guten Grtinde:aus dem christlichen Kapital, 
aus christlichen zahlungsfahigen Kreisen heraus flie~en 
namlich reiche Geldmittel, deren die Nazi ftir ihre sehr 
umfangreiche und kostspielige Agitation bedtirfen. 
After denying that National Socialism could be self-financing, the 
article continues: 
Da~ schwerreiche Industrielle und sonst mit materiellen 
Glticksgtitern gesegnete Zeitgenossen ftir politische Parteien 
oft ganz enorme Aufwendungen machen, ist auch bei anderen 
btirgerlichen Parteien zu beobachten und an der 
Tagesordnung. 
However, even while admitting that the SPD had itself received 
occasional financial contributions from outwith the party, the 
overriding self-reliance of the SPD was emphasised: 
Auch die Sozialdemokratie hat, ... in Einzelfallen von 
Idealisten geldliche Zuwendungen erhalten. Sie hat das 
niemals bestritten, aber ihre finanziell auschlaggabende 
Grundlage sind die Beitrage ihrer Mitglieder, denen tiber 
jeden eingegangenen und ausgegebenen Pfennig gewissenhaft 
Bericht erstattet wird. 
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With the Nazis, of course, things are arranged rather differently: 
Die finanzielle Grundlage ihrer Organisation und Agitation 
sind nicht die Opfer und Leistungen der eigenen Mitglieder, 
sondern die Zuwendungen aus geldkraftigen Kreisen, die das 
antikapitalistische Geschrei der Nazisozi ebenso wenig 
ernst nehmen, wie es ihre Ftihrer tun, die aber die Nazisozi 
als Sturmtrupps gegen den heutigen Staat willkommen hei~en 
und aus diesem Grunde haufig und reichlich in den Beutel 
greifen. 
And after a description of the extent of Nazism's need for 
financial support to maintain its organisations and propaganda, the 
sources of that support are detailed more specifically: 
Der reiche Fabrikant Mutschmann 1n Plauen als Geldgeber 
Hitlers ist bekannt, ebenso die liebevolle Untersttitzung 1n 
vielen tausenden von Reichsmark, die der schlimmste 
Scharfmacher in Deutschland, der Berliner Industrielle von 
Borsig, der Hitlerbande angedeihen la~t. Auch die 
Mtinchener Geldgeber sind bekannt, die nachhelfen, wenn 
auslandische Franken, Gulden und Lire ausbleiben. 
And finally the motivation for the SPD's expos1ng of the NSDAP's 
sources of financial support 1S given: 
Wir entrtisten uns nicht tiber die Geldgeber der Nazisozi und 
W1r entrtisten uns nicht dartiber, da~ die Hitlerherrschaften 
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Kapitalistengelder annehmen. Wir wollen nur die 
grenzenlose Heuchelei der Nazisozi affentlich anprangern, 
die landauf, landab ziehen und unter dem bladen Gebrtill 
ihrer verhetzten Anhanger die Sozialdemokratie 
beschuldigen, Sle werde finanziell von Judengeldern 
ausgehalten. Und dieses verlogene und traurige Handwerk 
der Nazisozi zu erschweren, das ist politische Notwehr. 
(7 May 1930) 
At the centre of this presentation of National Socialism's 
financial basis, then, lies not an abhorrence of the fact that 
business was contributing to the NSDAP as such, but rather a 
condemnation of the hypocrisy that the receipt of such 
contributions by the party exposed, the mockery it made of the 
Nazi's professed political beliefs and attacks on the SPD's 
finances. This should not, of course, be taken wholly at face 
value; there can be little doubt that any dabbling by the business 
community in the political sphere was anathema to the SPD. 
Nevertheless, leaving aside for the moment the Social Democratic 
conviction that National Socialism was in effect controlled by big 
business through its money, the notion that the NSDAP was in some 
way tainted by its sources of financial support was an important 
one for the SPD - not least because, as will have been seen from 
the article just discussed, the party's self-image was inextricably 
intertwined with its portrayal of the NSDAP's financial 
relationship with business. The close connection between the self-
image of the SPD and the modes of interpretation it applied to 
National Socialism has already been remarked upon in this study; ln 
the present context, it is arguable that the Social Democratic 
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conception of the financial structure of National Socialism, as 
well as serving an obvious propaganda function, was also used to 
reinforce a self-image which was primarily built upon an emphasis 
on the virtues of struggle and self-sacrifice - just as it is 
equally arguable that the potency of this self-image and the desire 
to characterise National Socialism as the negative contrast to it, 
was a further obstacle in the way to an acknowledgement of the 
possibility that, like the SPD, the NSDAP was largely funded by its 
membership and activities. It was certainly around this idea of 
self-funding that the contrast was drawn: the virtuous political 
practice of the SPD, financed by the sacrifices of its members and 
open to scrutiny, was contrasted with the dishonest politics of 
National Socialism, mysteriously secretive about its financial 
affairs, but in actuality reliant on money from its capitalist 
patrons: 
Die sozialdemokratischen Massen haben sich ihre gewaltige 
Organisation aus eigener Kraft aufgebaut. Sie haben 
Groschen urn Groschen zusammengetragen und eln Bollwerk 
gegen Jene aufgerichtet, die da glaubten, das schaffende 
Yolk fUr aIle Zeiten unterdrUcken und ausbeuten zu konnen. 
Herr Hitler aber erzahlt, da~ er 'personliche Darlehen 
aufgenommen habe, urn die allernotigsten finanziellen 
Grundlagen fUr den Neuaufbau der Organisation zu schaffen.' 
Er sagt, er finanziere den Luxus, der im 'Braunen Haus' 
aufgewendet wird: 'Unzahlige Versammlungsbesucher aus den 
bessersituierten Kreisen unseres Volkes ... ' sollen 
entsprechend geschropft werden. Das ist ein deutliches 
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Eingestandnis daftir, in welchen Kreisen die G6nner von 
Hitlers 'Arbeiterpartei' sitzen. [214] (15 May 1931) 
A similar contrast was drawn around a year later with reference to 
the 'Iron Front', the umbrella anti-fascist organisation of Social 
Democratic, Reichsbanner and trade union forces set up at the end 
of 1931: 
Die Faschistischen verwenden die lmmer reichlicher 
flie~enden Gelder der Industrie, der Exprinzen, der 
Kraut junker und der Generale, die wieder zur Herrschaft 1m 
Staate drangen. Die Eiserne Front wird sich aus elgener 
Kraft erhalten. [215] (3 February 1932) 
The 'Iron Front', indeed, embodying as it did so much of the 
symbolism that constituted the SPD's self-image, was frequently 
used in this way - especially through the means of a vocabulary of 
sacrifice which suffused the rhetoric surrounding the creation of 
this organisation. This vocabulary of sacrifice, for instance, was 
clearly to the fore in an Iron Front propaganda appeal of February 
1932, in which fascism's reliance on the subventions of the rich 1S 
emphasised, alongside the lack of such a reliance on the part of 
the Iron Front, which is dependent solely on the efforts and 
contributions, on the 'Opferwilligkeit' of its members: 
Gegen das Geld der Schwerindustrie und der Scharfmacher, 
die sich eine faschistische Btirgerkriegspartei und eine 
Btirgerkriegsarmee halten, gilt es, den Opfermut der 
Republikaner zu setzen! Wenn die Unternehmer aus dem 
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Mehrwert Btirgerkriegsbanden besolden, wenn sle eine 
konterrevolutionare Bewegung gegen die Republik und die 
demokratische Verfassung finanzieren, so wird die 
Arbeiterschaft trotz ihrer gedrtickten Lage aus ihrem Lohn 
den Kampffonds der Eisernen Front starken. [216] 
(9 February 1932) 
Thus Nazi financing is portrayed as operating on a morally lower 
plane from that of Social Democracy, the sullied nature of the 
NSDAP's money contrasted with the honesty and purity of the orlglns 
of the SPD's. And this idea of the immorality of National 
Socialist political practice In regard to its financial 
arrangements was further reinforced in other contexts - it was, for 
example, another of the functions of the attention paid to Hitler's 
allegedly luxurious lifestyle, which was usually accounted for in 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung with reference to the duplicity of the 
NSDAP's sources of income, as the following illustrates: 
Es ensteht die Frage: Wer hat in Wahrheit die ganze 
Geschichte bezahlt? Der Lebenstil des Herrn Hitler zeigt 
auf das deutlichste, da~ er in einem Zeitraum von wenlgen 
Jahren ein tiberaus ansehnliches Vermogen gebildet hat. 
Kein Zweifel ist, da~ seine rednerische und 
schriftstellerische Betatigung die Mittel dazu nicht 
geliefert haben kann. Von welcher Seite und mit welcher 
Begrtindung sind ihm diese Mittel also zugeflossen? 
Haben die Gonner der Hitlerpartei nicht nur die Partei, 
sondern auch ihn personlich mit finanziert? [217J 
(10 October 1931) 
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If, however, the SPD's conception of National Socialism's 
financial basis operated as a means of underlining the Social 
Democratic self-image and belief in a virtuous politics, it could 
also serve as a method by which aspects of Nazism that were 
problematic to the SPD could be explained away, could be 
rationalised. This is particularly evident, for instance, In 
regard to the intensity and novelty of the NSDAP's propaganda 
techniques: it was entirely typical of Social Democracy to reach 
for the ideological cliche when faced with discomfiting phenomena, 
to respond to National Socialism's propaganda activism by looking 
for the consplracy that lay behind it, rather than simply looking 
at it. Thus, even as early as 1929, Nazi success in Landtag 
elections in Baden provoked this response in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung: 
Ihr Erfolg ist hauptsachlich auf elne ma~lose verhetzende 
Agitation in den Stadten und auf dem flachen Lande 
zurtickzuftihren. Insgesamt haben die Nationalsozialisten 
wahrend des Wahlkampfes nicht wenlger als 1800 
Wahlversammlungen abgehalten; das ist u.a. eln Zeichen 
daftir, da~ die Hitlerianer wieder gut bei Kasse sind und 
von der deutschen Schwerindustrie wieder reichlich 
ausgehalten werden. [218] (28 October 1929) 
This judgement was reiterated a few weeks later: 
Die Hitlerpartei versteht sich auf die Finessen der 
Reklame, wie keine andere. Kunststtick, wenn der 
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entsprechende Geldschrank da ist und fUr selne FUllung 
sorgen schon zur rechten Zeit die schwerindustriellen 
Hintermanner, die ja jetzt alles auf die Nazikarte setzen. 
[219] (5 December 1929) 
Hence the fervour of Nazi propaganda could be reduced to a more 
convenient and manageable concept, could be collapsed into yet 
another indication that the hand of the business community was at 
work behind the NSDAP's apparent wealth. The SPD could convince 
itself that it was Wlse to the reality of National Socialism -
when, in fact, to the historian, the tendency always to interpret 
Nazism in terms of the supposed financial relationship to 
capitalism again bespeaks a disguised helplessness in the face of a 
movement operating outwith traditional political boundaries. It 
could be claimed that, along with the obvious ideological 
impulsion, one of the causes of the SPD's misjudgement of the 
NSDAP's financial affairs lay in its persistent application of 
widely prevailing models of political behaviour to a movement that 
largely bypassed them - for it was to some extent the certain 
knowledge that big business did contribute to the funds of the 
bourgeois political parties that created or confirmed within Social 
Democracy the absolute conviction that the same must have been true 
of the NSDAP [220]. Of course, this may well partially mitigate 
the SPD's idee fixe in this area - it must have seemed a reasonable 
enough suspicion (and it was a suspicion, it must be recalled, held 
by other parties as well as the parties of the left [221]) given 
that the business community did attempt to intervene in the 
political sphere by making contributions to political parties. And 
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yet, as has already been stated, National Socialism's relationship 
with big business was something far removed from this, and the 
failure to perceive the true nature of this relationship was a 
consequence of the SPD's difficulty 1n interpreting the 
contradictions the NSDAP presented as a mass populist movement of 
the right. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the SPD's creation of the 
fiction that big business bankrolled the NSDAP was partly an 
inference drawn from the actual behaviour of the business 
community, the ideological imperative was certainly the main 
driving force in the elaboration of that fiction: thus, as was 
mentioned earlier, the constant use of the supposed financial 
relationship between big business and National Socialism by the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung as a means by which to discredit Nazism's 
proclaimed anti-capitalist radicalism [222]. To describe the 
Social Democratic conviction about the existence of that 
relationship as in essence a fiction, moreover, may seem to be an 
overstatement of the case; a consideration of the 'evidence' the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung adduced to support its claims, however, 
does little to contradict this notion. There was, indeed, 
virtually no substantiated evidence presented in the newspaper at 
all. Instead, the majority of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
material consisted simply of assertion, a fact betrayed by the 
continual use of blanket terms such as the 'Unternehmertum', 
'Schwerindustrie' and the 'Fabrikanten', terms which were arguably 
without real meaning, but which were routinely used to describe the 
NSDAP's purported financial backers. This fondness for the use of 
such general terms - which always carried pejorative overtones -
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did not of course mean that individuals were not named, nor even 
that such individuals did not contribute to the NSDAP; it was, in 
fact, rather the case that a handful of names constantly reappeared 
in the Schwabische Volkszeitung in connection with this theme, 
taking on an almost symbolic quality, as if the mere mention of 
industrialists and businessmen such as Emil Kirdorff, Fritz 
Thyssen, Gustav Krupp, Hugo Bruckmann, Edwin Bechstein and Martin 
Mutschmann, all of whom were regularly invoked as exemplifying 
capitalism's financial support of Nazism, was sufficient proof of 
the SPD's wide-ranging allegations. The paucity of the evidential 
basis linking such people to the NSDAP, financially and otherwise, 
and the inadequacy of their use as a means to sustain the SPD's 
thesis, has been well exposed by H.A. Turner, the totality of whose 
conclusions need not be agreed with in order to accept that Social 
Democratic newspapers and propagandists were guilty of founding 
their accusations on myths and rumours, of magnifying slender 
connections to National Socialism, of the easy use as examples of 
small businessmen who were in no way representative of big business 
- of, in general, creating little more than a parody of the reality 
of the relationship between business and the NSDAP [223J. Even 
those individuals highlighted in the Schwabische Volkszeitung who 
were financially involved with the Nazi party could rarely, if 
ever, be said to have typified the attitudes of big business, heavy 
industry or the business community as a whole to National 
Socialism, even SupposIng that such typical attitudes existed. 
Similar criticisms can be levelled at the other main proof found In 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung of Nazism's reliance on the financial 
support of industry, that is Hitler's meetings with businessmen, 
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which have already been mentioned in another context. Disregarding 
reality and relying on the half-truths and falsehoods that were all 
the SPD usually possessed in the way of knowledge about such 
meetings, these events were transformed into the occasions on which 
Hitler received his orders from big business, after which, upon 
Hitler's promising to take on the task of destroying the labour 
movement, he immediately received maSSlve financial contributions 
from the assembled businessmen. Thus, a report from September 1930 
of Hitler's meeting with 'rund 400 Wirtschaftspolitikern des 
rheinisch-westfalischen Industriegebiets', has him vowing to 
destroy international Marxism, to free German workers from its 
claws; consequently 
Kassenschranke 6ffneten sich, Scheckbucher rauschten. [224] 
(23 September 1930) 
Of course, such 'evidence' was rarely totally fictitious; it 
usually had at least some basis in truth, however slim. Meetings 
between Hitler and businessmen did occur: Emil Kirdorff was a 
member of the NSDAP (for a short time), while men such as Bechstein 
and Bruckmann did have some connection with Hitler and some 
businessmen did contribute to Nazism's 'coffers' [225]. And, 
although it is easy enough to demonstrate that the SPD grossly 
exaggerated and misrepresented such facts, a simple condemnation of 
the party's failure to depict reality in this area yet seems an 
inadequate analysis, for in a sense reality, the truth did not 
matter given that the SPD's attitude was ideologically-
predetermined. Here, the way in which a continuing theme such as 
the finances of the NSDAP functioned in a newspaper like the 
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Schwabische Volkszeitung has to be appreciated; above all, the 
extent to which a singular world-view was being propagated, 
adherence to the tenets of which often became more important than 
the closeness of those tenets to the truth. Within this context, 
it is entirely unsurprising that half-truths, myths and lies about 
Hitler and his party's financial relationship to big business 
should be seized upon in the Schwabische Volkszeitung and referred 
to again and again, ultimately accruing a symbolic resonance far 
beyond their factual significance. [226] 
What is perhaps surprising - not to say a little perplexing -
1S that, alongside the Schwabische Volkszeitung's constant 
allegations about the financial contributions made by big business 
to Nazi funds, ran another theme, that of the continuing economic 
difficulties of the NSDAP (227). It is not proposed to examine 
this theme in any detail, for it was very much subordinate to the 
more theoretically-driven conception that has just been discussed, 
in the newspaper's coverage of the NSDAP's finances. There seems 
little doubt, however, that the portrayal of Nazi financial 
difficulties that is occasionally to be found in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung was closer to the truth than the more usual depiction 
of a party without financial anxiety due to the largess of the 
business community; this was especially true of the latter half of 
1932, when the NSDAP did indeed face financial disaster. 
Nevertheless, the blatant contradiction between the two treatments 
of the same theme cannot be disguised, and 1S evidence of the type 
of competing imperatives that can at times be seen struggling with 
each other in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's coverage of National 
Socialism. On the one hand, and predominantly, there existed the 
156 
desire to tie the NSDAP into the SPD's conception of the capitalist 
system and how it operated, and the consequent need to view Nazism 
as an agent of that system, financed and hence controlled by it. 
On the other hand - and this shall be returned to - there persisted 
within the SPD the tendency to believe that National Socialist 
success could only be transitory, that the movement must 
disintegrate, and the idea that the NSDAP stood constantly on the 
brink of financial collapse was an outgrowth of this tendency. 
Thus the image of National Socialism presented in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung could be altered if expedient, from that of a party 
luxuriating in unearned and undeserved wealth to one suffering 
desperate impoverishment. 
To conclude this section of the discussion, it 1S necessary, 
firstly, to stress again that the critique advanced here of the 
Social Democratic approach to the question of the NSDAP's finances 
should not be taken to imply the total acceptance of Turner's 
thesis, which seeks, beyond severing the connections between big 
business and the NSDAP, also to de-emphasise the influence of big 
business on the failure of Weimar in general. Certainly, Turner's 
research does much to confirm what is evident enough in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung - that is, that the SPD's desire to unmask 
Nazism as a tool of capitalism was an ideologically-driven 
necessity that impaired the judgement of the party. This impaired 
judgement revealed itself above all in an analysis of the NSDAP's 
sources of financial support that was simplistic, mechanistic and 
implausible. And although those accused of contributing to Nazi 
funds spanned the whole spectrum of reaction - and, indeed beyond, 
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for the SPD also believed, or professed to, that the NSDAP was in 
receipt of 'foreign gold' - the basic hostility to the capitalist 
system that underlay such accusations could never be disguised. 
This is why it again appears as if the true essence of National 
Socialism remains hidden from the SPD, continuing as it did to 
define the former in terms of an imaginary relationship with Social 
Democracy's fundamental enemy. Thus, although the need to 
discredit National Socialism by associating it with economic 
reaction was important to a newspaper like the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, it is arguable that it was at least as important to 
use this assumed association as a means of lambasting Germany's 
business community. The supposed contradiction between industry's 
claim to be suffering from the economic downturn and its generosity 
to the Nazi party, did not, for example, go unremarked in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, thus the reference to 
die Fabrikanten ... die trotz der Notlage der Industrie 
fUr die Zwecke der Hitlerpartei heute noch eine offene Hand 
haben. [228] (10 August 1931) 
or to the payments of 
... die sonst so notleidende Schwerindustrie an Hitlers 
Parteikasse. [229] (16 March 1932) 
The frequent highlighting of heavy industry as a major contributor 
to the NSDAP's wealth, indeed, would similarly seem to have had 
more to do with the extent to which the SPD's consciousness 
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remained rooted in the preV10US era's labour struggles, where it 
had been forged, than the reality of heavy industry's - even given 
that the concept of 'heavy industry' is a valid one - relationship 
with Nazism. 
And yet, although these analytical faults without doubt led 
the SPD to a complete misunderstanding of the NSDAP's connections 
with the business community and of the latter's complex and 
variegated attitudes to the former, it should not be forgotten that 
the SPD's instinctual belief that much of business was inherently 
hostile to the political, social and above all economic compromises 
upon which the Weimar Republic was founded, and increasingly so by 
the early 1930s, was a valid one. This, however, merely serves to 
underline how necessary an accurate dissection of the Nazi -
business relationship was, and thus how disastrously wrong-headed 
the SPD was in its blind adherence to the propaganda myth it had 
done so much to create. 
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CHAPTER 5 : National Socialism as a transitory phenomenon: 
the analysis of National Socialist ideology and 
propaganda in the Schwabische Volkszeitung and its 
wider implications. 
The use made by the Schwabische Volkszeitung of the myths 
surrounding the question of the sources of the NSDAP's apparent 
wealth, is an example of the SPD's engagement with National 
Socialism at its most propagandistic; indeed, throughout the 
analysis thus far the propaganda function of the material on Nazism 
to be found in the Schwabische Volkszeitung has been emphasised, 
and the extent to which that material was designed to portray 
National Socialism ln a manner which would have the greatest 
negative impact on the Schwabische Volkszeitung's readership has 
been highlighted. It would, however, be erroneous to give the 
impression that the reader of the newspaper would have encountered 
no discussion of the ideas represented by National Socialism. On 
the contrary, the SPD appears to have been very keen to dissect the 
NSDAP's fundamental ideology, for this too constituted part of its 
wider aim of elucidating the rival movement's main characteristics 
for its readership. It is, though, arguable that the difficulty 
the party had in developing such an analysis of Nazi ideology, a 
difficulty which is certainly evident in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's material on this theme, again reveals much about its 
inherent characteristics - for again that inflexibility of response 
is present, that reliance, already frequently noted, on 
predetermined expectations which subordinated thought to polemic. 
Now, as will be shown in a moment, that Social Democracy was 
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capable of identifying, and condemning, the key elements that 
constituted the motivating Weltanschauung of the NSDAP is not In 
doubt. However, this identification and condemnation is less 
interesting to the historian than the wider terms in which the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung couched its analyses of Nazi ideology, 
especially the models against which National Socialist ideas were 
judged. As with the themes that have been discussed up to this 
point, if attention here is focused, not on the propaganda value of 
the Social Democratic analysis - the portrayal of Nazi ideology in 
an entirely negative light - but rather on what it reveals of the 
SPD at this time, the texts can be shown to have had more than one 
level of meanIng, to be open to more than one possible reading. 
Thus the various traits that are being suggested as typical of the 
Social Democratic mind-set reveal themselves to the historian, not 
only through the obvious consequences they effected upon the 
content of the SPD's analysis of National Socialism, but also 
through the underlying shape of that analysis, in ways requIrIng a 
more subtle exegesis in order to become evident. Thus, the 
examination of Nazi ideology in the Schwabische Volkszeitung, it 
will be suggested, above all reveals the SPD's tendency to judge 
the NSDAP against itself, to use its own development and 
organisation as an analytical model through which National 
Socialism could be assessed; and this,it will be argued, 
represented another method of escaping the uncomfortable 
difficulties the Nazi movement presented for the SPD, another 
inadequate attempt to restructure the NSDAP's challenge to 
traditional political practice in conventional terms. 
First, though the more basic point must be made, that the SPD 
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was interested in National Socialism's motivating ideas and did 
quite accurately depict them from fairly early on in the NSDAP's 
resurgence. Thus, the party's anti-semitism and racial theories, 
its hatred of the Weimar system, its economic beliefs, its 
attitudes to Christianity, to women, to culture - these types of 
themes were all well covered by the Schwabische Volkszeitung. 
Unsurprisingly, though, the newspaper concentrated most of its 
attention on those aspects of Nazi ideology which appeared most 
relevant to the SPD itself, both ln general and in local terms. 
The previously examined emphasis on the NSDAP's anti-Marxism and 
the use of the concept of fascism in the Italian parallel were 
manifestations of this, and, with a similar aim, it was National 
Socialism's fundamental hostility to Germany's new democratic 
system that was most often used in the Schwabische Volkszeitung to 
characterise the movement's ideology. Indeed, for the SPD, this 
hostility was merely the counterpart of the NSDAP's anti-Marxism 
and fanatical hatred of the labour movement, given the amount of 
political capital that Social Democracy had invested in the Weimar 
Republic as a democratic system; for, however ambiguous its 
attitude was to the system in operation, Weimar nevertheless 
represented democracy and working-class achievements to the SPD -
and if the NSDAP was able eventually to polarise opinion around the 
system as a concept, the SPD was at least partially complicit ln 
this, because it felt compelled to defend the system, however far 
removed from a democratic ideal it was, against Nazi attacks, when 
more might have been gained from maintaining a more circumspect 
critical distance from it and, consequently, a less defensive 
posture. As it was, the NSDAP in a sense set the agenda for the 
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SPD, as the latter reacted to the anti-system propaganda of the 
former. Certainly, this aspect of Nazi ideology, its 'Ha~ gegen 
die Verfassung' [230J, was noted early on in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung and constantly reiterated In the following years, as 
this typical example from 1930 illustrates: 
Die Nazi-Sozi reprasentieren nicht nur den 'Sozialismus der 
dummen Kerle', sie sind auch Todfeinde des heutigen Staates 
selner demokratischen Grundlage wegen ... In ihrem Ha~ 
gegen den heutigen Staat schrecken sie, genau Wle In 
anderer Art die Kommunisten, vor keinem Mittel ztiruck, die 
Grundlagen des Staates zu zerst6ren. Neben der 
skrupellosesten Hetze gegen einzelne Bev6lkerungsschichten 
ist es den NaziSozi vor allem darum zu tun, die Autoritat 
jeder Regierung zu untergraben, die Bev6lkerung gegen die 
Beh6rden aufzustacheln, die Gesetze zu verh6hnen, urn 
dadurch die Fundamente des Staates langsam, aber, wie Sle 
glauben, sicher zu unterwtihlen." [231] (7 May 1930) 
Later National Socialism was defined as 
elne konterrevolutionare Bewegung gegen die Republik und 
die demokratische Auffassung. [232] (9 February 1932) 
Clearly, then, the highlighting by the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung of the NSDAP's anti-Weimar attitudes as, quite 
accurately, one of the foundation stones of its ideology was part 
of the wider perception of National Socialism as a threat, as a 
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threat, that is to say, particularly to achievements valued by the 
SPD. In other words, the portrayal of Nazi ideology was initially 
structured by the SPD's own areas of interest, naturally enough. 
This is why, in comparison to the the NSDAP's hostility to the 
Weimar system the party's anti-semitism and racial theories in 
general were, if not ignored, treated almost as a side issue in the 
SPD's anti-Nazi propaganda [233]. The contemptible nature of Nazi 
anti-semitism was taken for granted and therefore less often 
engaged with intellectually than savagely mocked. The relative 
marginalisation of this theme in the Schwabische Volkszeitung to 
the cutting aside or dubious jokes about Goebbel's 'semitic' 
appearance [234] was however also the result of a basic 
underestimation of the sincerity of National Socialist anti-
semitism. Thus, according to D.L. Niewyk: 
Most Social Democrats believed that right-wing leaders 
who played on bourgeois psychoses in Machiavellian style 
were too intelligent themselves to believe such racist 
nonsense. Only a minority thought it likely that Jews 
would be subject to severe persecution in the event of 
Nazi take-over, and none sensed that the Nazis might 
eventually resort to genocide. [235] 
(D.L. Niewyk, Socialist, Anti-Semite and Jew) 
This belief that Nazi anti-semitism was primarily a method of 
attracting support by playing on base prejudices rather than a 
genuine theoretical conviction was further encouraged by the 
readiness of the NSDAP to play down its anti-semitism when this was 
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expedient, in order, for example, not to harm perceptions of the 
party abroad. 
An interesting contrast to this, however, 1S the relatively 
high level of interest paid in the Schwabische Volkszeitung, to an 
aspect of the NSDAP's ideology that might have seemed just as 
peripheral to the SPD's interests as anti-semitism - that is, to 
National Socialist attitudes to Christianity; or, to be more exact, 
to the incompatibility of those attitudes and indeed Nazi attitudes 
1n general, with any kind of traditional Christianity. A typical 
article from September 1930 (headlined 'Nazi = Christen') for 
instance, talked of~ 
All die Unflatigkeiten und Gemeinheiten, die sich die 
nationalsozialistische Bewegung seit ihren Anfangen 
gegeniiber Christentum und Kirche wiederholt geleistet hat .. 
(5 September 1930) 
and claimed that the Nazis sought the creation of a nationalistic 
'Deutschtumsreligion', which would take its starting point from the 
party's 'deeply unchristian' racial beliefs. [236]. 
Similarly, any negative pronouncement from the religious 
establishment on National Socialism was eagerly published in the 
newspaper, and the writings of the 'theorists' of National 
Socialism, in particular Rosenberg's Myth of the 20th Century, were 
on occasion subjected to close and essentially propagandistic 
examination, in order that what the SPD perceived as a deliberate 
and expedient ambiguity in the Nazis' professed attitude to 
religion could be dispelled and the reality of its hostility to 
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Christianity revealed [237J. And the point here is that this must 
be seen as a response by the Schwabische Volkszeitung to the nature 
of the Social Democratic constituency in Augsburg - that is to say, 
its overwhelmingly Catholic nature. Whatever the actualities of 
the relationship between the average rank-and-file Social Democrat 
in Augsburg and his nominal religion, National Socialism's 
antipathy to Catholicism must yet have seemed to the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's journalists one aspect of Nazi ideology that could 
not fail to have a negative impact on the newspaper's readership; 
it may also have been the case that the highlighting of this 
element of Nazi ideology was an attempt by Augsburg's SPD to reach 
beyond its core support, to transmit a message about the nature of 
the NSDAP to other sectors of the city's Catholic population. 
Thus, as far as the content of the NSDAP's ideology was concerned, 
the basic alm remained constant~ whether dealing with the NSDAP's 
hatred of the Weimar system, its anti-semitism or its hostility to 
established religion, its messianic aspirations [238J, its theories 
about the function of women in society [239J, or its cultural 
criticism [240J - whatever element of Nazi ideology was the subject 
of attention, the substance of the ideas being discussed was always 
merely fodder for the Schwabische Volkszeitung's continued assault 
on National Socialism, propaganda to be used in whichever way 
seemed likely to make the most lasting impression. 
The despicable nature of the content of National Socialist 
ideology, then, was taken for granted, and material concerning it 
in the Schwabische Volkszeitung entirely predictable in nature. 
Much more interesting to the historian, however, is the underlying 
Social Democratic attitude to what may be termed the form of Nazi 
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ideology; that is to say, to the place that ideas occupied within 
the National Socialist movement and the intellectual quality of 
those ideas - in short, the extent to which they formed a coherent 
ideology which could be analysed as the SPD's could be. To the 
SPD, it was above all the poverty of National Socialist ideas and 
their failure to cohere as an ideology that was evident. Thus, the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung was littered with expressions of contempt 
for the paucity of original ideas and the lack of theoretical 
rigour and logical thought in Nazi propaganda and pronouncements. 
An article by Erik Nolting, for example, talked of: 
Die trostlose Unfruchtbarkeit der nationalsozialistischen 
Ideenwelt ... [241J (3 December 1929) 
The report of a speech by Carl Severing reiterated his claim that: 
... von Geist und Idee kann bei der nationalsozialistischen 
Propaganda keine Rede sein. [242J (21 February 1931) 
Elsewhere the question was asked: 
... ist schlie~lich nicht alles, was der 
Nationalsozialismus bis jetzt an Ideen produziert hat, eln 
schlechter Witz? [243J (17 July 1931) 
And finally, a similar strain of thinking was present when 
Augsburg's SPD Btirgermeister Ackermann discussed the secondhand 
nature of Nazi ideology: 
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Da ist nicht elne Spur von Originalitat, nicht elne Spur 
von Erkenntnis der soziologischen Zusammenhange ... Man 
kann sich auf politischem Gebiet tiberhaupt nicht ernsthaft 
mit ihnen auseinandersetzen, weil sie nirgends greifbar, 
nirgends fa~bar sind und nur Schlagworte haben. [244] 
(29 November 1929) 
There existed, then, a fundamental disdain for National Socialism's 
perceived inability properly to use ideas or to produce a 
consistent and convincing ideology - and, as will be shown more 
fully in a moment, the model, the ideal against which the NSDAP was 
judged by the SPD in this case was the SPD itself. The type of 
ideology that National Socialism was despised for failing to 
possess, was exactly the type of ideology that had played such a 
large part in the development of the SPD and which continued to 
exercise at least an intellectual grip on the party. The Social 
Democratic approach to Nazi ideology thus demonstrated its own 
belief in the importance of ideology and its own conception of what 
constituted such an ideology, more than it elucidated National 
Socialist ideas; for the SPD's 'analysis' of Nazi ideology was 
conditioned by its own self-image, its expectation of what a 
successful, durable mass movement should be and what it must 
possess. 
These traits were, for instance, written into the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's approach to one feature of the NSDAP's ideology that 
it recognised from the beginning: that is, the fact that the rival 
movement often appeared not to have one ideology but rather several 
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ideologies, a range of competing beliefs and motivations which was 
not merely the consequence of deliberate tactics on the part of the 
Nazi leadership (different messages for different constituencies) 
but was actually inherent in National Socialism. It was 
characteristic of the SPD's analysis, however [245J, to judge this 
multiplicity against an ideal of unity, that type of relative 
ideological unity prevalent within the SPD itself. Indeed, it 
could even be said that the Social Democratic attempt to discern a 
Nazi ideology could not but fail as, in the sense understood by the 
SPD, such an ideology did not exist, the essence of National 
Socialism did not, beyond their basic mobilising function, lie In 
its ideas. The Schwabische Volkszeitung gleefully highlighted any 
example of 'ideological' squabbling within the NSDAP or 
contradictions in the ideas expressed by the party's leadership and 
propagandists, apparently without realising that Nazi success was 
certainly not dependent on a conventional ideological unity; rather 
activism, propaganda and sloganeering were more highly prized than 
coherent intellectual or philosophical thinking about politics or 
economics. The contrast this made with the SPD's political 
behaviour, in which action was always justified (however tenuously) 
with reference to theory, and in which the theoretically schooled 
worker represented an ideal, could not have been starker - and 
equally clear in the pages of the Schwabische Volkszeitung was just 
how impossible it was for the SPD to make the leap of imagination 
that would have been necessary for an understanding to develop of 
how Nazi 'ideology' could differ so markedly from the SPD's (or the 
SPD's conception of its) ideology, without condemning the movement 
to impotent obscurity. Thus, although the Schwabische 
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Volkszeitung's attempts to engage with National Socialist ideas 
were both understandable and inevitable, those attempts again 
ultimately seem to expose the SPD's inability to analyse National 
Socialism in anything but conventional terms, its use, even if that 
use was unconSC10US, as a hermeneutic model, of concepts of 
ideology and class which perhaps adequately captured the essence of 
the SPD, but in terms of which National Socialism could only have 
been defined negatively - that is, with reference to the movement's 
refusal to be a traditional class-based and ideologically-
determined political organisation. 
To be fair, and to be more precise, it must be acknowledged 
that the SPD was capable of recognising that ideas were not vital 
to the success of National Socialism, that an ideology as such did 
not bind its followers together. Thus, it was occasionally 
suggested, or implied, that other aspects of the movement 
functioned almost as a replacement ideology, aspects such as the 
NSDAP's intense propaganda activism [246J or its use of violence 
[247J. And of course the logical counterpart of the SPD's rhetoric 
of contempt for the poverty of National Socialist ideas would have 
been a belief that those ideas could only have played a marginal 
part in the NSDAP's success; and yet in the Schw~bische 
Volkszeitung Nazi ideas did not cease to be analysed as if they 
were absolutely crucial to that success and as if a dissection of 
their intellectual inadequacy could somehow make a difference to 
that success. Consider, for example, the following extract, taken 
from an analysis of the NSDAP's party programme: 
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Das 'unabanderliche' Programm der Partei ist etwa hundert 
Zeilen lang und von verblliffender Primitivitat. Es ist so 
unfahig und bar jeder konstruktiven Idee, da~ nach ihm sich 
wirklich kein Staat, schon gar nicht ein bewu~t 1ns Chaos 
gerissenes Staatswesen neu aufbauen lie~e. Mit der 
kindlichnaiven 'Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft', dem 
Judenha~ und dem 'heldischen Flihrerprinzip' ist die 
Vielfaltigkeit des modernen Staatslebens nicht zu 
bewaltigen . 
... Seinem Inhalt nach ist das Programm e1n 
treues Spiegelbild der Nazi-Partei. Es operiert mit 
unklaren Begriffen und mystischen Forderungen. Es besteht 
aus v61liger Verkennung der Gegenwartskrafte und auf dieser 
'wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis' fu~enden phantastischen 
Vorstellungen. [248] (13 February 1931) 
The contempt here lS a contempt for a movement which fails to 
measure up to the SPD's standard of rationality (this theme of the 
SPD's image of itself as embodying rational thought and behaviour 
in opposition to Nazi irrationality will be further explored 
later); the presumed irrationality and primitiveness of Nazi ideas 
leads to an absolute confidence that National Socialism could not 
ultimately succeed. And yet the SPD continued to attempt to engage 
with National Socialism on the intellectual plane; the obvious 
consequence of the type of conception of National Socialism's 
ideology just quoted - which would have been to condemn Nazi ideas, 
but which hardly necessitated an analysis of them - was not drawn, 
the SPD's natural instinct was to look for a National Socialist 
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equivalent to its Marxism. 
This was also what led the Schwabische Volkszeitung to focus 
on Gottfried Feder as the NSDAP's main theorist or ideologist - the 
attention paid to Feder's ideas was not a true reflection of his 
position within the party (which required no such ideological guru) 
but was rather a reflection of the SPD's own expectations, even of 
its own requirements if it was to combat National Socialism. [249J 
Feder's economic theories provided at least a semblance of coherent 
thought and hence one of the few aspects of National Socialist 
ideology which could be subject to a detailed intellectual 
critique. And for the SPD to believe itself to have adequately 
comprehended National Socialism, it needed to develop and publicise 
such critiques, thus the misreading of the importance of Feder and 
his ideas to National Socialism. A good example of this 
misreading, and one which further elucidates its or1g1ns, was a 
ser1es of articles published in the newspaper in February 1931, 
entitled 'Die Nationalokonomie des kleinen Moritz. Die 
nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftstheorie unter der Lupe des 
Fachmannes' [250J. Although other strands of Nazi belief are 
mentioned, such as the movement's racial theories, these are 
quickly dismissed as failing to possess the mobilising power 
necessary for the creation of a mass movement; rather, because 
because 
Die motorischen Krafte der Zeit liegen heute 1m Ringen der 
Klassen, 
Okonomische und soziale Probleme stehen liberall im 
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Brennpunkt des Interesses, (13 February 1931) 
the NSDAP had to have an economlC programme if it was to have any 
hope of success. The consequence, according to these articles, was 
Feder's economlC theories, which in the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
were always summed up ln the phrase 'Brechung der 
Zinsknechtschaft'. What then followed was a lengthy critique of 
Feder's economic concepts, from the perspective of orthodox Marxist 
economics, and there can be no doubt about its thoroughness and 
accuracy; again, however, the suspicion arlses that, rather than 
dealing with ideas that were central to the functioning of National 
Socialism, the SPD's particular preoccupations were being imposed 
upon the analysis of the rival movement in an almost artificial 
manner. Certainly the presence of Feder's ideas as part of the 
general political landscape of the time is not in question; but the 
claim that the class struggle, and economic and social problems 
constituted the motor force of the age reveals the extent to which 
the emphasising of Feder's theories especially suited the SPD, for 
although this may have been the case for the SPD and its 
intellectuals, it yet seems at best a partial perspective from 
which to interpret National Socialism. Precisely defined economlC 
plans, like a precisely detailed programme, may have been vital to 
the SPD, but the Nazi movement operated along quite different 
lines. This is why the Schwabische Volkszeitung's consistently 
pursued desire to expose the inadequacies of the Nazi movement's 
socio-economic theories - for all that this was, admittedly, at 
least partly understandable as a means of propaganda counter-
attack - seems in retrospect above all a template of the SPD's own 
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fixations, its own preoccupation with theory and, once again, its 
inability to comprehend the basis of a political practice so 
radically removed from its own. 
This is not, of course, to deny that intellectual analyses of 
National Socialist ideas could not yield insights and perceptions. 
Among the most perceptive treatments of National Socialism to be 
found in the Schwabische Volkszeitung were three lengthy articles 
which appeared in June 1930 [251J, the first of which dealt with 
Nazi ideas, and which in general demonstrated less of the 
ideological cliche and a greater recognition of the realities and 
dangers of National Socialism than was often the case. 
Nevertheless, even here there was to be found the same underlying 
discomfort about engaging with a movement such as National 
Socialism, the same paradoxical combination of contempt for Nazi 
ideology and the compulsion to analyse it, and the same confidence 
that the poverty of Nazi ideas would ultimately render the movement 
harmless, the same characteristics, in other words, which prevailed 
in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's less sophisticated material on 
this theme. The article, entitled 'Die Ideen', begins with a 
typical enough disclaimer about the impossibility of the task of 
explicating Nazi ideas, claiming that any attempt to do so must 
founder on the latter's 'uncontrollable mysticism': 
Das ist das Charakteristische dieser soziologischen 
Erscheinung, da~ ihre geistige Substanz schaumiger ist als 
die irgend einer frtiheren Massenbewegung. 
Certainly the seemlng irrationalities of Nazism, its ambiguities 
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and confusions were always problematic for the SPD; this article, 
however, comes close, briefly, to discerning the real operating 
principles of National Socialism when it notes the intention behind 
the movement's 'Vagheit', that 1S the way it prevents National 
Socialism from being overtaken by events. 
Nevertheless, although in this sense the notion of Nazi 
ideology is admitted to be almost a false one, the remainder of the 
article concerns itself with attempts to penetrate the NSDAP's 
ideological 'vagueness', attempts undertaken with the model 1n mind 
of the type of cementing ideology present 1n the SPD. In 
particular, and predictably enough, Feder ('der gro~e Theoretiker, 
die wirtschaftliche Kapazitat der Nationalsozialisten') is 
pinpointed as the party's main ideologue, responsible for its 
programme (supposedly) and its core economic beliefs. And, as 1n 
the article just discussed above, much effort is then given over to 
a rational undermining of these beliefs, as well as the more 
nebulous Nazi concepts such as the importance of 'blood' and the 
'FUhrerprinzip'. The importance attached by the SPD to such a 
critique, moreover, was indicated by the contempt that the NSDAP's 
supposed failure intellectually to confront Marxism elicited: 
der Versuch e1ner konkret-fa~baren Auseinandersetzung 
mit der marxistischen Gedankenwelt ist von den 
'Theoretikern' des Nationalsozialismus noch nie gemacht 
worden. 
And the conclusion reached by this commentary was no less 
condemnatory: 
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Was bleibt, wenn man die geistigen Grundlagen dieser 
Bewegung untersucht, die kraftvoll sein will und von 
FUhrerkonkurrenz durchtobt ist, die einen Wirtschaftsplan 
zu haben vorgibt und ihn gegen die Einwande eines 
Elementarstudenten nicht verteidigen kann, die sich hinter 
einer Mystik verschanzt, mit der alles, schlechthin alles 
begrUndet und abgelehnt werden kann? Es bleibt als konkret 
fa~bare Idee schlie~lich nichts anders Ubrig als der 
Judenha~. Aber selbst der kann sich nur emotionell, nicht 
vernunftma~ig begrUnden ... 
... Selbst der Gegner versucht, sich in die geistigen 
Grundlagen einer soziologischen Erscheinung hineinzufinden. 
Aber dem Nationalsozialismus gegenliber versagt der beste 
Wille, weil ihm irgend etwas Geistiges einfach nicht 
zugrunde liegt. [252J (27 June 1930) 
This went straight to the heart of the Social Democratic dilemma In 
this area: for its worst possible enemy was the enemy with whom 
intellectual debate and dispute was at least futile, if not 
impossible. In the clash between Social Democratic rationality and 
Nazi irrationality, the SPD was bound to remain trapped in modes of 
thought and methods of political discourse structured around its 
experiences just as surely as the NSDAP was free of such shackles. 
For this reason, the accurate diagnosis of how the SPD should 
proceed which ended the analysis was certain to remain unheeded: 
National Socialist success, it was stated, 
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... ist der Erfolg e1nes kapitalkraftigen Barnum und 
Bailey, dessen Reklame grandioser ist als die irgend e1nes 
Konkurrenten. Dieses massenpsychologische Phanomen ist 
das, womit sich die ernsthafte Zeitkritik 
auseinanderzusetzen hat; nicht die verworrene Ideologie, 
die nur so lange bestehen kann, wie es ihr erspart bleibt, 
praktische Verantwortung zu tragen. [253J (27 June 1930) 
The 'muddled ideology' of National Socialism would continue to be a 
focus for discussion and polemic in the Schwabische Volkszeitung -
the SPD was not capable of freeing itself from its instinctual 
belief in the crucial importance of ideology in politics, even 1n 
the act of analysing the behaviour of other political movements. 
Implicit in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's investigation of 
the NSDAP's ideology was the belief that rationality, rational 
ideas would ultimately prevail over the intellectually impoverished 
approach of National Socialism. It was inconceivable to the SPD 
that a movement as bereft of ideas as the Nazi movement could mount 
a sustainable bid for power, far less a successful one; for the 
party's own development and experiences led it to put an enormous 
and probably misplaced faith in the power of theoretically grounded 
ideas. Political activism alone could not suffice. Feeding into 
this conviction was another feature of the NSDAP's political 
practice, one which clearly infuriated Social Democrats - that 1S, 
the extreme promiscuity of Nazi rhetoric, the tactic of casually 
promising everything to everyone, which was employed so brazenly by 
the party: 
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In der Agitation operiert Sle mit auswechselbarem Programm: 
hier schillert es agrarisch, dort gro~industriell, hier 
sozialpolitisch-fortschrittlich, dort scharfmacherisch-
reaktionar, hier monarchisch, dort republikanisch. [254] 
(1 October 1930) 
This was, to Social Democratic minds, a politics without virtue, 
mere demagogy and, as such, the SPD was convinced, it was a 
politics that would ultimately be exposed, practice would betray 
promlse, reality would betray rhetoric, and the National Socialists 
would be revealed as the dissemblers they undoubtedly were. More 
than this, it was the task of a Social Democratic newspaper such as 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung both to emphasise the inevitability of 
this process, and to accelerate it by highlighting every instance 
of Nazi contradiction and hypocrisy - an aspect of the SPD's 
approach to National Socialism that, as shall be seen in a moment, 
had far wider implications than might be expected. 
First though, it is necessary to outline briefly the way ln 
which this theme manifested itself ln the Schwabische Volkszeitung; 
a theme it must immediately be said, which was a constant 
throughout the period under discussion, used with wearying 
repetition. The newspaper never tired of emphasising the gulf 
separating Nazi propaganda from the realities of Nazi action, nor 
of lambasting the unscrupulousness of the practice of making 
infinite promises to various constituencies. The existence of this 
latter tactic was made clear to the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
readership many times, as in, for example, August 1930: 
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In ihren Wahlversprechen haben sie alle Ubrigen Parteien 
weit Ubertroffen. Sie haben sich nicht darauf beschrankt , 
die eine oder die andere Bev6lkerungsschicht politisch zu 
gewinnen, sondern sie haben sicherheitshalber allen alles 
versprochen. Sie sind eine Partei fUr BUrger und Arbeiter, 
fUr Enteignung und Schutz des Privateigentums, fUr Stadt 
und Land - kurz, nach ihren Wahlversprechungen sind sie 
Meister in der Kunst 'es recht zu machen jedermann'. In der 
Praxis sieht das allerdings anders aus. [255J 
(26 August 1930) 
Or In June 1932, with reference specifically to the workers: 
Er [HitlerJ ... macht dem Arbeiter Versprechungen Uber 
Versprechungen mit gr6~ter Gewissenlosigkeit, Wle es eben 
nur einem Hitler eigen sein kann ... [256J (9 June 1932) 
Also made explicit, however, was the SPD's expectation that any 
achievement of governmental responsibility by the NSDAP would 
reveal the impossibility of fulfilling its multitude of promlses, 
that this would be the true test of Nazi rhetoric: 
Erst wenn diese Partei in regierenden K6rperschaften ... 
in ausschlaggebende Stellungen gelangt, erst dann beginnt 
auch fUr sie die Probe auf die Echtheit oder Unechtheit 
ihrer Propaganda-Rhetorik. [257J (28 June 1930) 
To the SPD, of course, this was a test that the NSDAP would 
inevitably fail: 
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Sie ... schlagen selbst den Rekord in unerflillbaren 
Versprechungen an aIle Bevolkerungsschichten! Sie wlirden 
aIle enttauschen - am meisten aber die Arbeiter - wenn sie 
an der Macht waren. [258J (18 February 1932) 
It was even occasionally suggested in the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
that the National Socialists did not really desire the 
responsibility of power for precisely this reason [259J. And 
certainly the belief that, whether by being exposed to the 
realities of power or through some other means, the 
artificially-created National Socialist support base would 
disintegrate under the weight of unkept promises and lost 
illusions, was sincerely held by the SPD - providing, for example, 
a measure of consolation ln an analysis of 'the situation ln 
Augsburg' after the Landtag elections of April 1932, in which the 
NSDAP had displaced the SPD as the second most popular party 
locally. For, while admitting that the party had suffered a 'set 
back', the author of the article was yet confident that the NSDAP's 
support was but temporary, built upon hopes that could not be 
realised, proclaiming: 
Verlieren werden Sle elnes Tages die Wahlerschichten, die 
Sle ln den letzten Wochen durch unglaubliche Versprechungen 
an sich zogen. [260J (27 April 1932) 
Of course, this belief that support for National Socialism 
would quickly dissipate, seemingly as part of an inevitable 
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process, did not prevent the Schwabische Volkszeitung from seeking 
to hasten that process by highlighting the hollowness of Nazi 
rhetoric, the gap between promise and practice. The use of this 
tactic hardly needs labouring here as heavily as it was laboured 1n 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung itself, but it took the form, for 
example, and as has already been mentioned in another context, of 
contrasting the activities of Nazism in positions of power and 
responsibility with its previous propaganda [261]; or of, more 
generally, ridiculing the NSDAP's lack of practical achievements to 
match the extravagance of its rhetoric [262]. In another vein, 
that extravagant rhetoric was exploited in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung as the yardstick against which the contradictions and 
hypocrisies of National Socialist political practice could be 
measured, either at the level of the personal behaviour of 
individual Nazis, especially amongst the leadership, who 
conspicuously failed to remain true to the movement's ideals and 
policies [263]; or on the wider political plane, in the many 
articles which contrasted the 'words' and 'deeds' of the NSDAP 1n 
the day-to-day political struggle, 1n, to give one instance, 
parliament [264]. 
The Schwabische Volkszeitung's approach to this theme in its 
daily coverage of Nazism is, however, less significant than the 
wider implications of that approach. What should be said, firstly, 
is that, as with the analysis of Nazi ideology, the treatment of 
the NSDAP's unscrupulous rhetoric represented another instance of 
the transformation by the Social Democratic mind-set of those very 
qualities which, in retrospect, contributed most to Nazi success 
into negative characteristics that would supposedly guarantee the 
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movement's demise within the short-term. Moreover, although the 
continual reiteration of the failure of Nazi reality to match Nazi 
rhetoric may well have been a useful method of propaganda to direct 
towards the SPD's own supporters, it yet appears simplistic to have 
expected, as the Schwabische Volkszeitung apparently did expect, 
that exposing the mendacity and inconsistencies of Nazi propaganda 
in relation to practice would have had any effect on National 
Socialism's momentum. It is, of course, quite possible that the 
hammering home of this theme was another manifestation of the SPD's 
vulnerability, of its anxiety about the attractiveness of the 
NSDAP's rhetoric for its own followers; and it is certainly another 
instance of the SPD's faith in the instructive power of its 
propaganda, from which perspective its constant repetition becomes 
more understandable. It also, however, had its roots in the SPD's 
basic inability to comprehend Nazism's political practice, an 
inability which, again, was partly determined by the SPD's 
conception of its own political behaviour as embodying political 
virtue, rationality and scrupulous honesty. The Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's constant identification of examples of Nazi 
hypocrisy and disingenuousness most often appears as a pedantic 
resort to a rulebook of political virtue - a rulebook that the 
NSDAP had no intention of adhering to - which could possess little 
force in the face of the realities of Nazi politics. 
Moreover, although this tactic on the part of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung was in one sense an active one, that is it was a means 
of attacking National Socialism, it nevertheless also revealed a 
curious strain of passivity of response, or, perhaps better 
expressed, a passivity of expectation - the shaping expectation 
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being that National Socialism would betray itself, and that, 
therefore, the task of the SPD was to point this out whenever it 
occurred, and thus aid the process of disintegration. In part this 
was the consequence of a Social Democratic tendency which will be 
encountered again elsewhere, to avoid looking inward, to substitute 
the conviction that events would in some way inevitably run in 
their favour, for any self- criticism, for any profound 
consideration of the failings of the SPD that contributed to Nazi 
success. It was also attributable, however, to Social Democracy's 
adherence to Marxist theory in its analysis of National Socialism 
- for, to the SPD, the NSDAP's support base was a completely 
unnatural and unsustainable agglomeration of social classes, which 
was bound to fly apart at some point in the future: 
Auf die Dauer wird sich gewi~ auch in dieser Partei der 
Gegensatz der Klasseninteressen starker bemerkbar machen. 
Aber fUrs erste lebt sie davon, da~ sie kein greifbares 
Programm besitzt und ganz W1e es der agitatorische Bedarf 
verlangt, allen Schichten der Bevolkerung alles versprechen 
kann. [265J (5 November 1931) 
What can be said here on favour of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's obsessive underscoring of the 'immorality' of Nazi 
propaganda is that it correctly posited the possibility of tensions 
erupting within National Socialism if the high level of rank-and-
file expectations aroused by that propaganda was not fulfilled, or 
was not fulfilled quickly enough. Thus, the crisis faced by the 
NSDAP in the aftermath of the November 1932 Reichstag election 
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[266] was in one sense a confirmation of the SPD's analysis, a 
justification of all of its previous predictions that National 
Socialist success would, indeed could, only be a temporary 
irrationality. Certainly, this was the way that the Nazi position 
in late 1932 was presented [267] - that lS, with the absolute 
conviction that the NSDAP had entered a period of irrevocable 
decline, encompassing electoral defeat, financial ruin and 
internecine strife. The steadfast opposition of the SPD, moreover, 
was held to have contributed to this decline. 
Nevertheless, although perceptively identifying very real 
traits existent within the Nazi movement at this time, the ultimate 
effect of this seeming confirmation of the Social Democratic line 
can only be considered to have been disastrous. It was all too 
easy for the SPD to take false comfort from its belief that the 
NSDAP was rapidly becoming a spent political force. The NSDAP's 
obvious difficulties in late 1932 merely reinforced that conception 
of the movement's inherently transitory nature which was the most 
influential conclusion reached by the SPD from its study of the 
party's propaganda, that firm confidence that the latter's 
deceitful structure could not be maintained. And the damage 
produced by the resultant underestimation of National Socialism, 
which permeated the Schwabische Volkszeitung's perceptions of the 
movement, the never-hidden disbelief in its ability to attain 
power, was to become most evident ln the period after 30 January 
1933. For the idea that National Socialism would be tamed by 
governmental responsibility, that its radicalism and easy promlses 
could never be realised in practice, was not an instantaneous 
response to Hitler's appointment, but rather the culmination of a 
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portrayal of the NSDAP as a party whose demagogy was only possible 
outwith the limits imposed by power - and which, even outwith those 
limits, was constantly on the verge of disintegration. 
Basing a response to National Socialism on the supposed 
inevitability of its future disintegration contained obvious 
dangers - the danger, for example, that this would encourage 
passivity or complacency amongst the SPD's supporters, and, more 
threateningly, the danger that the NSDAP could achieve its goal of 
power before the process of disintegration had occurred. This 
central perception of the NSDAP was, however, widely held within 
the SPD, and was fed by other aspects of the party's analysis of 
Nazism besides the interpretations of National Socialist ideology 
and propaganda just examined. For example, the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung hungrily seized upon any evidence of rifts and 
conflicts within the NSDAP as indicating that the party's decline 
had begun [268]. In particular, the Schwabische Volkszeitung was 
eager to portray disaffection within the SA as the discontent of 
working-class Nazis who were disillusioned by their party's failure 
to translate its propaganda into reality - a portrayal which, 
although accurate to an extent, was also more than a little 
tendentious [269]. The Social Democratic tendency to look to the 
past for guidance, or, to be more accurate, for reassurance about 
its present difficulties also played a part here. National 
Socialism was frequently paralleled with earlier waves of anti-
semitism in Germany, and the lesson drawn, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that Nazism like these earlier movements could not 
endure [270] - a method of consolation which did not escape 
criticism for its superficiality even in the Schwabische 
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Volkszeitung [271J. There was, further, always an undercurrent of 
mockery in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's attitude to National 
Socialism: even while constantly underlining the deadly threat 
posed by Nazism to the working class, that identification of the 
NSDAP with the farce and failure of 1923 yet continued, that lmage 
of the party as a political rival which could not be taken wholly 
seriously, which was obviously fixed in the minds of Social 
Democrats and could not easily be obliterated [272J. This was 
perhaps most evident in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's approach to 
Hitler as a political leader, for there persisted a refusal to 
regard him as a worthy opponent, his pretensions were ridiculed, he 
was portrayed as a philistine and a parvenu, and particular use was 
made of the technique of mock-heroicisation, with the frequent 
sardonic paralleling of Hitler with Wilhelm II [273J. The 
rhetorical question implicit in such material always remained the 
same: how could such a man as Hitler, how could such a party as the 
NSDAP, aspire to govern Germany? 
However, more significant than these elements ln reinforcing 
this view of National Socialism was the presence of a strong streak 
of what can only be called economic determinism in the SPD's 
analysis of the movement: for the success of the NSDAP was most 
often explained in the Schwabische Volkszeitung with reference to 
Germany's parlous economic situation. More significantly, however, 
this explanation brought with it the allied expectation - agaln 
presented as an almost inevitable occurrence - that the alleviation 
of that situation would rob the NSDAP of the only context within 
which it could thrive. 
The connection between the growlng popularity of the NSDAP and 
186 
the worsenlng economic crlS1S was first made in a detailed way ln 
an article analysing the unusual degree of success Nazism was 
enjoying in the town of Pirmasens, described as 'the proletarian 
centre of the shoe industry.' The reason for that success was 
located in the town's particular economic conjuncture - having 
enjoyed a boom in the mid-1920s, the shoe industry, and hence the 
town, had since suffered a rapid economic decline producing an 
embittered middle class and thus fertile ground for National 
Socialism. In short: 
Die Ursache liegt ausschlie~lich ln den wirtschaftlichen 
Verhaltnissen. [274] (12 November 1929) 
The use of the word 'ausschlie~lich' is particularly revealing: 
for, although this article focused on a town with a specific 
economic structure, the type of economic determinism upon which its 
conclusions were predicated was to become the automatic response of 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung whenever it was faced with the task of 
rationalising National Socialism's advances. This, indeed, lS why 
the economlC explanation was particularly ln evidence in the 
aftermath of Nazi electoral triumphs. In the front page coverage 
of the NSDAP's huge increase in votes in the Saxony Landtag 
elections of June 1930, for example, it was boldly stated 
... da~ die schwere Wirtschaftskrise den Hang zum Extrem 
fordere und da~ also das schwache Wachsen der Kommunisten 
und das starke Wachsen der Nationalsozialisten 
konjunkturell bedingt sei [275] (23 June 1930) 
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and the accompanYlng interpretation laid great stress on the effect 
of swathes of the middle class proletarianised by economic 
depression, moving away from the old bourgeois parties incapable of 
representing these interests, to the NSDAP. Similar comment was to 
be found after the next 'catastrophe vote', that for the Reichstag 
In September 1930, in which National Socialism again made massive 
gains. On 17 September, for instance, under the headline 'Warum 
der Radikalismus?', the answer was duly provided: 
Es ist unzweifelhaft, da~ eln Teil dieser Wahler geglaubt 
hat, mit der Wirtschaftsnot, gegen Erwerbslosigkeit und 
Elend zu protestieren, da~ er, von der antikapitalistischen 
Maske des Nationalsozialismus betort, damit glaubte, einen 
Schlag gegen das kapitalistische System zu fUhren ... Die 
Illusion, da~ mit dem blo~en Protestgeschrei und dem 
Proteststimmzettel oder mit einer Politik der 
nationalistischen Abenteuer die Wirtschaftsnote von heute 
geheilt werden konnten, ist weiter verbreitet als man 
geglaubt hatte. [276] (17 September 1930) 
Then on 18th Spetember was to be read: 
eine der Hauptursachen der Wahlerinflation liegt in der 
schweren Enttauschung, die die wirtschaftliche Enttauschung 
seit der Verabschiedung des Young-Planes bei den breiten 
Massen verursacht hat: anstatt der versprochenen und 
erwarteten Entlastung und Ankurbelung der Wirtschaft, ist 
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elne unerhorte Verschlechterung eingetreten; und die 
verzweifelten Millionen, politisch und wirtschaftlich 
ungeschult, fUhren nun ihr Elend auf die Reparationslasten 
zurUck, wahrend es sich in Wirklichkeit urn welturnspannende 
Krisenerscheinungen handelt ... [277] (18 September 1930) 
And for good measure this analysis was reiterated on 19 September: 
Nationalsozialisten und Kommunisten verdanken die 
wesentliche Vermehrung ihrer Sitze der skrupellosen 
demagogischen Ausnutzung einer aus der Not erwachsenen 
Verzweiflungsstimmung. [278] (19 September 1930) 
By this stage, then, the existence of the interconnectedness 
of the rise of National Socialism and economic conditions was well 
established In the Schwabische Volkszeitung. At its core lay the 
SPD's realisation that the NSDAP had become the party of the 
disenchanted middle class: 
... die wesentlichen soziologischen UntergrUnde fUr den 
Erfolge der Nazis: Zerreibung des KleinbUrgerturns, 
Aussichtlosigkeit fUr den Nachwuchs des Mittelstandes, 
Abbau der Angestellten als Folge der Wirtschaftskrise ... 
[279] (16 January 1931) 
- a realisation that was far from comfortable for a party which 
considered itself as the natural framework from within which the 
frustrations and discontents of the proletarianised middle class 
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could be articulated. As with so many of the elements of the 
Social Democratic analysis though, once this interconnection had 
been so established, it was, so to speak, frozen: always available 
as a convenient explanatory tool, but essentially unchanging. It 
is, nevertheless, useful to quote from a few more instances of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's approach in this area, because it is 
interesting to note the way in which the newspaper's language and 
imagery mirrored, in the bluntness of its appeal, the reductive 
simplicity of the concept it sought to convey. The word that the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung most often used to describe the effect of 
the depression on its victims was 'desperation': 
Die trostlose wirtschaftliche Lage erklart unschwer den 
Aufschwung der Katastrophenpolitiker von rechts und links. 
Immer weitere Volkskreise werden von dumpfer Verzweiflung 
erfa~t und fallen so auf das Geschwatze gewissenloser 
Hetzer herein, die ihnen das Blaue von Himmel versprechen. 
[280J (12 April 1932) 
And, as this latter suggests, the desperate are easily preyed upon: 
Kein Zweifel wenn die Nazibewegung so gro~e Teile des 
deutschen Volkes in ihren Bann zwingt, da~ es in der 
Hauptsache der Hunger, die Arbeitslosigkeit und die 
Verzweiflung sind, die den Boden bereitet und Millionen 
leidender und gequalter Menschen in die Arme der 
Scharlatane und Quacksalber des Dritten Reichs getrieben 
haben. Da~ eln hungriger Magen nicht mit Logik gesattigt 
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werden kann, hat schon Heinrich Heine treffend dargelegt. 
[281J (21 May 1932) 
National Socialism, moreover, was specifically and repeatedly 
charged by the SPD with the deliberate exploitation of the German 
people's suffering, with being parasitic upon poverty and 
unemployment: 
Stempelstellen, Hunger, Not und Elend: das war das tagliche 
Brot dieser Agitation, von dem Sle gelebt haben. Am Hunger 
und an dem Elend der Millionen von Mtihseligen und Beladenen 
haben sich diese Nazis gro~gesaugt, daran haben sie sich 
gemastet und daran sind sie fett geworden ... Dick und fett 
sind sie geworden und gro~ durch das Elend der Massen. 
[282J (2 July 1932) 
Of course, it is not being suggested here that there was no causal 
connection between the rlse of the NSDAP and deteriorating economic 
conditions, merely, as will be discussed later, that the depiction 
of this connection in the Schwabische Volkszeitung was deeply, but 
typically suspect in the way it portrayed the motivations of Nazi 
supporters. The immediate point, though, is that this depiction 
also further entrenched the belief that National Socialism's 
success could only be temporary, that it was nothing but a 
'Konjunkturpartei', which would not survive economic recovery: 
1st vielleicht ein Jahr vergangen, ist, Wle anzunehmen ist, 
auch ein Auftrieb der Wirtschaft erfolgt, sinkt die Zahl 
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der Erwerblosen, dann ist es aus mit dem Spuk, aus mit den 
Konjunkturparteien, die, Wle die Nazi und die Kozi, nur im 
Sumpf wachsen konnen und von der Not und der Verbitterung 
zehren. Weder die Nationalsozialisten noch ihre 
Konkurrenten auf der Linken werden bei einer Neuwahl dann 
so viel Dumme finden Wle am 14. September 1930. [283J 
(2 March 1931) 
Contrasted to this, naturally enough, was the SPD's self-perception 
of its own qualities of endurance: 
Sie [die SozialdemokratieJ wei~, da~ ihre Grundsatze noch 
bestehen werden, wenn die politischen Konjunkturgewinnler 
von heute langst nur noch in Archiven und Museen zu finden 
sind. [284] (31 December 1931) 
This type of self-perception, indeed, could remaln inviolate, could 
retain its credibility largely as a consequence of the importance 
of factors such as the party's unthinking economic determinism in 
the SPD's analysis of Nazism - factors, that is, which placed the 
blame for the rlse of the NSDAP on external events and thus removed 
the necessity from the SPD of looking inwards, of self-criticism 
and self-analysis. The economic explanation may, by the beginning 
of 1933, have become just another hardened assumption, another 
ideological cliche virtually emptied of meaning by repeated use; 
its influence, however - in the way it had allowed the SPD to elude 
responsibility, to rationalise as beyond its control the reasons 
for widespread discontent and Nazi success, and conveniently to 
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explain that success without reference to its own inability to 
adapt to a rapidly-changing situation - had been profound. 
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CHAPTER 6 : The Schwabische Volkszeitung's portrayal of 
Nazism's following. 
i) The basic Social Democratic conceptualisation of the Nazi 
constituency. 
It would, of course, be true to say that the SPD's economic 
determinism was conditioned by the party's ideology; for, although 
employed in a relatively unsophisticated way, the concept certainly 
had its roots 1n Marxist belief. It was, however, more than just 
an expreSS10n of Marxism: the Social Democratic analysis of the 
influence Germany's economic plight exercised on the political 
sphere was also part of a broader attempt to address - or, more 
accurately, to justify - the SPD's failure to capitalise on that 
plight itself; to answer the question of why, 1n conditions so 
seemingly conducive to an anti- capitalist party like the SPD, it 
was proving to be so unattractive for those affected by economic 
problems. At the core of this attempt lay a very particular 
perception of the Nazi supporter, not as someone making a reasoned 
political choice, but rather as someone in some way misled, 
deceived or seduced. The economic context was crucial to this 
perception, in that it supposedly rendered the masses vulnerable to 
the lure of National Socialism; but, as may have been suggested by 
the quotations used a moment ago, the Schwabische Volkszeitung did 
not simply depict Nazi supporters as the economically desperate 
seeking a cure for their woes, it also suggested that this 
desperation had rendered them incapable of making rational choices, 
had produced some kind of mass mental dysfunction leading to the 
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rise of Nazism. In September 1931, for example, it was stated: 
Diese Zeit der Krise und der Not hat Millionen von 
Menschen aus dem seelischen Gleichgewicht gebracht. Je 
schlechter die Wirtschaftkonjunktur desto glanzender die 
Konjunktur fUr politische Scharlatene. [285] 
(9 September 1931) 
And some time later the connections between the economic crisis, a 
widespread sense of 'confusion' and Nazi success were drawn again 
in forceful language: 
Die Nationalsozialisten verdanken ihr Wachstum der 
geistigen Verwirrung, die als Folge der entsetzlichen Not 
in Deutschland urn sich gegriffen hat. Diese geistige 
Verwirrung hat den Boden abgegeben fUr eine dreist 
verlogene, das Yolk vergiftende nationalsozialistische 
Hetze. [286] (26 October 1932) 
The effects of the depression, however, provided only the obvious 
starting point for the conceptualisation of Nazi support in terms 
of a collective madness which had gripped Germany. It has already 
been pointed out that in its engagement with National Socialism the 
SPD saw itself as embodying the values of political rationality and 
logic, values judged against which Nazism seemed condemned to 
ultimate failure, whatever its temporary success. This 
self-conception, with its accompanying conviction about the 
complete lack of such values to be found in National Socialism, 
seeps through the whole of the Social Democratic analysis, but it 
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is particularly resonant in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
portrayal of Nazi supporters as the duped and misled, or even as 
the sick, less acting upon rational motives, desires and fears, and 
more being acted upon by an irrational force or malevolent disease. 
It is that portrayal that will be analysed in this section, with 
particular attention being paid to the language used by the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, constructed as it was around some very 
potent images and metaphors used to describe the rise of National 
Socialism - images and metaphors which, it seems likely, impeded 
rather than aided the SPD's efforts to comprehend Nazism. 
The essence of Social Democratic belief about support for 
National Socialism was that it could not be grounded in rationality 
- it could not, that is, be the expression of a consciously-
exercised political will, but must rather be the consequence of 
political immaturity or political stupidity, of a politics of 
emotion and passion rather than logic and reason, or of an 
aberrational state-of-mind such as that generated by economlC 
difficulties. As has already been indicated, the SPD's analysis of 
Nazism was to a large extent shaped by its first reactions to the 
resurgent NSDAP, and this was true also in this area: the frequent 
characterisation in 1928 and 1929 of Nazi supporters as childish 
and immature - as, for instance 'lausbtibische Gymnasiasten unter 
der Ftihrung von politischen Hetzern' [287J - was merely the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's initial method of implying that this 
particular political choice was not one that would ever be made by 
someone of adult intellect. The newspaper's attitude to Nazis ln 
the very early stages was still clearly laced with a basic 
scepticism about whether they were to be taken seriously, but even 
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In the period before 1930 the arrogant, but significant assumption 
that National Socialism was the refuge of the politically confused, 
dominated, as in the following, taken from a discussion of Nazism 
as part of the wider volkisch movement: 
Wenn die Volkischen in jtingster Zeit wiederholt Erfolge 
gehabt haben, so beweist das nur, wie viele verzweifelte, 
politisch leider unklare Menschen in unseren Land leben; 
Wle viele Menschen sich deshalb an Strohholme klammern 
und auf jede politische Scharlatanerie hineinfallen ... 
[288] (6 September 1929) 
And as the threat posed by the NSDAP grew, so too did the 
determination of the Schwabische Volkszeitung to trivialise the 
motivations of National Socialism's followers, to dismiss the 
reality of that threat by dismissing as in some sense inferior the 
articulation of political grIevances through the vehicle of Nazism: 
Nazi voters, for example, were said to stem 
... aus der gro~en Masse der Indifferenten, der 
Nichtwahler, der Unpolitischen ... Es sind Stimmen von 
Leuten, die es von Zeit zu Zeit einer Regierung oder einen 
System 'einmal bewiesen wollen', Stimmen der Verargerung, 
der Verzweiflung, nicht bewu~ten politischen Willens. [289] 
(17 September 1930) 
It could even be suggested at times that supporters of Nazism were 
somehow victims, victims of a political psychosis, of a political 
confidence trick, even of a form of political hypnosis: 
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In diesem Sinn hat die Hitlerei trotz allem 'Deutschland -
erwache' Geschrei die Leute nie aus dem Schlaf getrommelt, 
sondern das dumpfe Bumbum ihrer Propagandapauke hat im 
Gegenteil die daflir empfanglichen Massen in einer Art 
hypnotische Schlummerei versenkt. [290J (16 January 1931) 
And in the crudest manifestation of this perception of Nazi 
followers, they could simply be characterised as the stupid, or as 
in some way representing all that was most stupid in society: 
Hitler war der erste der die Dummheit der Menschen als 
politische Gro~macht entdeckt. [291J (2 July 1932) 
Especially the German middle class, moreover - 'ein vielfach 
ganz unpolitischer und unwissender Blirgertum' [292] - was believed 
to be susceptible to National Socialism's political magic: the 
NSDAP's success was 
... die Folge davon da~ die Machttraume des Faschismus die 
Kopfe von Millionen von Spie~blirgern vernebelt haben. Die 
geistige Umschichtung in den Kopfen des Blirgertums, das ist 
das wirklich Aktivum (sic) an Machtzuwachs der 
faschistischen Krafte. [293J (4 February 1932) 
Such susceptibility, however, was only of use to National Socialism 
if it could be successfully exploited, and the notion that the 
NSDAP was particularly adept at such exploitation was central to 
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the SPD's interpretation of the process by which the rival movement 
garnered support - for, to the SPD, the NSDAP's propaganda methods 
were a deeply suspect, indeed essentially an alien means of preying 
upon the despairing. This was made clear, for example, in a 
lengthy article published in the Schwabische Volkszeitung In June 
1932, which began by posing the question 
ob die 13 Millionen NSDAP-Wahler aus weltanschaulichen 
Grundsatzen fur diese Partei optierten, oder ob Sle nur 
einer Irreftihrung verfallen sind, der die Masse durch die 
Not nicht entgehen konnte? 
That the author of the article believed the latter to be the case, 
that any possibility of votes being cast for National Socialism on 
the grounds of rational conviction as opposed to the harsh demands 
of the moment was dismissed, is of little surprise. More 
interesting, though, is the emphasis placed upon Nazi propaganda 
techniques, where again Social Democratic frustration with the 
NSDAP's refusal to play the political game by the established rules 
was in evidence: 
Mit elner rticksichtlosen geradezu brutalen Reklame In Wort, 
Bild und Schrift nagt Hitler an dem notleidenden 
Volkskorper und begann an diesem seine Zersetzungsarbeit, 
bis er ihn sich schlie~lich geftigig gemacht hat ... Seine 
Art von Propaganda, die die sprichwortliche Soliditat der 
Deutschen roh erfa~t, auf deren neuartige Reklametechnik 
wir Deutsche bisher nicht eingestellt waren, machte jeden, 
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der nur Hitlers Volkischen Beobachter las, die bebilderten 
Anschlage und Plakate der NSDAP taglich studierte und deren 
Versammlungen besuchte, ungeahnt zum Soldling seiner 
Partei. 
Der Deutsche unterliegt in se1ner Biederkeit allzuleicht 
einer derartigen, auf grobste Suggestion abgestellten 
Reklame. [294J (8 June 1932) 
This portrayal of the honest, upright German people having been 
completely captured by the power of National Socialism's ruthless 
and unfamiliar style of propaganda, may seem in retrospect an 
exaggeration of the efficacy of that style, which was perhaps less 
important than the content of the NSDAP's propaganda to the party's 
success. No doubt this reflected the impression the NSDAP had made 
with its innovative methods of campaigning; it was also, however, 
the logical counterpart of the SPD's conception of the Nazi voter, 
for again this latter could be described as a victim, driven, 
almost against his or her will, to support the NSDAP by outside 
factors, by economic troubles or Nazi propaganda, and not as 
someone exerc1s1ng a normal political choice: 
Papierfluten tiberschwemmten die Stra~en. An den 
Anschlagssaulen brtillte ein teures Plakat das andere an. 
Amerikanische Methoden der Werbung trieben die Wahler in 
Angst und Rettungspsychosen hinein. [295J 
(23 September 1930) 
In short: to the SPD reason could never be the basis for supporting 
Nazism; but who could be expected to retain their power of 
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reasonlng In the face of the National Socialist propaganda 
bombardment? 
'Reason', ln fact, was the concept which underlay the SPD's 
depiction of National Socialism's supporters [296] - for the NSDAP 
was regarded as embodying all that was opposed to reason, of 
representing 'Unverstand': 
Schwieriger [than the struggle against the bourgeois 
parties] ist der Kampf gegen den Feind, der von jeher ihr 
schlimmster war: 'Der Feind, den Wlr am tiefsten hassen, 
das ist der Unverstand der Massen, den nur des Geistes 
Schwert durchbricht'. Dieser Feind sammelt sich im Lager 
des Nationalsozialismus. [297] (24 July 1930) 
The SPD's vocabulary of rationality, revolving around the words 
'Verstand' and 'Vernunft', was also used to define the type of 
person who would be attracted to Nazism: 
... weil die NSDAP nichts erreichen, sondern nur schimpfen 
kann, wird kein verntinftiger Mensch ihr Gefolgschaft 
leisten. [298] (23 August 1930) 
The frequency with which the word 'Vernunft', or one of its 
variants, appeared in the Schwabische Volkszeitung as the 
antithesis of all that National Socialism stood for, was only one 
instance of the way in which language entrenched the prevailing 
attitude to Nazi followers in the newspaper. The ideas that have 
just been discussed were fixed by language, the importance of 
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Nazism's mass support was contained and dismissed by imagery and 
metaphors which encoded that support as an irrationality, 
psychotic, unhealthy and, by implication, ephemeral. Most common 
was the suggestion through use of language that, far from 
constituting a simple matter of political choice, a decision to 
support the NSDAP had to be the result of some form of deception. 
The Nazi supporter from this perspective was someone who had been 
'lured', 'tempted', or 'enticed', someone who had taken the Nazi 
'bait', even someone who had been 'seduced' [299J - the insinuation 
being that National Socialist success was only explicable as the 
result of some kind of confidence trick or illusion, a gathering of 
support by unscrupulous means, rather than a straightforward 
attraction to the reality of the movement. This led, moreover, to 
the development of a strain of vocabulary which depicted attraction 
to Nazism as something involuntary and the Nazi as someone who had 
been in some sense 'captured': thus the use of words such as 
'enslavement' and 'addiction', 'bewitchment' and 'beguilement', or 
the use of such metaphors as hypnosis and slumber, chloroform and 
morphine to describe the success of National Socialism [300J. 
Images such as these latter, moreover - which again, of course, 
sought to emphasise how far removed from rational politics Nazism 
was - could also be extended to encapsulate more direct suggestions 
that succumbing to Nazism could only be likened to a condition of 
physical incapacity, such as drunkenness [301J or blindness [302J, 
which impaired the 'victim's' ability to resist or see through the 
movement's temptations. And in a similar vein, the paralleling of 
National Socialism with illness was frequent ln the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung: either mental illness - Nazism as a psychosis, Nazis 
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as psychopaths [303J; or physical illness - Nazism as an infection, 
a disease" a p01son, a fever ('Hitlerfieber') or an epidemic 
[304J. 
The consequences of such conceptualisations of National 
Socialist supporters were profoundly damaging to the SPD's analysis 
of Nazism - most notably in the casting of those supporters as 
essentially passive, as victims, as the seduced and misled unable 
to withstand the barrage of Nazi propaganda, a depiction which 
circumvented the need for any consideration, beyond the 
superficial, of the reasons for widespread discontent, and also 
neatly avoided the dangerous ground of introspection on the part of 
the SPD concern1ng its own failures 1n the political sphere. Of 
course, the Social Democratic belief that the NSDAP had become the 
focus for Germany's despairing and disillusioned is unproblematic; 
but the ideological belittling of this process, its convenient 
reduction to a visceral cry of pain from people without a conscious 
political will, the dismissing of Nazism as no more than a politics 
of desperation and illusion - such a caricaturing of its opponent's 
followers merely allowed the SPD to insulate itself against 
political realities, to feel itself absolved from the painful 
duties of self-analysis and self-criticism. The effects of Nazi 
political mag1c were added to those of the economic deterioration 
as a sufficient explanation for National Socialism's success. Thus 
both the wider failings of the Weimar Republic and the SPD's own 
failings were divorced from the factors seen to be propelling so 
many into the ranks of the National Socialists; and the 
disaffection evidenced by those attracted to the NSDAP could be 
disregarded, viewed as unimportant simply because it was refused -
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quite arbitrarily - the qualities which, to the SPD, were 
politically significant. 
Such an attitude, moreover, served only to reinforce the SPD's 
self-deluding self-image; and was, in fact, part of a broader 
tendency for Social Democracy to reach for explanations comforting 
to and confirmatory of that self-image, when confronted with a 
movement which directly challenged it. In this particular case, 
the SPD delighted ln portraying itself and its supporters as the 
only sane element ln a society increasingly engulfed by madness. 
Thus to the SPD and to rank-and-file Social Democrats were ascribed 
in the Schwabische Volkszeitung qualities which were ln explicit 
contrast to the psychosis of Nazism - qualities such as a rational 
approach to politics and political education and maturity. The 
traditional oppositions which provided the framework within which 
the SPD's conception of Nazi support was developed centred on the 
contrast between the SPD as the embodiment of rationality, 
intellect, 'Vernunft' and 'Verstand', and the NSDAP as the 
embodiment of irrationality, of lack of reason and of the idiot's 
resort to the physical rather than the intellectual. In February 
1932, for example, the type of virtues which Social Democracy 
perceived itself to be relying upon to secure victory in the 
struggle against fascism was made quite clear: 
Die Faschisten setzen ihre Hoffnung auf das Ruhrol, das 
ihre Propagandamaschine schmiert - die Krafte der 
lebendigen Demokratie aber setzen ihr Vertrauen auf die 
Festigkeit der demokratischen Uberzeugung, die aus 
politischer Erkenntnis und Erfahrung herausgewachsen ist. 
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Sie vertrauen nicht auf die Propagandaphrase, sondern auf 
die Einsicht des Volkes. [305J (19 February 1932) 
And unsurprisingly the key-word in the Social Democratic lexicon of 
political rationality - 'Vernunft' - was often used in connection 
with the SPD's possession of that quality and not only with the 
NSDAP's lack of it. Hence, it was stated: 
Wir Wlssen, da~ unsere Anhanger politische Vernunft 
Richtschnur ihres politischen Handelns seln und sich nicht 
von Sentiments leiten lassen. [306J (22 April 1932) 
And a few months later, in the midst of a general lamentation over 
continuing National Socialist success came another statement of 
faith in reason: 
Die Reaktion ist im Anmarsch ... Noch ist die Naziflut 
nicht eingedammt, noch nicht abgeriegelt. Oldenburg und 
Mecklenburg sind die Beweise politischer Verwirrung und 
Verwilderung. Und doch mu~ es wieder anders werden, es mu~ 
Vernunft und Verstand gegen Wahnsinn, Verleumdung und 
Niedertracht slegen. [307J (10 June 1932) 
These oppositions could even be articulated In a more philosophical 
vein: 
Der Nationalsozialismus hat aIle verderblichen Triebe und 
Leidenschaften der Menschen aus dem Tiefen hervorgeholt und 
zu Mitteln des politischen Kampfes gemacht. Wir 
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Sozialdemokraten W1ssen aber, da~ die deutsche Republik, 
wie jede menschliche Gemeinschaft, auf dem sittlichen 
Bewu~tsein, dem Rechtsgeftihl der meisten ihrer Mitglieder 
begrtindet sein mu~, weil anders menschliche Gemeinschaft 
tiberhaupt nicht bestehen kann. [308J (29 December 1931) 
As well as being drawn in such abstract terms, however, such 
contrasts were also expressed through the depiction of a class 
conSC10US working class, spiritually and intellectually armed 
within the traditions of the labour movement, in opposition to a 
basically stupid Spie~btirgertum, especially susceptible to Nazi 
propaganda. Of course, these characteristics were almost certainly 
delusory, but it was vital to the SPD's self-image that the idea of 
the well-schooled rank-and-file Social Democrat, immune to the 
meretricious appeal of National Socialism, be maintained - just as 
it was vital to continue to assert that the lack of such schooling 
provided one explanation for Nazi success: National Socialist 
voters, that is, were drawn from the ranks of the politically and 
economically 'unschooled' [309J. This latter argument was 
particularly pressed into serV1ce whenever the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung was called upon to rationalise the NSDAP's success 1n 
attracting the support of the impoverished middle class [310J. The 
SPD's analysis clearly identified the resentments of this class as 
anti-capitalist in nature, and could perceive Nazism's success in 
exploiting this; but given that the party saw itself as the only 
viable anti-capitalist party, it struggled adequately to assimilate 
this fact into its overall interpretation, it could not admit that 
the NSDAP was better able to take political advantage out of 
206 
economlc discontents than the SPD itself. One way out of this 
dilemma, as has been seen, was to point to the confidence trick of 
the NSDAP's 'pseudo-socialism'; another, as has just been 
discussed, was to portray Nazi success as the victory of 
superficial allure over political logic - with the concomitant 
implication that only those without the necessary political 
schooling, only such social groups as the proletarianised middle 
class, the bourgeoisie in general, and indeed anyone standing 
outside of the traditions of the labour movement, could be lured 
into the National Socialist trap, could fail to draw the only 
reasonable conclusion from their present predicament and support 
the SPD. 
The inevitable consequence of this line of thought, moreover, 
was that the unschooled could be educated and the deceived 
enlightened - and that the SPD, through its propaganda, could 
achieve this. For accompanying the party's perceptions of the Nazi 
supporter, was the SPD's belief ln the power of its 
'Aufklarungsarbeit' to cure the latter's 'sickness', to enable the 
'blind' to see again (such terms, natural extensions of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's favourite metaphors in this area, were 
often used). Indeed, the repetitive use of the concepts 
'Aufklarung' and 'Aufklarungsarbeit' - 'Aufklarungsarbeit gegen 
Faschismus und Terror'; 'Eine Welle der Aufklarung gegen die Welle 
der Hasses und der Unvernunft' [311J - reveals the depth of the 
SPD's faith ln reason as a political weapon. It is here that the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's expectations of the influence it could 
have are most clearly revealed, the conviction that it was 
educating its readership, and that its efforts in this sphere could 
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have a direct political effect. Thus, although the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's anti-Nazi material has frequently been described as 
propaganda in this thesis, the use of this term should not be taken 
to imply that the newspaper's overall approach was simplistic or 
one-dimensional; rather, that approach was predicated on the SPD's 
belief that by disseminating information about National Socialism, 
it could both protect its readership against the NSDAP and hasten 
the end of the latter's success by enlightening Nazism's misguided 
followers. [312] This belief, for example, lay behind the front 
page assurance the Schwabische Volkszeitung gave its readers during 
the presidential election of February 1932, that they, the 
'politically schooled', well understood the only choice that could 
be made between Hindenburg and Hitler - coupled as it was with the 
admonition: 
Au~erhalb unserer gro~en Organisation stehen aber noch 
gewaltige Massen, die noch der Aufklarung und der 
Aufrlittelung bedlirfen. Auf sie kommt es an! [313] 
(29 February 1932) 
Similarly, it was claimed ln November 1932 that, by this stage -
after, it is implied, all the efforts of the SPD to expose Nazism -
the deception of National Socialism should have been recognised by 
all but 'der Rest der Unheilbaren' [314]. This type of conviction 
about the effectiveness of its propaganda, though, for all that it 
may have been a legitimate consequence of the SPD's conception of 
the political role its press could play, necessarily reinforced the 
party's continuing, and ultimately fatal, underestimation of the 
NSDAP - an underestimation most often manifesting itself in the 
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belief that the movement's success would prove ephemeral, not least 
because it failed the SPD's tests of reason and logic: 
Diese Partei ... ist schon urn dieser barbarischen Umbildung 
und unliberbietbaren Unseriositat willen, rein 
parlamentarisch und geistig auf die Dauer gefahrlos. Auf 
dem Felde vernunftma~iger Auseinandersetzung ist sie 
klaglich unterlegen und wird sie immer unterlegen bleiben. 
[315J (30 June 1930) 
Thus the SPD's depiction of the Nazi supporter was both an 
expression of and a contributor to the party's scepticism about 
National Socialism's lasting potential: for to the SPD, the Nazi 
voter, the Nazi follower was always a victim, a victim of a 
temporary madness which could be cured - which, indeed, the SPD 
seemed to believe itself capable of curing. 
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ii) The sociological basis of National Socialist support and the 
spectre of the working-class Nazi. 
If the Schwabische Volkszeitung's conceptualisation of the 
process by which 13 million Germans came to support the NSDAP 
betrays, especially through its language, a hidden agenda, the 
Social Democratic analysis of the sociological basis of Nazi 
support is far more transparent in its desire to locate Nazi 
followers in social strata which accorded with the SPD's 
theoretical expectations and to repel the idea that the class it 
considered as its natural constituency had been, to any significant 
extent, 'captured' by National Socialism. This, indeed, is another 
area of the SPD's approach to Nazism in which the word 'analysis' 
1S a misnomer - for again fossilised assumptions shaped the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's material on this theme, assumptions 
hardened into 'facts' by their constant repetition 1n every 
available context. Most evident was the assumption that the NSDAP 
was basically a party of the middle class, a belief which was 
widely shared by commentators in Germany at the time. The fact that 
the historiographical tide has now turned against the middle-class 
interpretation, of course, would be a far from sufficient basis 
from which to mount a critique of the SPD's firm adherence to this 
V1ew [316]; there would be little point in making such a 
retrospective judgement from the perspective of modern historical 
research. An examination of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
presentation of Nazism's social basis, and particularly its 
portrayal of working-class Nazism, is relevant, however, in that it 
reveals again that nexus of factors - theoretical and ideological 
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expectations, the SPD's self-image, and its suppressed anxieties 
concerning the NSDAP's encroachment upon the working-class 
constituency - which conditioned its interpretation of Nazism and 
damaged its ability adequately to respond to the threat it posed 
[317]. 
Unsurprisingly, the sociology of the Nazi movement as it was 
established by the Schwabische Volkszeitung concentrated above all 
on its class basis, and was indeed an outgrowth of the Social 
Democratic preoccupation with class. Nevertheless, other aspects 
of the make-up of the Nazi constituency were not ignored. It had, 
for example, been quickly noticed that the NSDAP was extremely 
attractive to the young, a fact which was continually stressed 
throughout the period, often in conjunction with a recognition of 
the SPD's own failure in this area [318]. Naturally, though, this 
feature of Nazism was turned readily to propagandistic use in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, for especially in 1928 and 1929 the 
extreme youthfulness of Nazi followers was frequently mocked. An 
account of a Hitler meeting published in November 1929 thus claimed 
that one prominent element amongst the audience consisted of: 
kriegerisch, finster blickende Jlinglinge, die sich gern ln 
die Inflationslisten eingetragen hatten, wenn - das 
Wahlalter auf 16 Jahre herabgesetzt ware. [319] 
(9 November 1929) 
And just as a metaphorical immaturity was, as has just been 
discussed, often used by the Schwabische Volkszeitung to explain 
susceptibility to Nazism, so a literal immaturity was seen as 
another factor that could leave one open to seduction by National 
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Socialism: [320] 
Ein gro~er Teil der deutschen Jugend, der nicht wei~, was 
Massenmord ist und bedeutet, wird von verbrecherischen 
Phrasen in Wirklichkeit gar nicht so mutiger Leute in 
faschistischen Versammlungen eingefangen die ... die 
sich von Uniformglanz blenden lassen ... Diesen 
Irregeleiteten gehort unser Mitleid und es ist unsere 
Pflicht, sie eines Besseren zu belehren. [321] 
(29 November 1929) 
The trivialisation of the motives of young Nazis present here was 
typical; although the effects of mass unemployment on the hopes of 
the young, and consequently on their willingness to turn to 
radicalism for solutions, was recognised, in line with the SPD's 
economic determinism, characterisations of the NSDAP's young 
followers tended just as frequently to emphasise the importance of 
Nazism's superficial attractions - hence the suggestion that the 
young were especially vulnerable to the appeal of organisations 
which, like the NSDAP, surrounded themselves with an aura of 
conspiratorial secrecy [322]. 
In close connection to this stress on 
die unreifen jungen Burschen ... die das Gros der 
Hitleranhanger ausmachen [323] (11 January 1930) 
stood the recognition that the universities were infected with 
reactionary tendencies in general, and Nazism in particular. An 
initial lengthy analysis of this phenomenon published in March 1929 
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[324] was merely the precursor to a steady stream of articles 
delineating the right-wing atmosphere and anti-semitism present 
especially in Bavaria's universities and denouncing the intensity 
and consequences of the NSDAP's activities amongst students [325]. 
And just as students as a group came to be identified in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung with a high degree of Nazi support, so was 
this also the case with a variety of other occupational and 
professional groups [326]. Nazi success in penetrating the ranks 
of the country's teachers, civil servants, white-collar workers, 
farmers and even of the evangelical clergy was not, however, 
established in the Schwabische Volkszeitung in any analytical way, 
but, rather, impressionistically - references to the susceptibility 
of these professions to the temptations of National Socialism were 
scattered throughout the newspaper's coverage of the NSDAP until 
the existence of such links became accepted, and certainly 
unquestioned, facts. 
In similar impressionistic manner, the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung emphasised the NSDAP's attraction for some of 
Germany's more dubious elements, an emphasis which was designed 
further to alienate the paper's readership from National Socialism 
- thus was National Socialism frequently characterised as having an 
over-proportion of the anachronistic, the indifferent, the 
marginalised and the rootless within its ranks. The movement was 
presented, for example, as a refuge for hankerers after a lost era, 
for members of Germany's former royal families, for ex-army 
officers -
Offizierstypen, die sich wehmlitig zurlickerinnern an die 
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Zeit, in der S1e noch auf dem Kasernenhof kommandieren 
durften [327] (9 November 1929) 
and for those who had been brutalised by war and its aftermath, and 
who were now enticed by Nazism's bloodthirsty rhetoric [328]. And 
in some connection to this, Nazis were commonly portrayed as a 
collection of ne'er-do-wells, of the displaced and deracinated, of, 
as the Schwabische Volkszeitung liked to put it, 'entwurzelte 
Existenzen' : 
Die gegenwartige Anhangerschaft [of the NSDAP] besteht 
vornehmlich aus wurzellosen Elementen, die man mit 
propagandistischen Methoden sehr leicht gewinnen kann. 
[329] (21 October 1931) 
National Socialism was also perceived as having been successful in 
mobilising the previously unpolitical, those who, to the SPD, were 
best described as the 'indifferent'. Hence the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's post-mortem on the 'catastrophe vote' of September 
1930 claimed that: 
4 Millionen bisherige Nichtwahler sto~en zu den extremen 
Linken und Rechten ... Der Hauptteil der Wahler aber, der 
ihnen diesmal die Stimme gegeben hat, ist aus der gro~en 
Masse der Indifferenten, der Nichtwahler und der 
Unpolitischen gekommen. [330] (15 September 1930) 
However, although this point was made on a number of occaS1ons, it 
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was never followed up in any systematic way; it remained an 
impression, an assumption. As such its accuracy, like the accuracy 
of the other claims made in the Schwabische Volkszeitung about Nazi 
membership, was hardly relevant: for the aim of such claims, 
whether they centred upon the youth of the Nazis, the reactionary 
elements among the NSDAP's following, or the party's ability to tap 
new sources of electoral support, was basically propagandistic -
the implication was always that such support, such votes were 
politically unworthy. Perhaps the best example of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's use of this tactic was its treatment of the 
relationship between National Socialism and women. There was 
certainly a kernel of truth in the SPD's perception that women were 
proving especially responSlve to the appeal of Nazism - a 
perception that had been made ln the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
almost as soon as the NSDAP had begun to galn support on a 
significant scale [331]. This perception, however, was noticeably 
accompanied by a deliberate degrading of female Nazi supporters, in 
line with the more general disparagement of Nazi followers examined 
ln the last section. Thus the motives of such women were portrayed 
as illogical, often as emotional ('hysterischen Hitlerjungfrauen'; 
'hysterische Weiber' [332]) and, perhaps more interestingly, also 
as sexual. As an example of this, the following extract from the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's account of a visit by Hitler to Augsburg 
in April 1932, is typical: 
Und den mogen zur Kenntnis nehmen jene Damen und Damchen 
aus dem blirgerlichen Lager, die vor Adolfs Ankunft die 
Blumenladen formlich gestlirmt hatten. Jene Damen, die dann 
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1n der Halle drau~en am Rosenauberg in minutenlange 
Schreikrampfe ausbrachen! Jene Damen, denen es nicht urn 
Politik geht, sondern urn die Sensation, urn den 
Nervenkitzel, den ihnen ein Kinostar einer politischen 
Schmierenblihne (genannt Theater der NSDAP) mit einer 
15-Minuten-Rede bereitete. Jenen Damen, die ihre 
Sexualkomplexe am letzten Samstag abreagierten und 5 RM als 
angemessenen Preis daflir erachteten ... [333] (22 April 1932) 
And a similar explanation for Nazi success amongst women was 
propounded in December of the same year, when it was noted that 
'das erotische Moment' played a great role in the 'strange' 
attraction of women to National Socialism - 'strange', in the eyes 
of the SPD, because of the NSDAP's opposition to equal rights for 
women [334J. Faced with such apparent irrationality it was 
predictable enough that the SPD should resort to the belief that 
emotion, passion and something as alien as sexuality should have 
had no place in the political arena, and that any party which 
exploited such factors in order to garner support deserved only 
contempt. 
The Schwabische Volkszeitung's ideas about the general social 
basis of Nazism were thus embedded within material which had an 
explicitly propagandistic slant, but this very fact should be a 
warning against being too condemnatory of those ideas. It 1S 
necessary always to recall that the newspaper was indeed engaged 1n 
a daily propaganda war, and to remember how difficult it must have 
been to analyse the fast growing Nazi movement. National Socialism 
was first and foremost a threat; there was obviously no time for, 
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and ITO reliable data on which to base, a systematic survey of the 
NSDAP's support - if indeed the inclination to undertake one even 
existed. This is why there is little intellectual rigour in 
evidence 1n this area of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's coverage of 
Nazism, why it is impressionistic, imprecise and inconsistent, and 
why Nazi supporters also seem to be presented as stemming from 
whichever social group was most appropriate in the context of a 
particular analysis or article. Moreover, the SPD's approach to 
this aspect of Nazism was certainly shaped by the party's wider 
desire to trivialise the motivations of National Socialist 
supporters, as examined above. More consistency is, however, 
evidenced if the Schwabische Volkszeitung's depiction of the class 
basis of the NSDAP is considered; for if it was always the desire 
of the SPD to portray National Socialism's followers 
unsympathetically, it was an even more urgent necessity to repel 
the idea that the working class - or the 'true' working class -
were present in any significant numbers within National Socialism. 
This was most obviously achieved by definitively linking the 
NSDAP with the interests of the middle class. The reader of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung had from very early on been left 1n no 
doubt that National Socialism was primarily a vehicle of middle-
class outrage. In July 1929, an article in the newspaper discussed 
Nazism's capture of 
... breite Schichten des durch die Auswirkung des 
verlorenen Krieges verelendeten Mittelstandes, [335J, 
(4 July 1929) 
and a few months later this analysis was confirmed in an 
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examination of the class basis of Nazi support which defined the 
nature of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's convictions in this area 
for the whole period [336J: 
In der Hauptsache setzt sich die Mitgliedschaft und 
Wahlerschaft dieser Partei ... aus den Kreisen des 
gewerblichen Mittelstandes, die Zuhererschaft 
nationalsozialistischer Versammlungen aus Mittelstandlern 
zusammen. (16 November 1929) 
The SPD was aware, moreover, that the NSDAP had become the 
beneficiary of the collapse of the bourgeois parties of the centre, 
which had begun even before the onset of economic depression, the 
inheritor of 'das blirgerliche Stimmvieh': 
... beweist heute jede neue Wahl, da~ der 
Nationalsozialismus sein Rekrutenmaterial aus den Reihen 
des sogennanten 'blirgerlichen Wahlstimmviehs', insbesondere 
aus den liberalistischen Kreisen bezieht. Ehemals gro~e 
blirgerliche Parteien liegen zerschmettert auf dem 
politischen Schlachtfeld und stehen in Sorge, ob sie auch 
nur bescheidenste Reste in die kommenden Parlamente zu 
retten vermegen. Aus ihrer Asche allein erhob sich der 
Phenix NSDAP. [337J (15 September 1931) 
The tinge of contempt here for these middle-class Nazi supporters 
was entirely typical of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's attitude to 
them; indeed the most common term used by the newspaper in such 
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contexts was the pejorative 'Spie~er', a catchall expression of 
abuse for the middle class. Thus were National Socialist meetings 
described as being filled with 'rabiaten Spie~ern' [338J, with 
'rabiate, reaktionare Spie~er' [339J, or with 'das wildgewordene 
Spie~Urgertum' [340J; Fascism was claimed to have confused 'die 
Kopfe von Millionen Spie~bUrger' [341J; and Nazi electoral support 
in Augsburg was depicted as consisting primarily of 'einige Haufen 
ewig unzufriedener Spie~bUrger'. [342J An example of the way the 
terms 'Spie~er' and 'Spie~bUrger' were used in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's propaganda occurred in April 1932, when the SPD 
organised a political meeting In opposition to a National Socialist 
meeting in the city addressed by Hitler. The newspaper's report 
was headlined 
Die Schmach des Hitler - Besuches getilgt. Ein gro~er Tag 
fUr Augsburgs Sozialdemokratie! 8000 Staatsblirger gegen 
8000 Spie~bUrger 
and the difference between these two types of person made quite 
explicit: 
Bei Adolf die Spie~bUrger, bei uns die StaatsbUrger! Bei 
ihm Arbeiterfeinde, Klassenkampfer fUr den Profit, fUr die 
Ausbeutung, fUr die gesellschaftlichen Vorrechte - bei uns 
die Massen politisch geschulter Republikaner, die eintreten 
fUr Demokratie, fUr Freiheit, fUr den Sozialismus. [343J 
(22 April 1932) 
The validity and importance of the image of the working-class 
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Social Democrat which the Schwabische Volkszeitung used as a 
contrast to the reactionary 'Spie~er' will be considered in a 
moment; that the latter term was used as an insult and did not 
represent any profound analysis should, however, have been made 
clear enough, and illustrates the more general tenor of the SPD's 
approach to this question. There was a large amount of imprecision 
present in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's language; the various 
terms employed to describe the class or social basis of Nazism seem 
to have been interchangeable, and no attempt was made to delineate 
ln any precise way what the 'middle class', or the 'petty 
bourgeoisie', or the 'Spie~btirgertum' consisted of, of which strata 
of society they were constituted - everyone from the most 
impoverished sections of the middle class to the highest ranking 
civil servants were included at different times. Such imprecision 
was, however, inevitable given the ideological nature of the 
material, which was certainly not based upon factual evidence. The 
SPD's adherence to Marxist theory and consequent interest ln 
questions of class obviously predisposed it to categorise the NSDAP 
as a middle-class party; and insofar as the middle class, broadly 
defined, certainly did provide a disproportionate amount of support 
for Nazism, then reality coincided with theoretical prescription 
and political necessity. Although recent studies have provided a 
more complex and differentiated analysis of the NSDAP's 
constituency, and have stressed that it encompassed sectors of 
German society previously thought to have been relatively immune to 
Nazi influence, the essential importance of middle-class support to 
the NSDAP's electoral success remains unchallenged [344J. The 
bitterly mocking tone which the Schwabische Volkszeitung adopts 
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when discussing the middle class and National Socialism was also, 
however, another expression of the SPD's disappointment at its 
failure to exploit in any significant way the discontents of 
especially the newly impoverished middle class and awareness of the 
NSDAP's success in doing just that. Certainly the SPD in this 
period did not wish to alienate the middle class, or at least 
elements of it, such as white-collar workers, to which it believed 
it could be attractive, but political realities made the 
characterisation of the NSDAP as the party of the 'Spie~er' 
irresistable. 
Arguably, though, underlying the more obvious reasons for the 
SPD's desire to characterise the NSDAP as middle class was, again, 
deep Social Democratic anxiety about the relationship between 
Nazism and the working class. For if, as many historians would now 
stress [345], significant numbers of workers did become members of, 
or vote for, the NSDAP, this would have been deeply disturbing to 
the SPD - and, indeed, as has already been argued above, the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, in its attacks on Nazi socialism, 
evidences just such an awareness of the inroads National Socialism 
was capable of making into the SPD's 'natural' constituency. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the newspaper's methods of dealing with 
the concept of the working-class Nazi underline this sense of 
unease and insecurity. 
It was, of course, quite understandable that Social Democrats, 
given their ideas about the working class - which often appear to 
have been based on myths and illusions - and especially given their 
conception of the historical process in which that class was deemed 
to be caught up, were ill-prepared to confront the possibility that 
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National Socialism could find support among the working class. And 
inevitably, once the SPD did bring itself to confront this 
phenomenon - a phenomenon that, far more than, say, working-class 
support for the Catholic political parties, or even for the 
bourgeois parties, challenged the party's deepest convictions -
this confrontation took the form of an attempted stripping away 
from the working-class Nazi of his working-class credentials and 
assigning of him to a category outside of the traditional German 
labour movement. The putative power of the labour movement to 
immunise the worker against the propaganda of National Socialism 
was invoked as the positive contrast to and explanation for those 
workers who, without the benefit of such schooling, had fallen prey 
to Nazism; and the self-image of the SPD, in particular the image 
it fostered of the schooled Social Democrat, and the defining of 
the working-class Nazi in opposition to it, led the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung to construct its analysis upon some highly 
questionable assumptions about its own support, and about the 
nature of working-class engagement in the political process 1n 
general. 
The most basic way 1n which Social Democracy defended itself 
against the spectre of the working-class Nazi, however, was to deny 
that it existed, or at least in any way that was significant to the 
SPD; that is to say, denials that the NSDAP had achieved any 
success amongst the SPD's constituency - or amongst a more widely 
defined 'Marxist front', consisting of the combined supports of SPD 
and KPD - were consistent throughout the period. It was often 
stated that National Socialism had been decisively rejected by the 
'organised working class', that Hitler's desires in this direction 
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had been frustrated: 
Jedes Kind wei~ heute, da~ der Versuch Hitlers, die breite 
Masse der handarbeitenden Bevolkerung fUr sich und seine 
Bewegung zu gewinnen, vollig gescheitert ist. Nirgends ist 
es ihm gelungen, in beachtlichen Ausma~ in die 
marxistische Front einzubrechen. [346] (15 September 1931) 
The expedient combining of the followers of the KPD and SPD ln this 
way, in order to sustain the impression of working-class 
indifference to Nazism, was certainly a sign of the SPD's awareness 
of its deteriorating position - ln what other context would the SPD 
happily have bracketed itself with the KPD? Despite its apparent 
confidence, it is clear that beneath the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
declarations about the invincibility of the SPD or Marxism, there 
existed an unease, a sense of uncertainty which meant that the 
possibility that the party was, even if only at the margins, losing 
support to the NSDAP, could not be so easily dismissed. Indeed, 
such a loss of support was occasionally discussed in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, for example in April 1932, when it was 
predicted that this loss would prove only temporary: 
Vorausschauend kann wohl jetzt schon gesagt werden, da~ die 
dem Nationalsozialismus aus der Sozialdemokratie 
zugestromten Wahler der NSDAP bei nachster sich bietender 
Gelegenheit, zum mindesten zu einem Gro~teil die 
Gefolgschaft wieder versagen werden. [347] (26 April 1932) 
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There had, moreover, right from the start been admissions in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung that National Socialism had proved 
attractive to some workers - even in 1929, there were frequent 
expressions of regret of the foolishness of some German workers In 
this regard, such as the following from April of that year: 
Es ist nur traurig, da~ elne Minderheit deutscher Arbeiter 
sich noch lmmer von Phrasen betoren la~t, ohne auf Taten zu 
sehen ... [348] (16 April 1929) 
or this from November 1929: 
Es ist tief bedauerlich, da~ deutsche Arbeiter sich soweit 
vergessen konnen, einer Partei des Verrats ihre Stimme zu 
geben. [349] (26 November 1929) 
And in the same month, the Schwabische Volkszeitung had reluctantly 
to face the fact that Nazism's support extended beyond the young, 
the confused and the hysterical: 
Diese, bei allem Geschrei hochst harmlose, romantische 
Kerntruppe der Bewegung wtirde man sich selbst tiber lassen 
konnen, wenn nicht in letzter Zeit gro~ere Kresie des 
stadtischen Mittelstandes der nationalsozialistischen 
Agitation verfallen war, die auch in der 
Industriearbeiterschaft einige Erfolge erzielen konnte. 
[350] (29 November 1929) 
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Such perceptions, and the anxiety accompanying them, only increased 
in the following years, as the NSDAP became even more successful -
an increase that can be followed, not through statements of worry, 
which would have damaged rank-and-file morale, but rather through 
the explanations the SPD provided for the existence of these 
'deviant' working-class Nazis. 
For explanations were needed - there was an apparent 
contradiction between the Schwabische Volkszeitung's assertions 
about the invulnerability of the SPD's support and its acceptance 
of the idea of the Nazi worker. It was also likely that the reader 
of the newspaper knew of such workers active in Augsburg, even if 
their numbers were not large. What was to be made of such a 
phenomenon, one which confounded the SPD's class-bound political 
expectations? The SPD's solution to this problem was to stigmatise 
the working class Nazi as an outsider, as someone to whom the 
traditions of the Social Democratic labour movement were alien. 
Whether this characterisation had its roots in reality or was 
simply the consequence of political imperatives will be considered 
in a moment; it is necessary first, though, to delineate the 
approach in more detail. 
A useful starting point 1S an article which appeared in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung in April 1928, 1n which the claim was made 
that support for Nazism came 
... nur zum allergeringsten Teil aus Arbeitern. 
The existence even of this small proportion of workers was, 
however, easily explained away: 
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Bei den letzteren ergibt sich Ubrigens nicht selten, da~ 
auch waschechte Kommunisten im Nationalsozialismus ihre 
neue politische Heimat gefunden haben. [351J (April 1928) 
Although this was by no means the only example of ex-Communists 
being pinpointed as constituting the bulk of working-class Nazis 
[352J, the importance of this article is less this specific 
accusation, than the pattern it set of locating the Nazi worker 
decisively outwith the Social Democratic tradition. Rather than 
depicting him as an ex-Communist, however, it became more usual to 
portray him as belonging to the 'unorganised' [353J, to those 
workers who the SPD instinctively felt should rally to its cause, 
but consistently proved beyond the party's reach. In the midst of 
anti-Nazi polemics, moreover, the 'unorganised' were transformed 
into something more, seen as a mercenary underclass selling 
themselves to Nazism. Thus were working-class Nazis often 
described as 'lumpenproletariat' - it was claimed, for example 
da~ die Nationalsozialisten fUr ihre Schlagerkolonnen 
den Abhub des Lumpenproletariats zusammenkratzen [354J; 
(12 August 1930) 
or as 'the mob': 
Hitler sollte die Arbeiter fangen. Aber bei seinem 
Fischzug in den Industriestadten ist nicht die 
Arbeiterschaft sondern nur der Mob im Netz hangen 
geblieben. Den Arbeiter fing man nicht. Nur der Bodensatz 
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der Gro~stadte blieb 1n den Maschen des Netzes ... [355] 
(21 October 1931) 
In essence, such workers were being demonised; a clear message was 
being sent out about them, one which at the same time could only 
reinforce the righteous image of the true proletarian which the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung sought to project: 
Gewi~: es stellten sich schlie~lich auch in seiner 
Mannschaft Arbeiter ein, aber was fur Arbeiter! Krakeeler 
... die irgendwo nichts werden konnten, Unorganisierte und 
Gelbe, die sich uberall herumtreiben, wo ein neuer Laden 
aufgemacht wird, und schlie~lich die katilinarischen 
Existenzen der Gro~stadte. Wer darauf ausgeht, eine 
Revolution zu machen, mu~ rechtzeitig mit dem Mob und mit 
den Rowdies Fuhlung nehmen. Daher auch der bewu~t rude und 
gemeine Ton in der Agitation und Propaganda der Nazis.[356] 
(24 July 1930) 
As to what made the lumpen, the mob, the 'class renegades' [357] 
vulnerable to Nazi propaganda, beyond their obvious economic 
plight, on this the Schwabische Volkszeitung was quite clear: like 
the proletarianised middle class, the so-called underclass had 
failed to find their way to socialism [358], had not been immunised 
against Nazism by the powers of Social Democratic schooling - they 
constituted, that 1S 
Jener Arbeiter, die nicht genugend politisch geschult 
waren, urn der Schlammflut von Luge und Verleumdung zu 
widerstehen. [359] (27 April 1932) 
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Conversely, of course, those who had experienced such schooling 
could never be seduced by National Socialism's temptations: 
Arbeiter, die denken gelernt haben, die erzogen wurden und 
aufgewachsen sind in der Schule der SPD und der 
Gewerkschaften, werden gegen solche 'Lockungen' gefeit 
seln. [360] (28 November 1929) 
The same point was made in a discussion about the NSDAP's attempts 
to recruit amongst the unemployed, published in April 1936: 
Viele Erfolge werden die Nationalsozialisten mit ihrem 
Anbiederungsversuch bei dem Erwerbslosen kaum haben. Ihre 
judenfresserischen und sozialistenfeindlichen Parolen liben 
hochstens eine Wirkung auf solche Teile der Erwerbslosen 
aus, die nicht durch die politische und gewerkschaftliche 
Schulung gegangen sind. Jeder politisch aufgeklarte 
Arbeiter kennt die Naturgeschichte der Hakenkreuzler zur 
Genlige. [361 J (10 April 1932) 
The strength of this myth of the schooled worker, of the 
'geschulter und politisch wohlerzogener Arbeiter' [362J must be 
grasped. At times the Schwabische Volkszeitung gave the impression 
of believing not in the desirability of the creation, but in the 
existence of 
elne ihrer hohen Mission bewu~te, kulturell und politisch 
hochentwickelte Arbeiterklasse. [363] (2 May 1929) 
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And it always retained its faith In the ultimate victory of class 
consciousness: 
'Deutschland erwache!' rufen die Nazis. Jawohl, das 
Erwachen der Arbeiter wird kommen! Die Arbeiter, die sich 
heute noch von der Nazi-Partei der Prinzen und Offiziere 
und Gro~geldgeber mi~brauchen lassen, werden erkennen, 
wohin sie als Arbeiter, die auf Arbeiter-Ehre halten, 
gehoren. Das Klassengeftihl kann sich wohl vortibergehend 
bei einem Teil der Arbeiterschaft verwirren und verlrren 
lassen, aber ersticken, ganzlich ersticken la~t es sich 
nicht - auf die Dauer nicht. [364J (2 January 1931) 
The SPD seemed truly to believe that it was engaged in a battle it 
could not lose, a struggle between enemies of unequal strength -
and as the Schwabische Volkszeitung once put it, the key to the 
inequality lay in the differing qualities of Nazism and Social 
Democracy's respective supporters: 
Ungleich ist das Krafteverhaltnis ... Ungleich nicht nur 
nach der Zahl, sondern auch nach der Qualitat der Kampfer: 
Disziplinierte, politisch geschulte Arbeiter gegen rabiate, 
reaktionare Spie~er und einige verhetzte unorganisierte 
Arbeiter. [365J (18 February 1932) 
Recent historiography has, of course, emphasised that the Nazi 
penetration of the working-class constituency went deeper than 
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merely reaching the type of worker consistently suggested by the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung and indeed earlier historical work as the 
typical working-class Nazi - that is, the worker brought up outside 
of the traditions of the labour movement [366J. It is not, 
however, necessarily on such grounds that the newspaper's depiction 
of the working-class Nazi as a political deviant should be 
criticised - again it must be stressed that it would be unrealistic 
to use later historical research as a yardstick against which to 
measure contemporary impressions. Moreover, the idea that workers 
outwith the Social Democratic mainstream were more susceptible to 
the attractions of Nazism than those within it is basically 
accurate. There was, however, more involved in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's presentation of this aspect of Nazism than merely 
the perceptions and confusions of the contemporary observer: for 
the demonisation of the working-class Nazi served a crucial 
function within the analysis of National Socialism as a whole, it 
was another aspect of the SPD's desire to explain away those 
elements of National Socialism most inconvenient to its politics 
and its theory. That the SPD was anxious about the National 
Socialist threat to its own constituency has already been 
established; and this anxiety belies the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
apparent certainty that no class conscious, organised worker could 
support the NSDAP. At the level of theory and analysis, however, 
the Nazi threat did not exist: the working-class Nazi was a concept 
contradictory of the SPD's belief that the NSDAP was a party of the 
middle class. But since the presence of workers within the Nazi 
party could scarcely be wholly denied, the only way in which that 
presence could be acknowledged, and the integrity of the Social 
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Democratic analysis yet simultaneously maintained, was through the 
marginalisation of such workers. The caricature of the working-
class Nazi as stemming solely from traditions alien to mainstream 
Social Democracy that was developed in the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
was thus both expedient in propaganda terms and the inevitable 
consequence of the SPD's shaping theoretical beliefs. 
In this area as in others, then, the SPD's ideological 
convictions acted as a block on the party's ability to confront 
those aspects of National Socialism that appeared to confound those 
convictions; instead the party resorted to ideological manoeuvring, 
to the skillful side-stepping of the awkward analytical hurdle by 
means of the most convenient theoretical explanation. As far as 
the SPD was concerned, the NSDAP was, indeed had to be a 
middle-class party; thus its working-class supporters were only 
explicable as the lumpen and unschooled, or at most as the 
schooled, whose 'schooling' had been disrupted by economic 
distress. Any real engagement with the sources of dissatisfaction 
that led former SPD voters to switch allegiance to National 
Socialism was carefully avoided - and the question of why those 
outwith the parameters of the organised working class became Nazis 
in a time of economic depression rather than Social Democrats, the 
possibility that this was the result of a political approach on the 
part of the SPD which, had it been altered, had it been less 
parochial, could have increased its support to include a larger 
proportion of Germany's workers, was simply ignored. 
It is important to understand, moreover, that the SPD's 
attitude to the working-class Nazi was no mere propaganda facade -
the internalised ideological obstacles to an open acknowledgement 
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of working-class support for National Socialism were huge. There 
seems little reason, given the mind-set of most Social Democrats, 
especially those Social Democrats involved in literary production, 
to doubt that the explanations for the phenomenon of workers within 
the NSDAP propounded in the Schwabische Volkszeitung were sincerely 
held beliefs - just as there is no doubt that the image of the 
worker schooled in the Social Democratic tradition was as much a 
reality as an ideal to the newspaper. It was, of course, almost 
certainly a false reality; the SPD's concept of a deviant working 
class could only exist alongside the idea of the virtuous, class 
conSClOUS rank-and-file Social Democrat, immunised by political 
education against Nazism - an idea that was dubious, if not wholly 
illusory. How well schooled ordinary SPD supporters and voters 
really were must be open to question, and in a complex 
socio-political situation to single out the idea of schooling as 
the crucial factor differentiating the working-class Nazi from the 
rest of the working class seems simplistic, if entirely consistent 
with the SPD's world-view. The ideal of the schooled Social 
Democrat was another of the cliches of Social Democratic thought, 
the development of which enabled the SPD to make National Socialism 
comprehensible to itself; and like so much else in the SPD's 
outlook, this ideal may have been born in an era long since past, 
but its potency, its constricting potential remained very much a 
part of the SPD's present in the Weimar Republic. 
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CHAPTER 7 : Rhetorical responses to National Socialist violence 
in the Schwabische Volkszeitung. 
The Schwabische Volkszeitung's initial defining image of the 
NSDAP had been that of a party of violence; and although, as has 
been seen, the newspaper's engagement with National Socialism 
became far broader, the image of the Nazi as a violent thug was yet 
the most consistently adhered to aspect of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's portrayal of Nazism [367J. The flood of articles 
and reports designed to maintain and reinforce this image was 
unremitting and, while various in detail and extent, they contained 
but one message about Nazism's essential nature and threat. It is, 
indeed, highly likely that the basic 'image of the enemy' formed by 
the reader of the Schwabische Volkszeitung would have centred 
around the NSDAP's involvement in violence, and the implications of 
this must be explored. This is all the more necessary as it was ln 
reaction to its own perceptions of Nazi violence that Social 
Democracy determined the limits of its own willingness to resort to 
force, at least defensively; it will be shown however, that as the 
SPD's rhetorical assertions of such a willingness became ever more 
strident in response to the NSDAP's growth, so the tensions and 
contradictions within that rhetoric became ever more apparent -
tensions and contradictions which it is vital to understand if an 
explanation is sought for the SPD's rejection of mass resistance ln 
1933. Rhetoric and reality were separated by years of ingrained 
political practice, and the inability of the SPD to break free of 
the constraints of its tradition is revealed by the confusions and 
ambiguities its rhetorical assault on Nazi violence contained. 
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Nazi violence was presented in the Schwabische Volkszeitung as 
a cancer eating at the heart of German political life, indeed at 
the heart of German society as a whole; and the NSDAP as a party 
incapable of reasoned political debate, a party which, through its 
easy resort to the physical as a substitute for such debate had 
contributed more than any other to the barbarisation of the 
political atmosphere. The NSDAP was, in the common vocabulary of 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung, bestial and brutal, a 
'BUrgerkriegspartei' or, more accurately, a 'BUrgerkriegsarmee'. 
And as in other spheres, the consequences of Nazi violence were 
portrayed in the newspaper by means of the apocalyptic vision, 1n 
barely exaggerated depictions of a decent, civilised country 
suffering an onslaught from barbarian hordes: 
Das uniformierte Nazigesindel unternimmt an allen Ecken und 
Enden Terrorversuche gegen friedliebende BUrger, von 
Disziplin ist keine Rede, die Faust, das Messer und der 
Revolver feiern Orgien. [368] (18 June 1932) 
National Socialism, it was stated, was possessed of the will 
D utschland se1ne Do""rfer und Stadte, 1n e1n brennendes . .. e , 
Schlachtfeld zu verwandeln und unser Yolk 1n den blutigsten 
BUrgerkrieg zu stUrzen [369]; (16 September 1928) 
it had perpetrated countless 
... politische Obeltaten die seit Jahr und Tag das ganze 
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Land in e1ner Hexenkessel des Hasses, der Verleumdung und 
der Mordlust zu verwandeln droht. [370J (12 April 1932) 
Knuckledusters and pistols had become established tools of 
political conviction [371J, and Germany was gradually succumbing to 
a pr1macy of the fist: 
Die Nachrichten Uber terroristische Anschlage der 
Hakenkreuzhorden haben sich in den letzten Tagen derart 
gehauft, da~ mit allem Nachdruck verlangt werden mu~, da~ 
dieser Kulturschande e1n Ende bereitet wird ... Heute leben 
W1r W1e 1m Zeitalter des Faustrechts, kein anstandiger 
Mensch ist se1nes Lebens sicher, selbst die Frauen und 
Kinder in den Wohnungen sind diesen Bestien nicht mehr 
heilig. Tag fUr Tag, Tote und Verwundete, Uberfalle auf 
Gewerkschaftshauser, Druckereien, Genossenschaften, 
Uberfalle auf Privatwohnungen - fUrwahr ein Zustand, der 
zum Himmel stinkt. [372J (4 August 1932) 
It was the SPD's belief, moreover, that such violence was in no way 
random and uncontrolled, but rather amounted to a purposeful 
political strategy designed specifically to intimidate and 
ultimately defeat the NSDAP's political and intellectual opponents. 
Violence, from this perspective, was being deliberately provoked by 
Nazi propaganda: the purpose of the Volkischer Beobachter, for 
example, was claimed to be the 
... Aufpeitschung der niedrigsten Instinkte [of its 
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readership] ... Blut! Blut! Blut! so mu~ es den 
urteilslosen Hakenkreuzgehirnen taglich und stlindlich 
eingehammert werden, so mu~ die Bestie im Menschen geweckt 
werden. [373] (5 October 1929) 
Not only members of the NSDAP were portrayed as being affected by 
Nazi propaganda, however: 
So darf man sich tiber die moglichen Auswirkungen der 
nationalsozialistischen Sto~propaganda keiner Tauschung 
hingeben. Die Versammlungssprache der Nationalsozialisten 
hat breite Volksschichten, namentlich die Jugend, unsaglich 
verroht. Die politischen Leidenschaften sind bis zur 
Siedenhitze aufgepeitscht. [374] (29 December 1931) 
And along with the content of Nazi propaganda in general, the 
proclamations and speeches of the National Socialist leadership 
were similarly seen as creating the necessary context for political 
violence: 
Eine jede Rede der nationalsozialistischen Ftihrer 
bezeichnet den politischen Gegner als lebensunwtirdig, als 
Untermenschen den man am besten abtue ... Die 
nationalsozialistische Presse reizt ganz systematisch zu 
Gewalttatigkeiten. [375] (3 January 1931) 
The Nazi 'intellectual originators' [376] of violence had to take 
responsibility for the type of party they had created: 
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Yom politischen Meinungskampf ist keine Rede mehr. Es 
handelt sich darum, da~ eine Partei, die den Terror will, 
offen zu Morden und Blutvergie~en auffordert, und ihre 
Leute uniformiert zum Blutvergie~en auf die Stra~e schickt 
... Der Wille zum Blirgerkrieg und der Befehl zum 
Blirgerkrieg geht von den nationalsozialistischen Flihrern 
aus. [377] (23 June 1932) 
And the most significant aspect of such terror was its deployment 
as a means of silencing opposition: 
Ein besonders dunkles Kapital bilden die systematisch 
vorbereiteten Versammlungssprengungen und Uberfalle auf 
politische Gegner. Die viehische Roheit, mit der diese 
Messerstecher ihr Morderhandwerk ausliben, die zynische 
Grausamkeit, mit der sie sich mit flirchterlichen Waffen 
ausrlisten und die Tatsache, da~ es sich immer und immer 
urn notorische Rohlinge handelt, die die 
Nationalsozialistische Partei mit gro~er Brutalitat 
gegenliber Andersdenkenden vertreten, der Terror, in ihren 
eigenen Versammlungen, die zligellose Herabsetzung der 
Arbeit des Proletariats und seiner Partei, der 
Sozialdemokratie, das alles beweist, da~ wir recht haben, 
wenn wir der nationalsozialistischen Gefahr mit aller 
Kraft entgegentreten. [378] (26 November 1929) 
The Schwabische Volkszeitung's messages about Nazi violence 
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were conveyed to its readership through a predictable enough 
catalogue of National Socialist involvement in violent incidents 
[379J: Nazi murders, Nazi bombings, reports of clashes between 
Nazis and Communists, and of the 'bestial' behaviour of Nazi 
Reichstag and Landtag delegates, extensive, sensationalist coverage 
of court cases resulting from Nazi violence, the publicising of 
secret Nazi documents detailing the movement's violent desires, 
lists and statistics of violent crlmes committed by National 
Socialists - such was the staple daily diet which the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung took great delight in providing. It was a diet, 
moreover, supplemented by the type of warnings to the working class 
about National Socialist intentions examined earlier, only in this 
context specifically focusing on the movement's violent intentions 
- constantly emphasising, for example, Hitler's prophecy that heads 
would roll after the NSDAP came to power, or declaring: 
Sie [the NazisJ wollen die brutale Gewalt mit Messer und 
Revolver zum staatlichen System erheben. [380J 
(29 July 1930) 
The SPD could have no illusions about the role which force would 
play in a Nazi Germany, for the NSDAP's words and deeds allowed 
none: 
... Wir zweifeln nicht daran, da~ die 
nationalsozialistischen Ftihrer das Geltiste haben, ihre 
blutrtingstigen Deklamationen in die Tat umzusetzen. Ihre 
Btirgerkriegsbanden haben bisher schon blutig genug gehaust 
... Diesen Ha~ wollen die nationalsozialistischen 
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Blutprediger benutzen, um Deutschland in e1n allgemeines 
Schlachtfeld, in einen Trlimmerhaufen zu verwandeln. [381] 
(18 July 1932) 
Nevertheless, despite the deliberate construction of this image of 
National Socialism as a violent army disrupting normal life and 
poisoning the political atmosphere, the SPD ostensibly accepted 
that the NSDAP aimed to take power by legal means and not through 
the instrument of a Putsch. This acceptance, though, was 
deceptive: the possibility of such a Putsch is never quite 
dismissed, indeed accusations about the preparation of one are 
frequently made. Similarly the actions of the Nazi rank and file 
are seen to contradict the leadership's legal stance, even though 
Hitler's assertions of legality are accepted as a political fact. 
It was, that 1S to say, necessary for the SPD to maintain its image 
of the enemy by keeping alive the idea that the NSDAP was capable 
of the ultimate violent act, the insurrection against democracy. 
In part, of course, this may also have been a hangover from 
1923. The Schwabische Volkszeitung frequently made reference to 
Hitler's failed Putsch of that year, and there 1S a sense in which 
that event crystallised one image of National Socialism in the 
imagination of the SPD. Hence, notwithstanding the SPD's 
recognition that it was no longer Hitler's intention to attempt 
such an action, a willingness, indeed a desire to believe the 
contrary yet persisted. For this reason, acceptance of Hitler's 
professions of legality was, in the first place, only ever 
qualified, and, in the second, consistently undermined in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung by evidence suggesting the hollowness of 
those professions. Thus, a lengthy discussion of the problem 
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published in May 1931 [382J, whilst certain that Hitler was serious 
in his disavowals of using violence as a direct means to achieve 
power, and clear about the pragmatic Realpolitik lying behind this, 
was yet perceptively aware of the possibility that the violence 
inherent in National Socialism could emerge in unrestrained form if 
the movement ever did gain control of the country: 
Gewi~ libersieht Hitler die Wirkung selner Legalitatsschwlire 
auf die Sturmabteilungen nicht. Aber das Ziel, dem er mit 
der Preisgabe seiner revolutionaren Haltung zustrebt, 
scheint ihm das Opfer von ein paar tausend alten Anhangern 
wert. Er wird salonfahig, regierungsfahig 
Ob Hitler legal bleibt, wenn ihm einmal hilfsbereite 
Bundesgenossen die Moglichkeit geben sollten, den 
Regierungstraum Wirklichkeit werden zu lassen, ob er nicht 
dann auf demokratischem Weg zur Macht gelangt, sich durch 
einen Staatsstreich die Macht erhalten wlirde, sei 
dahingestellt. Gegenwartig sind seine Legalitatsbeteurungen 
ernst gemeint. 
The author of the article was, however, also compelled to 
demonstrate that the threat of Nazi violence did not simply lie in 
the future but was evident in the present behaviour of the Nazis, 
behaviour which made a stark contrast to Hitler's recent 
pronouncements: 
Aber Legalitat mli~te verpflichten. Nicht nur zur 
Ausschaltung von Putschplanen, nicht nur zur Absage an den 
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Hochverrat; Legalitat bedeutet, daa das Staatsgrundgesetz, 
die Verfassung und aIle Gesetze des Staates aus ehrlicher 
Uberzeugung geachtet und befolgt werden. 
Wie halt's die Partei in Wahrheit mit der Legalitat? 
The answer to this question was provided by a long list of examples 
of Nazi lawlessness over the previous two months, and the 
conclusion reached: 
So steht es in Wirklichkeit: Der Ftihrer schwort, und die 
Geftihrten pfeifen auf den Schwur. 
And this approach was merely the continuation of a pattern whereby 
any violent incident in which the NSDAP was involved could be 
seized upon as yet another demonstration of the sham nature of 
Hitler's legal course. Thus, the following reaction to a Nazi 
attack on a Volkshaus in Lemberg: 
Welcher Art und Beschaffenheit die von Hitler wiederholt 
beschworene Legalitat ist, daftir gibt der 
Augenzeugenbericht eines Unbeteiligen tiber den planmaaigen 
Oberfall von Nationalsozialisten auf das 'Volkshaus' in 
Lemberg (bei Pirmasens) am Sonntag, den 10. Mai, eine 
lehrreiche Illustration. [383J (16 May 1931) 
Unsurprisingly, the previously mentioned secret Hessen document was 
exploited in similar fashion: 
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Das Nachspiel, das die Hessenwahlen gefunden haben, zeigt 
auch die Verlogenheit der nationalsozialistischen 
Bewegung. Das Programm der hessischen 
nationalsozialistischen Landtagsabgeordneten fur ihren 
illegalen Regierungsantritt steht in schneidendem 
Widerspruch zu den Legalitatsschwuren Adolf Hitlers. 
Die Doppelztingigkeit und namenlose Heuchelei des 
Nationalsozialismus ist entlarvt. [384J (28 November 1931) 
Beyond this obvious tactic of stressing the gulf that existed 
between Nazism's rhetoric of legality and its violent reality, the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung further sought to cast doubt on the 
relevance of that rhetoric by claiming that many Nazis strongly 
disagreed with Hitler's policy. An article published in July 1931, 
for example, portrayed a faction within the NSDAP as impatient with 
the legal way and agitating for violent action: 
Man bereitet elne Stimmung vor, die der im Oktober 1923 
au~erordentlich ahnelt und die Anflihrer, ob sie wollen oder 
nicht, schlie~lich zu Gefangenen der eigenen 
unverantwortlichen Agitation machen mu~. 
To Hitler, though, is ascribed a rather more common-sense Vlew 
(which again indicates that the SPD did accept that Hitler's 
declared legality was a serious political strategy): 
Wahrscheinlich ist ... er davon tiberzeugt, da~ schon der 
Versuch einer Gewaltaktion von der abwehrbereiten 
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preu~ischen Polizei mit drakonischen Mitteln 1m Keime 
erstickt werden mti~te. 
But nevertheless: 
... Vorsicht ist am Platze, denn die Verzweiflung hat schon 
man chen zum Verbrecher gemacht. [385J (31 July 1931) 
The possibility that an act of force might be hazarded by the NSDAP 
was never removed from the minds of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
readers. On the contrary, in fact, for the newspaper was forever 
relaying rumours about supposed preparations on the part of the 
Nazis for a Putsch or for a civil war [386J. 
In short, the trenchant negative Image of National Socialism 
as a party of thuggish bestiality could not be allowed to be erased 
by any concept of the NSDAP as an essentially legal party as far as 
long-term political tactics were concerned - for, even though this 
latter concept was acknowledged and even publicised In the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, it was simultaneously and continually 
contradicted by the newspaper's broader depiction of Nazi violence. 
Beyond the basic reporting of the NSDAP's involvement in violence 
described above, the party's legalism was also made to seem less 
relevant by the Schwabische Volkszeitung than an aspect of that 
broader picture not yet mentioned: that is the SPD's conviction 
that the authorities were too lax in their treatment of Nazi 
violence. The Schwabische Volkszeitung was full of the same type 
of complaints that would have been found in any Social Democratic 
newspaper of the time [387J: the police were charged with failures 
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to act, or to act rapidly enough against Nazi displays of force, 
the courts with an unwillingness to punish the perpetrators of such 
displays (while being more than willing to act against members of 
the left-wing parties) and the state as an entity with an 
abdication of its duty to prevent Nazi violence and behaving too 
passively. By mid-1932, moreover, these beliefs had been 
transformed into an analysis which claimed that the Papen and 
Schleicher governments were in active collusion with National 
Socialism, had deliberately removed the barriers (such as the 
banning of the SA) which were all that prevented Germany from being 
plunged into civil war. In the months leading up to the Nazi 
Machtergreifung, indeed, when the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
portrayal of Nazi violence was at its most intense, that violence 
came almost to be regarded as state-sponsored [388]. 
It must also be remembered that the paramount fact concernlng 
National Socialist violence for any Social Democrat was that it was 
violence very specifically targeted at the labour movement - ln 
comparison to this fact and its manifestation in daily life, the 
NSDAP's disavowal of insurrectionary violence could have been of 
little importance [389]. It must be noted here that the SPD's 
interpretation of Nazi violence was comfortably located within its 
wider analysis of the NSDAP as the paid army of big business 
entrusted with the task of destroying the labour movement -
violence was only the starkest aspect of this attempted 
destruction, but also the one that could be most effectively 
dramatised in a newspaper like the Schwabische Volkszeitung. Thus 
throughout the period no opportunity was lost to emphasise how 
often Social Democrats found themselves the victims of unprovoked 
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Nazi attacks [390J; particularly from mid-1932, however, the extent 
to which Social Democracy felt itself to be under assault produced 
a type of siege mentality in the party (one which could only be 
reinforced by the hostile presence of the KPD on the political 
scene): 
Der ganze Ha~ dieser BUrgerkriegshetze richtet sich gegen 
die organisierte Arbeiterschaft, gegen den starksten Hort 
des Friedens und der Sicherheit, den Deutschland besitzt. 
Die Terrorakte der braunen Banden richten sich systematisch 
gegen die Einrichtungen der Arbeiterschaft. Der Ha~, der 
daraus spricht, ist der Ha~ der Klassenrenegaten, der 
Proleten, die sich der Reaktion und dem Scharfmachertum zum 
Kampfe gegen ihre KlassenbrUder verkauft haben. Sie sind 
Landsknechte gegen die Freiheit geworden, die das Brot des 
S6ldners gegen ihre Klassengenossen essen. Sie hassen uns, 
sie hassen unsere Diszipline, sie hassen das, was wir 
geschaffen haben, weil es eine dauernde Mahnung, elne 
dauernde Peitsche fUr ihre Gewissen ist! [391J 
(18 July 1932) 
The NSDAP's violence, the Schwabische Volkszeitung noted, was yet 
another contradiction of its socialism, directed as it was not 
against 'the palaces of the barons of industry' or the castles of 
Germany's princes and large-scale landowners: 
Statt dessen aber fliegen die Bomben und Benzinflaschen 
in die Gewerkschaftshauser, in die Gebaude der 
Krankenkassen und der Arbeiterzeitungen. Arbeiter sind es, 
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die nachts in ihren Betten erschossen werden, 
Arbeiterfrauen und Arbeiterkinder werden ihrer Ernahrer 
beraubt, Arbeitermutter ihrer Sohne. Funktionare der 
Arbeiterschaft werden terrorisiert, niedergestochen und 
niederschlagen, dieselben Leute die Jahrzehnte fur die 
Arbeiterschaft gekampft und in den Gefangnissen gesessen 
haben fur ihre Uberzeugung und fur das Recht der Volkes auf 
Arbeit und Brot. 
Das ist das Gesicht dieses Naziterrors, das ist das Gesicht 
einer 'Arbeiterpartei' des Herrn Hitler! Judas Hitler. 
[392J (10 August 1932) 
To the SPD, however, the very use of violence, irrespective of 
against whom it was used, was inherently incompatible with 
socialist values; this belief, indeed, shaped the SPD's response to 
the physical assault on it by Nazism. Once again, the SPD's 
self-image was crucial here: the NSDAP's casual resort to violence 
was contrasted with Social Democratic values perceived to be rooted 
in legality, order and discipline and maintained even while the 
party was being assailed from all sides by ideological enemies 
without scruples [393]. This contrast was inscribed in the SPD's 
thought and was the cause, as will be discussed in a moment, of the 
difficulties that confronted the SPD as it tried to counter the 
threat and the actuality of Nazi violence. In the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung it was often made explicit in reports of Social 
Democratic events, in which the disciplined behaviour of the 
participants was used as a yardstick against which to condemn the 
lack of such discipline displayed by the National Socialists. An 
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early example of this was an article published in August 1929, 
which took as its starting point the Nazi Parteitag recently held 
in Nuremberg, and the violence accompanying it, and continued: 
Wie konnte es auch anders sein! Vor 14 Tagen 
hunderttausend Arbeiterturner in Nurnbergs Mauern. Der 
Burger sah sie. Kein Zwischenfall war zu verzeichnen, 
trotz Tropenhitze keine Entgleisung. Selbst Polizeibeamte 
ruhmten unaufgefordert die zu bewundernde Disziplin der 
Arbeiter und deren Betragen. [394J (7 August 1929) 
As it developed over the next few years, this idea of the 
disciplined Social Democrat became almost fetishistic ln the way it 
was applied to almost every large-scale gathering of the labour 
movement reported on in the Schwabische Volkszeitung. A typical 
description of a Reichsbanner demonstration, for example, would 
proudly emphasise the presence of the Reichsbanner members 
In straffen korrekten Formationen 
and continue: 
... so stehen im ganzen Reich in dieser Stunde die fertig 
ausgebildeten, wohldisziplinierten Schufomanner. [395J 
(23 February 1931) 
And discipline was the Social Democratic quality that the National 
Socialists, possessing none themselves, were believed to despise 
most of all: 
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Sie hassen uns, Sle hassen unsere Disziplin. [396] 
(18 July 1932) 
The supreme demonstration of this discipline, moreover, was the 
refusal to be provoked by the NSDAP, the refusal to descend to the 
level of Nazism - and such refusals to be provoked based upon an 
ability to maintain discipline were, on the evidence provided by 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung, corMnonplace. Wnile the details may 
have been variable, the scenario was in essence always the same, as 
exemplified in the following extracts from the above mentioned 
article on a Reichsbanner meeting: 
Trotz nationalsozialistischer Provokationsversuche kam es 
nicht zu ernsteren Zwischenfallen ... Die zahllosen 
unverschamten Provokationen des sich in seiner 
Lacherlichkeit und bodenlosen Gemeinheit gleicherma~en 
liberschlagenden Nationalsozialisten . 
... Tatsachlich verdient die Geduld der aktiven 
Republikaner die hochste Bewunderung und das hochste Lob. 
[397] (23 February 1931) 
Or this from a few weeks later, making reference to a Nazi 
demonstration: 
Es fehlte natlirlich nicht an den bekannten Provokationen 
der Arbeiterschaft, doch verhielten sich die vernlinftigen 
Arbeiter ruhig und disziplinierte. [398] (16 May 1931) 
It was, moreover, not only the provocation of direct violence that 
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the SPD had to resist, the intellectual provocation provided by the 
Nazi leadership was just as much a test of Social Democratic 
discipline and patience - for instance, the behaviour of Frick 1n 
Thuringia: 
Es ist e1n unwlirdiger Zustand, da~ Herr Frick ungehindert 
weiter provozieren darf. Man sollte in den Kreisen der 
Verantwortlichen nicht vergessen, da~ es ungeheurer 
Selbstbeherrschung aller republikanischen Kreise bedarf, urn 
das putschistische und verfassungsfeindliche Treiben des 
Herrn Frick noch langer mitanzusehen. [399J (12 May 1930) 
The SPD, however, had no doubt about its capability to 19nore 
such provocations and to refrain from becoming embroiled 1n the 
consequences of 
... die Entfesselung dieser wilden und blutrlingstigen 
Blirgerkriegshetze, die nur dank der kaltbllitigen 
Besonnenheit der linksstehenden noch nicht zur 
katastrophalen Explosion geflihrt hat ... [400J (25 June 1932) 
For ultimately the discipline of Social Democratic workers was 
believed to lie at the heart of the moral strength that enabled 
them to refrain from resorting to violence, even during a time of 
great desperation - a point made in the Schwabische Volkszeitung in 
response to the accusation that the Weimar Republic's welfare state 
had undermined the will of the German people: 
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1st es moralische Zermtirbung, wenn sechs Millionen 
Arbeitslose und ihre Angehorigen ihr hartes Los, ihr Elend 
und ihre Not mannlich tragen, ohne dem Aufruhr und der 
Anarchie zu verfallen. 
Diese schweigende und leidende Millionenarmee - das ist das 
beste Zeugnis der moralischen Kraft der deutschen 
Arbeiterschaft. [401] (11 June 1932) 
The SPD's rhetoric of discipline, however, co-existed with a 
rhetoric of defiance, with constant assertions in aggressive 
language of the party's willingness to defend itself against 
Nazism; a co-existence which was extremely problematical. The 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's eagerness to proclaim that Social 
Democracy possessed both the capability and the desire to 
counteract any full-scale Nazi assault on the labour movement or 
indeed on the Weimar Republic as a whole, was the active, or 
potentially active, counterpart to the use of Nazi violence 1n the 
construction of a negative image of the enemy. This aspect of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's response to Nazi violence was present 
from the first but became virtually systematised within the 
language and propaganda of the newspaper with the advent of the 
Iron Front [402], which, considered as a literary expression of the 
SPD's reaction to the intensity of the NSDAP's activism - which 1S 
of course how it manifested itself within the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung - was intended even in its very name to embody the 
party's steadfastness and invincibility, and the absolute 
impossibility of succumbing to Nazi violence. Despite such surface 
confidence, however, this assertiveness, the attempt to compete 
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with National Socialism on its own terms, was an uncomfortable, 
almost unnatural, role for the SPD to occupy. For although the 
party sought to base its counter-offensive on the traditional 
Social Democratic self-image with its stress on discipline, that 
self-image stood in fact in real contradiction to the exciting of 
political paSS10ns, to the employment of an overtly aggressive 
political practice and especially to any coherent discussion of the 
possibility that the party, even in the most extreme of 
circumstances, would itself resort to violence. The Schwabische 
Volkszeitung deliberately created an image of National Socialism 
which could produce-only contempt and anger among its readership, 
whilst simultaneously relying upon a language of aggression to 
bolster the self-belief of that readership at a time when it was 
under fierce attack; but the tensions inherent in the use of that 
language, particularly the gulf separating the aggressiveness of 
expression from the actuality of action promised, betrayed the 
dilemma the SPD faced in this area. And, in spite of an attempt to 
convince even itself to the contrary, the traditional virtues of 
Social Democracy that the party was so keen to contrast with the 
behaviour of its enemies - discipline, patience, the ability to 
resist provocation, the reliance on the intellect rather than 
physical force - were clearly destined to prevail and to shape the 
party's behaviour at moments of cr1S1S. 
Nevertheless, even without the possibility of such a reading 
of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's assertions of the SPD's readiness 
to defend itself, those assertions would be important - not least 
because their possible impact on the paper's readership is one of 
the factors that must be considered later when analysing the 
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response of Augsburg's Social Democrats to the Nazi seizure of 
power. As was often the case, that which was to gain a new 
intensity in the final months of the Weimar Republic had been 
present in embryo in the Schwabische Volkszeitung in the early 
years of Nazism's resurgence. It was common enough even at this 
stage to find in the newspaper declarations about the unwillingness 
of the working class to remain passive if Nazi violence did not 
cease: 
Die Arbeiterschaft aber ist nicht gewillt, willenlos den 
Zeitpunkt abzuwarten, wo 'Arbeiter wie toIle Runde 
niedergeschossen' werden sollen. [403] (5 October 1929) 
Similarly frequent were warnlngs concernlng the action that the 
labour movement would be forced to take, if the state authorities 
failed to curb Nazi aggression. It was stated, for example, 
... da~ der Sozialdemokratie und dem Reichsbanner 
schlie~lich nichts tibrig bleiben wird, als zur Selbsthilfe 
aufzurufen, wenn die staatlichen Organe nicht in der Lage 
sind, mit der Nazi-Pest fertigzuwerden, [404] 
(18 August 1931) 
and this type of complaint could be put more stridently: 
In der republikanische Bewegung ist tiber das Treiben der 
Hitler-Banden wie auch die Versagen der Justiz ein 
gewaltiges Ma~ von Emporung und Erbitterung herangewachsen. 
Aus ihren Reihen kommt immer lauter der Ruf: So darf es 
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nicht weiter gehen! Es ist hochst Zeit, da~ die 
Staatsorgane energisch gegen das nationalsozialistischen 
Mordtreiben vorgehen, denn die Erregung der 
republikanischen Bevolkerung wachst ungeheuer, und die 
Republikaner sind keineswegs gewillt, sich von den 
Mordbuben mit dem Hakenkreuz wehrlos abschlachten zu 
lassen. [405J (3 January 1931) 
Also characteristic at this point was the claim that the patience 
of the working class had its limits: 
Genug der faschistischen Brutalitaten und Bluttaten! Die 
Geduld der friedliebenden Bevolkerung ist erschopft. [406J 
(28 October 1931) 
The traditional values of Social Democratic workers were reaffirmed 
even as the possibility was admitted that those values might be 
difficult to maintain in an increasingly violent climate: 
Man sollte sich davor hllten, den Langmut und die Disziplin 
der Republikaner auf eine zu harte Probe zu stellen. [407J 
(12 May 1930) 
However much the type of bravado that the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung was capable of displaying in the years before 1931 was 
a genuine response to the anxieties provoked by Nazi violence, it 
was only after that date that the SPD began to develop a rhetoric 
the aggression of which equalled, or attempted to equal the 
aggression the party faced. It was in this year, for example, that 
a militaristic vocabulary began to be routinely used, a vocabulary 
of struggle, of defence, of attack, as in the following, taken from 
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a front page report published on 2 January 1931: 
Partei, Gewerkschaften, Arbeitersportorganisationen und 
Reichsbanner formieren sich zur gro~en, geschlossenen 
Verteidigungsarmee der Republik ... Einigkeit und 
Geschlossenheit im Kampf gegen die Demagogen der Diktatur 
mu~ die Parole sein ... Wir sind stark in der Verteidigung. 
Wir mtissen starker werden zum Angriff. [408] 
(2 January 1931) 
The idea that the SPD had somehow moved into the attack against 
Nazism was the main component of the shift in tone of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's propaganda: 
Noch n1e ist unsere Bewegung in Stadt und Land so lebendig, 
so aktiv gewesen, W1e 1n den letzten Monaten. Uberall 
rtihrt sich was. Wir sind im Angriff, die Nazis - sie geben 
es selbst zu - in die Verteidigung gedrangt. [409] 
(2 March 1931) 
And this shift 1n tone was indeed conceived as a response to Nazi 
terror: 
Die Sozialdemokratie wird sich aber nicht darauf 
beschranken, Terror und Gewaltwidrigkeiten abzuwehren, S1e 
geht zum Angriff gegen den Nationalsozialismus tiber und 
wird ihn schlagen. 
Ungebrochene Kampfkraft lebt nur noch in der 
sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung, in den Gewerkschaften, 1m 
Reichsbanner, in der Arbeitersportbewegung, die es mit 
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allen Kraften zu fordern gilt. 
Auf politischen Boden fallt zwischen der faschistischen 
Reaktion und der Sozialdemokratie die Entscheidung. Wer 
nicht will, da~ Deutschland faschistisch wird, der gehort 
als Kampfer in die Reihen der Sozialdemokratie. [410] 
(28 November 1931) 
It was at this time, too, that language began to be used that, more 
explicitly than anything that had hitherto appeared 1n the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, appeared to suggest that the SPD would 
not shrink from the use of physical force if necessary - for 
instance, Horsing was quoted, 1n an article headlined '1931 -
Blirgerkrieg?' as denying that the Reichsbanner wanted a civil war, 
but then adding: 
Wenn aber die Feinde der Republik sich erdreisten sollten, 
gegen uns und damit gegen die Republik vorzugehen, so 
werden wir mit derselben Art und Methode und auch mit allen 
Mitteln, mit denen sie uns angreifen, ihnen entgegentreten. 
Wir werden sie, wenn die Interessen der deutschen Nation es 
forden sollten, restlos bis auf den letzten Mann 
vernichten. [411] (23 January 1931) 
And this shift to a more aggress1ve style of rhetoric was 
especially reflected on the front page of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, which came even more frequently to be given over to 
strident appeals to 'fight fascism' - a report of a Berlin 
Reichsbanner demonstration which occupied all of the front page on 
23 February 1931, for example, gives a good indication of the new 
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intensity with which the SPD had begun to respond to Nazi violence: 
Es galt, in der Gefahr dieser erregenden und den Bestand 
der Nation gefahrdenden Wochen den Totengrabern der 
Republik mit aller Deutlichkeit zu zeigen, da~ die 
verntinftige Mehrheit des deutschen Volkes nicht gewillt 
ist, sich durch die Hand verbrecherischer 'Politiker' das 
Vaterland zerschlagen zu lassen . 
... vor allen Dingen sind unsere Parteigenossen zur Stelle: 
Zehntausende, viele Zehntausende insgesamt, ein Heer, ein 
Menschenmeer, Wehr der Republik. Worte, die dem Ernst der 
Stunde entsprechen, Satze der Starke und der Kraft: jener 
Kraft, die die Republik erhalten wird, allen Feinden zum 
Trotz! 
... so stehen 1m ganzen Reich in dieser Stunde die fertig 
ausgebildeten wohldisziplinierten Schufomanner des 
Reichsbanners Schwarz-Rot-Gold im Reih und Glied, jeder 1n 
seinem Gau, jederzeit bereit: zu marschieren, zu kampfen, 
zu s1egen, wenn es die Verteidigung der Republik und der 
Demokratie erfordert . 
.... Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern aber erleben heute ihren 
schwarzen Tag ... die Stra~en wollten sie erobern, mit 
Terror und Gewalt sich durchsetzen. Das ist vorbei! 
AIle Gaue des Reichsbanners stehen 'marschbereit', 
korperlich und geistig stark und beweglich - abwehrbereit! 
Kameraden! Ein Btirgerkriegserfolg unserer Gegner ist von 
heute ab unmoglich, denn aIle gewaltanbetenden oder 
kriegsltisternen Gegner der Demokratie sehen heute unsere 
256 
Macht, und S1e werden sich htiten, loszuschlagen. Die 
Republik ist nicht wehrlos. [412] (23 February 1931) 
Inevitably, then, it was as a focus for this type of rhetoric 
that the 'Iron Front' manifested itself in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung; whatever the actuality of the 'Iron Front' as a 
vehicle of political mobilisation, it functioned in the newspaper 
as a means of propagandistic assertion of the SPD's resistance to 
National Socialism's aggression, a literary and symbolic 
declaration of the impossibility of Nazi success and the 
immovability of organised labour. The Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
'Iron Front' material gives the impression of being a conscious 
attempt to create an urgency and a momentum, to foster a sense of 
the labour movement's potential to defeat Nazi violence [413]; and 
an attempt also to infuse a sense of this potential into its 
readership. It was built around concepts such as the force, the 
power, the extent and the iron will of Social Democracy - and the 
'Iron Front' itself was constantly presented as an ever-growing 
army ready for action, ready for the coming struggle, ready to move 
into the attack. The vocabulary deployed exuded confidence and 
certainty, again making ready use of the language of the 
battlefield and a language of attack, and a similarly suggestive 
symbolism was used, such as that of the worker with his fist 
upraised [414]. All of this combined gave forth a message which, 
in its general sweep, must have appeared unambiguous - a message 
about the SPD's refusal to be intimidated and its determination to 
match force with force. 
It would of course be unacceptable to dismiss this rhetoric, 
257 
this attempt to construct an lmage of iron readiness to fight, as 
no more than hollow bombast, from a position of retrospective 
historical knowledge. The fact that there was no mass resistance 
to National Socialism in 1933, that rhetoric did not become 
reality, does not invalidate its potency as propaganda, and it is 
certainly not being implied here that its use was the consequence 
of anything other than a genulne belief ln the steadfast qualities 
of the SPD's support. However, the alr of unreality which often 
surrounds the Schwabische Volkszeitung's aggressive rhetoric, its 
gestural and forced nature, is not simply imparted by a knowledge 
of future events: the rhetoric itself evidences the unease which 
underlay the SPD's confident declamations, and elucidates the real 
dilemma the party faced whenever it attempted to confront the 
possibility of using physical force as a political weapon. 
Although this strain of propaganda represented an attempt to 
simplify a complex situation, to reduce it to the need to fight 
back against Nazism, although it certainly served an important 
internal function in bolstering Social Democratic self-belief, it 
never in fact freed itself from ambiguity. Ostensibly, the 
cumulative effect of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's rhetoric of 
defiance was potentially incendiary - its tone and language and its 
repetitive use within a context in which an image of Nazis as 
bestial thugs had been deliberately constructed, seemed designed to 
provoke a willingness to resort to the use of force if necessary. 
A closer examination of the meaning behind this rhetoric, however, 
of the actual action being proposed, yields something far less 
clear, something shifting and ambivalent. At times the possibility 
of physical resistance in extreme circumstances is baldly stated, 
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as the declaration by Horsing quoted above demonstrates; at others, 
as will be shown in a moment, it is seemingly made clear that 
resistance will be limited to the intellectual or spiritual, that a 
propaganda struggle for the minds of the misled will suffice. More 
often though the precise nature of the struggle is left vague: 
violent images are conjured up, the use of physical force as a last 
resort is never ruled out, but in exactly which circumstances and 
how such force might be deployed is never specified. This sense of 
vagueness and uncertainty about how rhetoric related to action was 
present from the first in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's responses 
to Nazi violence; and it was again systematised in the material 
relating to the Iron Front, the ambiguity of which mirrored the 
ambiguous position of the Iron Front as an organisation, hovering, 
as it did, between propaganda and quasi-military functions [415]. 
Ambiguity, though, was the inevitable consequence of the SPD's 
struggle to reconcile the need to consider using force with a 
characterisation of the Nazi enemy which placed its casual use of 
violence at the forefront of its evil. 
The limitations on the SPD's ability to accept the use of 
force, even defensively, as a valid political weapon were certainly 
considerable - in the course of the party's development, strong 
intellectual barriers against such a possibility had been created. 
One such barrier was the party's essential legalism - it was often 
stated that any Social Democratic action against Nazism would not 
be autonomous, that it could only take place in the context of a 
wider 'legal' offensive by the state against the NSDAP. The 
passage of rhetorical defiance quoted above from a February 1931 
front page article, for example, was immediately followed by this 
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statement: 
Wir stehen bereit jedem Ruf der legalen Staatsgewalt zu 
folgen als Helfer der legalen Machtmittel des Staates.[416] 
(23 February 1931) 
The SPD could not both defend the system and simultaneously demand 
activity that would transgress the system's structure of legality, 
could not easily castigate the NSDAP for its disregard of the force 
of law whilst seriously considering the use of extra-legal tactics, 
even if only in the most extreme of circumstances - this was to be, 
of course, one of the main dilemmas that the SPD faced in the 
aftermath of the Nazi seizure of power. 
The intellectual constraints on the SPD with regard to the use 
of force were, however, less often clearly explicated than revealed 
1n the confusions of the Party's rhetoric of assertion, and most 
obviously 1n the contrast between the violence of the language used 
and what it appears to imply, and the reality of what 1S being 
proposed if, that 1S, any clear goal is discernible. Although a 
certain vagueness had been characteristic of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's reactions to Nazi violence from the first - the day 
on which the Nazis would pay for their acts of brutality was always 
said to be near, what exactly would occur on that day was never 
specified - it was really when the SPD felt called upon to mount 
its more strident counter-offensive against National Socialism that 
the inherent contradiction between rhetoric and reality was 
crystallised, and it became ever more clear that the language of 
assertion and aggression employed was overstated when placed in the 
context of the actual possibilities for action. Beneath the 
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torrent of provocative words which accompanied the establishment of 
the Iron Front lay what was basically no more than a propaganda 
struggle for the minds of the misled, a form of intellectual 
resistance to Nazism. While, as has been demonstrated, the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's articles on the Iron Front were free ln 
their use of militaristic, pugnaclOus rhetoric, the reality of what 
was being described in those articles was rather more mundane -
that is, a mobilisation of support through organisation and 
propaganda, in particular through the holding of meetings. The 
potential for the use of physical force as a tactic seemingly 
inherent in the language is in fact delusory - indeed, one of the 
most striking aspects of the Iron Front material is how often the 
need is felt to distance the organisation from its rhetoric, to 
state that, despite appearances, the Iron Front was not an army, 
but rather an organisation whose tasks were located in the 
intellectual sphere, in the area of 'Aufklarungsarbeit'. Thus the 
Iron Front was frequently described in terms which made it appear 
to be primarily a spiritual front of some kind. An article 
published in February 1932, for example, stressed the importance of 
'geistige Macht' to the success of the Iron Front and located its 
main strength ln the intellectual and spiritual superiority of its 
supporters: 
Die gro~te Starke der Eisernen Front gegen den Faschismus 
ist die geistige Klarheit ihrer Anhanger tiber das, worum es 
geht. Der geballte eiserne Abwehrwille gegen aIle 
putschistischen Bestrebungen ruht auf der Erkenntnis der 
gro~en gesellschaftlichen und politischen Grundtatsachen 
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der letzten Zeit. Er erweckt aus elnem gltihenden 
idealistischen Willen zur Freiheit die Eiserne Front: Das 
ist geistige Geschlossenheit gegentiber dem Heer der 
Mitlaufer des Faschismus, gegentiber der Vielheit der 
spie~btirgerlichen Bestrebungen ... [417] (4 February 1932) 
This was the type of conceptualisation of the Iron Front with which 
the SPD was most comfortable. The logic of its own rhetoric might 
have taken the party in a different direction, but vague 
assumptions about the superior 'will' of Social Democrats were 
preferable to any more concrete definition of what form the SPD's 
resistance to Nazism would or might take. This was in fact 
inevitable: an avoidance of violence, a pride in the ability to 
achieve advances without its use, the condemnation of Nazism for 
its brutality, a belief in the primary of the intellect in 
political struggle - these were some of the SPD's deepest 
convictions: 
Wir brauchen nicht die rohe Gewalt. Wir sind tiberzeugt, 
da~ die Ideen weit starker sind als aIle Mittel des Zwanges 
und der Brutalitat! Gerade im Kampfe der Geister - und das 
solI der politische Kampf sein - entscheidet nicht das 
Rtistzeug der Barbaren, sondern Kraft der Uberzeugung und 
des Geistes! [418] (6 April 1932) 
This is why, even in the process of stating that the SPD would be 
willing to meet force with force, the party's pride in the fact 
that for it, unlike its opponents, this could only be the last 
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resort, is undisguised. Thus, for example, a front page article 
from June 1932 which was militant in its rhetoric, more explicit 1n 
its promise to respond to Nazi violence in kind than was usually 
the case, nevertheless simultaneously emphasised the alien nature 
of such rhetoric to the SPD, how conscious the party was that the 
use of force would involve a break with its traditions and 
self-image: 
Die emporgereckten Fauste der Millionen sind Treugelobnis: 
S1e sind der Jugend, den Mannern und Frauen der Eisernen 
Front zugleich Kampfansage an den politischen Gegner. Er 
mag wissen, da~ die Eiserne Front den politischen Kampf 
mit geistigen Waffen ftihrt, da~ aber die Faust der Eisernen 
Front ebenso entschlossen ist, gewalttatige Angriffe 
abzuwehren. Die Organisationen der Eisernen Front haben in 
jahrzehntelangen Kampfen gezeigt, da~ S1e ohne jede 
Gewalttat politisch streiten und kampfen konnen. Der 
niedertrachtige Gegner hat die rohe Gewalt auf die Stra~en 
und Platze, in die Versammlungen, ja in die Wohnungen und 
Organisationshauser getragen! Dieser rohen Gewalt setzen 
wir notigenfalls die Gewalt entgegen. [419J (24 June 1932) 
Political morality, political virtue is located in the intellectual 
sphere; the use of force is contemplated as a possible evil 
necessity, but it can hardly be stated with certainty that this 
contemplation was anything but rhetorical. Indeed, everything 
suggests that the SPD's instinctive distrust of political violence 
could not have been overcome in any circumstances - or at least in 
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any circumstances in which the party would have remained 
recognisable as the SPD which had functioned in the Weimar 
Republic. 
Thus, ln the struggle between rhetorical aggression and 
inherent caution which was played out in the pages of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, caution would always be victorious, even 
in moments of great crisis for the SPD. The truth of this would 
become apparent after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 
1933, as will be shown later; but to an extent the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's response to that event merely replayed its reactions 
to Papen's coup against Prussia six months earlier [420J. In its 
attempt to deal with this severe blow to its self-esteem, all of 
those traits of the SPD's self-image that have just been examined, 
all of those characteristics which the party considered raised it 
above the level of its opponents and constituted political virtue, 
came to the fore, as the SPD, clearly in fear of any rank-and-file 
spontaneous action, tried to calm the passions of its supporters. 
The stress was, as the following illustrates, on discipline, on the 
importance of not being provoked into rash action, and on the 
reliance on the legal path, most obviously on the forthcoming 
election, to display Social Democratic anger: 
Der Kampf urn die Wiederherstellung geordneter 
Rechtszustande in der deutschen Republik ist zunachst mit 
aller Kraft als Wahlkampf zu ftihren. Es liegt beim 
deutschen Volke, durch seinen Machtspruche am 31. Juli dem 
gegenwartigen Zustand ein Ende zu bereiten, der durch das 
Zusammenwirken mit der Nationalsozialistischen Partei 
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entstanden ist. Die Organisationen sind ln hochste 
Kampfbereitschaft zu bringen. Strengste Disziplin ist mehr 
denn je geboten. Wilden Parolen von unbefugter Seite ist 
Widerstand zu leisten. Jetzt vor allem mit konzentrischer 
Kraft fUr den Sieg der Sozialdemokratie am 31. Juli. [421J 
(21 July 1932) 
Another article, again published the day after the deposition 
of the Prussian government, emphasised the need for 'level-
headedness' (Besonnenheit), despite the great agitation it claimed 
Papen's action had created amongst Germany's proletariat, white-
collar workers and civil servants. It further pointed out that 
legally the situation in Prussia had yet to be decided, for an 
appeal had been launched in Germany's constitutional court; and the 
declaration ended, inevitably, with a call for the maintenance of 
the workers' 'exemplary' discipline [422J. In contrast to such 
discipline, the KPD's adventurism in calling for a general strike 
was rejected and condemned: 
Die kommunistischen FUhrer, die seit Jahren Schulter an 
Schulter mit den Nationalsozialisten den Kampf gegen 
Braun und Severing gefUhrt ... rufen jetzt wegen der 
Absetzung von Braun und Severing zum Generalstreik auf! 
Die deutsche Arbeiterklasse wird sich die Wahl ihrer Mittel 
und die Stunde ihres Handelns nicht von den Bundesgenossen 
der Nationalsozialisten im Kampfe gegen Braun und Severing 
vorschreiben lassen. Es gilt jetzt in voller Aktivitat, 
Disziplin und Einigkeit aIle Krafte fUr den Wahlkampf und 
den Sieg der Sozialdemokratie zusammenzufassen. [423] 
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(22 July 1932) 
The fact that the KPD was identified with a politics of foolhardy 
action was a further impediment to the SPD itself ever using 
supposedly extreme measures such as the general strike - for, just 
as the association of National Socialism with violence and 
brutality made it more difficult for the SPD to contemplate the use 
of force and thus a descent to the same moral level as the NSDAP, 
so the adoption of radical tactics previously championed by the KPD 
would have entailed a retreat from years of condemning such 
tactics. The greatest impediment however was the SPD's inherent 
belief in caution and legalism. Despite the previous fighting talk 
and passionate declamations, and despite the central importance of 
Prussia to Social Democracy, it was yet the necessity for 
restraint, the need to refrain from action, except for that 
connected with the July election, that was underlined in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung after Papen's coup. As was also the case 
whenever the rhetoric of aggresslon was deployed, the language used 
and the virtues lauded demonstrated the determining influence of 
the SPD's image of itself as the disciplined, law-abiding defenders 
of a state which was under threat from forces which possessed none 
of these qualities. They also demonstrated, however, that, as the 
ground decisively shifted from under the SPD, this self-image would 
ensure that the party's political options would be limited and its 
freedom of manoeuvre restricted. 
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CHAPTER 8 : The KPD in the Schwabische Volkszeitung: parallels and 
contrasts with National Socialism. 
The only political target attacked in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung with a similar degree of fervour and consistency as 
National Socialism in the later Weimar period was the KPD. A brief 
consideration of the newspaper's approach in this regard is 
appropriate in the context of this study, firstly because the KPD 
and NSDAP were often paralleled in the pages of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, and any examples of or allegations about co-operation 
and inter-connections between the two parties seized upon and 
emphasised; and secondly because the contrasts and similarities 
between the SPD's analyses of its two ideological foes are 
extremely revealing. 
That anti-KPD polemics were a staple of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's output for the whole of the Weimar era is entirely 
unsurprising, not only because of the general enmity that existed 
between the SPD and KPD on a nationwide scale, but also because of 
the depth of bitterness that the events of 1919 ln Augsburg had 
created between Communists and Social Democrats there - the gulf 
thus created was without doubt unbridgeable, certainly as far as 
the respective local leaderships were concerned. Indeed, as was 
mentioned in the introduction, it has been suggested that even ln 
mid-1932 the KPD was still regarded as a bigger threat by the SPD's 
leadership in Augsburg than the NSDAP, which continued to be seen 
as a transitory phenomenon [424J. The Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
anti-KPD propaganda was consistent and unrelenting, and represented 
one of the unchanging ideological determinants of Social Democracy 
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in the Weimar era. Whereas interest in the far-right fluctuated 
throughout the period according to the changing perceptions of the 
threat it posed, polemics against the KPD were unremitting - their 
frequency and intensity merely increased in the early 1930s as the 
KPD began to pose, from the left, a danger to the SPD equal to that 
posed by Nazism from the right. The nature of the SPD's propaganda 
in this area need be sketched only briefly; its content and tone 
were predictable enough [425J: attacks on the Soviet Union as a 
symbol of Communism, stressing the poor economic and living 
conditions of the working class there, the lack of political 
freedoms and so on; on the extent to which the KPD was under the 
control of Moscow; on the KPD's involvement in violence; on the 
insincerity of the KPD's 'united front' policy; on the activities 
of the RGO - all of this was commonplace in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, along with more general condemnations of the KPD's 
betrayal of the German working class by dividing it, and specific 
disputes with Augsburg's local Communists. And the contrast that 
most obviously suggests itself between this material and the 
newspaper's anti-Nazi propaganda is the more fixed and established 
nature of the former: the Schwabische Volkszeitung's approach to 
the KPD was unchanging and repetitive throughout the period of 
Nazism's rise, constantly levelling the same charges, hurling the 
same invective at the KPD, with only minor alterations required to 
incorporate the Communists' latest tactical manoeuvrings. The 
treatment of Nazism, however, especially in its initial stages, 
reveals far more of an attempt to come to terms with that which was 
new and not yet fully understood - indeed, it has been suggested 
above that National Socialism was peculiarly difficult for the SPD 
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to analyse because of the way it blurred traditional ideological 
and class boundaries, and the party's responses to this have been 
examined. The KPD, of course, presented no such difficulty for the 
SPD. 
Arguably, though, in its absorption of Nazism into its 
pre-existent world-view, the SPD pushed its analysis of National 
Socialism to the same position as its 'analysis' of Communism -
that 1S, as has been demonstrated, the interpretation of Nazism 
that the Schwabische Volkszeitung reveals rapidly becomes frozen, 
becomes a polemic reflecting the Social Democratic mind-set rather 
than political reality; in short, precisely the impression of 
unthinking ritual abuse, of ideologically predicated propaganda 
that the material on the KPD glves. There are, moreover, 
interesting similarities of interpretative and propaganda 
techniques in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's approaches to the two 
movements - similarities which at least open up the possibility 
that the newspaper's engagement with National Socialism was in part 
shaped or influenced by the propaganda methods and themes forged 1n 
its longer confrontation with the KPD. This may have been to an 
extent unconscious - for example, in the case of the SPD's belief 
that both the NSDAP and KPD were under the control of powerful 
forces working in the background (big business and Soviet Communism 
respectively) and its desire to expose this reality. It would be 
pushing this a little too far to claim it as another instance of 
the Social Democratic mind-set at work - after all, the KPD was 
indeed under the control of Moscow [426]; but it does at least 
suggest that there were modes of thought and propaganda with which 
the SPD felt particularly comfortable and which could be applied to 
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National Socialism as they had been applied to the KPD - and of 
these the most apparent is the SPD's propensity to view its 
political opponents within the framework of a wider conspiracy, a 
conspiracy which was usually perceived as being especially directed 
against the SPD itself. 
There were also, however, explicit parallels drawn between the 
two movements in the Schwabische Volkszeitung - parallels which 
reflected real similarities on a general level between the NSDAP 
and the KPD, but the function of which was more clearly 
propagandistic: the SPD's two main enemies could be simultaneously 
attacked and each further damned by its comparison with the other 
[427]. Thus were Nazism and German Communism analysed at varlOUS 
time$ as embodying common characteristics and aims [428]: both were 
parties of violence; both were believed to be targeting the SPD's 
constituency; both evinced a deep-seated hatred of both the SPD and 
the Weimar Republic; both were striving to create a dictatorship; 
and both espoused a 'false' socialism. The Schwabische 
Volkszeitung attempted, moreover, to strengthen the idea that there 
existed a basic 'inner affinity' between the KPD and NSDAP by 
highlighting any instances of co-operation between the two parties 
[429] - mainly parliamentary co-operation - and by frequently 
alleging that there was a fluidity of voters and members between 
them [430]. It would be unWlse to read too much into this; 
certainly the distilling of the KPD and NSDAP into a few easily 
comparable negative characteristics was superficial, but this 
propaganda ploy never obscured the very real differences between 
the two parties. Nevertheless, it was possibly helpful to the SPD 
to feel that both Nazism and Communism could be attacked on the 
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same grounds - especially National Socialism, perhaps, seemed to 
become more explicable from this perspective. 
Even more helpful to the SPD, however, was the role of 
scapegoat for the success of National Socialism that the KPD came 
to play in its analysis and propaganda - the role of 
'SteigbUgelhalter' for Nazism [431]. The rise of National 
Socialism furnished Social Democracy with a new context within 
which to attack the KPD, an attack which grew in intensity as the 
NSDAP's momentum increased. Particularly in 1932, the accusation 
that the primary responsibility for Nazi success lay with the 
political behaviour of the Communists is repeatedly made, although 
this was only the culmination of an earlier trend. In both its 
nature and tone, and in its repetitive use, the manifestation of 
this accusation in the Schwabische Volkszeitung was entirely 
predictable [432]: the KPD, despite its radical rhetoric, was, ln 
its objective role, a reactionary party; its agitation against the 
SPD and the free trade union movement aided capitalism in general 
and the NSDAP especially. Such themes received extra emphasis in 
moments of crisis - during the presidential election of 1932, for 
instance, one of the SPD's responses to its discomfiture over its 
support for Hindenburg was constantly to condemn the KPD's decision 
to put forward Thalmann as a candidate, its attitude encapsulated 
ln the oft-used slogan: 'Wer Thalmann wahlt, wahlt Hitler' [433]. 
In such ways the KPD became one of the SPD's stock explanations for 
the continuing success of the NSDAP - this was, for example, the 
implied answer to a question that the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
asked itself in March 1932: 
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Warurn war es moglich, da~ eln Mann Wle Hitler In 
Deutschland eingebUrgert werden konnte? Weil die 
Arbeiterschaft zum Teil in falschen Fronten steht und In 
volliger Verkennung der Sachlage. [434] (3 March 1932) 
And a month later, after describing the extent of reaction's grlp 
on Germany, an article in the newspaper continued: 
Nationalsozialismus ist elne betrUbliche Erscheinung in der 
deutschen Republik. Es brauchte aber keine Gefahr zu seln, 
wenn nicht jetzt und immerda dem Nationalsozialismus 
Hilfestellung geleistet wurde durch die Kommunisten. 
Und es ist das gro~te Verbrechen der Kommunisten an der 
Arbeiterschaft Deutschlands und nicht nur Deutschlands, da~ 
sie die HUter und Forderer und die StUtze der Reaktion 
sind. [435] (22 April 1932) 
But the existence of the enemy on the left was not just a 
convenient explanation for the NSDAP's irrational progress, it was 
also an excuse, another means of escaping the need for 
self-criticism, a justification, for example, for the lack of 
decisive action in the aftermath of Papen's coup against Prussia: 
Wenn Wlr wichtige, sehr wichtige Positionen preisgeben 
mu~ten, ich erlnnere an Preu~en, wenn wir nicht vollkommen 
gewachsen waren all den hinterlistigen Anschlagen, dann 
ist die Ursache in fehlenden Bataillonen zu sehen, die sich 
aber seit Jahren abtreiben lie~en durch den 
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Linksradikalismus der Kommunisten. Durch die Uneinigkeit 
der Arbeiterklasse war es moglich, da~ eln Leutnant mit 
einigen Mann es wagen konnte, Genossen Wle Grzesinski, 
Braun und Severing aus ihren Amtern zu holen. Der Genosse 
Otto Bauer, der FUhrer der osterreichischen 
Sozialdemokratie, konnte kUrzlich mit Stolz darauf 
hinweisen, da~ es in Wien unmoglich ware, da~ eln Leutnant 
und einige Mann einen der verdienten Genossen aus dem 
Wiener Rathaus holen, denn eine derartige Aktion stie~e 
auf die Abwehr des gesamten Proletariats. Bei uns ist 
diese Abwehr leider nicht moglich durch die 
Zerstorungstaktik von links. [436J (20 December 1932) 
The existence of the KPD and its tactics had systematically 
undermined the influence of the SPD and thus weakened the working 
class: 
Der von ihr mit allen Mitteln der LUge und der 
Verleumdung geschUrte Bruderkampf im sozialistischen 
Proletariat ist die tiefste Ursache fUr die Schwachung 
der Arbeiterklasse und den gefahrlichen Machtzuwachs 
ihrer unerbittlichen Feinde. [437J (6 December 1932) 
The existence of the KPD was thus inextricably linked with the rlse 
of National Socialism and the resurgence of reaction in Germany, as 
well as with the SPD's inability to prevent this - for the 
concomitant of that existence was the absence of its mythical 
alternative, that is of a united working class under the sole 
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leadership of the SPD. As in so many other aspects of its 
political engagement during the Weimar Republic, it was, here, the 
SPD's self-image - which was in fact the image of the party it 
thought it should be rather than the party it actually was - and 
not the reality of its own flawed political behaviour which 
determined its interpretation of events. 
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CHAPTER 9 : The NSDAP ln Augsburg: the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
treatment of Nazism in the local context. 
Most of the material on Nazism ln the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
presented it in a general way, as a political phenomenon exercising 
influence throughout Germany and which, thus, had to be analysed in 
accordance with this. However, the NSDAP was also a very real and 
a very disruptive political and social presence in Augsburg itself 
and the Schwabische Volkszeitung could not but reflect this. 
Unsurprisingly, this local aspect of the newspaper's 
engagement with Nazism largely paralleled the more general 
interpretation - local National Socialist activity was placed 
within the same rhetorical and analytical matrix which underpinned 
the latter. National Socialism in the local arena as depicted in 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung confirmed, although no doubt it also 
partly shaped, the broader analysis, it was presented in terms of 
the same essential characteristics using the same language, and 
subject to the same emphases and perspectives. For this reason, it 
would be repetitious to examine in any detail the similarities 
between the local and the more general portrayal of Nazism in the 
newspaper. The NSDAP in Augsburg was, for example, characterised 
as the party which had introduced violence into the town's 
political scene, just as it had done throughout Germany as a whole, 
violence aimed directly at Augsburg's labour movement, and ln 
reaction to which the Schwabische Volkszeitung resorted to a 
locally- specific version of that rhetoric of discipline and of the 
SPD's refusal to be needlessly provoked, combined with assertions 
of the party's ultimate willingness to defend itself and its 
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achievements which was examined above [438J. Similarly, the SPD's 
perception that the struggle with National Socialism was 
essentially a struggle for the working-class constituency informed 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung's coverage of local events just as 
strongly as those on the national level; thus, the newspaper 
displayed in the former the persistent desire to discredit the 
'socialism' of the local NSDAP and thus to undermine its 
credibility amongst Augsburg's working class. The supposed lack of 
working-class support for Nazism in Augsburg, the absence of 
workers amongst Augsburg's Nazi leadership, the NSDAP's support 
from local factory owners well-known for their poor treatment of 
their employees, the lack of socialist measures in the party's 
proposed communal programme [439J - these were the types of 
approach deployed on a daily basis to expose the sham of Nazi 
'socialism' and, again, this 1S an area that has been fully 
analysed in a previous section. Augsburg's National Socialist 
voters, just like all Nazi voters and followers were conceptualised 
as the blind, the sick, the misled and the seduced, the 
anti-rational who could only be cured or enlightened by the SPD -
the vocabulary and the ideas it encompassed remained the same, 
whatever the focus [440J. And the technique of contrasting 
rhetoric and reality was also consistent, that desire to 
demonstrate the failure of local Nazis to live up to their 
propaganda (especially with regard to anti-semitism) [441J. In 
short: the full range of attitudes and approaches which the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung displayed in its attempt to comprehend 
Nazism, and to reduce its threat unsurprisingly found an 
application 1n the coverage of local Nazi activity. What must be 
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considered, however, 1S the reception of such locally-based 
material amongst the newspaper's readership - the immediacy and 
impact gained by the use of events and examples drawn from that 
readership's community should not be underestimated. Of course, 
this 1S not a complex point, but it is an important one because, as 
will be discussed in a moment, the differences between the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's Augsburg-specific material and its 
general coverage of Nazism were differences of tone, rather than of 
ideas, perspectives or interpretation. 
This is not to say that no such differences existed; for, even 
though Augsburg was in many ways a typical town of the Weimar era 
in Germany, the progress National Socialism made in the town 
inevitably ran its individual course which found a reflection 1n 
the distinctive emphases of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's coverage 
of that progress. There was, for example, far less attention paid 
to the activities of the NSDAP in Augsburg before 1930 than to 
Nazism in the wider sense; in comparison to the frequency with 
which Nazism as a general phenomenon appeared in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, it appears almost under-represented in its local 
manifestations in these early years of the Nazi resurgence, and 
even to an extent in the early thirties. This was, no doubt, one 
consequence of the relative difficulty that the NSDAP had in making 
significantly rapid headway 1n Augsburg, faced as it was with two 
fairly solid blocks of support - i.e. the Social Democratic and the 
Catholic - in opposition to it. The relative nature of this 
difficulty needs to be stressed again here, but there were definite 
limits to the NSDAP's potential for growth in Augsburg, and one 
result of this was that Nazism as a national movement was possibly 
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seen to provide more scope and more interest than local Nazi 
activities. And to this was perhaps added a reluctance to admit 
that Augsburg, the status of which as a 'workers' city' the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung was always ready to eulogise, could 
seriously be under threat from National Socialism - it was far 
easier to locate that threat in the wider arena, whilst, as will be 
seen ln a moment, treating Augsburg's local Nazi contingent with 
the type of sardonic contempt which suggested that they could not 
be taken seriously. 
The perception of Augsburg as an 'Arbeiterstadt' also informed 
another particularity of the analysis of Nazism in Augsburg, that 
is the consistent characterisation of the local NSDAP as a party of 
the middle class. Far more than when discussing the class basis of 
the party as a whole, this aspect of its depiction in the local 
context gives less of an impression of knee-jerk prejudice, both 
because it accords well with Augsburg's socio-political structure, 
and because, as a depiction, it demonstrates the certainty and lack 
of ambiguity which so often eludes the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
approach to this topic elsewhere [442]. It would, of course, be 
unwise to view this as entirely straightforward. Although the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung evidences little, beyond the application 
of the customary caricatures, of the tortuous engagement with the 
idea of the working-class Nazi with regard to Augsburg's Nazi 
following that it displays in general, this cannot be taken to 
imply that there were no working-class Nazis in Augsburg or that 
the SPD was less anXlOUS about the Nazi challenge for the working-
class constituency in the town than elsewhere. On the contrary, 
although outwardly confident about the stability of its support, 
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the labour movement in Augsburg had, as has been shown, real 
historical reasons for fearing the ability of the right to gain 
ground within the working class. In this light, the portrayal of 
the NSDAP as overwhelmingly the party of Augsburg's middle class, 
although fundamentally accurate, was also a deliberate 
over-statement designed to reinforce a distinct image of the NSDAP 
in the town, to reassert the belief in the loyalty of the working 
class to the SPD, and to reassure the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
readership about the validity of that belief. 
In the local context, then, the job of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung was almost wholly propagandistic - there was no 
attempt to analyse Augsburg's NSDAP in ideological terms, no sense, 
indeed, of any conception that the party at the local level need be 
subject to any serlOUS analysis. Rather, the policies and practice 
of Nazism in Augsburg were regarded as an extension of those of 
Nazism as a whole, and thus the task the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
clearly set itself was not to analyse the local party 
intellectually, but to undermine its credibility in the minds of 
its readership. This is why it is a difference in tone rather than 
interpretation which distinguishes the newspaper's local engagement 
with Nazism; the targeting of events and individuals within the 
local community produced a markedly different style of polemic from 
that employed elsewhere [443]. The presentation of Augsburg's Nazi 
party as politically amateurish and contemptibly fractious and 
corrupt was achieved above all by personalised attacks on the 
party's maln figures, in particular on its leader, Karl Wahl, who 
was depicted in the Schwabische Volkszeitung as incompetent, venal 
and immoral. Local knowledge of a figure such as Wahl imparted an 
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edge to this material unlike that of similar character 
assassinations of leading Nazis on the national scene, the sphere 
of reference was different, the undermining of the image or 
reputation of an individual seemed almost more important than of 
the political ideas he represented. In the early years of renewed 
Nazi activity in Augsburg, moreover, much of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's coverage was imbued with a mocking tone, a tone 
which was never quite lost when dealing with local Nazi figures; 
there would always be present the sense that National Socialism's 
pretensions and ambitions, especially the stated aim of 
'conquering' Augsburg for Nazism, were laughably ridiculous if they 
were to be achieved by men of such low spiritual and intellectual 
quality, driven by personal ambition rather than political ideals. 
It was always with great glee that the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
reported any apparent failure by a local Nazi to live up to the 
party's stated principles, and any such failure could be woven into 
the mythology of the Augsburg NSDAP and referred to time and again. 
The idea of National Socialists as the 'renewers' of Germany was 
made to appear particularly risible glven that, according to the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, the local party was ln a state of 
intermittent flux, riven by discontents precipitated both by 
personality clashes and clashes which were interpreted as 
essentially class based, with Wahl emerging as the champion of the 
middle class, ensuring that the working-class influence on the Nazi 
party in Augsburg was kept to a minimum. 
This last point is a further reminder of the wider imperatives 
at work behind the Schwabische Volkszeitung's engagement with local 
Nazism, of the consistently pursued purpose which the use of a more 
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knowing tone did not alter. The newspaper's sharp consciousness of 
its purpose in relation to National Socialism, its self-perception 
as a propaganda weapon, has been mentioned previously; in the local 
context this conSClousness, and the sense that it was extremely 
effective as a counter-weight to Nazi propaganda could only have 
been strengthened as the Schwabische Volkszeitung became, as early 
as 1928 [444J, the recipient of threats of retribution from 
Augsburg's NSDAP for the type of coverage the party was receiving 
in the newspaper. In the years to follow, the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung was to find itself ever more frequently a focus for 
political confrontation; and its role in such confrontation was by 
no means a paSSlve one - as well as reporting on it and even 
condemning it, the newspaper also purposely embroiled itself ln the 
newly heightened, aggresslve political climate that National 
Socialism had introduced to Augsburg. The articles on the theory 
and practice of Augsburg's National Socialists that have been 
frequently cited in this chapter are a good illustration of this 
involvement, for, as they appeared in the Schwabische Volkszeitung, 
they were accompanied by a commentary on the reactions they had 
provoked among Augsburg's Nazi following - reactions claimed to 
include a widespread sense of disillusionment, accusations about 
the integrity of the newspaper's material, and, more typically, 
threats of, and actual acts of violence in retribution: 
An die Stelle klarer, sachlicher Feststellungen zu unseren 
bisherigen Veroffentlichungen haben die verantwortlichen 
Leute der hiesigen NSDAP wilde Drohungen gesetzt ... Wo der 
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Geist ausla~t, greifen sie zum KnUppel und zum Messer. 
[445J (22 July 1930) 
Against this background, it is entirely unsurprising that the 
foundation of a Nazi newspaper, the Neue Nationalzeitung, 1n 1931 
and consequent heightening of the propaganda war between the SPD 
and the NSDAP in Augsburg, served only to reinforce the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's consciousness of its vital role: 
Der neuen Zeitung der Nationalsozialisten ist durch 
Verdoppelung unserer Propagandatatigkeit fUr die 
Parteipresse zu begegnen. Die 'Schwabische Volkszeitung' , 
die in diesem Jahr auf ihr 30-jahriges Bestehen 
zurUckblickt, ist die beste Waffe im Kampfe der 
schwabischen Arbeiterschaft urn die Erhaltung und der Ausbau 
der Republik. [446J (2 March 1931) 
The confrontations between the Schwabische Volkszeitung and the 
Neue Nationalzeitung were bitter and, as polemicising against the 
Nazi newspaper become one of the SPD's main means of attacking 
National Socialism in Augsburg, throwing of charge and counter-
charge, impassioned invective and simple abuse between the two 
newspapers became a daily occurrence. The actual battlegrounds 
upon which the clashes took place varied widely, and included, for 
example, the Schwabische Volkszeitung accusing the Neue 
Nationalzeitung of hypocrisy in employing the services of a Jewish 
lawyer [447J, a dispute over the details of Hitler's war record 
[448J, Social Democratic anger over the supposed attempts of the 
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Nazi newspaper to intimidate local civil servants [449J, and the 
frequent condemnation by the Schwabische Volkszeitung of the Neue 
Nationalzeitung's sins of omission, of its failure, for instance, 
to give adequate coverage to the Papen cabinet's emergency decrees: 
... Der Inhalt der Notverordnung ist bekannt, die gesamte 
Presse hat sie im Wortlaute veroffentlicht - eine 
'rtihmliche' Ausnahme aber macht die Nazi-Presse; sie 
schweigt sich tiber diese Hitler tolerierte Notverordnung 
aus! 
Und das hat uns Veranlassung gegeben, die Augsburger 
Nazi-Zeitung zu studieren, was sie dem Pg-Arbeitslosen, dem 
Pg-Sozialrentner und dem Pg-Kriegsbeschadigten von der 
ftinften Notverordnung, die aIle frtiheren Notverordnungen an 
Lasten ftir die arms ten Schichten unserer Bevolkerung 
tibertrifft, zu sagen wei~. Wir haben nach der 
Notverordnung in der Augsburger Nazi-Zeitung gesucht und 
haben - nichts gefunden! Kein Wort tiber ihren Inhalt, nur 
ein paar vage und heuchlerische Satze, die eine 'Kritik' 
dieses von Hitler tolerierten reaktionaren Aderlasses an 
der schaffenden und darbenden Bevolkerung darstellen solI. 
So gemein und so demagogisch kann nur die National 
Sozialistische Deutsche 'Arbeiter' - partei sein. [450J 
(20 June 1932) 
As this last might suggest, within the range of issues over which 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung became involved 1n a war of words with 
the Neue Nationalzeitung, there was one constant - a condemnation 
of the perceived damage that the newspaper, as Augsburg's main 
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carrler of the Nazi message, was doing to the town's political 
discourse, of the baseness of its propaganda, of its use of 
unscrupulous methods, of its mendacity, and of its promotion of 
violence and terror. And, unsurprisingly, what most enraged the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung was the application of these methods to 
the SPD itself - whether to the policies of the party in general 
[451] or to the activities of the local SPD In particular. The 
reaction to Neue Nationalzeitung's claims that Augsburg's Iron 
Front was making active preparations for a civil war, for example, 
was typical: 
Heute sei allgemein gesagt: Die Zeitung, die seit Monaten 
taglich mit mehr oder weniger versteckten Drohungen gegen 
die Sozialdemokratie operiert, hat kein Recht, von 
Btirgerkriegsvorbereitungen der anderen Seite zu sprechen . 
... Sie spotten tiber die Hammerschaften der Augsburger 
Eisernen Front (nennen sie Wellblechfront usw.) und - rufen 
gleichzeitig nach der Polizei! Hilfe, Hilfe!: Die Roten 
machen Btirgerkrieg! Wie einfaltig, wie lacherlich und wie 
widerspruchsvoll ist diese Haltung. [452] (10 March 1932) 
And the Nazi newspaper's report, in the midst of the campalgn for 
the November 1932 Reichstag election, that the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung had cut its workers' wages, produced another 
condemnation of the newspaper's methods: 
Die 'Neue Nationalzeitung' brachte in ihrer Nummer 221 
unter dem Titel 'Palastrevolution bei der Schwabischen' 
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Auslassungen, die den Tatsachen nicht entsprechen . 
... 1m Laufe des Wahlkampfes werden ja noch mehrere 
LUgenbomben der Nationalzeitung platzen. Wie verzweifelt 
mu~ doch die politische Situation der Nationalsozialisten 
geworden sein, wenn sie jetzt in Kampf gegen die Marxisten 
zu solch plumpen Mitteln greifen. [453J (1 October 1932) 
There was indeed a sense of steadily accumulating frustration 
evidenced in the Schwabische Volkszeitung as it sought to combat 
the distortions and falsehoods of the Neue Nationalzeitung. It 
can, of course, hardly be asserted that the former did not itself 
publish some dubious material at this time; but the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's constant focus on the immorality and duplicity of 
the Neue Nationalzeitung was entirely consistent with the SPD's 
self-perception of the moral gulf that separated it from the NSDAP. 
The Schwabische Volkszeitung's contempt of the Nazi newspaper, 
expressed in high moral tones, led inevitably to reaction and 
counter-reaction, and even on occasion to active political 
mobilisation in protest against it. A useful illustration of this 
is provided by the Schwabische Volkszeitung's response to a 
description 1n the rival newspaper of a recently-held Iron Front 
demonstration: 
Das Augsburger Naziblatt hat es fertig gebracht, von der 
Demonstration am Samstag als von e1nem 'Hauflein 
Zigaretten rauchender Mannlein und Weiblein' zu sprechen. 
Wiederum ein drastisches Beispiel von der Wahrheitsliebe 
jenes Blattes, das vorgibt, fUr Wahrheit zu kampfen. 
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FUrwahr e1n sauberer Kampf. [454] (13 July 1932) 
Two days later the issue was taken up again as, once more quoting 
from the Neue Nationalzeitung's report, the 'Kampfleitung' of the 
Iron Front called, on the Schwabische Volkszeitung's front page, 
for a march in protest: 
In ohnmachtiger Wut beschimpfte die hetzerische 
National-Zeitung 1n Augsburg euch Republikaner! 
Sie schrieb: 
'Der 'Aufmarsch' der Ritter von der Mistgabel. Der mit 
gro~em Geschrei angekUndigte Aufmarsch der Eisernen 
Blechfront, 'Krampfabschnitt Augsburg', am vergangenen 
Samstag war eine heillose Pleite - Wegen des zeitweisen 
Regenwetters fand der Marsch durch die innere Stadt 
nicht allein nicht statt, sondern aus Angst vor der 
grenzenlosen Blamage, die man sich mit diesen einige 
Hundert pfeifen- und zigarettenrauchenden Mannlein ohne 
jede Marschdisziplin und den schafsgeduldig mitlaufenden 
Weiblein geholt hatte!!!' 
Das ist Gemeinheit und LUge! Die Eiserne Front ist durch 
die Wertachvorstadte und Oberhausen marschiert, weil die 
Polizei die innere Stadt fUr den Aufmarsch nicht freigab! 
Und S1e freut sich der Teilnahme der Frauen am Zuge denn 
bei ihr sind die Frauen nicht Menschen zweiter Klasse! Bei 
uns gilt Gleichberechtigung. Wir antworten am Samstag mit 
neuem Aufmarsch in Augsburg! [455] (15 July 1932) 
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And this march, in turn, brought forth a further 'shameful' report 
in the Neue Nationalzeitung, and the inevitable retort in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung: 
Die 'Neue National-Zeitung' in Augsburg hat sich den 'Ruhm' 
gesichert, einen besonders teutschen Stil zu pflegen. Was 
sie sich bisher an rtider und unverschamter Tonart gestattet 
hat, das tibertraf sie mit einer Glosse tiber die 
Demonstration der Eisernen Front in ihrer Montagsausgabe. 
Das Unmogliche ist mogliche geworden: die Gemeinheit hat 
sich selbst tibertroffen. Die Antwort an die Redakteure 
einer 'Arbeiter'-Partei gab Stadtrat Genosse Felder in der 
gestrigen gro~en Kundgebung der Eisernen Front im 
Herrle-Saalbau . 
... Es sollte aber noch besser kommen nach dem Zug am 
Samstag, von dem auch das Btirgertum gestehen mu~te, da~ er 
in gro~ter Disziplin durchgeftihrt wurde von elner 
imponierenden Masse anstandiger Menschen. 
Die Nazi-Zeitung vom Montag hat es fertig gebracht, von 
Zuhaltergestalten in diesem Zug zu sprechen ... 
Zugteilnehmern wurde in diesem Schmahartikel 1m den Mund 
gelegt, da~ sie davon gesprochen hatten, Sle wtirden 
wenigstens irgend ein Fahnentuch als Tischtuch von der 
Demonstration nach Hause bringen. Redakteure einer 
sogenannten Arbeiterpartei schreiben das! Das 
Unerhorteste kam aber dann am Schlu~ und da hie~ es 
wortlich: 
'Die Begeisterung der Frontier' war nicht tiberma~ig. 
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Die Anwesenheit der Polizei und das Bewu~tsein, da~ die 
PlUnderung von Laden, Lebensmitteln usw. unmoglich sei, 
dampften natUrlich die geistige Schwungkraft der 
klassenbewu~ten Marxisten, die sich mit stiller Wehmut 
an die Zeiten erinnerten, da sie von ihren UmzUgen mit 
gefUllten Rucksacken heimkehrten' 
Das ist der Gipfel der Gemeinheit und ich frage Sie: Was 
wollen diese Leute damit in Augsburg. Es ist anscheinend 
so, da~ es den Nazis bisher in Augsburg zu ruhig zugegangen 
ist, da~ sie mit solchen unerhorten VorwUrfen Ma~nahmen der 
Schwergekrankten gegen ihre Zeitung und Partei prOVOZ1eren 
wollen, urn dann heuchlerisch von marxistischen 
Untermenschen zu sprechen, die die Gewalttatigkeiten 
eroffnen. Man mu~ diesen Leuten sagen: 
Es ist eine ungeheuer widerliche Heuchelei, wenn diese 
Leute fUr sich und ihre Presse in Anspruch genommen haben 
sie seien es, die Anstand und Sitte gegen die Presse der 
Marxisten verteidigen mU~ten ... So lange auch hier am Orte 
sich Nazi-FUhrer befinden, die sich bis heute noch nicht 
gereinigt haben von den schweren VorwUrfen, die W1r 
offentlich seit Jahr und Tag gegen sie erhoben, so lange 
ein Mann sich von dem schweren Vorwurf seiner eigenen Pgs, 
er habe Heeresgut verschoben, sich nicht gereinigt hat, und 
das ist der Herr Rehm, so lange wird die ungeheure Infamie 
des Nazi-Blattes noch unterstrichen. [456J (19 July 1932) 
A consideration of this lengthy quotation lS a useful point at 
which to sum up here - for it demonstrates the way 1n which 
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coverage of National Socialist activity in Augsburg assimilated 
into a more general propaganda framework, ln which the common 
motifs of Social Democratic rhetoric such as the emphasis on the 
importance of discipline or the anxiety to discredit the NSDAP's 
working-class credibility were present, local material which often 
had a slightly more mordant edge to it, and which gives an insight 
into just how deeply-felt the disruptive effect that the NSDAP had 
on political life in Augsburg was by the SPD. It also perhaps 
suggests that the tone of moral superiority adopted by the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung in its propaganda war with the Neue 
Nationalzeitung, though entirely consistent with the SPD's 
self-image and political intentions, was slightly deceptive. The 
SPD always faced the dilemma when confronting National Socialism of 
how to combat it effectively without adopting its methods. The 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's fulminations against the debasement of 
local political culture produced by the NSDAP were no doubt 
sincere; it had little choice though but to participate in this 
debasement, as it responded in kind to the propaganda of the Neue 
Nationalzeitung, in ways which often were themselves inflammatory, 
as the reproduction of the most offensive passages of the Nazi 
newspaper's reports on Social Democratic events could be adjudged. 
Here, as elsewhere, then - most notably ln the SPD's use of a 
language of violence - there is a sense ln which National Socialism 
forced an agenda upon the SPD, dictated the terms of struggle and 
forced the party to use a propaganda rhetoric it would not have 
freely chosen: what masqueraded in the Schwabische Volkszeitung as 
an active and assertive response to Nazi aggression was frequently 
just another expression of Social Democratic uncertainty, of the 
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SPD's inability to shape a politics of opposition to the NSDAP 
which was both effective and true to its own nature. 
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CHAPTER 10 30 January 1933 and after: the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's response to Nazism in power. 
An analysis of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's response to 
Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on 30 January 1933, although of 
obvious importance, inevitably involves some repetition, simply 
because there was no new response, merely a recapitulation of 
well-worn themes. Although there was certainly a recognition of 
the potential seriousness of the situation, and the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung was certainly vigorous in its efforts to mobilise the 
Social Democratic constituency for the March Reichstag election, 
there was no re-evaluation of National Socialism. For by this 
stage the SPD's view of the NSDAP was so deeply entrenched that its 
analysis of the party in power was determined by the expectations 
its own rhetoric had created, rather than by realities. It was 
therefore predictable that the Schwabische Volkszeitung would react 
to the new political conjuncture by reiterating those elements of 
its interpretation of Nazism which had become mere propaganda 
cliches through over-use. Thus, as briefly mentioned previously, 
it remained the case even after Hitler's appointment that the 
newspaper wished continually to underscore, as it had done so many 
times before, the sham nature of the NSDAP's professed socialism. 
The complexion of Hitler's cabinet was proclaimed as the final 
proof of this latter point, for how could a socialist surround 
himself with the representatives of reaction: 
Dies Kabinett bedeutet den Klassenkampf von oben gegen 
die Arbeiterschaft. Sein Programm ist: 
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gro~kapitalistischer Kurs! In diesem Kabinett sitzt 
der angebliche Sozialist Hitler zusammen mit dem 
Kapitalisten Hugenberg, der Personifizierung aller 
arbeiterfeindlichen und sozialreaktionaren Krafte in 
Deutschland. Kapitalistischer Kurs! Dazu Herr von Papen, 
der Mann der Steuergeschenke an die Unternehmer, der 
Vertrauensmann der Gro~agrarier und Osthilfenehmer! 
Kapitalistischer Kurs im Bunde mit dem feudalen Junkertum! 
Dazu Stahlhelm Seldt als Arbeitsminster, der erklarte 
Gegner der Sozialversicherung, der Feind der deutschen 
Gewerkschaften aller Richtungen, der Verktinder 
Hugenbergscher sozialreaktionarer Gedanken. Der 
Unternehmer an der Spitze der Reichsarbeitsministeriums. 
Das ist deutlich. [457J (31 January 1933) 
Hitler had become the head of 
... der ausgesprochensten Kapitalistenregierung, die 
es jemals in Deutschland gegeben hat . 
... Wo bleibt der Kampf gegen das 'rasende Kapital'? 
Hugenberg erlaubt ihn nicht! 
Wo bleibt die Enteignung der Bank- und Borsenftirsten! 
Herr von Papen erlaubt sie ihnen nicht! [458J 
(3 February 1933) 
Far from realising the NSDAP's socialist rhetoric, the installation 
of such a government could result only in the oppression of the 
working class: 
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Grenzenlos ist die Verachtung, die jeder klassenbewu~te 
Arbeiter gegen eine sogenannte 'Arbeiter' Partei hegt, 
deren FUhrer sich mit 5 Adeligen und mit den Vertretern 
der Schwerindustriellen- und Junker-Kaste in eine 
Regierung setzen! Das Hitler-Papen-Hugenberg-Kabinett 
wird positiv nur in einer Richtung arbeiten: UnterdrUckung 
aller staatsbUrgerlichen Freiheit, unerhorte Versklavung 
der Arbeiterschaft! [459] (3 February 1933) 
And indeed the first acts of the new government were presented 
as an attack on the working class at the behest of reaction, 
couched in terms which stressed that the mendacity that the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung had accused Nazism of so often was now an 
unmistakable reality. Thus one of its first measures, the 
announcement that the 'Reichsarbeitsministerium' would be 
abolished, was interpreted as the beginning of a full-scale assault 
on the Weimar Republic's social provisions [460]. An article 
published on 6 February 1933, assessing the first week of Hitler's 
government, first of all emphasised what had not taken place, 
before making this very point: 
Was ist geschehen? Wir stellen fest, da~ weder die 
Zinsknechtschaft gebrochen, noch die Gro~banken 
verstaatlicht, noch Renten, Lohne und UnterstUtzungen 
erhoht ... ist. 
Seine erste Tat war die Zerschlagung des 
Arbeitsministeriums. Worurn die Arbeiterschaft seit 
Jahrzehnten gekampft hatte, das ist ausgestrichen ... 
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Hitler ist Reichskanzler, Hugenberg feiert Orgien der 
Sozialreaktion, wo bleibt die Nazipropaganda gegen den 
Sozialreaktionar Hugenberg? 
... Eine Woche Hitler - eine Woche voll Verwirrung des 
Staatslebens, voll Sozialreaktion und Terror! Eine 
Woche Hitler - eine Woche der Entfesselung aller 
sozialreaktionaren Geltiste, der Verwirklichung 
sozialreaktionarer Traume! Noch nie ist eine demagogische 
Agitation so restlos entlarvt worden, wie die 
nationalsozialistische Agitation durch die erste Woche des 
Systems Hitler! Hitler geht im Joch Hugenbergs, des 
erbittertsten Feindes der Arbeiterschaft! [461] 
(6 February 1933) 
Similarly, when condemning the ralslng of customs duties on cattle 
and fat on 10 February 1933, the comparison was again with those 
radical measures which had been part of Nazi propaganda over the 
previous years: 
Endlich hat die Hitler-Regierung auf wirtschaftlichem 
Gebiet einen Beschlu~ zustandegebracht. Er hilft nicht 
den Arbeitslosen, Rentnern und Kriegsbeschadigten, die am 
hilfsbedtirftigsten sind. Er verstaatlicht auch nicht die 
Banken und schafft auch die Zinsknechtschaft nicht abo 
Was er bringt sind Zollerhohungen, die eine Preiserhohung 
und damit eine weitere Beeintrachtung der Kaufkraft 
breitester Volksschichten zur Folge haben mtissen. [462] 
(10 February 1933) 
Events in Prussia, where it was alleged that many long-serving 
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civil servants, often, it was claimed, former workers and unlon 
activists who were well-respected by the population, were being 
removed in favour of Nazi sympathisers from the higher social 
classes, were adduced as further proof of the hollowness of the 
NSDAP's radical rhetoric, which had been a useful tool for 
achieving power, but nothing more: 
Unter der Herrschaft der 'Arbeiterpartei' von Hitler, 
Goering, Prinz Auwi, Graf Hilldorf, Graf Reventlow und 
General Litzmann verschwindet der letzte Hauch von 
Sozialismus, von Freiheit und Gleichberechtigung der 
Arbeiterschaft. Es ist wieder freie Bahn den Prinzen, 
den Adligen, dem Gro~grundbesitz und Gro~kapital. Der 
nationale Sozialismus der 'Arbeiterpartei' marschiert, 
so da~ die Adligen und Barone, die 'feinen Leute' zu 
Amt und Wtirden kommen. Davon, da~ den Armsten der Armen 
'in 48 Stunden' geholfen wird, ist es ebenso still 
geworden wie von der Aufhebung der Zinsknechtschaft, der 
Zerrei~ung des Versailler Vertrages und von der Aufhebung 
der Hunger-Verordnung des Herren von Papen. [463J 
(17 February 1933) 
This type of approach to the new government was not simply 
directed by the Schwabische Volkszeitung at Social Democrats as 
confirmation of a long-standing analysis, but was also aimed, in 
the SPD's tradition of attempting to educate its enemies' deluded 
supporters, at the followers of Nazism. In one example, the 
existence of former Social Democrats and Communists, who had 
transferred their loyalties to the NSDAP in the belief that 
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socialism could be achieved by this party was admitted (and, as 
discussed earlier, it was rare to find in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung an admission that working-class Nazis could have this 
motivation), In order to warn them that their expectations would 
remain unfulfilled: 
... Woher sollen dem Sozialisten, der von KPD oder SPD 
in die Reihen des 'Sohnes des Volkes', des 
Spitzenkandidaten der NSDAP trat, Erftillung seiner 
sozialistischen Sehnsucht werden, wenn der Vertrauensmann 
der landwirtschaftlichen und schwerindustriellen 
Arbeitgeber und der zum viertenmal sanierungslUsternen 
Gro~agrarier des Ostens Verwalter, neln Diktator der 
Wirtschaft geworden ist. Auf Vorschlag Hitlers! Glauben 
diese sozialistischen Arbeiter der Faust, da~ Alfred 
Hugenberg seine Scherl- und Ufa-Konzerne verstaatlicht? 
Glauben sie, da~ ihre Pgs in diesen Betrieben oder in denen 
des Geldgebers Fritz Thyssen, der Krupps, der I.G. Farben 
usw. dividendenberechtigt werden? Wie wollen sie den 
sozialen Volkstaat der Gerechtigkeit errichten, wenn fUr 
'Streik gegen Lohnraub des ausbeuterischen Kapitalismus' 
Todesstrafe mit den Unterschriften Hitler-Hugenberg 
notverordnet wird? [464J (11 February 1933) 
National Socialist followers continued to be characterised as the 
deceived, the confused and the misled, as the blind and the asleep 
[465J - and comfortably locating the new situation within the 
matrix of propaganda that had been constructed hitherto, the 
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Schwabische Volkszeitung once again saw its task as one of 
awakening the politically slumbering, of allowing the ideologically 
blind to see once more, primarily by constantly demonstrating that 
National Socialism in power could not make good the rash promises 
of its election propaganda. The newspaper firmly believed that: 
In den Kreisen des politisch Ideenlosen, durch die 
Wirtschaftskrise zermtirbten und entwurzelten Btirgertums 
wird es bald ein jahes Erwachen geben [466J (4 March 1933) 
A belief ln the essentially transitory nature of Nazi success 
remained fundamental ln determining the SPD's attitude to events. 
That propaganda ploy of the NSDAP of promising 'everything to 
everyone' which so frustrated the SPD and which the party believed 
could not survive the harsh realities of power, would now be 
revealed as the fraudulent contrivance it was, as demands were made 
that promises be made reality: 
Wer so viel versprochen hat Wle Adolf Hitler, hat 
nattirlich die Pflicht, selne Versprechungen soweit 
zu erftillen, wie das moglich ist ... Auch die national-
sozialistischen Massen verlangen Antwort, wann die 
Erftillung kommt. [467J (10 February 1933) 
And, as the Schwabische Volkszeitung stated the day after Hitler's 
appointment as Chancellor, it was determined to expose what it 
regarded as inevitable, that is Hitler's inability to satisfy the 
many desires of his varied constituency, assuring its readers of 
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its intentions towards the new men ln power: 
Wir werden ihnen ihre Versprechungen, ihre Prophezeiungen, 
ihre Gro~mauligkeit Tag fur Tag vorhalten. Wir werden 
dem Volke aufzeigen, wie es mit der nationalsozialistischen 
Propaganda belogen und betrogen worden ist. [468J 
(31 January 1933) 
Thus the Schwabische Volkszeitung highlighted the basic 
ridiculousness of Hitler's new position, as the man who had 
declared so often that he would renew Germany was shackled to the 
forces of the past. [469J And as the days passed, it made its maln 
theme the Hitler government's lack of concrete achievements, 
especially in the economic sphere where the NSDAP had been so 
extravagant in its promises. [470J An article published on 9 
February 1933 in response to a speech given by Hitler posed the 
question: 
... Wie steht es mit Arbeit und Brot? 
Es war wieder einmal nichts mit der Enthullung der 
gro~en Rettungsplane Hitlers, die angeblich schon seit 
Jahren in der Schublade seines Geheimschrankes schlummern. 
Seine Anhanger und Glaubigen warten mit Schmerzen darauf. 
Sie rufen laut zu ihm: Herr, gib sie uns, damit wir wider 
die Feinde stehen. Zwar hat Adolf Hitler in die Schublade 
gegriffen, aber es war nur die Schublade Schleichers. Und 
was er hervorgezogen hat, war ein Instrument gegen die 
Presse- und Meinungsfreiheit in Deutschland, aber kein 
Instrument zum Kampfe gegen die Not. 
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... Von Prophezeiungen wird das Yolk nicht satt. Das hat es 
inzwischen gelernt. Es will Freiheit, es will Arbeit und 
Brot. Statt der Freiheit hat es eine Verordnung gegen die 
Pressefreiheit erhalten. Auf Arbeit und Brot aber soll 
es vier Jahre warten. Das ist die Regierungskunst des 
neuen 'Systems'. [471] (9 February 1933) 
The Schwabische Volkszeitung's judgement after '14 days of Hitler' 
was equally as bleak: 
... In diesen 14 Tagen hat sich in Deutschland manches 
geandert - aber wer wollte behaupten, da~ es besser 
geworden sei? Arbeitslosigkeit, Not, Hunger, Elend -
alles wie zuvor! Wer seine Sache auf Versprechungen 
gestellt hat, erlebt bittere Enttauschung. [472] 
(16 February 1933) 
The changes produced by the new government were all negative - as 
well as ending press freedom, these changes included, it was 
claimed, a worsening of Germany's foreign relations and the 
creation of a climate in which the SA could commit acts of violence 
against Social Democrats and Communists with impunity. This empty 
record was contrasted with the achievements of Social Democracy in 
power in 1918 and 1928/30 [473]; and inevitably the point was made 
that, just as the SPD had predicted, once burdened by the 
responsibilities of power, National Socialism's demagogy would 
begin to fracture, the hyperbolic claims which had attracted so 
many to the NSDAP would be revealed as a meretricious deceit: 
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Jetzt sind S1e an der Macht, jetzt konnen S1e ze1gen, 
was S1e konnen, und schon jetzt zeigt sich, da~ sie gar 
nichts konnen. [474J (10 February 1933) 
Nevertheless, although this latter, oft-repeated theme would 
seem to suggest that National Socialism did at least posses the 
reality of power, even if not the capability to use that power to 
solve Germany's problems, it was characteristic of the Social 
Democratic analysis that, simultaneously, the NSDAP was 
consistently portrayed as in fact having no significant 
governmental power at all. The SPD had, after all, so often denied 
that this was possible, had predicated its whole interpretation of 
Nazism on the belief that it was an ephemeral phenomenon that would 
disintegrate long before it could attain power - and, as has just 
been discussed, this belief informed its view of the movement after 
30 January 1933, a newspaper like the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
still saw as its main purpose to expose the NSDAP's failures and 
thus accelerate its decline. Not that this apparent contradiction 
presented the SPD with any real difficulty - for, again as had been 
so frequently explicated in the past, the NSDAP was not autonomous. 
If Hitler had become Chancellor it could only be because the real 
powers, the forces of reaction and big business had deemed it 
expedient; he was a mere 'Aushangeschild' [475J, without any real 
influence. Thus, according to an article written by Josef Felder, 
Augsburg's Reichstag representative, Hitler's government was no 
such thing: 
Ja, W1r haben eben keine Regierung Hitler. Wir haben 
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nur elnen Reichskanzler Hitler, der von dem fUr das 
Volk weit gefahrlicheren Vizekanzler Papen scharf 
kontrolliert wird. [476] (1 February 1933) 
More usually it was Hugenberg who was described as the man In 
control, the 'Wirtschaftdiktator' determining economic policy: 
Hitler ist zwar 'an der Macht', aber Hugenberg und 
seine kapitalistischen Hintermanner regieren. [477] 
(10 February 1933) 
The constitution of Hitler's cabinet appeared to confirm this: 
In elnem Kabinett von 11 Personen sitzen 3 
Nationalsozialisten. Als 'Macht' hat sich Adolf Hitler 
immer die Maschinengewehre und die Uniformen vorgestellt. 
Wo ist der nationalsozialistische Preu~enkommissar, dem 
die preu~ische Polizei untersteht? Wo ist der 
nationalsozialistische Reichswehrminister? Und endlich: 
wo ist der nationalsozialistische Arbeitsminister? Ich 
frage Sie und sage Ihnen, das sind die Posten, die von 
elner Clique Hugenbergs und den Deutschnationalen fUr sich 
okkupiert worden sind! 
Adolf Hitler hat den Schein der Macht Damit erfUllt 
er seine historische Mission. FrUher war er Dekorateur, 
heute ist er Dekorationssttick. Das Kabinnet hei~t Adolf 
Hitler, aber das Kabinett ist Alfred Hugenberg. Adolf 
Hitler darf reden, Alfred Hugenberg wird handeln. [478] 
(7 February 1933) 
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The manner ln which Hitler came to power - correctly presented in 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung as the result of intrigue and secret 
dealing within the reactionary elite [479] - and the composition of 
his cabinet, appeared so well to confirm the expectations of Social 
Democracy with regard to National Socialism that the whole process 
became the culminating point of the Social Democratic analysis. 
National Socialism's attainment of power was, paradoxically, read 
as the ultimate proof of its impotence, as final proof that the 
NSDAP was in the control of other forces, of big business, which 
had now 'decided' that the party would be most useful in 
government, and of reaction in general. Thus the underestimation 
of National Socialism, that fatal belief that it had been shackled 
and tamed in power [480] - and, indeed, even after it had become 
clear that this was not the case, the belief that the Nazi regime 
simply could not endure, which was widespread amongst SPD activists 
- cannot be seen as other than having been rooted in the long-term 
misperceptions of Nazism that have been analysed above: primarily, 
that is, in the absolute refusal to accept the NSDAP as an 
independent political organisation, an organisation which was 
simply beyond the possible control of German reaction and big 
business, and also in an over-reliance on such tools of 
interpretation as the agent theory and the conviction that big 
business funded National Socialism. 
It could, of course, be argued that, against a background of 
years of chronic governmental instability, the belief that National 
Socialism's time in power would be no more than another short-lived 
episode, did have some justification in a contemporary context. 
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However, the SPD's response to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor 
simply cannot be considered as nothing more than a rational 
analysis of the political conjuncture in the aftermath of that 
event; for that response was determined by the persistent tendency 
to underestimate Nazism's potential political durability which was 
the particular consequence of the modes of interpretation applied 
by the SPD to the NSDAP, a tendency which has been frequently 
highlighted in the preceding chapters of this thesis. 
As was often the case in the Schwabische Volkszeitung, though, 
its rhetoric belied its analysis in the weeks after Hitler's 
appointment. It may have professed to view National Socialism 1n 
government as little more than another aspect of a general 
'counter-revolution' instigated by reaction at this time, but the 
propaganda content of the newspaper reveals unmistakable signs of 
anxiety. There occurred in particular a further heightening of its 
rhetoric of defiance, further declarations of the unbreakable 
spirit of Social Democracy, and a further flirtation with the idea 
of the labour movement's willingness to defend itself with all the 
methods at its disposal in the decisive struggle now approaching 
[481] - the sub-text being, as ever, that the SPD would even be 
prepared to use force if necessary. Again, a vocabulary of 
struggle and combat was deployed - 'Kampfbereitschaft', 
'Kampfentschlossenheit', 'Kampfeswille' and 'Kampfgeist' were 
constants in the articles appearing in the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
at this time, as that militaristic language which was examined in 
an earlier section of this work was forcefully reiterated. [482J 
And again it was often the 'Iron Front' which provided the 
propaganda framework for the articulation of such sentiments. [483J 
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At the same time, the readers of the newspaper were left in no 
doubt that they and the labour movement in general were under 
renewed physical attack as the SA were given free rein and a wave 
of terror swept over the country: 
Tatsache ist, da~ die Unruhe in Deutschland immer starker 
wird. Taglich fallen Todesopfer. Die Blutschuld der SA 
schreit zum Himmel. Versammlungen der Sozialdemokraten und 
der Kommunisten werden immer wieder von bewaffneten 
nationalsozialistischen Banden uberfallen und zu sprengen 
versucht. [484] (2 February 1933) 
At the local level, though, there were declarations that the SA 
would never rule the streets of Augsburg, for the united will of 
the city's working class simply would not allow this to occur: 
Dieser Wille wird vor allem nicht dulden, da~ die SA 
in Augsburg die Stra~e beherrscht, er wird nicht 
dulden, da~ in der Arbeiterstadt Augsburg Terrorakte 
gegen die Arbeiterschaft versucht werden [485] 
(2 February 1933) 
And if such acts of terror were attempted, then Augsburg's National 
Socialists were left in no doubt about how the SPD would react: 
Wir wiederholen mit noch gro~eren Nachdruck, was wlr 1m 
Jahre 1932 schon einmal gesagt haben, als die personliche 
Hetze der Augsburger Nazis ma~los unverschamt wurde: 
Fur jeden von uns 10 von euch! [486] (3 February 1933) 
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This type of rodomontade was accompanied by an atavistic 
turning to the past as a means of self-assurance: to, that is, the 
image of the SPD as the party which had faced adversity and 
persecution before and emerged from it strengthened, the party 
which many foes had attempted to destroy, none successfully, above 
all the party which had survived its greatest test, the period of 
Bismark's Socialist Law. Significantly, allusions to that era were 
frequent after 30 January 1933 - conditions during the campaign for 
the March Reichstag elections were compared with those during the 
operation of the Socialist Law, and judged to be worse. As then, 
though, this kind of persecution would only make the SPD more 
determined: 
In einem gro~en Teil des Reiches ist unsere Werbearbeit 
fUr die Wahlen des 5 Marz vollig unterbunden. In 
anderen ist sie empfindlich eingeschrankt. Damit ist 
ein tatsachlicher Zustand geschaffen, wie er selbst zur 
Zeit des Sozialistengesetzes nicht bestanden hat . 
... Aus Verfolgungen hat unsere Partei stets neue Kraft 
geschopft. Schon der 5 Marz mu~ die Wahrheit dieser 
alten Erfahrung bestatigen. [487] (4 March 1933) 
And this indeed was how the election results were analysed: 
Noch n1e, auch in der Zeit des Sozialistengesetzes nicht, 
hat die Partei einen solchen Wahlkampf erlebt! Geknebelt 
und gebunden, gehetzt und verfolgt, mit Verleumdungen 
UberschUttet, gegen die sie sich nicht wehren konnte, so 
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ging Sle in diesen Kampf. Und ihre Verluste? Von 121 
Reichstagsmandaten eines, von 7,247,952 Stimmen 71 455 , , 
noch nicht einmal 1 Prozent. Das ist ein Erfolg, der 
mehr wiegt, als mancher stUrmisch gefeierte Wahlsieg.[488J 
(7 March 1933) 
The Schwabische Volkszeitung exuded an outward confidence in the 
ability of the working class to withstand an assault on it by the 
NSDAP - an awareness of the fighting qualities of the working 
class, for example, was believed to be behind the calm and measured 
response of the national committee of the socialist trade union 
movement to the new political situation, described thus in an 
article published on 2 February 1933: 
Die Ruhe und die Zuversicht, die fUr die Verhandlungen 
des Bundesausschusses kennzeichnend war, kommt nicht von 
ungefahr, sie stammt aus der genauen Kenntniss der 
reichen Widerstandskrafte der deutschen Arbeiterschaft, 
die in ihrer jahrzehntelangen Geschichte schon manchen 
Gegner kommen und gehen sah, von dem die Sage ging, da~ 
er die Arbeiterbewegung endgUltig vernichten werde. [489J 
(2 February 1933) 
Behind such confident declamations, however, and behind the 
image of a party steadfast and defiant, lay a reality of timidity 
and caution. As far as a prescription for action was concerned, 
the same message was transmitted over and over in the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung: there was to be no precipitate action, no pretext was 
to be given to the new government for an attack on the 
organisations of the working class, discipline was to be maintained 
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and the boundaries of the constitution observed. This basic 
principle of fighting Hitler's government on the basis of the 
constitution and legality was laid down the day after Hitler became 
Chancellor: 
... Wir werden diese Regierung der Provokation und der 
Reaktion unerbittlich bekampfen. Die Manner dieses 
Kabinetts haben den Verfassungseid geschworen, wir aber 
werden fest mit beiden FU~en auf dem Boden der Verfassung 
und der Gesetzlichkeit den Kampf gegen Sle fUhren. [490J 
(31 January 1933) 
At the same time, the vital importance of providing the government 
with no excuse to 19nore the constitutionally-defined limits to its 
powers was stressed: 
Diese Regierung wartet auf die Gelegenheit, auf den 
Vorwand, urn die Grenzen der Verfassung zu sprengen. 
Wir werden ihr diesen Vorwand nicht gehen! Jetzt ist 
die Pflicht der gesamten Arbeiterbewegung ein au~erstes 
Ma~ von KaltblUtigkeit und Disziplin zu zeigen. Es gilt 
die Kampfkraft der gesamten Arbeiterbewegung geschlossen 
zu erhalten, es gilt sie zu sammeln fUr den Fall, da~ 
diese Regierung den au~ersten Konfliktsfall schafft. [491J 
(31 January 1933) 
Thus, as ever the rhetoric of action referred only to future 
possibilities; for the present it was the 'highest duty' [492J of 
Social Democrats to remain calm. 'Disziplin', 'KaltbIUtigkeit', 
and 'Besonnenheit' became the key positive words in the Schwabische 
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Volkszeitung's lexicon at this time whereas the concept of the 
'Einzelaktion', the rash and foolish independent action, had an 
overwhelmingly negative value. [493J The temptation to take such 
action was admitted: 
... Da~ die deutsche Arbeiterschaft, soweit Sle den 
Geist der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung ln sich aufgenommen 
hat und gewerkschaftlich geschult ist, sich gegen diese 
sozialreaktionare Regierung am liebsten in unmittelbarer 
Aktion zur Wehr setzen wtirde, ist menschlich begreiflich, 
aber sachlich falsch. [494J (2 February 1934) 
To glve way to such impulses, to indulge in the politics of the 
grand gesture would only harm the interests of the working class. 
Even a weapon such as the general strike could only be used as a 
last resort: 
Letzte Mittel, Wle der Generalstreik, sind nur in letzten 
Situationen erfolgreich. Wenn einmal angewendet, mtissen 
sie Erfolge bringen, falls sie nicht eine Katastrophe nach 
sich ziehen sollen. Die scharfsten Patronen verschie~t 
man nicht auf dem Schie~platz, sondern im wirklichen Kampf. 
Diese Situation ist der Staatsstreich von oben. [495J 
(7 February 1933) 
The parallels between the SPD's response to Hitler's 
appointment as Chancellor and its response after Papen's removal of 
the Prussian government in July 1932 are obvious enough - in both 
cases stress was laid on the need for discipline, the dangers of 
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being provoked into hasty action, and the importance of operating 
within the boundaries of legality. [496] In both cases, too, the 
KPD was used as an exemplar of the idiocy of rash adventurism; thus 
warnlng was glven in the Schwabische Volkszeitung in early February 
1933 against 
... Einzelaktionen, Wle Sle von den kommunistischen 
FUhrern propagiert werden ... 
Die FUhrer der Eisernen Front sind sich ihrer Aufgabe 
und ihrer Verantwortung bewu~t und sie werden nicht ein 
Flugzeug nach Moskau besteigen, wenn eine Einzelaktion 
mi~glUckt ist. [497] (3 February 1933) 
And the persecution of the KPD by the new reglme In the aftermath 
of the Reichstag fire (which the SPD accepted as being the work of 
the KPD) was used in the newspaper to reinforce the message that 
discipline and restraint were all-important: 
Der sinnlose, verbrecherische Anschlag gegen das 
Reichstagsgebaude und die zweifellos planma~ig betriebenen 
Terrorakte der Kommunisten haben, wie nicht anders zu 
erwarten war, der Regierung willkommenen Anla~ gegeben, 
einen Feldzug auf Leben und Tod gegen die Kommunisten und 
ihre Organisationen zu fUhren. [498] (4 March 1933) 
In disavowing any responsibility for the Reichstag fire, the 
opportunity was taken to emphasise the moral basis of Social 
Democratic politics: 
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Wir verabscheuen, wle jeder verntinftige Deutsche, 
dieses Werk sinnlosen und verbrecherischen politischen 
Hasses und politischer Entartung ... Die 
Sozialdemokratische Partei hat in 70 Jahren mtihseligen, 
aber auch ruhmreichen Wirkens an dem deutschen Volke 
Werke des kulturellen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen 
Aufbaues verrichtet, deren Spuren die dank der 
Verblendung weiter Teile unseres Volkes nunmehr tiber 
unser armes Land hereingebrochene Reaktion nicht wird 
verwischen konnen. 
Den ethischen Grundlagen unserer sozialistischen 
Weltanschauung entspringt die unbedingte Ablehnung 
jeglicher Gewaltakte zur Erreichung politischer Zwecke. 
[499] (4 March 1933) 
Ultimately it was not possible for the SPD to abandon these 
ethical foundations, or the moral abhorrence of political violence 
they created. That violence would be the consequence if the 
government did not abide by the constitution was made clear in the 
Schwabische Volksz~itung, thus Josef Felder: 
es kann werden ein erbitterter Kampf von Millionen, 
wenn die neuen Herren auch nur urn Haaresbreite von den 
Grundrechten der Verfassung abweichen. [500] 
(1 February 1933) 
Clearly, though, this was not what the SPD hoped for; it wished 
rather for a continuation of legal politics: 
Sie brauchen nur elne legale Regierung zu seln, dann 
310 
sind wir ganz selbstverstandlich auch eine legale 
Opposition. [501] (7 February 1933) 
Again it was threatened that if the government turned away from 
legality it would have to bear responsibility for the results of 
its actions; even in stating this, however, the extent to which the 
SPD's own faith in legality would remain the starting-point for the 
party's political decision-making, was revealed: 
Die Arbeiterbewegung wird in Deutschland immer eln 
politischer Faktor bleiben. Wir denken nicht daran, 
unsere Ziele zu verbergen. Wir wollen unsere Gegnerschaft 
gegen die Herren von heute weder abschwachen noch 
bemanteln, wir sagen jeder arbeiterfeindlichen Politik 
den scharfsten Kampf an. Wir sagen nur, da~ es seit 
Jahrzehnten unsere Art ist mit gesetzlichen Mitteln 
und sachlich zu kampfen. Wir zeigen damit den Herren 
von heute die Moglichkeit, den politischen Kampf in 
Deutschland wieder auf ein Niveau zu bringen, das eines 
Kulturvolkes wlirdig ist. Diese Moglichkeit bietet ihnen 
jetzt die Verfassung. Sie zeigt den Weg. Wird dennoch 
ein anderer, ihm entgegengesetzter beschritten, so 
mogen die Sieger von heute daflir die Verantwortung 
libernehmen. Sie werden sie auf die Dauer nicht tragen 
konnen. [502] (7 March 1933) 
The legalism and the moral certainty expressed here was the true 
essence of the SPD's politics and had contributed to its resilience 
in the past. To have made actual its rhetoric of defiance and its 
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asseverations of a willingness to defend itself with all the means 
at its disposal if necessary, would have constituted a fundamental 
shift in the nature of the SPD. As has been suggested here, there 
was a real linguistic attempt to make the possibility of such a 
shift seem persuasive; and this linguistic attempt was partially 
mirrored by organisational initiatives such as the creation of the 
Iron Front. Of course, the use of this particular strain of 
belligerent propaganda must be understood within the wider context 
of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's general aims, specifically the 
urgent necessity to bolster the morale of the SPD's rank and file 
at an extremely difficult time for the party. The newspaper's 
rhetoric of assertion was an inevitable consequence of the daily 
propaganda struggle with National Socialism; arguably, the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung would have been failing in its duty if it 
had not made this attempt to boost the confidence of its 
readership, and it would be wrong to imply that it was ln some way 
duplicitous of the newspaper to use such language when little of 
real substance lay behind it. Nevertheless, it remains the case 
that Social Democracy was never comfortable employing such 
linguistic aggression, and that the heart of the SPD remained 
embodied in the language of discipline and caution it continued to 
speak, even whilst simultaneously seeming to threaten the NSDAP 
with violence. Thus, while the other aspects of the Social 
Democratic analysis of National Socialism that have been examined 
ln this work, and the inflexible nature of that analysis which was 
so clearly revealed in the Schwabische Volkszeitung in the weeks 
after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, are certainly 
illuminative of why the SPD rejected mass resistance and adhered to 
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the legal path, it is suggested here that it 1S above all in the 
use of a language of violence that the SPD's particular world-view, 
that world-view which so influenced the decisions the party made in 
1933, was expressed. For the SPD's effort to forge a rhetoric of 
assertion 1n its confrontation with Nazism exposed the virtual 
impotence of Social Democracy before an enemy as ruthless and 
amoral as the NSDAP, and exposed also the SPD's awareness of this 
and its desire to reinvigorate itself. That it could not do this, 
that it could not alter its intrinsic character, that it in the end 
could not but remain true to its past history may have been a 
political and intellectual failure; it is more questionable though 
if it was also a moral failure. 
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CHAPTER 11 : CONCLUSION 
For all that much of the emphasis in this study has been on 
the flaws evident ln the SPD's analysis of National Socialism, it 
must nevertheless be recognised that the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
material on Nazism exhibited a basic vigour, effective if 
considered purely as propaganda. If the primary task of Social 
Democratic newspapers in the later Weimar years was to shape the 
reactions of Social Democrats to National Socialism ln ways which 
would protect them from the contagion of Nazism, and create the 
degree of self-confidence within them necessary to defend working-
class organisations and achievements from the attacks of the NSDAP, 
then the Schwabische Volkszeitung can be adjudged to have 
succeeded. As will be discussed in a moment, evidence does exist 
to support the assertion that Augsburg's core Social Democrats did 
indeed know their enemy and knew, moreover, how they wished to 
combat that enemy; and, even if this necessarily cannot be proven 
conclusively, it hardly seems overly speculative to suggest that 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung must have been influential in this 
area, although other factors, such as organisational loyalties and 
the pressures of social circumstances, would of course also have 
been important in determining responses to Nazism. The extent of 
the coverage devoted to National Socialism, its often 
confrontational and sensational style, and the virulence of the 
anti-Nazi polemics the Schwabische Volkszeitung contained, was 
clearly designed to impress upon the newspaper's readership that 
their freedom, livelihoods, and even their lives were at risk from 
National Socialism. The explicit depiction of Nazism as a threat 
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to working-class rights was examined in chapter 2, but this was 
also the underlying theme of other aspects of the SPD's analysis, 
such as the interpretation of the NSDAP as a tool of reaction being 
used to attack the working class and its organisations, and, within 
this, its characterisation as an inherently violent party. 
In the pursuit of its alms, and as the Nazi threat grew 
alarmingly, the Schwabische Volkszeitung's propaganda became 
increasingly militant, its language ever more aggressive, and its 
prognostications of the fate of the working class under any future 
Nazi rule took on an apocalyptic tone, as the nature of the 
newspaper was inevitably changed by the exigencies of the struggle 
to counteract Nazism. Moreover, this change in its nature was 
certainly forced upon the Schwabische Volkszeitung as one aspect of 
the debasement of German political culture which Social Democrats 
believed the rise of Nazism had precipitated; it did not represent 
an approach stemming naturally from the SPD's traditional mode of 
agitation, and it 1S this fact which makes a consideration of the 
cumulative effect of the newspaper's propaganda especially 
interesting. In its willingness to gamble on what effect its 
overtly bellicose stance might have on the newspaper's readership, 
the Schwabische Volkszeitung reflects the extent to which the SPD 
had by this time lost control of events and could merely react to 
an agenda set by the actions of the NSDAP, even whilst 
simultaneously declaring its intention of asserting itself with 
renewed energy. 
In retrospect, of course, it is clear that the deliberate 
construction of an image of the Nazi enemy, the function of which 
was to warn and to motivate rank-and-file Social Democrats, was 
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undermined by other elements of the Social Democratic analysis of 
National Socialism. Thus, for example, the SPD's tendency, often 
remarked upon in this thesis, to underestimate the NSDAP, to 
conV1nce itself that the party's success could only be transitory, 
was a contradiction of the volume and tenor of the material devoted 
to Nazism in the Schwabische Volkszeitung, and exposed the 
competing imperatives at work within the newspaper - for the need 
to maintain morale amongst the rank and file by diminishing the 
importance of National Socialism could not be allowed to disguise 
the equally pressing necessity to galvanise that rank and file by 
constantly underlining the seriousness of the Nazi menace. It 1S 
in such confused and ambiguous messages, and not in any failure by 
the SPD in Augsburg adequately to recognise the danger Nazism 
represented and to warn its supporters against that danger, that 
the historian can find explanations for the feebleness of the SPD's 
capitulation in 1933. 
This must be explored later in this conclusion in more detail, 
and with specific regard to the response of Augsburg's Social 
Democrats to the establishment of the National Socialist 
dictatorship. First, though, a more basic point must be made, one 
which can perhaps be lost if the focus is too much on the 
complexities of the SPD's analysis of Nazism: that is, the effort 
that has been made in the preceding chapters to deconstruct the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's rhetoric, as a means of interpreting the 
difficulties that the SPD faced when confronting the NSDAP, should 
not be allowed to obscure the direct and negative effect that 
aspects of the SPD's analysis had on the party's ability to combat 
its enemy. It is not only the hidden meanings behind the rhetoric, 
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and the subtleties and ambiguities of the language employed which 
elucidate why the SPD made the decisions it did in 1933, but also 
the consequences for the party's political behaviour and strategy 
in the struggle against National Socialism of its misperceptions of 
the rival movement. It is thus obvious enough that the SPD's 
over-concentration on a number of ideologically-predetermined 
themes, many of which revolved around questions of class, hindered 
its capability of realistically assessing the causes of Nazism's 
success, by producing a fixed and inflexible view of National 
Socialism, one which, moreover, relieved the party of the need for 
honest self-examination. Again, the persistent underestimation by 
the SPD of National Socialism's potential to succeed as a lasting 
political movement, was the analytical defect which most obviously 
exercised a deleterious effect on the party's response to events, 
particularly so after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor. For 
although, as mentioned in the last chapter, there were several 
factors which apparently justified the SPD's belief in the 
temporary nature of Nazism in power, and although that belief was 
shared by other political parties in Germany at the time, the 
contradiction between such a belief and the volume of anti-Nazi 
propaganda that had appeared in the Schwabische Volkszeitung since 
1928 remains nevertheless glaring. It is precisely because the SPD 
had so often emphasised the danger National Socialism represented 
to the Weimar Republic, and had so often used the parallel with 
events in Italy to reinforce this message, that the party's seeming 
lack of awareness in 1933 of the NSDAP's long-term threat is so 
surprising. As has been suggested throughout this thesis, though, 
this response flowed from an interpretation of National Socialism 
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which continually conceptualised it as an inevitably ephemeral 
movement, the success of which stemmed primarily from short-term 
circumstances, such as the economic depression, the removal of 
which would end Nazism's success. 
It could also be argued, however, that just as serious ln the 
long-term as the power of the idea of National Socialism as a 
transitory phenomenon, had been the SPD's inability, in its 
confrontation with the NSDAP, to produce a propaganda capable of 
mobilising support from outwith Social Democracy's traditional 
constituency, something which the parochial nature of the type of 
material found in the Schwabische Volkszeitung was hardly designed 
to achieve. In the introduction to this thesis, mention was made 
of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's position as a general daily 
newspaper, aimed not only at members of the SPD or the wider labour 
movement, but rather also at Augsburg's newspaper-reading public as 
a whole, as a commercial enterprise. In truth, though, there is 
little evidence in the content of the newspaper, at least as it is 
reflected in the engagement with National Socialism, that this fact 
ever significantly shaped the Schwabische Volkszeitung's approach. 
The constant expectation, alluded to several times in the course of 
this work, that the newspaper's anti-Nazi material could have an 
effect on non-Social Democrats, and even on Nazi supporters, was 
belied by the narrow range of its propaganda. The latter, in its 
repetitive concentration on such themes as the conspiracy of the 
capitalist class at work behind National Socialism, big business 
funding of the NSDAP, and the class basis of Nazism's support, was 
clearly tailored to the interests and outlook of Social Democrats, 
and seldom effectively addressed the newspaper's putative wider 
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audience. If, therefore, one element of the SPD's dilemma in the 
Weimar Republic was that it could not expand as a political 
movement by mobilising either sectors of the middle class or those 
workers outwith the Social Democratic mainstream, then an analysis 
of the Schwabische Volkszeitung suggests that the insularity of the 
SPD's literary propaganda may have contributed to this. 
It was exactly this type of defect which was identified by 
contemporary intellectual critics of the SPD's engagement with 
Nazism, from both the right and the left wlngs of the party. [503] 
Carlo Mierendorff, for example, explicitly attacked the belief that 
the NSDAP would simply fade into obscurity like previous anti-
semitic movements, and admonished the SPD not to rely on the 
disintegration of the Nazi movement, but rather to rely on its own 
efforts. Alexander Schifrin, meanwhile, censured the widespread 
idea that the NSDAP's rise was simply due to the critical economic 
situation, and also perceptively noted that to characterise 
National Socialism as nothing more than a tool of capitalism was to 
ignore the fact that it was precisely because the movement had an 
independent existence ('Eigenleben') that it was such a dangerous 
opponent. And from the left wing of the SPD criticism was constant 
of the party's passivity of response to Nazism, a passivity which, 
agaln, could be seen to have been encouraged by convictions about 
the temporary nature of the NSDAP's success. 
Despite the validity of such criticisms, the SPD's response to 
National Socialism's assault on the labour movement in 1933 should 
not be interpreted as having been principally the consequence of an 
inaccurate analysis of Nazism; arguably, such inaccuracy would not 
have prevented the SPD from achieving a more robust defence of 
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itself than actually occurred, if the party had not anyway been 
fundamentally weak. Certainly, the NSDAP was the enemy that the 
SPD was least well- equipped to comprehend and to confront; a basic 
lack of understanding of the type of movement National Socialism 
was does pervade the Schwabische Volkszeitung's material on Nazism, 
and it was the source of much of the SPD's political difficulty 1n 
the last Weimar years. Nevertheless, the SPD was also clearly 
ill-equipped to deal with any determined enemy during those years, 
for it exuded a general aura of stagnation, and of a loss of its 
previous certitudes and sureness of political orientation, which 
were difficult to retain amid the uncertainties of the Weimar 
Republic. Thus, the predicament of the SPD in 1933 was as much 
the result of the general structural problems of the party as a 
political organisation, the culmination of a long-term sclerosis, 
as it was a reaction specifically determined by the nature of the 
party's engagement with National Socialism over the preceding 
years. This is not to dismiss the importance of the direct effects 
of the latter, or of the value to the historian of a delineation of 
the main contours of the SPD's interpretation of Nazism; it 1S, 
though, to claim that merely to concentrate on the flaws 1n that 
interpretation is inadequate as an explanatory tool, for it was the 
determinants underlying those flaws, and not the flaws as such, 
which ultimately conditioned the SPD's behaviour. 
It is, then, those traits which have been identified 
throughout this thesis as having exercised a shaping influence on 
the approach to National Socialism demonstrated by the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, that have the most significance, those deep-rooted 
Social Democratic characteristics which could not but be revealed 
320 
ln the course of the propaganda struggle with Nazism. Taken as a 
whole, those characteristics represented the Social Democratic 
mind-set, a mind-set which did not provide the SPD with the type of 
intellectual flexibility that would have enabled it to react with 
greater assurance to the emergence of the National Socialist 
threat. One aspect of this mind-set which has been frequently 
mentioned in this study, was the extent to which it remained 
grounded in pre-1914 conceptions; it was this, above all, which 
produced the SPD's incapacity ever really to 'see' the NSDAP 
properly, because the latter did not function within traditional 
class or ideological boundaries, and thus could not easily be 
intellectually located. The SPD's obvious bewilderment in the face 
of this was the consequence also of an analysis of Nazism often 
driven by the party's own self-image and political expectations, 
again a part of the SPD's mind-set. Thus, for instance, as was 
discussed in chapter 5, the Schwabische Volkszeitung's approach to 
Nazi ideas illuminates as much about the SPD's attitude to ideology 
as it does about the latter's role within the NSDAP. Similarly, 
what is most often revealed in the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
discussions of the NSDAP's following, is the very precise, if 
hardly realistic, conception that the SPD had of its own support 
and the qualities it supposedly possessed. And the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, further, exhibited the tendency to transform elements 
which were in fact positively contributing to the success of 
National Socialism - such as the movement's ability to gain support 
from across the class spectrum - into exactly those factors which 
would 'inevitably' guarantee the NSDAP's disintegration, simply 
because they did not accord with the SPD's view of how a mass 
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movement should operate. 
It must be reiterated here that this narrowness of perspective 
did not damage the efficacy of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's 
material on Nazism as propaganda; it does however demonstrate the 
limits of the SPD's political imagination, which certainly affected 
the party's political judgement, for the SPD's misperceptions of 
National Socialism were often only symbolic of wider misreadings of 
events and circumstances. The most significant example of this was 
certainly the SPD's denial of the NSDAP's autonomy, the shackling 
of the movement to the old enemies who continued to obsess Social 
Democracy, through the use of the myth of big business funding. It 
has to be recognised that this myth blinded the SPD, not only to 
the reality of National Socialism, but also to the reality of the 
economic and political role of business 1n the Weimar Republic. 
The modes of interpretation revealed by an examination of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's anti-Nazi rhetoric, were not, that 1S, 
simply the SPD's method of comprehending the NSDAP, they also 
represented the party's general means of analysing political, 
social and economic phenomena. A further instance of this was the 
continuing importance of, if not Marxist theory explicitly, then at 
least Marxist concepts and beliefs. The SPD's self-deceiving 
convictions about the, seemingly preordained, behaviour of class 
groups has been highlighted 1n previous chapters, but the more 
subtle influence of Marxism 1S also discernible in the SPD's always 
implicit faith in the inevitability of its ultimate victory, and 1n 
the idea that the NSDAP, as an 'unnatural' combination of social 
groups, could not long survive. 
Such attitudes were not simply generated by the necessities of 
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the immediate confrontation with National Socialism, but were 
rather rooted in the SPD's long-term development. This is best 
exemplified by the contradictions and equivocations revealed in the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung's approach and response to Nazi violence: 
the legalism, the humanist fear of bloodshed, and the desire to 
avoid the taking of risks were integral to the SPD's perception of 
itself, to its belief in the morality of its political behaviour. 
The rise of the NSDAP and the violence of its methods merely 
provided a pressing set of circumstances within which this self-
perception could be confirmed, a moral dilemma to which there could 
only ever have been one, non-violent, solution. Similarly, the 
Social Democratic 'mentality' in the later Weimar years is only 
explicable if the importance of the SPD's sense of its own history 
is realised; for this provided a further framework of 
interpretation, one which, as in the case of the false parallel 
drawn between the era of Bismark's Socialist Law and the advent of 
the Nazi dictatorship, was used to diminish the significance of 
National Socialism and to bolster the SPD's misplaced confidence ln 
its ability to surVlve repreSSlon. 
What this study of the Schwabische Volkszeitung has revealed 
about the SPD's modes of thought, and the direct and often 
disastrous political consequences those modes of thought could 
have, is therefore confirmatory of other interpretations which seek 
to explain the SPD's response to the rise of Nazism by examining 
the prevailing mentality within the party - emphasising, as indeed 
this thesis has done, the SPD's traditionalism, its legalism, and 
its fear of risk, and often applying this to the hesitant and 
indecisive behaviour of the SPD's leadership at national level ln 
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1933. Of course, it must be acknowledged that the idea of a Social 
Democratic mind-set only has relevance within the wider context of 
actual political events and decisions, in isolation it tells but a 
partial story; it is certainly not being suggested here that the 
SPD's world-view provides a singular explanation for its actions. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the Social Democratic mind-set can 
be related to the specific course of events in Augsburg after 30 
January 1933; for if indeed the SPD's reaction to National 
Socialist attack can be explained with reference to that mind-set, 
then this should be demonstrable in the case of Augsburg's SPD, and 
with regard to the influence of the Schwabische Volkszeitung. 
What is certain is that the various steps of the Nazi seizure 
of power in Augsburg [504J, and in particular the terror directed 
against the SPD in the weeks following 9 March 1933, met with no 
mass Social Democratic resistance in the city. This latter date 
was the day on which Augsburg's National Socialists took possession 
of the city hall, an event which was thereafter mythologised as 
having provided the signal for the 'national revolution' to begin 
throughout Bavaria. On 9 March, Augsburg's NSDAP leader, Karl 
Wahl, in a speech from the balcony of the city hall, had the 
following message for those who had, from the same spot, proclaimed 
the beginning of the Weimar Republic in November 1918: 
Hier sind Sle gestanden, diese Schurken, und haben 
alles in den Kot gezogen. Die heutige Kundgebung 
wird den Herren zum Ausdruck bringen, da~ ihre Zeit 
ein fur allemal vorbei ist und da~ ihr System mit 
Stumpf und Stiel ausgerottet wird. Die Idee des 
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Marxismus und die elenden verbrecherischen Fuhrer 
mussen weggefegt werden ... [505J 
(Quoted in: K. Filser and P. Sobczyk, 'Augsburg 1m Dritten Reich') 
The making real of this promise involved, for the SPD, the banning 
from 10 March 1933 of the Schwabische Volkszeitung, at first for 
four days and then indefinitely, and the arrests, in several waves 
over the next four months, of the party's city council 
representatives, the leadership of the Reichsbanner, leading 
functionaries of the party, the Iron Front, and the socialist 
societies, and a number of Jewish intellectuals who were SPD 
members (in contrast to the NSDAP's persecution of the KPD in 
Augsburg, however, lower lever SPD functionaries and ordinary party 
members largely escaped arrest. [506J) 
Against the background of the response of the SPD at national 
level to similar events throughout Germany, the caution of 
Augsburg's Social Democratic leadership was entirely predictable; 
this caution should, however, be analysed also in the light of the 
attitudes revealed by the Schwabische Volkszeitung in this period, 
as outlined in chapter 10, for these were the attitudes of 
Augsburg's local SPD leaders, and they were clearly not likely to 
produce radical measures. The enduring belief that National 
Socialism was an instrument of reaction and capitalism, and hence 
that Hitler possessed only the semblance and not the reality of 
power, and the desire not to provoke the new government or take 
unnecessary risks, were the shaping concepts of these leaders at 
this time. Thus, beyond the stationing of a Reichsbanner unit ln 
the Social Democratic 'Volkshaus' , no preparations for armed 
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conflict or resistance were made, and the party in Augsburg, as 
elsewhere, seemed to ready itself for a period of repression, 
heartened, as always, by the collective memory of earlier times: 
Der schmachvollen Zeit des Sozialistengesetzes 
folgte ... ein glanzender Sieg der Sozialdemokratie. [507] 
(6 March 1933) 
This is not to say that there were no disputes within the SPD 1n 
Augsburg concerning the strategy the party should adopt. Such 
disputes, though, did not centre on the possibility of attempting 
direct resistance to National Socialism, but were rather 
disagreements over whether continued legal SPD activity might be 
feasible if the party pursued a course of 'adaptation' (Anpassung), 
or whether emigration and illegal activity represented the only 
realistic options. [508] 
Such arguments, of course, ceased to be relevant following the 
outlawing of the SPD by the new reg1me on 22 June 1933. This final 
blow produced in Augsburg, as elsewhere in Germany, a widespread 
feeling of resignation and dismay amongst Social Democrats. [509] 
There was, too, anger at the inaction and helplessness which had 
marked the response of the SPD's leadership to the Nazi terror; 
but, more than this, there 1S evidence that there was frustration 
that no signal had been given by the leadership for, at the very 
least, vigorous defensive action, for it does seem that in Augsburg 
the potential for such action did exist, that a hard core of Social 
Democratic activists were awaiting such a signal, and were bitterly 
disenchanted when it failed to materialise. For many Social 
Democratic activists in Augsburg, the party's inertia after 30 
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January 1933 was the fatal climax of an inadequacy in the attempt 
to counteract Nazism which, as was discussed in the introduction, 
had provoked discontent within the party's rank and file from 1930. 
It is, of course, far from easy to demonstrate conclusively 
the existence of such attitudes; that there was a mood of 
expectancy and a willingness to resist National Socialism 
physically amongst Augsburg's Social Democrats, is, however, 
asserted by various contemporary participants in the events of this 
time in the city. Certainly, this would not have been unique to 
Augsburg: as, for example, Hartmut Mehringer has pointed out in his 
discussion of the SPD in Bavaria as a whole in this period, there 
was real pressure, especially from within the party's youth 
movement and the Reichsbanner, for decisive action, a pressure 
which the leadership sought to dissipate by diverting it in the 
direction of campaigning for the March Reichstag election. That 
the leadership did not respond positively to the obvious desire of 
the SPD's activists in Bavaria for a more forceful policy, served 
only to widen an already existent gulf between the rank and file 
and the higher levels of the party. [510J 
This wish to move on to the offensive ln the struggle against 
National Socialism was discernible also among the SPD's activists 
in Augsburg as Nazism's grip on Germany tightened [511J; a common 
component of the recollections of such activists is the 
identification of the rank and file's readiness for a physical 
confrontation, and of the disillusionment created by waiting for a 
signal from above which never came. Thus, for example, Heinrich 
Wismann, a young SPD member and contributor to the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung, recalled the atmosphere of the time in the following 
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way: 
Wir bereiteten uns 1n dieser Zeit auf e1ne gewaltsame 
Auseinandersetzung mit den Nationalsozialisten vor 
Die 'Ritleritis' wurde immer gefahrlicher, und 
ich erinnere mich, da~ wir am Ende der Weimarer Zeit 
in der Wohnung von Bauer (Jakobertor) auf den Befehl 
warteten zurtickzuschlagen. Ausgertistet waren wir mit 
einfachen und primitiven Waffen. Der Einsatzbefehl 
blieb aus. [512] (R. Wismann, 'Erinnerungen ... ') 
Significantly enough, this rank-and-file militancy is related to 
the creation of the Iron Front and the publicity the latter 
received in the Schwabische Volkszeitung, by Eugen Nerdinger, 
another young Social Democrat active at this time, in his book 
Brtider, zum Licht empor: 
Die Saalschlachten der Nazis im Rerrlesaalbau forderten 
die Gegenwehr des Reichsbanners, spater der 'Eisernen 
Front' heraus. Die Basis der Augsburger Arbeiterbewegung 
nahm die Rerausforderung an. Sie militarisierte sich in 
den Arbeitersport-, Jugend- und Parteiverbanden. Die Basis, 
bereit die Republik zu verteidigen, schlo~ sich 1931 in der 
'Eisernen Front' zusammen ... 
Die Grtindung der 'Eisernen Front' wurde in der 
Schwabische Volkszeitung ausftihrlich angezeigt und 
besprochen. Die zunehmende Militanz der Arbeiterbewegung 
hatte das Ziel, die Republik, die ortlichen Einrichtungen 
der Bewegung, wie Volkshaus, Vertagsgebaude, Druckerei, 
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Gewerkschaftshauser usw. gegen nazistische Angriffe zu 
verteidigen. [513] (E. Nerdinger, BrUder, zum Licht empor) 
As mentioned previously, it was often younger Social Democratic 
elements who had been most disaffected by a perceived weakness 1n 
the response of the party leadership to the r1se of National 
Socialism; unsurprisingly, then, the type of readiness and 
expectation described by Wismann and Nerdinger, was strongly felt 
by such youthful activists, at least according to the testimony of 
one member of the 'Sozialistische Arbeiterjugend' in Augsburg: 
Man sah den Gegner in geschlossenen Formationen vor sich 
und man sah, da~ die Republik verloren war. Und man hatte 
den unbandigen Willen, ihnen zu ze1gen, da~ man gegen S1e 
antreten wollte und da~ man das soziale Geschaffene 
verteidigen wollte. Und da kommt nun die Organisation 
dazu, die SAJ formierte sich zu Zehnerschaften. Wir waren 
bereit, zusammen mit der Eisernen Front und den 
Organisationen der Arbeiterschaft, Arbeitersportvereine, 
die ja, bis zu 26 hab' ich einmal gezahlt sind es gewesen, 
einzelne Sparten mit dem Reichsbanner usw. kampfen wollten, 
die Republik verteidigen wollten ... 
Wir waren bereit, die Konsequenzen zu ziehen und es kam 
keine au~erparlamentarische Kampfwendung, kein Signal, die 
Republik zu verteidigen. Und so gingen wir unter und wir 
wu~ten genau, diese Kampfe, wie sie jetzt nun stattfinden 
werden, die dauern langer als wie die, unsere 
Vatergeneration uns damals sagte, Bub glaub doch, 
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Weihnachten ist der ganze Spuk zu Ende. [514J 
(Quoted in: H. Bretschneider, 'Arbeitersportler und 
Arbeitersanger') 
This last reference to a generational difference in the 
perception of how long the Nazi regime could endure is important, 
for this was one of the key points of disagreement between the 
first resistance groups in the Augsburg area, active from the 
summer of 1933, and the SPD leadership in exile in Prague. [515J 
The rejection by those involved in resistance work in Augsburg of 
the belief, held by the exiled leadership and shared by many of the 
SPD functionaries who remained in Germany, that Nazi rule could 
last only a few months, led also to a rejection of the leadership's 
conception of how illegal activity should be organised. [516J Such 
differences, however, were the result also of a wider distrust of 
the SPD establishment; for, in what can be seen as a retrospective 
confirmation of the claim that a potential for decisive action was 
to be found amongst Augsburg's rank-and-file Social Democrats in 
1933, it was the perceived betrayal of this potential by the SPD's 
leadership which determined the subsequent attitudes of many 
participants in resistance groups. Moreover,the core of such 
resistance groups was often provided by, for instance, former SAJ 
activists, and others from the radical wing of the Weimar SPD, 
those, that is, who had been most critical of the party's 
stagnation and its ineffectuality in combating the NSDAP. [517J 
And it was certainly disenchantment with the behaviour of Social 
Democracy's leaders, which provided the starting-point for the work 
of such illegal activists as those who, in a pamphlet published in 
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1945, sought to explain their motivation and ideals: 
Mit dem Jahre 1945 endete e1n Krieg, der ftir uns 
bereits 1930 begonnen hatte. Nach dem ersten Wahlsieg 
der Nationalsozialisten 1930 erwarteten wir eine 
Intensivierung des politischen Kampfes unserer SPD-
Parteiftihrung. Wir setzten uns bei der Errichtung 
der Eisernen Front voll ein. Wir sahen die Fronten 
gegeneinander aufmarschieren, bereit ftir eine 
bevorstehende Auseinandersetzung. Wit warteten auf 
den Befehl zum Einsatz. Wie Reichsbanner und Eisernen 
Front standen auch einige Zehnerschaften der 
'Sozialistischen Jugend' bewaffnet in Augsburg bereit. 
Der Befehl blieb aus. Das war ftir uns die dramatische 
Wendung. 1m Entsetzen tiber den wtirdelosen Untergang 
der Partei und die kampflose Aufgabe der Demokratie 
zeigte sich uns folgende Situation: Geistige 
Desorientierung, Wirrnis, falsche Beurteilung, unrichtige 
Prognosen durch SPD-Funktionare im 1nnern und durch die 
emigrierte Leitung des Parteivorstandes in Prag, tiber 
Wesen und Weg, Eigenart und Struktur des Hitlertums. [518] 
('Bericht der "Revolutionaren Sozialisten" Sudbayerns, 
Gruppe Augsburg') 
A knowledge of the provenance of the source from which the 
above quotation stems, and indeed of the other sources used here 1n 
support of the idea that in 1933 rank-and-file radicalism amongst 
Augsburg's Social Democrats was frustrated by the indecision of the 
leadership, must lead to the exercise of some caution when 
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considering the credibility of such sources as evidence. The 
memoirs of contemporary participants, written many years after the 
events they describe (thus Wismann's memoir is from 1963, and 
Nerdinger's book was published in 1984), cannot be accepted 
completely uncritically, an awareness is necessary of the 
retrospective distance involved and the distortions this could 
generate. Moreover, when the testimony involved 1S that of those, 
such as the resistance group which published the pamphlet mentioned 
a moment ago (and to which Eugen Nerdinger belonged), who were 
deeply involved in illegal anti-Nazi activity, the danger must 
always exist that, consciously or unconsciously, the events of the 
Weimar era may have been reconstructed in such a way as to justify 
the later actions of the authors. It must also be recognised that 
assertions about the militant state of mind of Augsburg's 
rank-and-file Social Democrats, do not amount to a definitive proof 
of that militancy - especially when those assertions originate from 
a relatively small number of sources. 
Furthermore, even an acceptance, or partial acceptance, of 
such assertions, should not be taken to imply a judgement of any 
type concern1ng the potential for success of an attempted act of 
mass resistance by the SPD or the labour movement in general, or 
regarding the number of workers who might have become involved in 
such an act. There were, of course, massive obstacles in the way 
of mass action: the divided nature of working-class political 
allegiance was one such obstacle [519J, as was the intimidating 
atmosphere created by Nazi terror, arrests, threats and harassment, 
but it is above all the consequences for the labour movement of the 
world economic crisis which must be considered in this context. 
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[520J This latter, although its effects cannot be considered 1n 
isolation from a broader range of political and social trends 
laming particularly the SPD, undermined both the economic position 
of the working class and, as a result, the strength of the labour 
movement. Given the limits that were thus clearly placed on the 
SPD's ability to mobilise workers, and on the capability of workers 
to respond to any appeal for radical measures, the risk involved in 
attempting mass resistance was undeniably great. Although an 
unwillingness to take risks can be identified as one of the traits 
of the SPD's leadership which led to its fatal lack of 
decisiveness, the fear that precipitate action could have a tragic 
and bloody outcome was certainly not without foundation. Thus as 
T.W. Mason has pointed out [521J, the difficulties in which the 
economic depression placed the SPD, in combination with its more 
general political disorientation, did not provide an auspicious 
starting point from which to resist National Socialism. 
The SPD's avoidance of mass action is therefore understandable 
from a number of perspectives. It is, for example, understandable 
in the light of the objective situation as it was assessed by the 
party's leadership at the time, however that assessment may be 
judged in retrospect. Thus, given the factors just outlined above, 
and the debilitating effects of the economic crisis in particular; 
given the lack of preparation for any kind of insurrection, and 
that a virtually weaponless Iron Front would have confronted the 
full power of the state, which was now in the possession of the 
NSDAP; given that the SPD had no history of using violence as a 
political weapon; and given the firm belief within the party that 
Nazism in power could not endure - given all this, the decision to 
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refrain from an endeavour which involved incalculable risks appears 
entirely rational. The idea that the response of the SPD in 1933 
was reasoned and guided by prevailing circumstances, must however 
be balanced by a consideration of the influence of those underlying 
determinants which, as this thesis has shown, the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's engagement with National Socialism disclosed, and 
which provide a further framework for analysing the SPD's dilemma 
after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor. For what 1S being 
suggested here, and what has been suggested throughout this work, 
is that, when decisions were made in 1933, these underlying 
determinants, the SPD's legalism, its humanism, its faith in 
discipline and order, and its abhorrence of violence, were just as 
crucial to the outcome, indeed perhaps more crucial, than any 
objective analysis of the situation, any measured consideration of 
the likelihood of mass resistance proving successful. 
What the Schwabische Volkszeitung's anti-Nazi material 
illustrates, therefore, is the struggle which occurred between the 
traditionalism of the SPD's inherent nature, and the dictates of 
the political moment, the necessity to attempt to alter that nature 
in order to confront the NSDAP. However, although the argument of 
this study has been that the SPD's traditional values were always 
the strongest influence when decisions had to be made, what an 
analysis of the Schwabische Volkszeitung in its local context 
demonstrates is that, no matter how little effect the SPD's 
rhetoric of assertion may have had in determining the attitude of 
the party's leadership in 1933, its effect on the rank and file in 
Augsburg had been considerable; and that a desire did exist within 
that rank and file for active resistance to National Socialism, 
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however carefully this desire must be defined. The decision to 
practise restraint and to avoid taking risks, that is to say, did 
not negate the years of repeated proclamations exhorting the 
working class to be ready for battle, and claiming that the SPD 
would resist with every means at its disposal any attempt to 
destroy the Weimar Republic, or the impact of such proclamations. 
Thus, much of what has been revealed in the preceding analysis 
of the Schwabische Volkszeitung would appear to confirm the 
plausibility of the depiction given in the sources quoted from 
above of Augsburg's core Social Democrats as radicalised, militant, 
and waiting 1n early 1933 for the signal to resist National 
Socialism. Of course, the efficacy of the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's anti-Nazi rhetoric as propaganda should not distract 
the historian's attention entirely away from the range of 
counter-factors militating against mass resistance; and, indeed, 
even the assertion of that efficacy must be more speculative than 
empirically demonstrable. It is, though, as stated at the 
beginning of this conclusion, the construction of a very specific 
image of the enemy which 1S most striking about the Schwabische 
Volkszeitung's treatment of Nazism - an image of the enemy intended 
to produce an aggressive antipathy to the NSDAP in the newspaper's 
readership, and to instil that readership with a self-belief and an 
energy which would enable it to withstand Nazi intimidation more 
effectively. It is probable that the most significant concrete 
influence this effort by the Schwabische Volkszeitung to create a 
consciousness amongst Social Democrats of the Nazi threat had, was 
in the contribution this made to the maintenance of that fairly 
stable SPD electoral support described in chapter 1. However, in 
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the aggressiveness of its rhetoric the Schwabische Volkszeitung 
went far beyond what would have been necessary to achieve only 
this, employing in fact, a mode of propaganda entirely consistent 
with the creation of the type of radicalised, active potential 
those such as Nerdinger and Wismann claim existed amongst the rank 
and file. 
This supposition, moreover, gains further credence when it 1S 
considered within the framework of Augsburg's wider history, as 
outlined in the introduction. The sense of flux and 
unpredictability, the unstable temper of the working class, the 
entry of violence into the political arena - this change in 
Augsburg's political culture, in combination with the extremely 
labile nature of the late Weimar era, certainly made possible in 
1933 what would have been unthinkable in the years before 1914 1n 
Augsburg: that 1S, mass action, involving at least part of the 
working class, of the kind that could conceivably have been 
triggered off by the SPD's leadership in resistance to National 
Socialism, though, as just discussed, this 1S a complex matter, 
difficult to judge. In a similar way, the fact that such mass 
resistance did not occur had a specifically local dimension, in 
that the fear of mass mobilisation and working-class spontaneity 
which the events of the immediate post-war years had produced 
within Augsburg's SPD leadership, acted as a brake upon any radical 
action which could potentially escape the control of that 
leadership. This, indeed, suggests a parallel between the 
situation in Augsburg during the Weimar Republic's first and last 
years. In both cases a radicalised, or partially radicalised, rank 
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and file had that radicalism stymied by the fear and hesitancy of 
the SPD's leadership, its refusal to take risks, and desire to 
maintain a rapidly-disappearing control - ln the earlier period 
this was most evident in the response of the local Social 
Democratic leaders to the establishment of the Soviet Republic ln 
Augsburg, and the consequences of that response. One of those 
consequences, of course, was a widespread loss of respect for the 
SPD's leadership in the city, a sense of disillusionment which 
arguably remained constant throughout the Weimar Republic, and 
which was only reinforced by the party's defeat in 1933. 
This general disillusionment, and particularly the 
disenchantment provoked by the leadership's perceived 
indecisiveness at the crucial moment, can be regarded as a 
partially- articulated recognition of those flaws in the structure 
and world- view of the SPD which prevented it from functioning 
effectively within the Weimar polity, and especially in its 
confrontation with National Socialism; though perhaps the fact of 
that ineffectuality was more apparent than the causes of it. It 
seems, however, significant that it is not a lack of information 
and warnings about the NSDAP that is complained of in the sources 
quoted from a moment ago; those sources evince, rather, a 
keenly-felt awareness of the wider failings of the SPD's leadership 
which prevented the rank and file from acting upon the unequivocal 
knowledge of the threat of Nazism which they had gained from the 
SPD's newspapers and propaganda over the previous years. And this 
tends further to support the idea advanced in this thesis that 
explanations for the SPD's ultimate powerlessness should be located 
in the general stagnation of the party, in that mind-set which 
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close study of the Schwabische Volkszeitung reveals, and not In any 
failure of propaganda. 
To claim that rank-and-file Social Democrats in Augsburg would 
have known their enemy, however, is not to claim that the image of 
National Socialism possessed by that rank and file was 
ideologically underpinned. That image would have been primarily 
mediated by the SPD's propaganda; however, as the example of the 
Schwabische Volkszeitung demonstrates, this propaganda was not, in 
the main, characterised by its intellectual subtlety, even if it 
was clearly informed by certain fixed ideological concepts. The 
basic purpose of the Schwabische Volkszeitung's anti-Nazi material 
was not explicitly ideological, but was rather grounded in the 
exigencies of the day-to-day political struggle with the NSDAP; and 
there is little to suggest that complex, ideologically-based 
perceptions of National Socialism were of any importance to 
ordinary members of the SPD in Augsburg. It would, therefore, be 
unsurprising if a greater clarity and simplicity about the Nazi 
problem and how it should be dealt with, had existed within the 
mass base of the SPD than amongst its leadership; and this, in 
turn, would help to explain why the gulf between the rank and file 
and the leadership of the party was widened, as it apparently was 
in Augsburg, by the tensions precipitated by the rise of Nazism. A 
situation of conflicting pressures had been created, in which a 
rank and file increasingly predisposed to a more aggressIve 
response to Nazism came into conflict with a leadership and with 
organisational imperatives tending towards caution. 
Paradoxically, though, this rank-and-file desire for forceful 
action to combat the NSDAP could not safely be suppressed by the 
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Social Democratic elite, but had, ln fact, to be encouraged by the 
SPD's propaganda: the necessities of political mobilisation simply 
did not allow for a rhetoric of caution (although, as discussed 
previously, even the Schwabische Volkszeitung's rhetoric of 
aggression reveals much about the inherently cautious nature of the 
SPD). It is this sense of contradictory impulses at the heart of 
the SPD which the Schwabische Volkszeitung above all illustrates, 
contradictory impulses generated as the party struggled to react 
convincingly to the new style of politics initiated by the NSDAP, 
and yet simultaneously strove to retain its traditional political 
identity. The dilemma facing the SPD was that, although clearly 
recognising how dangerous National Socialism was, the party 
remained imprisoned within that traditional identity; thus it could 
not reinvent, and therefore reinvigorate, itself. That such a 
reinvention was attempted at the level of rhetoric, is certainly 
confirmed by an examination of the Schwabische Volkszeitung in the 
later Weimar years. And as the history of the SPD in Augsburg ln 
these years shows, the use of a rhetoric of pugnacl0us defiance, 
however ambiguous and confused that rhetoric may appear in 
retrospect, was not without risks in the effect it produced on the 
SPD's core support, and in the desire it provoked within at least 
part of that support for a militant solution to the Nazi problem. 
Forced, however, as the SPD was, to take a risk in propaganda terms 
which it would not take in reality, it was inevitable that this 
desire, though potent, would remain unfulfilled. 
339 
ABBREVIATIONS 




















Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn 
Arbeiterverein Yom Werk Augsburg 
Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich 
Bayerische Volkspartei 
Deutsche Demokratische Partei 
Deutscher Metallarbeiterverband 
Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 
Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Ntirnberg 
Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen-Organisation 




Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Emigration) 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
Stadtarchiv Augsburg 
Spinnerei und Weberei Augsburg 
Unabhangige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
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382. Ibid., 21 May 1931 'Hitler's Legalitat.' 
383. Ibid., 16 May 1931 
384. Ibid., 28 November 1931 
385. Ibid., 31 July 1931 
386. For example: ibid., 3 March 1932 'Die SPD in Augsburg im 
Sturmjahr 1931'; 24 March 1932 'Nazi terror in Bayern. Die 
Vorbereitungen zum Burgerkrieg'; 6 April 1932 'Hoch und 
Landesverrat der NSDAP', 9 April 1932 'Der Wille zum 
Burgerkrieg.' 
387. For example: ibid., 25 July 1931 'Warum triumphierte in 
Italien der Faschismus'; 3 January 1931 'Hitlers Burgerkriegs-
Armee'; 21 May 1931 'Die Nazibanditen von Pirmasens'; 25 July 
1931 'Wildwest in Bayern'; 13 November 1931 'Hitlers Privat-
Armee'; 20 December 1932 'So oder so ... ' 
388. For example: ibid., 18 June 1932 'Dem Pack die Zahne zeigen'; 
25 June 1932 'Die Bluthetze'; 30 June 1932 'Kampfer und 
Kampferinnen der Eisernen Front'; 5 August 1932 'Jetzt aber 
Schlu~'; 6 August 1932 'Parteilichkeit ohne Ende'; 16 January 
1933 'Tone statt Taten.' 
389. That the organisations of the labour movement were the main 
target of Nazi violence cannot be doubted - as C. Fischer 
states in Stormtroopers, p.178, the SA's confrontation with 
Social Democracy was 'uniquely single-minded and intense', and 
J.M. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany 
(Bloomington and London, 1977), pp.3-22, interprets National 
Socialism and its use of violence as the culminating point of 
a long-term search by the German middle class for an effective 
anti-socialist movement. See also R. Bessel, Political 
Violence, pp.75-79. 
390. As R. Bessel points out, the portrayal of their followers as 
the innocent victims of unprovoked violent attacks by 
opponents was common to the Nazi, left-wing and Catholic press 
- 'Violence as Propaganda', p.141. 
391. Schwabische Volkszeitung, 18 July 1932 
























'Hitlerbanditen in Rothenburg o. T. '; 16 May 1929 'An die 
deutsche Arbeiterschaft'; 28 May 1930 'Die Kommunazi'; 12 June 
1931 'Die Naziseuche in Slidbayern'; 25 july 1931 'Wildwest ln 
Bayern'; 21 October 1931 'Nervositat'; 27 June 1932 
'SA-Angriff auf den Vorwarts.' 
As this section will demonstrate, the importance of legalify, 
order and discipline to the SPD produced, at least amongst the 
leadership, a dislike of risk and of extra-parliamentary 
action which militated against the use of violence in most, if 
not all, contexts. See: H. Grebing, German Labour Movement, 
p.132; D.J.K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic, p.29; W.H. Maehl, 
The German Socialist Party, p.174. On the pre-war origins of 
these traits see, for example: V.L. Lidtke, The Alternative 
Culture, pp.12-13; S.H.F. Hickey, Workers ln Imperial Germany 
(Oxford, 1985), p.294. 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, 7 August 1929 
Ibid., 23 February 1931 
Ibid., 18 July 1932 
Ibid., 23 February 1931 
Ibid., 16 May 1931 
Ibid., 12 May 1930 
Ibid., 25 June 1932 
Ibid., 11 June 1932 
Like the Reichsbanner itself, the Iron Front was often viewed 
with distrust by many officials and pacifist elements within 
the SPD - its militant, agressive posturing, and the threat of 
extra-parliamentary action that it seemed to promise, 
obviously sat uncomfortably with the traditions and previous 
practice of the SPD. See: R. Breitman, 'Nazism in the Eyes of 
German Social Democracy', p.207; J.M. Diehl, Paramilitary 
Politics, pp.132, 250. 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, 5 October 1929 
Ibid., 18 August 1931 
Ibid., 3 January 1931 
Ibid., 28 October 1931 
Ibid., 12 May 1930 
Ibid., 2 January 1931. The use of aggressive language and 
military metaphors was of course also commonplace in Nazi 
propaganda - see R. Bessel, 'Violence as Propaganda', pp.131-
132. 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, 2 March 1931 
Ibid., 28 November 1931 
Ibid., 23 January 1931 
Ibid., 23 February 1931 
The Iron Front should also be seen as a reaction to the 
NSDAP's propaganda and mobilisation techniques - as, in fact, 
an attempt by the SPD to imitate those techniques and to 
utilise them for its own ends. Thus D.J.K. Peukert interprets 
the symbolism of the Iron Front as the SPD's response to the 
NSDAP's propagandistic harnessing of the 'regimented mass', 
this latter concept being, in Peukert's view, crucial to the 
transformation of the public domain in the Weimar Republic -
The Weimar Republic, p.161; and H. Mommsen points out that 
the distaste some within Social Democracy felt for the Iron 
Front stemmed from the fact that it adopted quasi-fascist 
forms - 'The Immobility of the SPD', pp.52,57. 
Examples of 'Iron Front' material: Sc~wab~sche Volkszeitung, 













'Gro~e Aktion der Eiserne Front'; 3 February 1932 'Eiserne 
Front in Augsburg gebildet'; 5 February 1932 'Wir 
marschieren'; 15 February 1932 'Die gro~e Kampfgemeinschaft 
fur Volksrechte gegen Diktatur'; 18 February 1932 'Augsburg 
den Republikanern'; 22 February 1932 'Sieghaft schreitet die 
Eiserne Front'; 2 March 1932 'Wir schlagen Hitler'; 4 April 
1932 'Schlagt Hitler'; 29 June 1932 'Die Volksmehrheit gegen 
die Nazi-Barone'; 5 July 1932 'Augsburger, heute in den 
Saalbau Herrle'; 18 July 1932 'Eiserne Macht'; 11 August 1932 
'Auf den Barrikaden ... ?'; 5 November 1932 'Her zu uns.' 
The rhetorical ambiguity which characterised Iron Front 
literary propaganda paralleled, and was an articulation of, 
the ambiguous position of the Iron Front within the Social 
Democratic movement. Militaristic in appearance and 
organisation, the creation of the Iron Front only really made 
sense if it was to be used in the type of violent conflict 
which the SPD's leadership was desperate to avoid; it soon 
became clear that the Iron Front was highly unlikely to be 
called into action in this way, and thus it remained primarily 
a focus for propaganda and morale-boosting. Hence, just as 
the SPD's rhetoric of aggression could never displace the more 
deeply-rooted Social Democratic values of order, discipline 
and legality, so the outward form of the Iron Front was belied 
by its actual function. 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, 23 February 1931 
Ibid., 4 February 1932 
Ibid., 6 April 1932; Other examples: 4 August 1932 'An die 
Partei'; 12 January 1932 'Die gro~e Rede des Landtages -
Vizeprasidenten Genossen Auer in Augsburg'; 8 March 1932 'Das 
3 Reich kommt nie.' 
Ibid., 24 June 1932 
The merits of the SPD's response to Papen's coup, the 
alternative options open to the party, the extent of the 
capability and willingness of the rank and file to resist the 
coup with force, the probable outcome of such resistance - all 
of this remains fertile ground for discussion and dispute. 
What is important in the context of this study is that this 
response demonstrated - more clearly, perhaps, even than the 
party's reaction to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor and 
subsequent events - that caution, discipline and the desire to 
remain within the legal and constitutional framework would 
determine the SPD's behaviour and not the aggression seemingly 
reflected in its propaganda rhetoric. See: R. Breitman, 
German Socialism and Weimar Democracy, pp.185-188; W.H. Maehl, 
The German Socialist Party, pp.190-193; H. Mehringer, 'Die 
bayerische Sozialdemokratie', p.327. 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, 21 July 1932. See also: ibid., 21 
July 1932, 'Reichsexekution auf Befehl Hitlers!'; 26 July 
1932, 'Macht vor Recht'. 
Ibid., 21 July 1932, 'An die deutsche Arbeitnehmerschaft'. 
Ibid., 22 July 1932 
E. Riegele, 'Parteientwicklung und Wiederaufbau', part A (I) 
A few examples from many: Schwabische Volkszeitung, 7 November 
1929 'Paradies oder Holle'; 31 March 1930 'Stalin befiehlt: 
Neue Parole der KPD'; 10 September 1930 'Ru~land - wie es 
ist'· 7 November 1930 'Moskaus neueste Attraktion'; 29 
Dece~ber 1930 'Sklavarie statt Sozialismus. Die Folge des 







und Mensch'; 20 November 1931 tKommunistische Einheitsfront. 
Hauptfeind: die Sozialdemokratie'; 31 December 1931 
'Politische Jahreswende'; 2 February 1933 'Das Kampfgelobnis 
der 700 Funktionare'; 7 February 1933 'Das Gesicht der 
Gegenrevolution. Augsburg-specific examples: 15 February 1930 
'Das nVerbrechenn der Betriebsobmanner Baur!'; 8 April 1930 
'Ein schwerer Schlag gegen die Augsburg KPD'· 9 April 1930 , ' Krach in der Augsburger KPD'; 24 July 1931 'Auf der Stra~e 
nach wildem Streik. Das ist die Frucht kommunistischer 
Arbeit'; 24 June 1932 'Kommunistisches Einheitsfront -
Manover. ' 
See, for example, B. Fowkes, Communism in Germany under the 
Weimar Republic (London, 1984), pp.155-159, 199-201, who 
describes the 'ultimate function' of the KPD to have been that 
of 'an instrument of Soviet foreign policy'. The most obvious 
manifestation of this was, of course, the 'social fascism' 
line laid down by the Comintern and followed by the KPD in 
Germany, thereby further poisoning the relationship between 
KPD and SPD. It would, though, as D. Geary has pointed out 
(in 'The Failure of German Labor in the Weimar Republic', in 
M.N. Dobkowski and I. Walliman (eds.), Towards the Holocaust, 
p.182) be simplistic to ascribe the failure of the two working 
class parties to form a united front to fight Nazism only to 
the influence of the Soviet Union on the KPD. Given that the 
KPD began to increase its support precisely when propagating 
the social fascism line, this latter must therefore have found 
some resonance amongst sections of the German working class 
and could not simply have been a foreign importation. There 
were, moreover, plentiful historical and domestic reasons, as 
the example of Augsburg demonstrates, for the bitter hostility 
that existed between SPD and KPD. 
Such paralleling of the NSDAP and the KPD had taken place 
within Social Democratic circles as early as 1923 - see R. 
Breitman, 'Nazism in the Eyes of German Social Democracy' , 
p.199. Interestingly enough, though, the KPD in turn 
similarly compared Nazism and Social Democracy - C. Fischer, 
The German Communists and the Rise of Nazism. p.176. 
For example: Schwabische Volkszeitung, 23 August 1928 
'Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern'; 6 May 1929 'An die deutsche 
Arbeiterschaft'; 1 April 1930 'Einheitsfrontschwindel nach 
kommunistischen Muster'; 10 April 1930 'Die Hankreuzler und 
die Erwerbslosen'; 28 May 1930 'Die Kommunazi'; 21 January 
1931 'Aus dem Tiergarten die Nazis'; 16 March 1931 'In den 
Armen liegen sich beide'; 23 October 1932 'Verrater. Das 
neueste Schanddokument der KPD.' 
For example: ibid., 22 December 1930 'Kommu-Nazi im Landtag'; 
6 July 1931 'Landtag und Notverordnung. Niedrige Manover der 
Kommu-Nazi'; 14 October 1932 'An das deutsche Volk'; 6 
December 1932 'An die Partei.' 
Examples: ibid., 16 April 1928; "26 August 1929 
'Klassenkampftone bei Hitler'; 2/3 September 1930 'Krach im 
Nazi Lager'; 2 January 1931 'Aus dem Tiergarten der Nazi'; 24 
February 1931 'Stellungswechsel: Von der Nazis zu den Kozis'; 
2 November 1931 'Der neue Schwindel der Augsburger "National-
Zeitungn ,; 11 April 1932 'Reichsprasident Hindenburg.' 
Such a fluidity does seem to have existed, although its 
extent and also the interpretation that should be placed upon 












Communists and the Rise of Nazism, p.137; C. Fischer, 
Stormtroopers, pp.206-218. There was again a local historical 
p"recedent for this type of fluidity, for a significant number 
of volkisch activists in the early 1920s had formerly been 
involved in left-wing politics. Thus the chairman of the 
Deutsche Werkgemeinschaft, Karl Bohrer, had been an official 
in the Soviet Republic, and the chairman of Augsburg's first 
National Socialist group formed in November 1922, Josef 
Schroffer, had previously been"a member of the MSPD, USPD and 
KPD. It was, moreover, reported of the newly established 
NSDAP in Augsburg 
•.. da~ sich in dieser Partei eine Reihe ehemaliger 
Kommunisten und Spartakisten befindet ... 
(BHStA, MA 102 147, Lageberichte des Regierungs -
Prasidenten von Schwaben und Neuburg 1921-1924, 22 January 
1923; see also G. Hetzer 'Die Industriestadt Augsburg', pp.51-
52). 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, 6 February 1931 
Examples: ibid., 21 July 1930 'Wahler und Wahlerinnen'; 26 
July 1930 'Die Hoffnung der Scharfmacher. Die politische 
Rolle der kommunistischen Partei'; 9 September 1930 'Ein 
letzter Appell'; 30 January 1932 'Die Hauptaufgabe der KPD. 
Freies Feld dem Faschismus durch Zerschlagung der Eisernen 
Front'; 14 March 1932 'Glanzender Sieg der Augsburger 
Republikaner'; 25 April 1932 'Keine Alleinherrschaft der 
Nazis'; 14 September 1932 'An das" deutsche Volk'; 1 October 
1932 'Wahlkampf in Augsburg eroffnet.' 
Examples: ibid., 11 February 1932 'Der Feind in Rucken'; 2 
March 1932 'Adolfs Bundesgenossen'; 8 March 1932 'Wer Thalmann 
wahlt, wahlt Hitler.' 
Ibid., 3 March 1932 
Ibid., 22 April 1932 
Ibid., 20 December 1932 
Ibid., 6 December 1932 
For example: ibid., 20 October 1928 'La~t euch durch die 
Hitlerianer nicht provozieren'; 23 October 1928 
'Nationalsozialisten greifen die Burger an'; 3 December 1929 
'Nationalsozialisten greifen an'; 14 July 1930 / 22 July 1930 
'Theorie u. Praxis der Augsburger Nationalsozialisten'; 29 
February 1932 'Eine freche Terror - Androhung gegen Augsburgs 
Polizeidirektor'; 10 March 1932 'Plumpe Falschung der 
Nationalzeitung'; 22 July 1932 'Gefahr in Augsburg. Weg von 
der Stra~e beim Goebbels - Rummel'; 29 September 1932 
'"HeIden" sehen dich an, Adolf.' 
For example: ibid., 22 July 1930 'Theorie und Praxis der 
Augsburger Nationalsozialisten'; 9 September 1930 'Auch bei 
Hitler - nicht Neues'; 16/23 January 1931 'Das Kommunal-
Programm der Nationalsozialisten'; 22 May 1931 
'"Arbeiterpartei" tagt geheim im Augsburger Palast-Hotel'; 14 
July 1931 'Adolf-Hitler - Putschismus und das Dritte Rei~h'; 
30 July 1932 'Heinrich Losch & Co. Augsburg. So zahlt eln 
begeisterte Nazi. ' 
Ibid., 9 December 1929 'Die gro~e Abwehrschlacht gegen das 
Augsburger Burgertum'; 23 November 1929 'Opposition um der 
Opposition willen'; 22 July 1930 'Theorie und Praxis der 



















Hitler - nicht Neues'; 15 July 1931 'Seht her, das sind die 
"National-Sozialisten". ' 
Ibid., 23 August 1930 'Theorie und Praxis bei den Augsburger 
Nationalsozialisten'; 28 December 1931 'Wenn das der Hitler 
sehen wtirde ... '; 23 January 1932 'Heil! Heil! Neue National-
Zeitung. ' 
Examples: ibid., 10/22 July 1930 'Theorie und Praxis bei den 
Augsburg Nationalsozialisten'; 8 September 1930 '''Adolf 
Hitler, antworten Sie heute in der Sangerhalle!"'; 9 September 
1930 'Auch bei Hitler - nichts Neues! '; 12 September 1930 
'Noch einmal: Adolf in Augsburg'; 26 November 1930 'Der 
Reichstags - Prasident spricht heute im Saalbau Herrle! '; 24 
February 1931 'Die letzte Nazi-Versammlung im Herrle'; 25 June 
1931 'Nationalsozialistischen Kopfjager'; 17 March 1932 
'Nachlese zur Reichsprasidentenwahl.' 
For the following see, for example: ibid., 20 October 1928 
'Ein Tag der Freude'; 22 June 1929 'Meuterei bei den 
Augsburger Hakenkreuz-Sturmtrupps'; 9/10/14/22 July 1930 
'Theorie und Praxis bei den Augsburger Nationalsozialisten'; 8 
September 1930 '''Adolf Hitler, antworten Sie heute in der 
Sangerhalle!n,; 9 September 1930 'Auch bei Hitler - nicht 
Neues'; 9 April 1931 'Hakenkreuz-Herrschaft im Versorgungsamt. 
Wie lange noch'; 14 July 1931 'Adolf Hitler - Putschismus und 
das Dritte Reich'; 15 July 1931 'Seht her, das sind die 
"National"-Sozialisten'; 26 September 1931 'Wie die Augsburger 
Nazi schwindeln'; 12 October 1931 'So sieht es im Dritten 
Reich aus. Das wahre Gesicht der National "sozialisten", ; 17 
March 1932 'Nachlese zur Reichsprasidentwahl'; 23 April 1932 
'Augsburger! Das ist Wahl, der nationalsozialistische 
Landtagskandidat'; 13 March 1932 'Die Nazis beantragen 
Auflosung des Stadt rates , , 28 July 1932 'Die Wahrheit tiber den 
Gautag der Nazis in Augsburg.' 
Ibid., 3 November 1928 'Sie wollen in der Redaktion kommen.' 
Ibid., 22 July 1930 
Ibid., 2 March 1931 'Die Augsburger Sozialdemokratie im Jahre 
1931. ' 
Ibid., 23 January 1932 'Heil! Heil! Neue National-Zeitung. 
Gemilderte Antisemitismus - Adolf, was sagte nun!' 
Ibid., 4 March 1932 'Eine Antwort an die Neue "National-
Zeitung". Mit Adolf im Felde'. 
Ibid., 29 February 1932 'Eine freche Terror - Androhung gegen 
Augsburgs Polizeidirektor. Was sich die "Neue 
Nationalzeitung" alles leistet'. 
Ibid., 20 June 1932 
For example: ibid., 12 October 1931 'So sieht es im Dritten 
Reich aus. Das wahre Gesicht der National "sozialisten", ; 
2 November 1931 'Der neue Schwindel der Augsburger "National-
Zeitung". Bankerotte Wirtschaftftih~er sind bei ihr stet~ 
Sozialdemokraten'; 3 November 1931 An unserer Leser. Eln 
unerhorter Schwindel der National-Zeitung.' 
Ibid., 10 March 1932 'Plumpe Falschung der Nationalzeit~ng. 
Die Hakenkreuzler blamieren sich'. Also 12 March 1932 Nur 
frech gelogen Ne-Na-Zi. ' 
Ibid., 1 October 1932 
Ibid., 13 July 1932 
Ibid., 15 July 1932 
Ibid., 19 July 1932 




























Ibid., 3 February 1933 
Ibid., 3 February 1933 
Ibid., 1 February 1933 'Hitlers erste "Tat"'. 
Ibid., 6 February 1933 
Ibid., 10 February 1933. 
'Hitlers Sofortprogramm. 
Ibid., 17 February 1933 
Ibid., 11 February 1933 
See also ibid., 10 February 1933 
Wann wird es erftillt?'. 
For example: ibid., 1 February 1933 'Hitlers erste "Tat"'; 6 
March 1933, 'Nationale Mehrheit mit Waffenhilfe der KPD'. 
Ibid., 4 March 1933 
Ibid., 10 February 1933 
Ibid., 31 January 1933 
Ibid., 1 February 1933 'Hitlers erste "Tat"'. 
See for example: ibid., 6 February 1933, 'Eine Woche Hitler'; 
10 February 1933, 'Hitlers Sofortprogramm. Wann wird es 
erftillt?'; 13 February 1933, 'Wieviel erhalt Hitler aus 
Reichsgeldern' . 
Ibid., 9 February 1933. A presidential decree, drafted before 
Hitler's appointment but promulgated on 4 February 1933, 
allowed the banning of newspapers and meetings which 'abused, 
or treated with contempt, organs, institutions, bureaus or 
leading officials of the state' or broadcast information that 
might 'endanger the vital interests of the state'. The 
reference to a 4 year wait is an allusion to the two four year 
economic plans announced by Hitler in his 'Appeal to the 
German People', his first speech as Chancellor, given on 31 
January 1933. For the text of his speech see: J. Noakes and 
G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945. Volume 1. The Rise to Power 1919 
-1934 (Exeter, 1983), pp.131-134. 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, 16 February 1933. 
Ibid., 1 March 1933, 'Fur ein freies Deutschland'. 
Ibid., 10 February 1933 
Ibid., 3 February 1933 
Ibid., 1 February 1933 
Ibid., 10 February 1933. See also: 3 February 1933, 'Fort mit 
euch! Unsere Antwort an Hitler und Papen'; 6 February 1933, 
'Eine Woche Hitler'. 
Ibid., 7 February 1933. For an analysis of the realities of 
Hugenberg's position at this time, and of the events leading 
to his resignation from Hitler's government on 26 June 1933, 
see: G. Corni, 'Alfred Hugenberg as Minister of Agriculture: 
Interlude or Continuity?', in German History volume 7, number 
2 (1989). 
For example: Schwabische Volkszeitung, 7 February 1933, 'Das 
Gesicht der Gegenrevolution' . 
It must be remembered, of course, that 
unique to the SPD, but was rather held 
left and the right, and indeed by many 
the situation in Germany - I. Kershaw, 
this belief was not 
by many on both the 
foreign observers of 
Hitler (London, 1991), 
p.87.. 
For example: Schwabische Volkszeltung, 2 February 1933, 
'Erhohte Kampfbereitschaft'. 
For example: ibid., 2 February 1933, 'Das Kampfgelobnis der 
700 Funktionare; 8 February 1933, 'Die Eisenbahner stehen 
bereit'· 7 March 1933, 'An der Partei'. 





































Ibid., 2 February 1933 
Ibid., 2 February 1933 
Ibid., 3 February 1933 
Ibid., 4 March 1933 
Ibid., 7 March 1933 
Ibid., 2 February 1933 
Ibid., 31 January 1933 
Ibid., 31 January 1933 
Ibid., 1 February 1933, 'Wie im August 1914'. 
For example: 1 February 1933 op. cit.; ibid., 2 February 1933, 
'Das Kampfgelobnis der 700 Funktionare'; 3 February 1933, 'Wir 
~r~ffn:n heute den Wahlkampf in Augsburg'; 8 February 1933, 
Dle Elsenbahner stehen bereit'. 
Ibid., 2 February 1933 
Ibid., 7 February 1933 
See Chapter 7 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, 3 February 1933 
Ibid., 4 March 1933. The KPD also, and typically, served a 
further function in the Schwabische Volkszeitung at this time, 
that of scapegoat in its analysis of the election of 5 March. 
On 6 March the newspaper's front page was headlined 'Nationale 
Mehrheit - mit Waffenhilfe der KPD', and the text claimed, 
correctly, that 'many, many' communists had switched their 
votes to the NSDAP. 
Ibid., 4 March 1933 
Ibid., 1 February 1933 
Ibid., 7 February 1933 
Ibid., 7 March 1933 
On this see: H.A. Winkler, Der Weg in die Katastrophe, pp.194-
206; H. Grebing, 'Auseinandersetzung mit dem 
Nationalsozialismus', especially pp.262-264; R. Breitman, 
'Nazism in the Eyes of German Social Democracy', p.207. 
See: K. Filser and P. Sobczyk, 'Augsburg im Dritten Reich', in 
G. Gottlieb et al. (eds.), Geschichte der Stadt Augsburg, pp. 
614-619; G. Hetzer, 'Die Industriestadt Augsburg', pp.76-106, 
150-154, 178-187; W. Domarus, Nationalsozialismus, Krieg und 
Bevolkerung, pp.41-46; H. Mehringer, 'Die bayerische 
Sozialdemokratie', pp.338-347. 
Quoted in K. Filser und P. Sobczyk, 'Augsburg im Dritten 
Reich', pp.614-615. 
Thus of the 579 people arrested during 1933 in Augsburg, 
between 350 and 400 were members of the KPD or its associated 
organisations: ibid., p.618. 
Schwabische Volkszeitung, 6 March, 1933. 
G. Hetzer, 'Die Industriestadt Augsburg', p.181. 
E. Riegele, 'Parteientwicklung und Wiederaufbau', part A (II); 
H. Mehringer, 'Die bayerische Sozialdemokratie', p.345. 
Ibid., p.342 
E. Riegele, 'Parteientwicklung und Wiederaufbau', Part A (I). 
H. Wismann, 'Erinnerungen an die Zeit des Widerstandes gegen 
die Hitlerdiktatur' contained in ASD file 'SPD Augsburg 1933-
1963' . 
E. Nerdinger, BrUder, zum Licht empor, p.181. 
H. Bretschneider, 'Arbeitersportler und Arbeitersanger', pp.13 
-14. 
K. Filser and P. Sobczyk, 'Augsburg im Dritten Reich', p.619. 
G. Hetzer, 'Die Industriestadt Augsburg', pp.191-200. 
Ibid., p.215 
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518. tBericht der ~Revolutioniren Sozialisten" Sudbayerns, Gruppe 
Augsburg', contained in ASD file 'SPD Augsburg 1864-1978'. 
519. The bitterness that existed between Communists and Social 
Democrats in Augsburg ruled out any possibility of cooperation 
between the two parties in defence of working-class rights in 
1933. Indeed, when Augsburg's SPD leader. Josef Felder, 
suggested at an Iron Front meeting in February 1933 that the 
coming struggle would have to be undertaken 'shoulder to 
shoulder' with Communist workers, the negative reaction of his 
audience demonstrated that this was simply unrealistic: 
Schwibische Volkszeitung, 2 February 1933. 
520. See: T.W. Mason, Social Policy in the Third Reich, pp.79-87. 
521. Ibid., p.85 
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